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1
Introduction
Brad Hershbein
Kevin M. Hollenbeck
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Student loans are instrumental in broadening access to postsecondary educational opportunities. For many individuals who want
to develop their own human capital but who otherwise do not have
the means, loans serve as an important supplement to governmental or
institutional grants in making educational investments affordable and
increasing the educational attainment of the population. The availability of student loans thus has great value for individual students and the
country as a whole.
However, the burgeoning volume of debt and repayment difﬁculties that many people now experience have created a vigorous debate
on whether public policy should further intervene in student loan transactions. In economic terms, do the beneﬁts exceed the costs? As with
many public policy issues, answering that question is not straightforward. Close examination of the data on cumulative debt, number
and characteristics of borrowers, types of institutions, and repayment
dynamics raises almost as many questions as it answers. In alignment
with its mission of investigating the underlying dynamics of the labor
market, a component of which is the educational preparation of the
workforce, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research organized a conference on student loans to catalyze careful and informed
analysis of this understudied, but increasingly important, public policy.
This volume includes the papers that were presented at the conference,
held in Ann Arbor at the University of Michigan in October 2013.1 The
Spencer Foundation and the Education Policy Initiative at the University of Michigan Ford School of Public Policy cosponsored the event.

1
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THE CONFERENCE BEGINS: MEASURING DEBT BURDENS
Much publicity has focused on the size of outstanding student debt,
which has surpassed $1 trillion. However, this aggregate number taken
out of context can obscure, rather than enlighten, the policy debate.
Measuring debt is complicated and can be done in different ways.
Sandy Baum’s chapter brings attention to several of them. She starts by
examining trends in total student loan debt, number of borrowers, and
average balances. In the case of average balances, the denominator matters, as the average could be over all students or over the students who
borrow. Interestingly, the former has declined over the past two years.
Further, student borrowers may be pursuing undergraduate or
graduate education. Baum documents that both the levels and growth
trends in per-student loans are much greater for graduate students than
for undergraduates. She suggests that if public policy is to address loan
availability or terms for students, it must certainly treat these two types
of students differently. Finally, Baum compares nonfederal with federal
loans. Both the volume and percentage of students taking out private
loans have essentially halved since their peak in the 2007–2008 academic year.
Baum concludes by suggesting that the most pressing public policy
concern is for students who may have unmanageable debt levels—in
her analyses, these tend to be independent students, students attending
for-proﬁt institutions, and African American students—and to institute
income-dependent repayment programs that shift risk from students to
taxpayers.
Meta Brown, Donghoon Lee, and colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York document in Chapter 3 trends in aggregate student
debt and repayment vis-à-vis other forms of debt. Drawing on a longitudinal database of consumer credit reports that covers the entire country,
they show that total education debt tripled between 2004 and 2012,
and that it was the only major source of debt (among mortgages, credit
cards, auto loans, and home equity lines of credit) that increased during
the Great Recession. Commensurate with that ﬁnding, they note that
the fraction of individuals with education debt and the average balance
per borrower both grew unabated between 2004 and 2012. Some of
this increase was due to more people pursuing education, but some of
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it was also due to interest accumulation from low repayment and high
delinquency during the recession.
When Lee at al. examine repayment, they ﬁnd that as of the end
of 2012, 17 percent of borrowers are behind on their student loan payments by 90 or more days, surpassing credit card debt in the highest
delinquency rate. The situation is even more dire for borrowers who
are in active repayment (and not in deferment or forbearance): 31 percent of these borrowers are delinquent by 90 or more days. The rise in
student debt and difﬁculty in repayment may have crowded out access
to other forms of credit, the authors surmise, documenting that other
debt—especially mortgages—fell sharply from 2005 to 2012 for young
student loan borrowers.

REASONS FOR GROWTH
Undeniably, student debt—however you measure it—has been
increasing over the past two decades, but it has not been growing at
the same rate for all students, or even all graduates. Brad Hershbein
and Kevin Hollenbeck in Chapter 4 address the questions of where in
the entire distribution of college graduates has debt grown, when was
it growing, and what factors, if any, can explain it. Using data from
the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study for individuals who
earned bachelor’s degrees, they ﬁnd that debt—contrary to popular
belief—grew faster over the 1990s than over the 2000s, with the sharpest increase occurring between 1996 and 2000. They also ﬁnd that the
increase that did occur between 2000 and 2008 was mostly concentrated
in the top fourth of borrowers and was entirely due to private loans.
Using statistical decomposition techniques, the authors ﬁnd that
increases in tuition and fees and the expected family contribution (a
proxy for ability to pay) can explain most of the increase in borrowing
in the early 1990s and in the 2000s. The surge in borrowing in the late
1990s, however, is not explained by costs or other observable factors.
Instead, the chapter suggests that this growth was due to the introduction of new loan products, particularly unsubsidized Stafford Loans and
private loans.
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Chapter 5 by Elizabeth Akers, Matthew M. Chingos, and Alice M.
Henriques also attempts to explain the surge in student debt over the last
20 years and looks at distributional changes. However, their analyses
rely on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) and cover the entire American population, not just
recent bachelor’s graduates. Akers, Chingos, and Henriques reach
general conclusions that extremely large debt burdens are exceptional
cases, and that rising educational attainment—in particular, graduate
education—explains part of the increase in aggregate debt balances.
They also ﬁnd that tuition increases are perhaps the largest explanatory factor for increased debt, but that changes in behavior, such as
greater substitution of debt for out-of-pocket ﬁnancing of postsecondary expenses, also have contributed to the increase.
Akers, Chingos, and Henriques also review a number of recent
studies on the return to higher education and note that the extent to
which the increase in debt burdens is leading to ﬁnancial hardship is an
unresolved question.

STUDENT BORROWING AT FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS
As noted by Baum in Chapter 2, one of the groups of students most
likely to have unmanageable debt consists of individuals who attended
for-proﬁt institutions. Stephanie Riegg Cellini and Rajeev Darolia focus
on these students in Chapter 6. Their analyses suggest that relatively
high and rising tuition coupled with relatively low student ﬁnancial
resources are likely to be the key factors that explain the elevated debt
levels of for-proﬁt students relative to students in other higher education sectors. Costs and borrowing patterns in the for-proﬁt sector are
similar to those found in four-year nonproﬁt institutions; however,
unlike the nonproﬁt sector, tuition hikes were not offset by increases in
institutional grants.
Cellini and Darolia pose an interesting question: What motivates
students to attend for-proﬁt institutions? For the most part, characteristics and educational aspirations of students attending for-proﬁts are
similar to those for students attending two-year, nonproﬁt (public or
private) institutions and who have relatively low levels of debt. Yet the
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ﬁnancial burdens and loans that the for-proﬁt students bear are most
similar to those for students in four-year, nonproﬁt institutions.

IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY NONDISCHARGEABILITY
A unique feature of student loans is their presumptive nondischargeability in bankruptcy. For many years, this feature was limited
to government or nonproﬁt-originated loans. Xiaoling Ang and Dalié
Jiménez in Chapter 7 look at the impact of congressional legislation
in 2005 that amended bankruptcy laws to make private student loans
nondischargeable as well. (Unlike federal student loans, private loans
take into account the credit risk of the potential borrower.) The authors
suggest that this change in the law has three theoretical implications. It
should have, other things equal, 1) increased the volume of private student loans; 2) increased the “riskiness” of the borrowers (i.e., decreased
their average credit score); and 3) decreased the interest rate charged to
borrowers.
In fact, the analyses by Ang and Jiménez indicate a very large
increase in the volume of private loans originated after 2005, which
they attribute primarily to the law change. The credit score of borrowers
skewed toward the lower end of the distribution, although the mean did
not change appreciably. Finally, the average interest rate of private loans
at four-year undergraduate institutions increased by 35 basis points. The
ﬁrst two ﬁndings conﬁrm the theoretical hypotheses; however, the third
ﬁnding is opposite of what was expected. While this result received
ample discussion at the conference, it remained a puzzle.

DEFAULT AND REPAYMENT BEHAVIOR
Chapter 8 by Lance J. Lochner and Alexander Monge-Naranjo
examines default and repayment behavior over the 10 years following graduation for individuals who earned a bachelor’s degree. These
authors note that outcomes are not as simple as the binary case of
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repayment or default that is often the focus of media stories and creditors, including the federal government. In particular, they analyze
ﬁve outcomes: 1) the fraction of undergraduate debt still outstanding;
2) default; 3) nonpayment (default, deferment, or forbearance); 4) fraction of debt in default; and 5) fraction of debt in nonpayment. They
relate these outcomes, at both 5 and 10 years after graduation, to individual and family background, college major, postsecondary institution
characteristics, amount borrowed, and postschool earnings. Of these
variables, they ﬁnd the most important ones explaining repayment
outcomes are the amount borrowed and postschool earnings. Perhaps
surprisingly, college major and institutional characteristics are not correlated with repayment behavior once the other factors are accounted
for, and among the individual and family characteristics, the only variable that consistently matters is race. As with Baum’s chapter, Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo’s study reveals that African Americans have signiﬁcant repayment difﬁculties relative to all other ethnic/racial groups,
even after controlling for many other variables.
A somewhat surprising ﬁnding in Chapter 8 is that many borrowers who enter a nonpayment status eventually return to good standing.
Over half of the individuals in default ﬁve years after graduation are in
“repaying/fully paid” status ﬁve years later; and almost three-quarters
of individuals in deferment or forbearance ﬁve years after graduation
are in good standing ﬁve years later. The authors conclude that policy
strategies that focus exclusively on short-term default, without considering rehabilitation, may be too narrow.

LONG-TERM OUTCOMES
In addition to causing difﬁculty for repayment, increased student
loan burdens may affect other life-cycle behaviors of young adults as
they enter careers or family formation. In Chapter 9, Dora Gicheva and
Jeffrey Thompson look at long-term household ﬁnancial stability. Isolating the causal impact of student loans on future behavior is problematic
because the same set of factors that inﬂuence student loan behavior may
also inﬂuence the type of education pursued, academic success, and
later earnings. The authors employ an instrumental variable strategy
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to get around this problem. In particular, they use the national average
amount borrowed per full-time equivalent student when an individual
was 17 years old to predict that individual’s borrowing amount.2
Gicheva and Thompson look at four indicators of ﬁnancial stability after age 30: 1) being denied any type of credit, 2) late payments on
loans, 3) bankruptcy, and 4) homeownership. In analyses that control
for several demographic characteristics and local economic conditions,
the authors ﬁnd that borrowing amounts are positively related to bankruptcy and negatively related to homeownership and making on-time
payments, with especially strong results for individuals who failed to
complete college.

LOAN AVERSION
Public perception and the data agree: more and more students are
taking on more and more debt. In an interesting twist of emphasis, however, Sara Goldrick-Rab and Robert Kelchen examine loan aversion in
Chapter 10. They begin by noting that aversion may include individuals who have a distaste for borrowing, but it also may include students
who lack information about loans or students who were not offered loan
opportunities in their ﬁnancial aid packages. In looking at data from a
sample of more than 600 ﬁrst-time undergraduates at Wisconsin public
institutions who received a Pell Grant and from which the actual loan
package offered was observable, the authors note several ﬁndings that
accord with intuition and prior evidence, but they also point out several
results that may seem surprising.
In particular, Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen ﬁnd that the following
characteristics are associated with greater propensity to turn down an
offered loan: Southeast Asian ethnicity, greater parental education,
lower net prices and less institutional prestige, family background with
less ﬁnancial strength, longer time horizons of the student, planning
to work part-time while in college, and higher levels of social capital.
They also document differences in loan aversion rates between survey
data (student responses) and administrative data (college records), and
these differences also vary across subgroups of students.
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Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen’s analysis further ﬁnds a lack of correlation between ﬁnancial knowledge and borrowing behavior. While
this may suggest that increased ﬁnancial education of students, as some
researchers and policymakers have proposed, may not substantively
change students’ borrowing behavior, the authors caution that their
sample of low-income, Pell Grant recipients may not generalize to all
undergraduate students.

THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDES: SPECIFIC
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Three chapters in the book have speciﬁc policy prescriptions, all
touching on the issue of how to improve loan repayment. In Chapter
11, Lauren Asher and Debbie Cochrane, along with their coauthors at
The Institute for College Access and Success (TICAS), offer speciﬁc
recommendations in four areas: 1) consolidation and simpliﬁcation of
federal loans, 2) streamlined repayment options, 3) improvements in
loan counseling, and 4) strengthened consumer protections. They advocate that the federal government offer a single undergraduate student
loan with no fees, a low in-school interest rate, and a ﬁxed rate in repayment that cannot rise much beyond the rate paid by current borrowers.
In terms of repayment, the authors present a “Plan for Fair Loan
Payments” for all federal borrowers that calls for affordable payments
based on income, family size, and total federal debt, and that offers
forgiveness after 20 years of payments. They recommend rigorous loan
counseling before students commit to borrowing, not just at entrance
and exit. Finally, the authors have a number of suggestions in the area
of consumer protection, particularly in the area of collections.
Susan Dynarski and Daniel Kreisman also present a speciﬁc plan
for an income-based repayment system, which they label “Loans for
Educational Opportunity.” (Chapter 12 contains an abbreviated version
of their paper, which was originally commissioned by The Hamilton
Project. See Note 1.) They document four facts about student loans and
future earnings: 1) a moderate level of debt for the typical student borrower, 2) a high payoff to a college education, 3) high rates of default
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on typical loans, and 4) higher rates of default among young borrowers.
They argue that in light of these four facts there is not a debt crisis, but
rather a repayment crisis.
Under their Loans for Educational Opportunity proposal, payments
would be automatically deducted from borrowers’ paychecks, similar
to the payroll tax for Social Security. Instead of paying off loans during
a ﬁxed, 10-year period, borrowers would have up to 25 years, although
they could opt to pay down the loan more quickly. Dynarski and Kreisman suggest that this system will reduce the administrative costs of the
current student loan system. The chapter also addresses how their proposed system would work for self-employed individuals or those who
become unemployed.
In Chapter 13, Jason Delisle, Alex Holt, and Kristin Blagg examine
how a loophole in the federal government’s Pay As You Earn (PAYE) program for student loans can affect graduate and professional students. The
authors show that for many of these students, there is a level of borrowing at
which increasing the loan balance has no impact on the amount of total repayments under PAYE because of the program’s loan forgiveness beneﬁt; the authors call this borrowing level the “no marginal cost threshold.”
If a borrower could predict this threshold with certainty, then she would
have an incentive to increase the size of her loan because doing so
would essentially be costless.
Using data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
and the American Community Survey, Delisle and his coauthors estimate that the majority of graduate and professional student borrowers
will borrow more than the no marginal cost threshold. This suggests
that PAYE effectively functions as a form of tuition subsidy. The most
signiﬁcant levels of subsidization occur in conjunction with the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness program, in which loans are forgiven after
only 10 years of payments if the borrower qualiﬁes under a public service job. As a remedy for the unintended level of subsidy, the authors
propose that the period of repayment before forgiveness be lengthened
or that the amount that can be forgiven be capped.
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CONCLUSION
The conference exceeded expectations. The papers presented there
and included in this volume represent the most current research and
knowledge about student loans and repayment. The conference agenda
included comments from discussants and general discussion after each
of the papers was presented. We thought that the discussants’ comments
and the general discussion added great value to the papers. We thank the
discussants, who are listed at the end of this volume, for their thoughtful insights. We hope this volume serves as a valuable reference for
researchers and policymakers who seek a deeper understanding of how,
why, and which students borrow for their postsecondary education;
how this borrowing may affect later decisions; and what measures can
help borrowers repay their loans successfully.
We also thank our cosponsors, the Spencer Foundation and the
Education Policy Initiative at the Ford School of Public Policy. The
opportunity to convene a community of scholars has furthered our
collective insights of the behaviors of students who are attempting to
ﬁnance their investments in higher education.

Notes
1. Chapter 12 has an abbreviated version of the Dynarski and Kreisman paper, which
was originally commissioned by The Hamilton Project. The full paper may be
accessed from http://www.hamiltonproject.org/ﬁles/downloads_and_links/THP_
DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf.
2. As might be expected at a conference with a number of economists participating,
much discussion took place around the validity of this instrument.
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2
The Evolution of Student
Debt in the United States
Sandy Baum
Urban Institute

The conversation about student debt in the United States has
descended into an alarmist focus on the aggregate amount of education
debt (over $1 trillion by some estimates); on stories about individual
students who borrowed excessively and are struggling to repay in a
weak labor market; on a comparison between credit card debt (which
has fallen quite a bit in recent years) and education debt (which has not);
and on fears of a “student loan bubble” that might follow the path of the
housing bubble. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan said recently that
the student loan “crisis” has grown so large that it poses “a threat to the
American dream” (Porter 2013).
It’s time to take a step back to examine the role of debt in ﬁnancing
postsecondary education, the path over time in postsecondary participation and the accompanying student borrowing, and the basic arguments
underlying debt ﬁnancing of postsecondary education and the government’s role in the system. The sections that follow examine some of the
perspectives on student loan data that can alter the picture that emerges.
Is outstanding debt or annual borrowing more meaningful? Should nonborrowers be included in average debt ﬁgures? Does the path of total
borrowing tell the same story as the path of borrowing per student?
Should we focus on all postsecondary students or only on undergraduates? The goal is not to choose the optimal data on which to rely, but
to elucidate the different information emerging from different choices
about what to measure.

11
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OUTSTANDING DEBT
Perhaps the most commonly cited student debt ﬁgures are those
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Table 2.1 reports outstanding household debt of various types from the third quarter of 2003
to the third quarter of 2013. Education debt grew from $250 billion in
2003 to $610 billion in 2008 and to $1.03 trillion in 2013. There is no
doubt that this represents rapid growth worthy of attention, but several
other facts from these data are also relevant.
•

Education debt increased from 3 percent to 9 percent of outstanding household debt over the decade. This is a signiﬁcant
change, but mortgage debt is 70 percent of the total, and home
equity revolving credit is another 5 percent. Widespread default
on student loans could be a real problem, but even if the government did not hold the vast majority of this debt, the economic impact would obviously be on a different scale from the
collapse of the housing market.

•

Credit card debt increased by 24 percent between 2003 and
2008 but fell by 22 percent over the following ﬁve years, ending the decade $21 billion (3 percent) below its 2003 level. (See
Table 2.2.)

•

Outstanding education debt increased by 68 percent between
2008 and 2013—less than half the rate of growth between 2003
and 2008. (See Table 2.2)

Perhaps more fundamental is the question of whether the new focus
on outstanding student loan debt is the best way to understand the risks
facing credit markets; the economy; or past, current, and future students.
Outstanding debt per borrower has not grown nearly as much as
total outstanding debt. Enrollment in postsecondary education has
increased rapidly in recent years, and the number of borrowers retiring
their debt each year is signiﬁcantly smaller than the number incurring
debt for the ﬁrst time.
Figure 2.1 shows the real growth in total outstanding education
debt relative to the growth in the number of borrowers with debt and the
growth in average balances from the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 through the
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Table 2.1 Outstanding Household Debt, 2003:Q3 to 2013:Q3 (in billions of dollars and as a percentage of total
household debt)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Mortgage ($)
5.18
6.21
6.91
8.05
8.93
9.29
8.94
8.61
8.40
8.03
7.90
Home equity
0.27
0.43
0.54
0.60
0.63
0.69
0.71
0.67
0.64
0.57
0.54
revolving ($)
Auto ($)2003
0.68
0.75
0.83
0.82
0.82
0.81
0.74
0.71
0.73
0.77
0.85
Credit card ($)
0.69
0.71
0.73
0.75
0.82
0.86
0.81
0.73
0.69
0.67
0.67
Student ($)
0.25
0.33
0.38
0.45
0.53
0.61
0.69
0.78
0.87
0.96
1.03
Other ($)
0.48
0.41
0.41
0.44
0.41
0.41
0.38
0.34
0.33
0.31
0.30
Total ($)
7.56
8.83
9.79
11.11
12.13
12.68
12.28
11.84
11.66
11.31
11.28
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Mortgage (%)
69
70
71
72
74
73
73
73
72
71
70
Home equity
4
5
6
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
5
revolving (%)
Auto (%)
9
9
8
7
7
6
6
6
6
7
7
Credit card (%)
9
8
7
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
Student (%)
3
4
4
4
4
5
6
7
7
8
9
Other (%)
6
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013a).
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Table 2.2 Percentage Changes in Outstanding Household Debt,
2003–2013
2003–2008
2008–2013
Mortgage
79
−15
Home equity revolving
157
−23
Auto loan
18
4
Credit card
24
−22
Student loan
146
68
Other
−14
−26
Total
68
−11
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013b).

Figure 2.1 Total Outstanding Student Debt, Number of Borrowers with
Outstanding Debt, and Average Balance, Relative to 2005
Fourth Quarter, 2005–2012
2.50

Total debt

Borrowers

Average balance

2.09
2.00

1.56
1.50

1.33

1.00

0.50

0.00
2005:Q4

2006:Q4

2007:Q4

2008:Q4

2009:Q4

2010:Q4

2011:Q4

2012:Q4

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013b).
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fourth quarter of 2012. Total outstanding debt was 124 percent higher in
constant dollars at the end of 2012 than it had been eight years earlier.
In contrast, average balances increased by 33 percent (in 2012 dollars),
while the number of borrowers rose by 66 percent. The number of borrowers increased much more rapidly than the average amount borrowed
from 2007 through 2010 but did not increase between 2010 and 2011,
when average balances continued to grow.
Outstanding balances include debt that was incurred many years
ago as well as recent borrowing, borrowing by both students and parents, and borrowing by both undergraduate and graduate students. The
accrual of unpaid interest, penalties, and other charges also add to the
total outstanding debt.
Solutions for relieving the strains of student debt should certainly
include borrowers with old debts who are struggling, and many policy
proposals ignore these people. However, developing strategies for the
future requires a focus on recent student borrowing patterns. Striking
a balance between concern about overdependence on debt for ﬁnancing postsecondary education and welcoming increases in borrowing
as a sign of increased participation by students with limited resources
requires more information about borrowing patterns across students on
different educational paths, from different socioeconomic backgrounds,
and of different ages.

ANNUAL BORROWING
The year-by-year data on federal student loans are more accurate
than either estimates of outstanding debt or the data on the total debt
levels of students who graduate with different credentials or who leave
school without credentials. Those data are based either on samples of
students from surveys conducted every four years or on surveys with
disappointing response rates completed every year by colleges and
universities.
Total annual borrowing, detailed in Table 2.3, has increased dramatically since 1970–1971, when students borrowed $7.6 billion (in
2012 dollars) through education loan programs. Thirty years later,
in 2000–2001, total borrowing through these programs had reached
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Table 2.3 Total Federal and Nonfederal Loans to Undergraduates,
Graduate Students, and Parents of Undergraduate Students,
1970–1971 to 2012–2013, Selected Years (in millions of 2012
dollars)
PostTotal
secondary borrowing
Federal
Nonfederal
enrollment
per FTE
loans ($)
loans ($)
Total ($)
(FTEs)
student ($)
1970–71
7,622
7,622
7,148,575
1,066
1975–76
7,490
0
7,490
8,479,688
883
1980–81
19,276
0
19,276
8,819,013
2,186
1985–86
21,071
0
21,071
8,943,433
2,356
1990–91
24,403
0
24,403
9,820,205
2,485
1995–96
39,364
2,000
41,364
10,172,987
4,066
2000–01
45,664
6,750
52,414
11,427,001
4,587
2005–06
67,984
20,860
88,844
13,408,264
6,626
2006–07
69,083
23,750
92,833
13,612,494
6,820
2007–08
75,638
25,530
101,168
13,960,922
7,247
2008–09
90,144
12,390
102,534
14,608,127
7,019
2009–10 106,648
9,040
115,688
15,764,432
7,339
2010–11 112,037
8,110
120,147
16,220,701
7,407
2011–12 109,814
8,130
117,944
16,143,133
7,306
2012–13 101,469
8,810
110,279
15,918,548
6,928
NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent.
SOURCE: College Board (2013).

$52.4 billion, and it more than doubled, to $120.1 billion, over the next
decade. As of 2012–2013, however, annual borrowing had fallen from
its 2010–2011 peak.
Some of the borrowing changes are due to policy changes. For
example, the increase from $24 billion in 1990–1991 to $41 billion in
1995–1996 was to a signiﬁcant extent the result of the introduction of
the unsubsidized Stafford Loan program, which expanded the federal
program from one designed only for students with documented ﬁnancial need to one including all students.
Enrollment growth is another issue. While total borrowing between
2000–2001 and 2012–2013 increased by 110 percent in real terms,
from $52.4 billion to $110.3 billion, borrowing per full-time equivalent
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(FTE) student increased by 51 percent, from $4,587 (in 2012 dollars)
to $6,928.
The decline in both total borrowing and borrowing per student over
the last two years may or may not signal a longer-term trend. But these
data should serve as a caution to those who have a tendency to predict
that when a trend is unfavorable it is likely to continue to be more and
more unfavorable. Predictions of doom based on temporary circumstances generate attention-grabbing headlines. But as the economy rises
from the depths of the Great Recession, fewer people will enroll in college as the labor market recovers, and students may borrow less as state
tax revenues, incomes, and savings rise. Both the upward pressure on
tuition prices and the ﬁnancing strains on families and students are also
likely to diminish to some extent.

DEBT PER STUDENT VERSUS DEBT PER BORROWER
Most discussions of average debt levels focus on debt per borrower,
setting aside the signiﬁcant number of college students who do not borrow at all, or at least do not rely on education loans. In 2011–2012,
31 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients, 50 percent of associate’s
degree recipients, and 34 percent of those who earned postsecondary
certiﬁcates did not have education debt. Including these students may
obscure some of the potential problems facing borrowers, but it paints
a clearer picture of how students ﬁnance their education. For example,
in 2011–2012, median debt for bachelor’s degree recipients who borrowed was $26,500, and 10 percent borrowed more than $54,900. The
median for all bachelor’s degree recipients was $16,900, and the 90th
percentile was $44,500 (National Center for Education Statistics 2012).

UNDERGRADUATE AND GRADUATE STUDENTS
About 87 percent of all postsecondary students are undergraduate
students, while the other 13 percent are graduate students who have
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already completed bachelor’s degrees. Both undergraduate and graduate students are eligible for federal student loans. First-year dependent
undergraduate students with documented ﬁnancial need may be eligible
for up to $3,500 in subsidized loans, on which the government pays the
interest while the student is in school. These students frequently also
take unsubsidized loans, because the total federal student loan borrowing limit is $2,000 higher than the limit for the subsidized program.1
Since July 1, 2012, graduate students have been eligible only for unsubsidized federal student loans.
Federal loan repayment options are the same for undergraduate
and graduate debt. While most students take the default option of making ﬁxed payments every year for 10 years, there are also graduated
repayment plans under which payments increase over time, extended
repayment plans that allow smaller payments over more years and, of
particular importance, income-dependent repayment plans. These plans
make the amount owed dependent on the borrower’s income, limiting
required payments to a manageable portion of discretionary income and
forgiving remaining debt after a period of years.
As indicated in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2, in 2012–2013, federal
loans per postsecondary student were $6,374. But focusing only on
undergraduate students yields an average of $4,897, while graduate students borrowed over three times as much.
Graduate student debt may be an increasing problem as the gap in
earnings between individuals with bachelor’s degrees and those with
advanced degrees grows, leading more students to continue their studTable 2.4 Average Federal Loans per FTE Student, FTE Undergraduate
Student, and FTE Graduate Student, 1992–1993 to 2012–2013
Federal loans per
Federal loans
Federal loans per
FTE postsecondary
per FTE UG
FTE graduate
student ($)
student ($)
student ($)
1992–93
2,574
1,959
6,968
1997–98
4,007
3,216
9,465
2002–03
4,364
3,406
10,940
2007–08
5,418
3,978
14,937
2012–13
6,374
4,897
16,239
NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent.
SOURCE: College Board (2013).
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Figure 2.2 Average Federal Loans per FTE Undergraduate and per FTE
Graduate Student 1992–1993 to 2012–2013 (in 2012 dollars)
$20,000

Average federal loans per FTE undergraduate

$18,000

Average federal loans per FTE graduate student

$16,000
$14,000
$12,000
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
$4,000
$2,000
$0

NOTE: FTE = full-time equivalent.
SOURCE: College Board (2013, Figure 3B).

ies.2 But policy responses to this issue should likely be quite different
from those to the undergraduate debt issue. Subsidies for undergraduate
students are critical from the perspectives of both equity and efﬁciency.
Some postsecondary education is a virtual necessity for earnings that
support a secure lifestyle. There is broad consensus that accidents of
birth should not prevent people from having the opportunity to access
this education. Failing to provide access also leads to a less productive
labor force and to greater reliance on publicly funded income support
programs.
The role of public subsidies for graduate education is less clear-cut.
Certainly there are social beneﬁts to increased educational attainment at
this level, but anyone undertaking graduate study is already a four-year
college graduate, and public subsidies come largely from taxpayers
with lower incomes at the time students are enrolling, and even more
so after they have completed their advanced degrees. Arguments for
investing in education only if the ﬁnancial returns are likely to be high
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enough to justify the expenditure are stronger in the case of graduate
education than in the case of undergraduate education.
There are certainly exceptions and sound arguments for some level
of subsidy. However, the argument that graduate student debt, which is
held by individuals who have the highest earnings potential of any segment of the population, should be addressed by public policy is much
weaker than similar arguments about undergraduate debt.

NONFEDERAL LOANS
Nonfederal loans, from banks and other private lenders and to a
lesser extent from states and from colleges and universities, may be a
particular concern because they do not come with the repayment protections attached to federal loans. It is not easy to arrange for lower or
postponed payments when borrowers hit difﬁcult ﬁnancial times, and
private loans are not eligible for the federal income-dependent repayment plans. Moreover, while the interest rates on federal student loans
are limited by law, private loans frequently carry variable interest rates
that can reach very high levels.
Figure 2.3 shows that nonfederal borrowing almost doubled, from
about $10.5 billion (in 2012 dollars) in 2002–2003 to $25.5 billion in
2007–2008. As was the case in other credit markets, lending standards
were less than rigorous. Many of the loans made during this period have
not yet been repaid, and concerns over this outstanding debt are probably well placed. But the market collapsed in 2008–2009, and total nonfederal borrowing has been in the $8–$9 billion range since 2009–2010.
In 2007–2008, 14 percent of undergraduates and 11 percent of
graduate students relied on the private loan market. By 2011–2012, as
shown in Table 2.5, those percentages had declined to 6 percent and
4 percent, respectively (National Center for Education Statistics 2008,
2012). Both supply and demand forces contributed to this change. The
tightening of credit markets is evidenced in the decline from 39 percent
to 12 percent in the share of undergraduates and from 29 percent to
5 percent in the share of graduate students in for-proﬁt postsecondary
institutions taking private loans (National Center for Education Statistics 2008, 2012). But at the same time, federal loan limits for under-
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Figure 2.3 Total Nonfederal Education Loans, 1997–1998 to 2012–2013
(in 2012 dollars)
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SOURCE: College Board (2013, Table 1).

Table 2.5 Percentages of Undergraduate and Graduate Students Taking
Private Loans, 2007–2008 and 2011–2012, by Sector
2007–08
2011–12
Undergraduate students
Private for-proﬁt
39
12
Private nonproﬁt four-year
25
12
Public four-year
14
7
Public two-year
4
2
Total
14
6
Graduate students
Private for-proﬁt
29
5
Private nonproﬁt four-year
12
5
Public four-year
6
3
Total
11
4
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2008, 2012).

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 21

1/28/2015 8:22:05 AM

22 Baum

graduates have increased, and federal GradPLUS Loans have become
available to graduate students.

EVALUATING EDUCATION BORROWING
People tend to compare individuals with student loan obligations to
those with similar earnings who do not have the same debt. It is not a
surprise that the consumption options of former students who borrowed
are more limited than those whose parents paid their way. But what if
those students had not borrowed? Chances are they would not have had
the same education, job, or earnings. The more important comparison is
between the students’ opportunities with a college education and some
debt and their opportunities if they did not attend college at all.
The fact that students borrow to fund postsecondary education is
not in and of itself a problem. The arguments for debt ﬁnancing for
investments with high expected rates of return are straightforward.
Between 2008 and 2011, the gap between the median earnings of high
school graduates aged 25–34 and those in the same age range with a
bachelor’s degree or higher declined from 74 percent to 69 percent for
men and from 79 percent to 70 percent for women, but the long-term
trend is upward. The earnings premium for men rose from 25 percent
in 1971 to 56 percent in 1991 and to 69 percent in 2011. For women it
rose from 43 percent in 1971 to 56 percent in 1991 and to 70 percent in
2011 (Baum, Ma, and Payea 2013, Figure 1.6). Moreover, the earnings
gap is larger for workers at older ages (Baum, Kurose, and Ma 2013,
Section 6).
Average debt levels are not alarming. The popular press notwithstanding, the typical bachelor’s degree recipient entering the labor market with as much as $30,000 or $40,000 in debt will not have undue
difﬁculty repaying that debt out of the earnings premium from his or
her education. But the growing number of borrowers with higher debt
levels may struggle, even if they are reasonably successful in the labor
market. And labor market outcomes are uncertain. Earnings levels vary
quite a bit among people with similar levels of education, and some
borrowers with average debt levels might face difﬁculties, especially if
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they are attempting to repay their student loans over a relatively short
10-year time period.
The existence of income-dependent repayment options for federal
student loans effectively changes the risk of student debt. Many of
those with very high debt levels have at least some nonfederal student
debt, but the new federal repayment plans shift much of the risk from
students to taxpayers, since borrowers are not expected to repay if their
earnings are inadequate.

THE FEDERAL ROLE
The logic of education debt and the manageability of average debt
levels for typical college graduates do not diminish the very real problems facing a minority of students because they made unwise decisions
about their investments in education; because they were, for whatever
reason, unable to succeed in meeting their educational goals; or because
their labor market outcomes have been less favorable than anticipated.
As long as there is a public interest in promoting educational opportunities and attainment, and as long as the federal government is, as
it should be, the primary source of student loans, public policy must
address these issues constructively.
Some of the concerns about levels of student debt are voiced in the
form of recommendations to scale back federal student loan programs.
One argument is that the availability of easy credit gives colleges and
universities more leeway to raise their prices. This position also reﬂects
the idea that the federal government is inappropriately encouraging students to overborrow.
But in the absence of ample federal credit, many students are likely
to turn to the private loan market, which is apt to offer reasonable terms
to students enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs at selective colleges who have ﬁnancially secure cosigners. It is less likely to provide favorable terms to the students from low-income, ﬁrst-generation
families borrowing to ﬁnance enrollment in community colleges, or to
low-income adults seeking credentials that will, for the ﬁrst time, make
them eligible for jobs that pay a living wage. Federal education policy
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is (or should be) designed to provide opportunities to those students
who would otherwise fall through the cracks.
The challenges presented by the prevalence of private student loans
between 2002–2003 and 2007–2008 provide a reminder about why the
federal government is involved in this market. The private market relies
on credit histories and collateral in determining its lending terms. Students tend to have limited credit histories, low incomes, and minimal
assets. Many students, including those with weak future prospects, took
private loans with high interest rates. When sufﬁcient federal loans
were not available to meet their needs, or when they didn’t understand
their options, they looked elsewhere.
In the current belt-tightening environment, suggestions about risk
rating of federal student loans have become surprisingly common. The
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (2013)
ﬂoated the idea in a recent report. Other observers have promoted programs that would modify loan terms based on either the institutions in
which students enroll or the characteristics of the students themselves.
Some of the suggestions are designed to protect the federal budget
(Simkovic 2011), but others are designed to protect students against
overborrowing.
It is unrealistic to believe that offering high-risk students loans with
higher interest rates is the best public policy for helping them make
wise decisions about their educational paths. The national priority
on assuring that students with limited means can participate in postsecondary education requires that we make reasonable ﬁnancing options
available to them. Suggestions about incorporating risk rating into the
federal loan system generally rely on the assumption that students will
respond to market signals and either forgo college or choose alternative
programs and institutions when presented with unfavorable loan terms.
Both history and the insights of behavioral economics make this seem
unlikely.3 And while there are surely students who would be better off
not pursuing further education than attending the institutions in which
they enroll, dismantling the system that allows students with limited
ﬁnancial means and uncertain academic futures the chance to improve
their prospects is not a prescription for a healthy economy or an equitable society.
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WHO IS BORROWING TOO MUCH?
There are two central questions: 1) Who are the students with the
highest debt levels, and 2) who are the students with the least manageable debt burdens? These questions are not the same, since students
who are in school for a longer time and earn higher degrees are likely
to accumulate the most debt—and to have the earnings to repay that
debt. Those who enroll for short periods of time and never earn credentials borrow relatively small amounts but also have weak labor market
outcomes.
The most recent available data on aggregate debt by demographic
and educational characteristics are for 2011–2012. That year, 23 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients with debt had borrowed more than
$40,000. The percentage with no education debt at all was 31 percent.
But 44 percent of bachelor’s degree recipients from for-proﬁt institutions graduated with $40,000 or more in debt, compared to 18 percent
of those from the private nonproﬁt sector and 10 percent from public
institutions. Student loan default patterns also direct attention to the
for-proﬁt sector, with 43 percent of FY2011 defaulters coming from
these institutions (U.S. Department of Education 2013). The for-proﬁt
sector is, and should be, a particular focus of concerns about student
borrowing.
Comparisons of the debt levels of bachelor’s degree recipients
with different demographic characteristics give additional indication of
where the problems lie. Independent students borrow more than dependent students. Federal loan limits are higher for independent students,
who can now borrow up to $57,500 in Direct Loans for undergraduate
study, compared to $31,000 for dependent students whose parents qualify for PLUS Loans. Independent students are also more likely to have
responsibilities for supporting families and less likely to have parental
support on which to fall back.
As Table 2.6 indicates, among 2011–12 bachelor’s degree recipients, 9 percent of dependent students and 24 percent of independent
students accumulated more than $40,000 in education debt, with single
independent students and those with dependents more likely to fall into
this category than those who were married without dependents.
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Table 2.6 Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of
Bachelor’s Degree Recipients by Dependency Status and
Dependent Student Family Income, 2011–2012
$20,001–
$40,001 or
No debt
$1–$20,000
$40,000
more
All bachelor’s
31
24
29
16
degree recipients
Dependent
35
27
29
9
Less than $30,000
23
37
31
9
$30,000–$64,999
22
30
39
9
$65,000–$105,999
40
23
26
12
$106,000 or more
46
23
25
7
Independent
26
21
29
24
No dependents,
25
22
29
24
unmarried
No dependents,
34
20
2
18
married
With dependents
24
2
30
27
NOTE: Includes all loans ever borrowed for undergraduate education in 2011–12 and
prior years. Does not include loans to parents of undergraduate students.
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012).

Among dependent students, the patterns by family income level are
not so clear. Students from higher-income families were more likely
not to borrow at all. But among those who borrowed, those from the
lowest-income families were most likely to borrow $20,000 or less.
Those from families with incomes between $65,000 and $106,000 were
most likely to accumulate debts exceeding $40,000, both overall and
among those who borrowed.
As Table 2.7 shows, the breakdown of graduates by sector highlights the reality that the students who earn their degrees from for-proﬁt
institutions are most likely to have high levels of debt. Within each
sector, independent students are more likely than dependent students
to be in this situation, and among dependent students, it is middle- or
upper-middle-income students who are most likely to borrow more than
$40,000 to ﬁnance their bachelor’s degrees.
It is also notable that, as indicated in Table 2.8, within income
groups, there are differences in debt levels by racial/ethnic groups.
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Table 2.7 Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of Bachelor’s
Degree Recipients, by Dependency Status, Dependent Student
Family Income, and Sector, 2011–2012
$20,001– $40,001 or
No debt $1–$20,000 $40,000
more
Public four-year
36
27
27
10
Dependent
Less than $30,000
27
39
27
7
$30,000–$64,999
25
35
33
7
$65,000–$105,999
47
24
23
6
$106,000 or more
48
22
25
4
Independent
31
25
28
16
Private nonproﬁt four-year
27
23
32
18
Dependent
Less than $30,000
12
37
41
10
$30,000–$64,999
14
23
51
13
$65,000–$105,999
27
21
31
21
$106,000 or more
42
23
26
10
Independent
25
20
29
26
For-proﬁt
13
12
32
44
Dependent
Less than $30,000
0
20
35
45
$30,000–$64,999
9
10
50
31
$65,000–$105,999
26
20
24
30
$106,000 or more
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Independent
13
11
31
45
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012).

Small sample sizes make it difﬁcult to include breakdowns by sector,
race, and income, but black students are disproportionately likely to
enroll in the for-proﬁt sector, while Hispanic students are overrepresented in community colleges.4 Among 2011–12 black bachelor’s
degree recipients, 28 percent had at least $40,000 in debt. This compares to 14 percent of white graduates, 16 percent of Hispanic graduates, and 6 percent of Asian graduates. Percentages with high debt were
higher for independent students, with 35 percent of independent black
bachelor’s degree recipients borrowing more than $40,000.
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Table 2.8 Percentage Distribution of Aggregate Debt Levels of Bachelor’s
Degree Recipients, by Dependency Status, Dependent Student
Family Income, and Race/Ethnicity, 2011–2012
$20,001– $40,001 or
No debt
$1–$20,000
$40,000
more
White
33
24
30
14
Dependent
Less than $30,000
20
40
31
9
$30,000–$64,999
21
30
41
7
$65,000–$105,999
39
24
26
12
$106,000 or more
48
21
25
7
Independent
26
21
31
23
Black
16
24
32
28
Dependent
Less than $30,000
5
36
43
16
$30,000–$64,999
9
25
42
24
$65,000–$105,999
25
30
28
17
$106,000 or more
23
38
31
8
Independent
18
18
29
35
Hispanic
28
27
29
16
Dependent
Less than $30,000
25
39
31
6
$30,000–$64,999
26
35
28
12
$65,000–$105,999
36
23
31
10
$106,000 or more
28
27
34
11
Independent
28
23
28
22
Asian
53
23
18
6
Dependent
Less than $30,000
51
27
19
3
$30,000–$64,999
39
27
34
0
$65,000–$105,999
65
18
14
4
$106,000 or more
56
32
11
1
Independent
55
19
13
14
SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012).
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Both differences in enrollment patterns and the reality that black
families tend to have lower asset levels than other families with similar
incomes make it unsurprising that even within income categories, black
bachelor’s degree recipients have higher debt levels than members
of other racial/ethnic groups (Shapiro, Meschede, and Orsoro 2013).
Among dependent students, within racial/ethnic groups, it is middleincome students rather than lower-income students who are most likely
to accumulate high levels of debt.
High debt levels don’t tell the whole story of at-risk borrowers,
because for students who don’t earn bachelor’s degrees—those who
leave school either with associate’s degrees or certiﬁcates or with no
postsecondary credentials—earnings tend to be lower, and lower levels
of debt can lead to unmanageable payment requirements. The 84 percent of 2011–12 bachelor’s degree recipients who borrowed $40,000 or
less are not likely to be at risk, except under unusual circumstances, and
as Table 2.9 indicates, very few certiﬁcate holders and students who left
school without a credential accumulated this much debt. But we know
that those who do not complete their credentials are disproportionately
likely to default. This pattern may be a function of factors other than
debt to earnings ratios, including a reluctance to prioritize the repayment
of loans that did not serve their intended purpose. But targeted efforts
to diminish student debt problems should certainly include a focus on
students with debt levels that do not exceed the overall average.

ENROLLMENT PATTERNS
Tuition and fees, as well as living costs for college students, have
risen relative to family incomes over time, even after taking into consideration the role of ﬁnancial aid in reducing the net price that students
actually pay. It is not surprising that students are relying more heavily on borrowing than they did a generation ago. Student loans have
become more easily available, and parents seem more willing to shift
the responsibility for paying for college onto their children, but the
increase in postsecondary participation rates across the population also
plays a role.
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Table 2.9 Total Student Debt Levels of 2003–04 Beginning Postsecondary Students, by Credentials Earned by
2009 (%)
$10,001–
$20,001–
$30,001–
$50,001 or
No debt
$1–$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$50,000
more
Total
43
25
16
8
5
2
Bachelor’s degree (31%)
36
12
22
14
1
5
Associate’s degree (9%)
42
24
18
9
7
1
Certiﬁcate (9%)
39
45
12
2
1
0
No degree, still enrolled (15%)
39
27
18
9
5
2
No degree, not enrolled (35%)
52
30
11
4
2
0
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Between 2001 and 2011, the total number of postsecondary students grew by 32 percent, from 15.9 million to 21 million. Each student
is borrowing more on average, but the growth in debt per student has
been slower than the growth in the number of students borrowing. In
recent years, because of rapid enrollment growth, total federal loans
have grown about twice as fast as federal loans per student. In other
words, it isn’t so much that students are borrowing more, it’s that more
students are enrolling and borrowing.
Over the decade from 1983 to 1992, about 30 percent of recent high
school graduates enrolling immediately in college were from families
in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This percentage
increased to an average of about 32 percent from 1993 to 2002 and to 34
percent from 2003 to 2012. The percentage of the new college students
whose families were in the highest ﬁfth of the income distribution fell
from about 28 percent between 1983 and 1992 to 25 percent from 1993
to 2002, and to 24 percent over the most recent decade.5 More analysis
is necessary to determine the role of the changing economic circumstances of college students, but it seems clear that in order to understand
borrowing patterns over time, one should consider the demographic
characteristics of students.

CONCLUSION
More students today are borrowing to ﬁnance their education than
did a generation ago or even a decade ago, and more students are borrowing amounts of money that have the potential to cause them longterm ﬁnancial difﬁculties. But this reality does not deﬁne a broad
“crisis.” In order to address the very real problems of students with
unmanageable levels of education debt, it is important to focus on the
students who are struggling, rather than on students in general. And it is
necessary to put education debt into the context of the investment it is
ﬁnancing and the payoff of that investment.
Among bachelor’s degree recipients, it is not students from lowincome families who accumulate the highest levels of debt. Rather,
independent students, most of whom are older than traditional college
age, students who attend for-proﬁt institutions, and African American
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students are more likely than others to accumulate high levels of education debt. These groups of students are also those least likely to earn
four-year degrees. Instead, many earn associate’s degrees or certiﬁcates, or leave school without a credential. Focusing on these students
and helping them to make decisions that will more likely lead to positive outcomes is more constructive than generalized panic about student
debt.
Much of the hand wringing about student debt stops short of proposing solutions. Viable policy solutions for these particular problems
are much more feasible than attempts to have taxpayers cover the entire
cost of postsecondary education, or scenarios in which the cost of providing quality education plummets.
Income-dependent repayment programs shift a signiﬁcant portion
of the risk of education debt from the student to the taxpayer, protecting
students against unforeseen circumstances. This is critical, given the
uncertainty involved in postsecondary investments. The recent focus
on potential improvements to these repayment programs is welcome,
but care must be taken to balance protecting students with misdirecting subsidies and creating perverse incentives. For example, lowering
the percentage of discretionary income required from 15 percent to 10
percent of income exceeding 150 percent of the poverty line provides
signiﬁcant savings only to borrowers with incomes high enough for 5
percent of discretionary income to be a measurable amount. Furthermore, limiting required payments in this way and forgiving outstanding debt after 20 years, when combined with the availability of federal
loans for graduate students up to the cost of attendance, creates an unintended windfall for graduate students with very high debt levels, even if
their earnings are far above the average for the taxpayers providing the
subsidies (see Delisle and Hope [2012]).
Making income-dependent repayment the default option, so that
students would not have to have an unusual amount of information,
complete a complicated application process, or overcome a series of
bureaucratic hurdles in order to beneﬁt, could solve much of the student
loan problem. Extending eligibility to students with longstanding debts
and limiting the amount of unpaid interest allowed to accrue are also
important components of a policy solution.
But such a system will not be feasible if the goal is to prevent students from bearing a reasonable share of the costs of their own educa-
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tion. The system must be carefully designed to target subsidies at students for whom unforeseen outcomes create unmanageable difﬁculties.
It must also be combined with more effective information and guidance
in advance of student enrollment and borrowing.
Shifting the burden of repaying loans from students to taxpayers
does not diminish the importance of the choices students make about
postsecondary study or the support they get to help attain their goals.
Many of the problems students face with overborrowing could be prevented if they had more effective guidance about their options and
their chances of success. Strategies for diminishing the problems facing future students should include improved support for students—both
academic support and assistance with complex decisions. In addition,
reforms of the student loan system, both in terms of regulation of the
private market and redesign of repayment systems for federal loans,
must ameliorate the difﬁculties facing those who are already in untenable situations as well as protecting future students.
Headline-grabbing statements about high aggregate loan debt do
not help the students who need our attention. We should focus on the
debt levels of individual students, improve the policies in place to protect them against circumstances beyond their control that lead to repayment problems, and provide incoming students with better information
and advice so they don’t make poor education and career decisions or
borrow excessive amounts.
Notes
1. The limit on subsidized loans for dependent students is $4,500 in the second year
and $5,500 in the third year and beyond. The total annual borrowing limit is, in
each case, $2,000 higher. Total borrowing for dependent undergraduates may not
exceed $23,000 in subsidized loans and $31,000 overall. Independent students
(and dependent students whose parents are not eligible for federal parent loans)
have the same subsidized loan limits but higher overall limits (studentaid.ed.gov/
types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized).
2. Between 2001 and 2011, the gap in median earnings between full-time working
males aged 25–34 whose highest degree was a bachelor’s degree and those with
only a high school diploma fell from 57 percent to 56 percent. For those with a
master’s degree or higher, the gap grew from 94 percent to 112 percent (U.S.
Census Bureau 2014).
3. For a discussion of the implications of the insights from behavioral economics for
the design of the student aid system, see Baum and Schwartz (2013).
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4. Hispanic students constitute 18 percent of the students at community colleges but
only 13 percent of all students at degree-granting institutions. In 2010, almost half
of all Hispanic students across the country were enrolled at community colleges.
Black students enroll in disproportionate numbers at for-proﬁt institutions. The
share of black students in total enrollment at for-proﬁt institutions (29 percent)
was nearly twice as high as the share of black students in total postsecondary
enrollment (14 percent) in 2010 (Baum and Kurose 2013).
5. Calculations by the author based on the National Center for Education Statistics
(2012).
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Studies continue to indicate that higher education is a worthwhile
investment for individuals (Goldin and Katz 2008) and raises the productivity of the workforce as a whole (Moretti 2004). While the rising cost of postsecondary education has not eliminated this “college
premium,” it has raised new questions about how a growing number
of students can make these investments (Archibald and Feldman 2010;
Dynarski and Kreisman 2013). One solution to this problem is student
loans, which have come to play an increasingly important role in ﬁnancing higher education. Yet, in spite of its importance, educational debt
is not well understood, partly because the currently outstanding stock
of student debt includes loans made by both government and private
lenders, and there exist few central repositories of information on the
characteristics and performance of all student loans. In this chapter, we
bring a new data set to bear on this important issue and present a brief
analysis of the historical and current levels of student debt and how
those debts are performing. We also brieﬂy discuss the implications of
student loans for borrowers and the economy.
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DATA
Our analysis is based on data drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York Consumer Credit Panel (CCP), which represents a 5 percent random sample of U.S. individuals with credit ﬁles as well as all
of their household members. 1 In all, the entire data set includes anonymous credit ﬁles on more than 15 percent of the population, or nearly
40 million individuals. The panel includes information from the credit
reports for those individuals for each quarter during the last 14 years,
and we use data for this analysis through December 2012. While the
CCP commences in 1999, irregularities in student loan reporting prior
to 2004 suggest dropping the 1999–2003 data, and we thus begin our
analysis in 2004.
The sampling exploits randomness in the last two digits of individuals’ Social Security numbers. 2 The procedure ensures that the panel is
dynamically updated in each quarter to reﬂect new entrants into credit
markets. In addition, Equifax, the data provider, matches the primary
individual’s mailing address to all records in the data to capture information about other members of the primary individual’s household.
While these individuals are added to the overall CCP sample, in this
chapter we focus on the 5 percent primary sample members.
The data set includes detailed data on individual student loans and
individual mortgage loans, such as
•

month and year the account was opened,

•

current balance and payment status,

•

origination balance,

•

whether the account is individual or joint,

•

scheduled monthly payment,

•

narrative codes giving details of the account (such as the payment is deferred), and

•

industry code indicating the type of the servicer.

In addition, the data set includes somewhat more aggregated data on
individuals’ other loans, including credit cards, and auto loans, such as
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•

total number of each type of account (for example, the total
number of credit cards);

•

credit limit on each type of account (for example, the combined
credit limit on all credit cards); and

•

total balance on each type of account in each status (for example, the total credit card balance that is current, 30-days delinquent, and so on).

More general information regarding the borrower on the credit
report includes
•

residential location of the borrower at the census block level
and also zipcode level;

•

birth year of the borrower;

•

indicators for whether the individual has a foreclosure or bankruptcy within the last 24 months, and ever, on the report;

•

indicators for whether the individual has any accounts in collection and the amount of collection; and

•

a consumer credit score that is analogous to the well-known
FICO score.

The data are completely anonymous and stripped of all personal
identiﬁers. Unfortunately, while the vast majority of student loan servicers report to credit bureaus, these data do not distinguish between
private and federal loans. Outside reports suggest that private loans
account for approximately 15 percent of aggregate student debt.
Although a number of reports have pointed to differences in the growth,
size, and performance of private and federal loans, this limitation of our
data will require a focus on the total student debt burden.

GROWTH OF STUDENT DEBT
Between 2004 and 2012, total student debt in the United States
nearly tripled, from $364 billion in 2004 to $966 billion in 2012
(see Figure 3.1). Expressed in annual terms, this means student debt
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Figure 3.1 Total Student Loan Balances, by Age Group
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.

increased by an average of 14 percent per year. As of the end of 2012,
about two-thirds of this debt is owed by borrowers under the age of 40,
with about one-third of the total being owed by borrowers under the
age of 30. Americans older than 40 also have student debt, but their
share is much smaller, with 17 percent held by borrowers in their 40s,
12 percent held by borrowers in their 50s, and the remainder held by
borrowers 60 and older.
Among the various types of household debt, student debt is unique.
While balances on all other forms of household debt—including
mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and home equity lines of credit—
declined during and after the Great Recession, student debt has steadily
risen, as shown in Figure 3.2 (see Brown et al. [2013] for a discussion of
dynamics of other kinds of household debts during the 2000s). In 2010,
student debt surpassed credit cards to become the second-largest form
of household debt after mortgages, whereas prior to 2008, the student
debt was the smallest of household debts.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 40

1/28/2015 8:22:12 AM

Measuring Student Debt and Its Performance 41

Figure 3.2 Nonmortgage Balances Reported on Consumer Credit Reports
1,000
900
800
700

$, billions

600
500
400
300

HELOC
Credit card

200

Auto loan
Student loan

100
0
04:Q4

05:Q4

06:Q4

07:Q4

08:Q4

09:Q4

10:Q4

11:Q4

12:Q4

SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.

What accounts for the rapid increase of the aggregate student debt
in this period? Our research shows that increases in number of borrowers and the average debt per person equally contributed to the growth
of total student debt. Between 2004 and 2012, the number of borrowers increased by 70 percent from 23 million borrowers to 39 million
(see Figure 3.3). In the same period, average debt per borrower also
increased by 70 percent, from about $15,000 to $25,000.
Note, however, that there is actually a great variation in balances
among borrowers, as shown in Figure 3.4. Of the 39 million borrowers,
about 40 percent have balances of less than $10,000. Approximately
another 30 percent owe between $10,000 and $25,000. Only 3.7 percent
of borrowers have balances of more than $100,000, with 0.6 percent, or
roughly 230,000 borrowers nationwide, having more than $200,000 of
debt.
With respect to the rise in the number of borrowers, Figure 3.5
shows that a steadily increasing share of younger people are taking out
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Figure 3.3 Number of Borrowers and Average Balances Per Borrower
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of Student Loan Balances in Q4 2012
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Figure 3.5 Percentage of 25-Year-Olds with Student Debt
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student loans: in 2004, only about 27 percent of 25-year-olds had student debt, while eight years later, in 2012, the proportion of 25-yearolds with student debt increased to about 43 percent.
There are several explanations for these increases. First, more people are attending college, adding to the number of borrowers (National
Center for Education Statistics 2013). Second, students are staying in
college longer and attending graduate school in greater numbers, and
loans to ﬁnance graduate study have become more readily available
(Gonzales, Allum, and Sowell 2013). Third, it has become cheaper for
parents to take out student loans to help ﬁnance their children’s education.3 Fourth, the cost of a college education has continued to grow
sharply during the period (College Board 2013).
If student borrowers complete their education and quickly start
repaying their debt, then the increase in the number of borrowers and in
the total amount of student debt would in part be offset by the outﬂow.
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However, as we will discuss in the next section, the repayment rate on
student loans is low. This is because many borrowers delay payments
through continuing education, deferrals, forbearance, and income-based
repayment plans. Some borrowers have difﬁculty making required payments, become delinquent on their debt, and ultimately default, which
for federal loans is deﬁned as falling 270 days behind on payments. In
addition, discharging student debt is very difﬁcult; the delinquent debt
stays with the borrower, and the high rate of inﬂow and the low rate of
outﬂow contribute to the increase in the total student debt outstanding.

STUDENT LOAN DELINQUENCY
Over the past eight years there has been an increase in payment
difﬁculties for student loan borrowers. The most common measure of
inability to meet the debt obligation is the proportion of borrowers 90
days or more past due on their payments. We refer to this as the “measured delinquency rate.”
As of the fourth quarter of 2012, about 17 percent, or 6.7 million
borrowers, were 90 days or more delinquent on their student loan payments; see the left panel of Figure 3.6. The measured delinquency rate is
higher among borrowers aged 30–49 than it is among younger or older
borrowers, which is unexpected since typically younger borrowers
have higher delinquency rates. There was a strongly increasing trend in
delinquency between 2004 and 2012 among all age groups, with measured delinquency rising from an overall rate of less than 10 percent in
2004 to 17 percent in 2012.
The measured delinquency rate on student debt is currently the
highest of any consumer debt product, although for most of the last
decade credit card delinquency was even higher. 4 Nonetheless, the
measured delinquency rate is somewhat misleading, and the effective
delinquency rate on student debt (as we deﬁne below) is even higher.
As noted above, in 2012 the measured delinquency rate among the 39
million borrowers was 17 percent. But many of the remaining 83 percent in fact were not paying down their loan balances. While 39 percent
did reduce their balance from the previous quarter by at least one dollar,
14 percent of borrowers had the same balance as the previous quarter.
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Figure 3.6 Delinquency Rates for Borrowers Overall and for Those
in Repayment (%)
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A full 30 percent of borrowers actually saw an increase in their balance.
In other words, 44 percent of borrowers were neither delinquent nor
paying down their loans.
Those borrowers whose balances did not decline are likely not yet
in the repayment cycle, meaning that they were either still in school,
in deferral, or in a forbearance period delaying their regular payments. This group may also include some borrowers who participate in
income-based repayment plans and make only small payments, which
are often insufﬁcient to cover the accumulated interest. In order to have
a more accurate picture of the delinquency rate, we calculate the “effective delinquency rate” by excluding this 44 percent of borrowers not
in repayment; the result is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 3.6.
This effective delinquency rate is nearly double the measured delinquency rate, with almost one-third of borrowers in repayment being
delinquent on their debt. Interestingly, borrowers under 30, who previously appeared to have a lower measured delinquency rate than the
30–49 age group, are now shown to have the highest effective delinquency rate. The fact that fewer of these younger borrowers are in the
repayment cycle masks high effective delinquency rates among those
who are.
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Figure 3.7 Quarterly Transition Rate into Delinquency, Borrowers
in Repayment
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It is important to note that because of the unique character of student debt, an increasing delinquency rate deﬁned either way does not
necessarily imply that a greater percentage of new borrowers are falling behind on repayment. Borrowers who became delinquent in the
past and remain so are included in the delinquency rate. Some may
also default, which, again, is deﬁned as being more than 270 days past
due in the case of federal loans. Because student debt is not generally
dischargeable, even in bankruptcy, the delinquency rate may continue
to increase even when the percentage of borrowers becoming newly
delinquent remains constant.
We address this issue in Figure 3.7, which depicts the proportion
of borrowers in repayment who became newly delinquent on a quarterly basis. Here we see that in 2005 about 6 percent of nondelinquent
borrowers in repayment transitioned into delinquency each quarter, on
average. By 2012, that rate had increased to 9 percent. This conﬁrms
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that indeed there was an increasing trend of borrowers becoming newly
delinquent over time.

STUDENT DEBT’S ROLE ON THE HOUSEHOLD
BALANCE SHEET
An advantage of our data is that they allow us to look at all the
liabilities on each individual’s balance sheet and to put educational debt
and delinquencies into the broader context of household debt. In this
section, we refer to non–student loan debt as “other debt.”
Figure 3.8 reports on other debts for borrowers aged 25–30 in 2005
(left panel) and 2012 (right), by their levels of student debt outstanding. In 2005, the average amount of other debt held by student loan
Figure 3.8 Average Non–Student Loan Balances, Borrowers Aged 25–30
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borrowers aged 25–30 exceeded student loan debt, which was $18,200.
Interestingly, there was a positive association between student debt and
other debt, such as mortgages, credit cards, and auto loans. Borrowers
with higher student loan balances used to have more other debt compared to those with lower or no student debt. After all, student debt has
historically been an indicator that the borrower has some level of higher
education and thus a higher permanent income, so it is perhaps unsurprising to see this reﬂected in the balances on other debts.
Following the general trend of household deleveraging outside of
student debt in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis (Brown et al. 2013),
other debt balances declined for all borrowers between 2005 and 2012.
But they declined much more for borrowers with student loans, so that
student loan borrowers now have lower other debt at around $20,000,
on average. Meanwhile, the average student debt among student loan
borrowers increased to $26,500 for those who were between 25 and 30
in 2012. The decline in other debt was especially visible among those
with high levels of student debt. As a result, the previous positive association between student and other debts has disappeared.
The shift we observe is an outcome of the interplay between supply
and demand factors, and it is difﬁcult to disentangle them. Borrowers
with higher student loan balances may have become less conﬁdent about
their future labor market and income prospects and therefore reduced
their demand for credit. On the other hand, lenders may have become
more conservative in supplying loans to high-balance student loan borrowers. Likely, both demand and supply factors played a signiﬁcant role
in the sharp reduction in the accumulation of other debt by high student
loan borrowers.
Brown and Caldwell (2013) discuss the implications of student debt
and delinquencies on access to other forms of credit such as auto and
mortgage ﬁnancing. Figure 3.9 complements that analysis. In 2005,
many young student debt borrowers, even those with a balance of more
than $100,000, were able to ﬁnance a home purchase. The fact that more
of these high student loan borrowers did so than those with lower or
no student loan balances most likely reﬂects differences in income and
higher postgraduate degree attainments (including holders of professional degrees with good labor market prospects). However, the large
homeownership gap between high, low, and no student loan borrowers
has since declined considerably.
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Figure 3.9 Mortgages among Student Loan Borrowers Aged 25–30
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Again, it is difﬁcult to distinguish demand and supply factors, but
it appears likely that the sharp decline in mortgage originations among
the high student debt borrowers in part reﬂects a tightening of mortgage eligibility, for example, through maximum debt to income ratio
requirements. Brown and Caldwell (2013) provide further evidence of
a decline in access to credit by student loan borrowers, showing that
while student loan borrowers aged 25 (or 30) used to have average
credit scores comparable to those without student debt, by 2012 they
had considerably lower average credit scores. This may be attributable
in part to the high student debt delinquency rate.
Delinquent student loan borrowers have (perhaps not surprisingly)
always been much less likely—or able—to borrow for a home purchase.
There are now many more delinquent borrowers than in 2005. In light

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 49

1/28/2015 8:22:22 AM

50 Brown et al.

of the increasing student debt burden and the growth in the delinquency
rate, especially among young borrowers, student debt is likely to have
an important inﬂuence on borrowers’ use of other types of credit, particularly mortgage credit.
Figure 3.10 addresses the association between delinquencies on
student debt and other debt. Not surprisingly, delinquent student loan
borrowers are more likely to also be delinquent on other debts. They are
delinquent on 17 percent of their auto loan balances, on 35 percent of
their credit card balances, and on 28 percent of their mortgage balances,
and these rates are much higher compared to those with no delinquent
student debt.
Figure 3.10 Student Loan and Other Debt Delinquency, 25–30-Year-Olds,
2012:Q4
40
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax.
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CONCLUSION
Higher education is an important investment among younger individuals to equip them for better job prospects and higher income potential, but over the last several years it has been accompanied by a growing
student debt burden. Total student loan balances almost tripled between
2004 and 2012, owing to increasing numbers of borrowers and higher
balances per borrower; educational debt is now the second-largest liability on household balance sheets, after mortgages. Nearly one-third of
the borrowers in repayment are delinquent on student debt, a fact that is
masked by the large numbers of borrowers who are in either deferment
or grace periods. While we do not establish causality, it appears that the
higher burden of student loans and the associated high delinquency rate
negatively affect borrowers’ home purchases, other debt payments, and
access to credit.

Notes
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The authors are
grateful to Brian Cadena and Raven Molloy for helpful comments.
1. See Avery, Calen, and Canner (2003) for a detailed discussion of the contents,
sources, and quality of credit report data.
2. See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for further details about the sample design and
content of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel.
3. “Student Loans,” accessed February 8, 2014, http://www.ﬁnaid.org/loans/parent
loan.phtml.
4. See the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s quarterly report on household debt
and credit, where delinquency rates are reported as a percentage of outstanding
balances rather than as a percentage of borrowers. Available at http://www.new
yorkfed.org/microeconomics/data.html (accessed February 10, 2014).
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Within the past 21 months, there have been almost as many major
news articles on the topic of student debt as there were in the preceding 21 years.1 Headlines have trumpeted the stories of recent graduates
with six-ﬁgure debt levels and aggregate loan balances exceeding $1
trillion.2 A growing number of policy organizations and Web sites have
begun to focus and compile information on student debt.3 And, perhaps
in response, President Obama announced in August of 2013 a major
initiative to address rising college costs.4 Despite this increased attention on debt writ large, surprisingly little is known about how student
debt has changed for different types of students or what factors can
explain it.
Yet, understanding the patterns and factors underlying debt increase
is paramount, both for ensuring that students and their families have
a realistic, well-informed picture of college ﬁnance, and for guiding
policymakers toward debt-amelioration strategies for those who need
them most. Considerable focus is spent on average debt levels because
these are easy to update frequently, but this may be misguided. The distribution of debt is so diffuse, as we show, that changes in the mean are
not informative for most students. For example, an increase in borrowing among the top 10 percent of borrowers will increase the mean and
total accumulated debt—numbers commonly reported—but leave debt
levels for 90 percent of students unchanged. This may seem a convenient hypothetical, but it actually closely resembles how debt evolved
for college graduates between 2000 and 2008. In short, factors that
53
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inﬂuence debt for the median borrower may be quite different from
those that inﬂuence debt for borrowers in the highest decile. The effectiveness of policy proposals meant to address “rising student debt” rests
on how they recognize these phenomena.
In this chapter, we use the National Postsecondary Student Aid
Study (NPSAS) to investigate the growing student debt of college graduates—those earning a bachelor’s degree. Our focus on this segment
of students is not because other groups (graduate students, students
with subbaccalaureate degrees, students leaving without any credential) have not experienced rising debt—they have—or because they are
unimportant. Rather, the choice is motivated by the recent media interest in college graduates and the desire to limit the analysis to a manageable scale.5 The data cover the period between 1990 and 2008, and our
analysis examines the entire distribution of borrowing among graduates. In addition to documenting how the distribution has changed over
time, for all graduates and subgroups, we employ statistical decompositions to apportion the changes by various observable characteristics,
such as demographics, attendance patterns, incomes, and costs. Notably, the decompositions allow the role of observable factors to vary at
different points of the distribution.
In broad terms, our major ﬁndings are that debt proﬁles increased
much more in the 1990s than in the 2000s, with the largest part of this
increase occurring in the latter part of the decade. The growth occurred
throughout the distribution. Between 2000 and 2008, debt increases
were concentrated almost entirely in the top quartile of the distribution
and at private institutions, and they stemmed largely from the expansion of private borrowing. About one-third of the overall increase in
debt at graduation between 1990 and 2008 is explained by observable
characteristics of the students and the schools they attend. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that observables explain more of the increase at the extensive
margin (whether a student ever borrowed) and around the median than
they do near the top of the distribution. Of the explained share, roughly
half can be attributed to college costs alone, although this still implies
that costs account for a small fraction of the total increase in borrowing.
When we look at intermediate time intervals, observables explain
most of the increase in borrowing—between 50 and 100 percent, or
more—from 1990 to 1996 and 2000 to 2008. While cost structure plays
an important role, so do other factors, and again there is a greater role
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for unexplained factors in the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast,
observables explain practically none of the debt increase between 1996
and 2000, and this is true throughout the entire distribution.
We investigate several possibilities that might show up as “unexplained” factors in driving debt increases in the upper tail and throughout the distribution in the late 1990s, including movement from informal
to formal loans, redistribution of debt from parents to students, variation in interest rates, increases in federal borrowing limits, the introduction of unsubsidized loans (which are not means tested), and the
growing market for private loans. While the ﬁrst four of these appear
to be unimportant, we ﬁnd suggestive evidence that the latter two may
play a prominent role.
We note a number of caveats to our analyses. First, we are not able
at this time to examine the distributional changes, if any, that occurred
as a result of the Great Recession starting in December 2007.6 As documented by the College Board (2012a), aggregate borrowing increased
signiﬁcantly during and after this recession. A second caveat is that the
NPSAS data contain information only on current and graduating students. As such, they do not contain data on postgraduation labor market
experiences or repayment information, and our chapter cannot consider
these important outcomes. Third, while the data are quite rich in detail,
they do not contain information on previous institutions attended (and
the net costs thereof), so differences across students (and over time) in
transfer behavior are not captured in the analysis. Finally, the data do
not fully document alternative loan sources, including informal loans
from friends and family or borrowing against existing assets. Nonetheless, our chapter is the ﬁrst to investigate distributional changes in borrowing over time and link these to changing characteristics of student
attendance.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
data source and presents descriptive statistics and distributions from
it. We then review the decomposition methods that are used to explain
the reasons behind borrowing trends. The results of those decompositions are then presented, followed by a discussion of possible factors
that could account for the unexplained portion of the decompositions.
Finally, we offer concluding remarks. Two appendices to the chapter
describe the data processing in detail and provide an overview of the
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market for student borrowing, including the structure of terms and borrowing limits, from approximately 1980 through today.

THE NPSAS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The NPSAS is an approximately quadrennial survey of students
attending Title IV institutions (those eligible for federal aid) that is conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. The nationally
representative cross-sectional survey is designed speciﬁcally to gather
information on how different students pay for higher education.7 It provides student-level information on ﬁnancial aid provided by the federal
government, the states, postsecondary institutions, employers, and private agencies, along with student demographics and enrollment characteristics. The restricted-use version we employ has incredibly rich
detail, including administrative data on student ﬁnancial aid programs
merged from both the Free Application for Federal Student Aid and the
National Student Loan Data System, the central database for all federal loans. Extensive data about family circumstances, demographics,
education and work experiences, and student expectations are collected
from students through an interview.
The survey waves are reasonably consistent over time, which is
important for our analyses of the debt burdens of graduating seniors
from ﬁve waves: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 (the most recent
available).8 The richness of the data is important because our goals
are to understand why student debt is growing and for whom. Having
cross-sections with large sample sizes and spanning almost two decades
allows us to examine the growth in student debt over the entire distribution of college graduates. This allows far more nuanced analyses than
are possible by examining means or population totals. (More information about the NPSAS and how we process the data for analysis can be
found in Appendix 4A.)
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DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES
Table 4.1 summarizes changes in the distribution of student borrowing at graduation. There were substantial increases over the last two
decades in both the rate of borrowing for bachelor’s degree earners and
in the real levels of borrowing. Between 1990 and 2008, the fraction
of graduates who borrowed increased by 13 percentage points, from
about 55 percent to over 68 percent, with the sharpest increase occurring between 1996 and 2000.
The next panel of the table lists quantiles of borrowing for all graduates, including those who did not borrow at all, in constant dollars. Mean
levels have more than doubled over the 18-year horizon, with more
than $5,000 of the total $10,000 increase coming between the classes of
1996 and 2000. Since 2000, however, average debt has increased more
modestly. This trend of rapid debt increase over the 1990s and milder
increases over the 2000s is apparent through at least the 75th percentile.
Only in the extreme right tail, above the 95th percentile, has borrowing
continued to grow as quickly as it did in the 1990s.
The last panel shows that, among borrowers, the median level of
borrowing more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, from about
$10,400 to just under $22,000. However, that level remained stable
between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the mean level of borrowing increased between 2000 and 2008 as the individuals in the upper
tail of the borrowing distribution signiﬁcantly increased their levels of
borrowing. Even so, while there have been media suggestions of individuals graduating with six-ﬁgure levels of debt, these data suggest that
such instances are quite rare, as the 99th percentile of borrowers did not
reach that level of borrowing in any of the waves (see also Kantrowitz
[2012]).
Table 4.1 thus illustrates two facts that are not well known in either
the academic or popular press. First, debt at graduation increased much
faster between 1990 and 2000 than it did during 2000 and 2008, and
this was true throughout the distribution. Second, the increase in borrowing in the later period was entirely concentrated in the top quartile;
the bottom 75 percent of graduates of the class of 2008 had roughly the
same debt as the classes of 2000 and 2004. These facts can perhaps be
more directly seen in Figure 4.1, which displays the cumulative bor-

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 57

1/28/2015 8:22:26 AM

58 Hershbein and Hollenbeck

Table 4.1 Cumulative Borrowing Statistics from NPSAS, by Wave
1990
1996
2000
2004
2008
Ever borrow
0.545 0.526 0.636 0.656 0.682
Total borrowing ($000s)
Mean
7.2
9.2
14.4
14.8
17.2
25th
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Median
1.9
2.5
10.9
11.6
13.1
75th
11.4
17.7
24.5
23.8
26.6
90th
20.8
25.4
34.8
36.4
42.5
95th
27.3
30.8
42.5
47.7
52.1
99th
48.1
44.9
60.6
65.6
85.0
Total borrowing among
borrowers ($000s)
Mean
13.2
17.6
22.6
22.6
25.2
10th
2.4
5.4
5.6
6.0
5.9
25th
4.8
9.7
12.9
11.9
12.4
Median
10.4
17.0
21.8
20.4
21.3
75th
18.0
23.6
29.3
29.8
33.1
90th
25.7
30.2
38.8
42.6
47.8
95th
32.1
35.1
49.0
51.6
56.0
99th
64.2
51.6
64.5
72.7
90.3
NOTE: Statistics use population weights (of late 2013 vintage) and are for domestic
students in the year indicated. Monetary amounts are inﬂated to year 2012 dollars
using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes
loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

rowing distributions of graduates from each wave of the NPSAS in constant dollars. The remainder of this chapter seeks to gain understanding
of the factors that shifted the borrowing distribution so dramatically
between 1990 and 2000, and the factors that shifted the upper tail of the
distribution between 2000 and 2008.
Our ﬁrst analysis is entirely descriptive and is meant to isolate
changes in debt among certain subgroups. We examine four of these:
1) dependent versus independent students; 2) public versus private,
not-for-proﬁt institutions; 3) graduates who took four or fewer years
to degree versus those who took ﬁve or more years; and, 4) for dependent students, those whose family income is above versus below the
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Figure 4.1 Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among
College Graduates
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends
and family.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

median.9 Figure 4.2 displays the cumulative borrowing distributions for
dependent and independent students. As would be expected, the proportion of dependent students with loans is smaller than the proportion of independent students with loans, and the levels of borrowing are
much smaller for dependent students in all years of the data. While the
distributions for dependent students are qualitatively quite similar to
the overall distributions (Figure 4.1), the distributions for independent
students show a relatively smooth, monotonically increasing pattern
over time. That is, each wave’s distribution (ﬁrst-order) stochastically
dominates the preceding wave, which is not at all true for dependent
students, whose debt proﬁle in 2004 is smaller than in 2000 for the
middle segment of the distribution. Nonetheless, both graphs show substantially larger increases in debt over the 1990s than over the 2000s.
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Figure 4.2 Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate
Subgroups, Dependency
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SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

Figure 4.3 shows the comparison between public schools and private, not-for-proﬁts. It is not surprising that both the propensity to ever
borrow and borrowing levels are greater in all time periods at the latter institutions. What is less well known is the remarkable similarity
in the debt proﬁles at publics across the 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves.
Aside from a slight increase between 2004 and 2008 in the upper tail,
balanced by a modest decrease between 2000 and 2004 in the middle,
the distributions almost lie on top of one another. Although much has
been made of the decline in state-level appropriations to public universities during the Great Recession (Lewin 2013), these appropriations
had actually fallen by about 15 percent per full-time equivalent student
between 2000 and 2004, and they still remained below 2000 levels at
the start of the recession (College Board 2012b, Figure 12B; Quinterno
and Orozco 2012, Figure 6). Despite these reductions (and concomitant
tuition increases), debt of graduating students changed little, especially
relative to the large increases over the 1990s. On the other hand, while
debt also increased little over the 2000s for the bottom 60 percent at
privates, it increased substantially for the top 40 percent, with the size
of increase rising with the distribution quantile. Above the 80th percen-
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate
Subgroups, Sector
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SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

tile, the debt increase between 2000 and 2008 was comparable to that
between 1990 and 2000.
Turning to Figure 4.4, we look at debt distributions by time to
degree, although data limitations restrict the analysis to the 1996 and
later waves. Students who take longer to ﬁnish accumulate more debt,
almost mechanically, and as in the previous groups, debt increases
faster between 1996 and 2000 than it does over the following eight
years. However, for students who graduate on time, debt actually fell
between 2000 and 2008 through the 80th percentile while rising, often
considerably, above that quantile. Among the students who took longer,
debt increased modestly but monotonically throughout the distribution.
Finally, we compare dependent bachelor’s degree recipients by
family income in Figure 4.5. In general, borrowing levels are not that
dissimilar across the income groups; although students from wealthier
families have more resources, they also tend to graduate from more
expensive schools. The standard pattern of fast debt increases during
the 1990s is present here, but the most striking trend is that this increase
is mostly concentrated between 1990 and 1996 for the lower-income
group and (more than) entirely concentrated between 1996 and 2000
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Figure 4.4 Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate
Subgroups, Time to Degree
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Figure 4.5 Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate
Subgroups, Income of Dependents
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for the upper-income group. A related point is that for the latter time
period the borrowing rate increased only mildly for the poorer students;
however, it increased by 25 percentage points, from 30 percent to 55
percent, for wealthier students. Taken together, these trends imply that
changing factors between 1996 and 2000 had a disproportionate impact
on student borrowers whose family incomes were above the median
and affected borrowing at all levels, not just the top.
A few themes from these comparisons stand out. First, the large
increase in debt that occurred throughout the distribution between
1990 and 2000 (Figure 4.1) is common to all the subgroups examined,
suggesting that behavioral or policy differences, and not composition
effects, are more likely to be the prime suspect. Second, “traditional”
graduates (dependents who ﬁnish on time) experienced debt increases
over the 2000s only in the top portion of the distribution, while “nontraditional” students’ debt increases were more uniform.
The next section describes the decomposition methods we employ
to systematically unpack changes in the empirical distributions.

DECOMPOSITION TECHNIQUES
To examine the factors behind increases in borrowing, we employ
three different econometric decomposition techniques: 1) OaxacaBlinder, 2) semiparametric reweighting, and 3) recentered inﬂuence
functions. While the ﬁrst of these techniques is common in the literature, it is not suitable for decomposing statistics other than the mean.
The second and third techniques, while not as well known, allow for the
decomposition of the entire distribution of borrowing. Below we brieﬂy
describe each of these techniques, including strengths and weaknesses.
Oaxaca-Blinder
This technique, independently published by Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973), linearly decomposes the average difference in outcomes
across groups into differences in observable characteristics and differences in structural factors. Formally, let Yi=Xi βi+ εi for i = A,B. Then
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(4.1)

 ܧሾܻ െ ܻ ሿ ൌ ሼ ܧሾܺ ሿ െ  ܧሾܺ ሿሽߚ  כ ሼ ܧሾܺ ሿሺߚ െ ߚ  כሻ
  ܧሾܺ ሿሺߚ  כെ ߚ ሻሽǤ

The left-hand term represents the average difference between groups A
and B. The ﬁrst term in braces on the right shows the difference in average observables between the groups, multiplied by a common or reference coefﬁcient vector, β. Since Xi is observable for both groups, this
component is considered to be what is “explained” by observables. The
second term in braces is the difference between the group-speciﬁc coefﬁcient vector and the reference coefﬁcient vector, scaled by the observables, for both groups. Since deviations from the reference coefﬁcient
are generally not known, this component is considered to be structural
or “unexplained.”10 It is common in many economic applications (notably, wage discrimination) to set the reference coefﬁcient β* to the estimates of either βB or βA. In this case, one of the terms in the second pair
of braces drops out, and the “unexplained” portion is the (scaled) deviation of one group’s estimated coefﬁcient vector from the other’s.11 In
other cases, the reference coefﬁcient is set to a weighted average of βA
and βB, in which the weights depend on the application (see Jann [2008]
for an overview).
In practice, Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition is straightforward to implement. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are performed on groups A and B, separately, and Equation (4.1) is calculated
using estimates of βA and βB from these regressions. The technique thus
permits detailed decompositions that allow the contribution from each
element of Xi (or β) to be estimated, as well as their sum. It is worth
noting, however, that the εi terms cancel out as a result of the expectations operator (and the standard OLS assumptions). For this reason,
O-B decomposition is valid only for the conditional mean function.
In this chapter, we use the O-B decomposition to investigate
changes in the extensive margin of having ever borrowed at the time
of college graduation as well as mean borrowing levels. Our choice of
reference coefﬁcients is the set from the earlier time period in the comparison, although we consider the sensitivity of our results to other sets
of base coefﬁcients.
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Semiparametric Reweighting
Proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) in their analysis
of changes in the wage distribution, this technique reweights observations from one group so that the joint distributions of the Xi are similar for both groups. By dealing with the joint distributions of the Xi ,
this reweighting technique overcomes the linearity restriction of O-B
and allows the construction of a counterfactual distribution, not just the
counterfactual mean. Thus, quantiles and other distributional statistics
such as variances or Gini coefﬁcients can be compared.12
Semiparametric reweighting is implemented by performing a logit
or probit regression on the pooled sample, with the dependent variable
being equal to one if an observation is in group A and equal to zero
if it is in group B.13 The right-hand-side variables include all the elements of X, and in some cases interaction terms as well. Fitted values, p̂,
Ƹ
from this regression are used to construct propensity weights, ͳ െ Ƹ , for
group B; weights for group A are set equal to one. If data are sample
weighted, the propensity weights can be multiplied by the sampling
weights to create composite weights. Distributional statistics for the
two groups can be compared by using these composite weights for each
group.
We employ this approach to compare the cumulative distributions
of borrowing across time periods while controlling for the joint distribution of observables. However, a shortcoming of the reweighting is that
it does not easily allow attribution to a speciﬁc (marginal) component of
X. While it is possible to perform the reweighting multiple times, leaving out one element of X each time, to isolate the contribution of that
particular X element on the borrowing distribution, doing so is somewhat cumbersome and tedious for a nontrivially dimensioned vector of
X. This drawback motivates the third decomposition technique.
Recentered Inﬂuence Functions
This technique, suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), is
an extension of O-B for statistics beyond the mean, particularly unconditional quantiles. For any quantile q, deﬁne the recentered inﬂuence
function (RIF) as
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(4.2)
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where Yq is the value of Y at quantile q, f(Yq) is the density of Y at q
and needs to be estimated, and 1(Y ≤ Yq) is an indicator function that
equals one if, for a given observation, Y is less than or equal to Yq and
zero otherwise. Note that RIFq takes on only two values determined by
whether Y exceeds Yq. The RIF has the interesting property that E[RIFq]
= Yq.14 Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) show that performing O-B on
the RIF can recover decompositions at the unconditional quantiles of Y.
While it is easy to estimate Yq in a sample, it is more challenging
to estimate f(Yq). The density is commonly estimated using kernel density methods, and these are somewhat sensitive to bandwidth choices,
particularly for distributions, like those for cumulative borrowing, that
are not unimodal and roughly symmetric. On the other hand, the similarity to O-B allows the marginal contribution of speciﬁc elements of
X to be analyzed much more easily than in the case of semiparametric
reweighting.
The Observables
The usefulness of each of the decomposition methods depends on
the set of observed variables. Fortunately, the NPSAS data are especially rich. In addition to core demographics such as age, dependency
status, sex, ethnicity, and marital status, the set of controls include parents’ education, the student’s state of permanent residence, the region
of the school, whether the student is in state, whether attendance is full
or part time and full or part year, the type of institution attended, a set of
majors, and whether the student changed schools during the last year.15
In addition to these variables, all of which are binary or categorical,
we include a quartic in expected family contribution (EFC) interacted
with dependency status, a quartic in list tuition (or cost of attendance),
a quartic in grants, and full interactions of the cost and grant measures.16
We have chosen to include costs and grants with interactions separately,
instead of a simple polynomial in net cost (e.g., tuition less grants)
because the former approach is more ﬂexible and allows behavioral
considerations (such as a response to nominal instead of net prices)
while still nesting the more traditional assumption of net cost.17
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Despite this detail, the data are not quite ideal. The cross-sectional
design of NPSAS limits what is observed about attendance history.
While it would be useful to know the cost, ﬁnancial-aid structure, and
attendance intensity for all years before graduation, we see only the
ﬁnal year and must use these data as a proxy for the entire undergraduate experience. Subject to this caveat, summary statistics of these variables, by wave, are presented in Appendix Tables 4C.1 (for continuous
measures) and 4C.2 (for categorical measures). We will often refer back
to these measures in our discussion of the decomposition results.

DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
Oaxaca-Blinder and Ever Borrowed
We ﬁrst seek to explain the sharp increase in the propensity of having ever borrowed that occurred between 1996 and 2000. As this is
a binary outcome, and we are interested in the mean change, we use
Oaxaca-Blinder and focus across different time intervals that span the
borrowing spike. In each of the time intervals, the reference coefﬁcients
are set equal to those from the earlier period. The composition effects
thus capture changes in the joint means of the observables, assuming
that the relationship between the observables and borrowing was the
same in the later period as it was in the earlier period. This implies that
decompositions with different starting periods are not strictly comparable, but they may still be informative. For ease of presentation, we
group the observable variables into seven more aggregate categories:
1) age and dependency status; 2) sex, marital status, and ethnicity;
3) both parents’ education level (including missing); 4) state of permanent residence, region of school, and in-state status; 5) institutional sector, attendance intensity, and major; 6) EFC; and 7) tuition and grants
and interactions.18 The ﬁrst panel of Table 4.2A looks at the 1990–2000
time period, during which the borrowing rate increased by 9 percentage
points. The decomposition shows that about 4 percentage points (45
percent) of the increase was due to observable factors, with most of the
effect concentrated in EFC (the mean of which fell in this time period)
and tuition (which rose). The remaining share of the increase was due
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Table 4.2A Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Tuition
1990–2000
1990–2008
Mean difference (percentage points)
9.03
(1.40)
13.64
(1.42)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.27
(0.33)
−0.81
(0.44)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.86
(0.49)
0.99
(0.55)
Parental education
−0.42
(0.30)
−0.43
(0.46)
Location, in-state status
−1.01
(0.67)
−1.75
(0.66)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.01
(1.99)
0.68
(1.09)
Expected family contribution
1.09
(0.28)
0.64
(0.41)
Tuition and grants
3.40
(1.81)
6.75
(1.98)
Total
4.05
(1.51)
6.08
(2.38)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
3.07
(1.57)
5.77
(1.59)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−4.04
(4.58)
−5.43
(4.31)
Parental education
1.51
(1.34)
0.36
(1.09)
Location, in-state status
1.72
(2.05)
1.55
(2.15)
School sector, attendance, major
−1.94
(11.85)
−2.01
(10.65)
Expected family contribution
−6.33
(2.34)
−1.65
(2.12)
Tuition and grants
0.90
(5.41)
−2.20
(6.25)
Constant
10.08
(14.51)
11.16
(14.40)
Total
4.98
(1.57)
7.55
(2.24)

1996–2000
10.99
(2.02)

1996–2008
15.60
(2.05)

−0.09
0.85
0.98
0.41
1.75
−1.08
−0.73
2.07

(0.39)
(0.52)
(0.69)
(0.83)
(0.69)
(0.84)
(1.33)
(2.16)

1.12
1.27
1.31
0.49
0.86
−2.44
2.30
4.91

(0.79)
(0.65)
(0.93)
(0.87)
(1.05)
(1.15)
(1.92)
(2.96)

−0.08
11.94
1.13
−1.77
−5.92
9.90
−4.20
−2.07
8.93

(2.54)
(5.59)
(1.97)
(2.95)
(6.25)
(3.53)
(8.18)
(11.54)
(2.02)

0.33
10.25
−0.37
−2.76
−4.28
15.49
−6.99
−0.99
10.69

(2.65)
(5.10)
(1.59)
(3.03)
(5.73)
(3.14)
(9.60)
(11.44)
(2.68)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.2B Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Cost of Attendance
1990–2008
1996–2000
1990–2000
Mean difference (%-points)
9.03
(1.41)
13.64
(1.43)
10.99
(2.02)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.28
(0.32)
−0.76
(0.43)
−0.15
(0.39)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.91
(0.49)
1.11
(0.55)
0.87
(0.50)
Parental education
−0.41
(0.30)
−0.50
(0.46)
0.90
(0.67)
Location, in-state status
−1.02
(0.68)
−1.81
(0.66)
0.48
(0.86)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.51
(0.72)
0.32
(0.82)
1.75
(0.67)
Expected family contribution
1.18
(0.30)
0.77
(0.43)
−1.08
(0.86)
Attendance cost and grants
4.14
(0.94)
8.21
(1.34)
0.50
(1.53)
Total
4.57
(1.44)
7.34
(1.93)
3.27
(2.26)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
3.12
(1.57)
5.56
(1.60)
−0.43
(2.57)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−4.94
(4.61)
−6.80
(4.30)
12.78
(5.59)
Parental education
1.25
(1.33)
0.25
(1.08)
0.84
(1.98)
Location, in-state status
1.22
(2.05)
1.85
(2.21)
−1.51
(3.00)
School sector, attendance, major
−1.34
(3.91)
−2.99
(3.69)
−6.68
(6.15)
Expected family contribution
−7.37
(2.33)
−2.98
(2.12)
9.15
(3.50)
Attendance cost and grants
−22.89
(9.03)
−3.57
(10.88)
−0.31
(13.41)
Constant
35.42
(10.88)
14.99
(11.93)
−6.11
(15.16)
Total
4.47
(1.54)
6.30
(1.82)
7.73
(2.11)

1996–2008
15.60
(2.05)
1.12
1.29
1.18
0.50
0.81
−2.51
4.36
6.75

(0.78)
(0.65)
(0.91)
(0.90)
(1.05)
(1.16)
(1.86)
(2.94)

−0.30
10.69
−0.53
−1.69
−6.57
14.55
19.22
−26.54
8.88

(2.67)
(5.14)
(1.61)
(3.09)
(5.76)
(3.12)
(15.59)
(16.99)
(2.60)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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to changes in the coefﬁcients relating the observables to the outcome,
but the factor-speciﬁc estimates are too imprecise to isolate changes in
marginal relationships. When examining the longer interval from 1990
to 2008, again 45 percent of the increase is explained, with a slightly
greater role for tuition.19
The next two panels use 1996 as the base year. While there are
slightly larger increases in the percentage borrowing relative to the
1990 base year, the share of the increases attributable to the covariates
was smaller, between 20 and 30 percent. Furthermore, the explanatory
share in this horizon did not load so heavily on costs but was more
diffuse. On the other hand, the estimates on the coefﬁcients for EFC
are quite large and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that for a given
ability to pay, students were becoming more likely to borrow. However,
because the 1996 sample size is relatively small (see Appendix Table
4C.5), these coefﬁcient estimates are less reliable, and we treat them
cautiously.
Table 4.2B shows that if we use the broader cost of attendance measure instead of tuition (but leave other variables the same), the picture
is similar. A slightly larger share is accounted for by the observables—
between 50 and 55 percent for the 1990 base, and 30 and 40 percent
for the 1996 base—suggesting that increases in nontuition expenses
also increased borrowing. In summary, roughly half of the long-term
increase in the borrowing rate was due to observable factors, with cost
increases explaining the lion’s share. This leaves a substantial fraction due to structural changes, and more so if 1996 is used as the base
instead. Note that this pattern is consistent with the large increases in
the debt proﬁle between 1996 and 2000. The behavioral explanation for
this trend is a topic to which we will return.
Semiparametric Decompositions of the Distributions
What would the cumulative distribution of borrowing in 2008 look
like if the distribution of covariates were the same as it was in 1990?
Figure 4.6 answers this question by plotting the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) from 1990 and 2008 (as in Figure 4.1) against just
such a counterfactual distribution. Reweighting the 2008 distribution
shows that just over half of the increased propensity to borrow (the
change in density at zero) can be explained by changes in the covari-
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Figure 4.6 Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among
College Graduates, 1990, 2008, and Counterfactual 2008
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NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates
was the same as in 1990. (See text for the set of covariates used for reweighting.) All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and include studentlevel borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends and family.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

ates—very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder ﬁndings despite a quite different methodology. Moving up the distribution, changes in observables
explain approximately half of borrowing levels up to the median, but
they become less and less relevant in the higher quantiles. This result
is not entirely unexpected: changes in borrowing limits, both federal
and private (see Appendix 4B), are not included in the set of covariates, since they vary only over time and not in the cross-section, but we
would anticipate that their effect would be concentrated heavily in the
upper tail of the distribution.
The four panels of Figure 4.7 use the same reweighting approach
across shorter time intervals. By looking at different time horizons,
it is possible to locate when, and where in the distribution, structural
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changes were more important in affecting borrowing than covariates.
The top left panel reweights the covariate distribution in 1996 to resemble the distribution in 1990. Interestingly, the counterfactual shows a
much larger reduction in borrowing rates than actually took place, indicating that structural or policy changes increased the fraction of graduates who borrowed.20 For levels, the counterfactual for 1996 generally
gets more than halfway to the 1990 distribution between the 60th and
90th percentiles, and it is basically identical to the 1990 distribution for
the top decile. Observables clearly explain the bulk of the debt increase
between 1990 and 1996, and we will subsequently analyze which
observables were important to this change.
In contrast, the top right panel of Figure 4.7 illustrates a negligible role for observables between 1996 and 2000. Virtually all the
debt increase throughout the entire distribution is due to unexplained
or structural factors. Consistent with the Oaxaca-Blinder analysis, the
importance for behavioral changes is much greater in the late 1990s
than earlier that decade.21 In fact, the bottom left panel, looking at
changes between 1990 and 2000, is almost a composite of the previous
two panels, with the counterfactual distribution approaching the halfway point between the actual 1990 and 2000 distributions through the
50th percentile, and roughly a quarter of the way from the 2000 to 1990
distribution at higher quantiles. In some ways, this is reassuring, as it
suggests that the earlier results are not just due to small sample issues
in the 1996 wave. The last panel focuses on the change between 2000
and 2008, when debt proﬁles increased relatively little. Here, reweighting the covariates accounts for all the change up to the 80th percentile,
about half of the change between the 80th and 90th percentiles, and
almost none in the top decile.
From these decompositions, it appears that changes in observables
were responsible for much of the observed shifts in borrowing between
1990 and 1996 and again from 2000 to 2008. The exceptions are that
observables overexplain the lower tail in the early 1990s and underexplain the upper tail in the 2000s. Moreover, observables seem to have
no explanatory power during the late 1990s. What policy or behavioral
explanations ﬁt with these patterns is a topic we return to in the next
section. Before that, however, we turn to recentered inﬂuence function
decompositions in order to gauge which set of observables mattered
most.
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Figure 4.7 Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among
College Graduates, DFL Counterfactuals
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NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates
was the same as in 1990. (See Figure 4.6 for the set of covariates used for reweighting.) All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends
and family.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
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Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions
While the reweighting-based decompositions give a useful graphical overview, the RIF method allows for a greater level of detail of the
importance of speciﬁc factors. Table 4.3A presents the decompositions
over the 1990–2008 period for four statistics: the mean level of borrowing (which uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition), and the 50th, 75th,
and 90th percentiles of the distributions of debt. Of the mean difference
in borrowing levels of $9,940, only $1,940—or about 20 percent—is
explained, a result quite consistent with Figure 4.6. Although the largest component is due to cost structure, the coefﬁcient is imprecise.22
Smaller, but more precise, effects are due to changes in EFC and attendance patterns.23
At the median and 75th percentile, about one-third of the borrowing
increase is explained, which is somewhat less than in Figure 4.6 for the
median and somewhat more for the higher quantile, but not statistically
different in either case. At both quantiles, the factors that were important at the mean are still relevant, as well as a slight role for age due
to graduates being more likely to ﬁnish in their mid- to late 20s. At the
90th percentile, observables explain essentially nothing, as before, and
this appears to be due to the coefﬁcient on cost structure turning negative and canceling out the mostly positive effects from other factors.
Table 4.3B repeats the analysis using the broader cost of attendance
measure. The results are similar except for a slightly greater share
explained by observables, and this is entirely due to a higher loading on
cost structure (which is now statistically signiﬁcant). Nontuition costs
such as room and board matter, particularly in the top decile, where the
coefﬁcient is now positive and nearly 30 percent of the increase in borrowing is now explained.
Looking at the bigger picture, between 30 and 40 percent of the
debt increase between 1990 and 2008 at both the median and 75th percentiles is explained by observables, and half of this share (15–20 percent of the total increase) is due to changes in the cost structure alone
(mostly tuition). At the top decile of borrowing, changes in the tuition
and grant structure led to students borrowing less, but this reverses once
nontuition expenses are accounted for.24 A small share, between 5 and 7
percent, of the overall rise in borrowing is due to the increased ﬁnancial
resources among dependent students and decreased ﬁnancial resources
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Table 4.3A Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Tuition
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
9.94
(0.27)
11.17
(0.48)
15.19
(0.54)
21.66
(0.53)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.16
(0.08)
0.42
(0.14)
0.54
(0.17)
0.21
(0.18)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.11
(0.11)
0.18
(0.14)
0.14
(0.23) −0.11
(0.25)
Parental education
0.02
(0.10)
0.08
(0.11)
0.27
(0.20)
0.14
(0.20)
Location, in-state status
−0.14
(0.13) −0.37
(0.30) −0.18
(0.61)
0.00
(0.63)
School sector, attendance, major
0.63
(0.21)
0.96
(0.54)
0.96
(0.83)
1.65
(1.11)
Expected family contribution
0.26
(0.08)
0.67
(0.22)
1.08
(0.21)
1.28
(0.26)
Attendance cost and grants
1.23
(0.83)
1.32
(1.07)
2.67
(2.03) −4.06
(2.82)
Total
1.94
(0.86)
3.26
(1.48)
5.48
(2.32) −0.89
(2.75)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.23
(0.45)
0.85
(0.79) −1.38
(0.83) −2.86
(1.00)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−1.39
(1.00) −2.75
(1.40) −2.95
(2.11) −3.97
(2.09)
Parental education
0.06
(0.25)
0.18
(0.34) −0.68
(0.44) −0.29
(0.46)
Location, in-state status
−0.40
(0.85) −0.63
(0.71) −0.13
(1.15) −0.32
(1.45)
School sector, attendance, major
0.75
(1.47) −2.55
(3.31)
0.98
(2.23)
1.45
(2.86)
Expected family contribution
−0.27
(0.54) −1.42
(0.67)
0.99
(0.81)
2.89
(1.10)
Attendance cost and grants
4.57
(1.60)
8.51
(3.51)
2.74
(3.19)
9.40
(3.97)
Constant
4.89
(2.48)
5.72
(5.34)
10.15
(4.20)
16.26
(5.69)
Total
8.01
(0.91)
7.91
(1.76)
9.71
(2.35)
22.55
(2.78)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.3B Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Cost of Attendance
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
9.94
(0.27)
11.17
(0.48)
15.19
(0.54)
21.66
(0.53)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.14
(0.07)
0.41
(0.14)
0.46
(0.16)
0.13
(0.17)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.15
(0.10)
0.18
(0.13)
0.14
(0.24) −0.16
(0.26)
Parental education
0.02
(0.10)
0.08
(0.11)
0.29
(0.20)
0.17
(0.21)
Location, in-state status
−0.17
(0.13) −0.32
(0.29) −0.30
(0.60) −0.04
(0.62)
School sector, attendance, major
0.66
(0.19)
0.96
(0.52)
0.61
(0.79)
1.25
(1.06)
Expected family contribution
0.28
(0.08)
0.61
(0.21)
1.00
(0.21)
1.14
(0.26)
Attendance cost and grants
1.76
(0.35)
2.11
(0.98)
3.71
(1.40)
3.83
(1.93)
Total
2.55
(0.43)
4.03
(1.39)
5.91
(1.78)
6.32
(2.24)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.24
(0.45)
1.07
(0.71) −1.69
(0.80) −3.29
(0.97)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−2.28
(1.06) −3.26
(1.50) −4.39
(2.20) −5.71
(2.28)
Parental education
0.02
(0.25)
0.16
(0.33) −0.79
(0.44) −0.39
(0.47)
Location, in-state status
−0.31
(0.88) −0.37
(0.68)
0.03
(1.13) −0.31
(1.44)
School sector, attendance, major
−1.29
(1.08) −2.79
(1.09) −2.03
(2.08) −2.08
(2.65)
Expected family contribution
−0.87
(0.54) −2.63
(0.67) −0.02
(0.83)
1.93
(1.19)
Attendance cost and grants
11.52
(2.60)
20.82
(5.33)
12.22
(4.65)
5.46
(5.43)
Constant
0.84
(3.15) −5.85
(4.51)
5.96
(5.33)
19.73
(7.22)
Total
7.39
(0.46)
7.15
(1.68)
9.28
(1.79)
15.34
(2.33)
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of independent students. This apparent paradox results from fewer
dependent students qualifying for need-based grant aid and more independent students not having sufﬁcient outside income to pay for college expenses. In all cases, a large share remains unexplained, with the
largest change in coefﬁcients loading on cost structure. That is, not only
did costs rise, but for a given set of costs and grants, students borrowed
more than they did in the past, conditional on the other observables.25
We now break down the decompositions by time period, looking
at the 1990s and 2000–2008 periods separately. For the former, a quick
glance reveals that, as in the reweighting-based decomposition, observables explain quite little (less than 15 percent) of the debt increase over
the 1990s, and this is true throughout the distribution and whether the
tuition (Table 4.4A) or cost of attendance measure (Table 4.4B) is used.
The reduction in explanatory power relative to that of the longer period
stems from the smaller load on cost changes, which is now negligible.
This pattern is consistent with relatively small increases in both list
tuition and cost of attendance in this time frame (Table 4C.1). While
structural (coefﬁcient) effects on costs are generally still present, the
coefﬁcients representing the constant term, which likely capture omitted variables such as policy reforms, are quite large and statistically
signiﬁcant, especially in upper quantiles.
Before turning to the 2000s, it is helpful to look at the 1990s more
granularly, as the reweighting decompositions showed substantial differences in the role of observables between the two. Appendix Tables
4C.3A–4C.4B examine the 1990–1996 and 1996–2000 periods separately. Reassuringly, the RIF estimates are quite consistent with the
reweighting decompositions, down to overexplaining the increase in
borrowing at the median in the early 1990s.26 For the earlier period,
the change in age composition, cost structure, and EFC all contribute
signiﬁcantly toward greater debt at the median and above, although
the explanatory share falls from about one-half to about one-third
when moving from the 75th to the 90th percentile, as the roles of cost
structure and age diminish at the top of the distribution.27 In contrast,
between 1996 and 2000, the role of age has diminished to negligible
levels, and while attendance patterns contribute slightly toward greater
borrowing, this covariate is outweighed by the reversal in the relationships of EFC and costs. In short, observables explain more of the debt
increase between 1990 and 1996 because the observables that tend to
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.4A Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Tuition
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
7.13
(0.29)
9.03
(0.61)
13.12
(0.52)
13.96
(0.64)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.13
(0.07)
0.63
(0.22)
0.81
(0.19)
0.33
(0.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.11
(0.10)
0.09
(0.11)
0.05
(0.20) −0.15
(0.20)
Parental education
−0.01
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
0.02
(0.13)
0.14
(0.15)
Location, in-state status
−0.07
(0.14) −0.88
(0.39) −0.50
(0.56)
0.07
(0.70)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.02
(0.25)
1.05
(0.65) −0.01
(0.67) −0.25
(0.92)
Expected family contribution
0.15
(0.06)
0.49
(0.17)
0.47
(0.11)
0.42
(0.12)
Tuition and grants
0.85
(0.36) −0.12
(0.45)
0.15
(0.76) −1.36
(0.92)
Total
1.15
(0.34)
1.32
(0.61)
0.99
(0.89) −0.80
(0.98)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.51
(0.40) −0.62
(0.84)
0.12
(0.75) −6.72
(1.26)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−1.72
(0.98) −2.62
(1.88) −1.21
(2.18) −4.34
(2.56)
Parental education
0.17
(0.35)
1.37
(0.57) −0.52
(0.49)
0.11
(0.72)
Location, in-state status
0.23
(0.74)
1.28
(0.85)
0.38
(1.01) −1.66
(1.53)
School sector, attendance, major
1.37
(1.77) −5.63
(4.07)
1.80
(2.68)
1.54
(3.83)
Expected family contribution
−1.82
(0.49) −6.99
(1.15) −0.09
(0.91) −0.12
(1.51)
Tuition and grants
2.78
(1.40)
7.15
(2.93) −0.70
(2.73)
8.73
(3.20)
Constant
5.47
(2.58)
13.42
(5.52)
12.27
(4.77)
17.22
(6.30)
Total
5.99
(0.46)
7.71
(0.99)
12.14
(1.02)
14.75
(1.25)
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Table 4.4B Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Cost of Attendance
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
7.13
(0.29)
9.03
(0.61)
13.12
(0.52)
13.96
(0.64)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.11
(0.06)
0.61
(0.21)
0.70
(0.19)
0.21
(0.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.14
(0.09)
0.08
(0.11)
0.04
(0.20) −0.18
(0.21)
Parental education
−0.02
(0.07)
0.06
(0.08)
0.04
(0.13)
0.15
(0.16)
Location, in-state status
−0.07
(0.14) −0.84
(0.37) −0.66
(0.54) −0.04
(0.68)
School sector, attendance, major
0.21
(0.16)
0.61
(0.42)
0.09
(0.71)
0.12
(0.95)
Expected family contribution
0.17
(0.06)
0.50
(0.17)
0.49
(0.11)
0.43
(0.12)
Attendance cost and grants
0.64
(0.24)
0.31
(0.61)
0.25
(0.70)
0.29
(0.69)
Total
1.17
(0.32)
1.32
(0.67)
0.94
(0.87)
0.96
(0.87)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.41
(0.41) −0.30
(0.79) −0.17
(0.77) −6.64
(1.24)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−2.26
(0.96) −2.51
(1.98) −2.33
(2.17) −5.63
(2.64)
Parental education
0.13
(0.35)
1.24
(0.57) −0.66
(0.49) −0.04
(0.74)
Location, in-state status
0.30
(0.78)
1.23
(0.85)
0.49
(1.01) −1.60
(1.51)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.52
(1.31) −4.98
(1.75) −1.25
(2.65) −3.27
(3.99)
Expected family contribution
−2.34
(0.51) −7.80
(1.17) −0.83
(0.92) −1.80
(1.58)
Attendance cost and grants
3.27
(1.94)
12.27
(5.94)
0.74
(3.73)
10.76
(5.08)
Constant
7.81
(2.54)
8.56
(5.52)
16.20
(5.36)
21.21
(6.88)
Total
5.96
(0.41)
7.71
(0.97)
12.18
(1.05)
12.99
(1.08)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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matter the most, cost and EFC, changed more in this period than they
did between 1996 and 2000. The apparent puzzle is that the fastest debt
growth occurred in a period when list cost barely budged and net cost
actually fell.
The contribution of changes in observables over the 2000s, on the
other hand, is considerable, and much of this is due to increases in cost.
As shown in Tables 4.5A and 4.5B, the RIF approach substantially
overexplains the shift in borrowing at the median and 75th percentiles,
and more so when cost of attendance is used instead of tuition. Changes
in cost often account for half or more of the observable share, although
parental education, attendance patterns, and EFC also matter. At the
90th percentile, where the reweighting decomposition found only a
modest role for observables, the RIF technique places more weight on
them, explaining at least two-thirds of the debt increase, with cost and
EFC having the largest impact.28
In summary, the RIF decompositions qualitatively resemble the
reweighting-based decompositions: a large role for observables in
the early to mid-1990s and again between 2000 and 2008, but almost
no explanatory power for them in the late 1990s. In both techniques,
observables explain less at the very top of the borrowing distribution.
The RIF analysis, however, shows that the most important observed
factor contributing toward greater borrowing is cost, and this is particularly true over the 2000s, when costs increased relatively quickly. EFC
also matters consistently across time periods and quantiles. Smaller but
still meaningful effects are found for age composition over the 1990s
and attendance patterns and parental education over the 2000s, with
all these more prominent in the middle of the debt distribution. Core
demographics and geography, despite changing a great deal over time,
do not seem to be related to the shift in student debt.

DISCUSSION
Although much of the increase in debt over the 2000s can be
explained by changes in student and institutional characteristics, the
NPSAS data point to structural, behavioral, or policy shifts underlying
the majority of debt increases in the 1990s, particularly the late 1990s,
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Table 4.5A Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Tuition
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
2.81
(0.25)
2.14
(0.50)
2.07
(0.38)
7.71
(0.61)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.47
(0.11) −0.34
(0.12) −0.25
(0.07) −0.57
(0.18)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.12
(0.05)
0.26
(0.09)
0.13
(0.05)
0.26
(0.12)
Parental education
0.49
(0.08)
1.16
(0.19)
0.40
(0.08)
0.52
(0.14)
Location, in-state status
−0.05
(0.06) −0.04
(0.21)
0.02
(0.10)
0.42
(0.23)
School sector, attendance, major
0.22
(0.10)
0.50
(0.28)
0.45
(0.14)
0.92
(0.33)
Expected family contribution
0.22
(0.08)
1.33
(0.17)
0.66
(0.07)
1.30
(0.19)
Tuition and grants
1.09
(0.15)
2.44
(0.41)
1.11
(0.20)
2.15
(0.45)
Total
1.62
(0.24)
5.30
(0.65)
2.52
(0.27)
5.01
(0.61)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.47
(0.42)
1.61
(0.66) −1.51
(0.48)
4.31
(1.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.20
(0.94) −0.65
(1.48) −1.88
(1.05)
0.15
(2.39)
Parental education
−0.57
(0.22) −2.32
(0.43) −0.31
(0.30) −0.92
(0.44)
Location, in-state status
−0.65
(0.59) −1.36
(0.85) −0.21
(0.65)
0.85
(1.16)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.19
(0.81)
2.50
(1.14) −0.30
(0.70)
0.88
(1.48)
Expected family contribution
1.45
(0.54)
4.42
(0.84)
1.02
(0.44)
2.57
(0.80)
Tuition and grants
1.07
(1.39)
0.35
(2.66)
4.86
(1.52) −4.19
(3.03)
Constant
−0.58
(1.88) −7.70
(3.21) −2.12
(2.10) −0.96
(3.79)
Total
1.20
(0.30) −3.16
(0.75) −0.46
(0.45)
2.70
(0.90)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.5B Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Cost of Attendance
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
2.81
(0.25)
2.14
(0.50)
2.07
(0.38)
7.71
(0.61)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−0.43
(0.11) −0.30
(0.11) −0.23
(0.06) −0.55
(0.17)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.11
(0.04)
0.24
(0.09)
0.12
(0.05)
0.24
(0.12)
Parental education
0.46
(0.08)
1.11
(0.19)
0.38
(0.08)
0.48
(0.14)
Location, in-state status
−0.06
(0.06)
0.02
(0.21)
0.08
(0.10)
0.59
(0.24)
School sector, attendance, major
0.14
(0.10)
0.37
(0.27)
0.33
(0.13)
0.60
(0.30)
Expected family contribution
0.23
(0.08)
1.40
(0.17)
0.70
(0.08)
1.42
(0.20)
Attendance cost and grants
2.08
(0.18)
4.29
(0.40)
2.34
(0.21)
4.61
(0.63)
Total
2.53
(0.24)
7.13
(0.62)
3.72
(0.28)
7.39
(0.85)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.35
(0.40)
1.47
(0.64) −1.52
(0.47)
3.82
(1.15)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−0.12
(0.92) −0.90
(1.48) −2.08
(1.03) −0.29
(2.37)
Parental education
−0.53
(0.22) −2.18
(0.43) −0.25
(0.30) −0.81
(0.45)
Location, in-state status
−0.64
(0.57) −1.09
(0.81) −0.17
(0.65)
0.71
(1.17)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.46
(0.82)
2.18
(1.13) −0.60
(0.73)
1.72
(1.52)
Expected family contribution
1.35
(0.52)
3.88
(0.85)
0.62
(0.46)
3.02
(0.86)
Attendance cost and grants
7.29
(2.52)
6.06
(5.04)
12.58
(3.17) −6.37
(5.70)
Constant
−6.97
(2.95) −14.41
(5.47) −10.23
(3.50) −1.48
(5.99)
Total
0.28
(0.29) −4.99
(0.71) −1.66
(0.44)
0.32
(1.15)
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when debt proﬁles increased faster than in any other period. In this section, we review several possible explanations and weigh the evidence
for each.
Formal Loans Crowding Out Informal Loans
The analysis above considers formal loans in which a promissory
note has been signed and repayment shows up in credit reports. Informal
loans from friends and family also occur, although it is unclear whether
these are actually intended to be repaid (with or without interest). A possible “structural” explanation for debt increase is that formal loans have
displaced informal loans over time. The NPSAS asked about informal
loans only through 2000, but that covers the period in which observables
have little explanatory power. Figure 4.8 plots CDFs of borrowing for
1990, 1996, and 2000, both with and without informal borrowing. The
thinner or paler lines reﬂect the distributions of formal borrowing from
Figure 4.1, while the thicker lines add in informal borrowing. If displacement were occurring, we would see the difference between total
and formal borrowing shrink over time. In fact, we see the opposite:
while informal borrowing is rare in 1990, it expands by 1996 and is of a
similar magnitude in 2000. We can thus rule out this story.
Parents Transferring Loan Burden to Children
Our analysis also has focused on debt in the student’s name and
thus has excluded borrowing directly by parents in the form of PLUS
Loans. While the terms of student-level loans are more generous than
parent-level PLUS Loans (see Appendix 4B), parents are often in a better ﬁnancial position with which to make repayment. However, if parents have become less willing or able to borrow for their children than
in the past, the transference of the burden could explain increases in
student-level borrowing. Figure 4.9 shows that this is not the case. The
lighter-line CDFs in the ﬁgure again show the distributions of borrowing taken from Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines add in cumulative
PLUS borrowing of parents (data for 1990 are unfortunately unavailable). Rather than decreasing over time, PLUS borrowing has increased
substantially and become more pronounced further down the distribution. Thus, the intergenerational transfer explanation, at least through
PLUS Loans, does not work, either.29
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Figure 4.8 Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among
College Graduates with Informal Loans
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars.
Thicker lines include student-level borrowing from all sources including loans from
friends and family; thinner lines exclude these informal loans, as in Figure 4.1.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

Change in Interest Rates
The prevailing interest rates for student loans (federal and other)
have varied over time, and basic economic theory implies that lower
interest rates should increase borrowing, all other things being equal.
Figure 4.10 presents time series for the interest rates on the predominant federal loan program, the Stafford Loan, as well as the U.S. prime
rate, a benchmark for private loans and, at times, federal loans as well.
Prior to the early 1990s, Congress periodically set a ﬁxed rate for Stafford Loans (sometimes creating a huge subsidy, as in the early 1980s).
Between 1992 and 2006, Stafford rates were tied to market rates before
being ﬁxed again.30 Although interest rates drop by nearly four percentage points in the early 1990s, they are relatively ﬂat over the late 1990s,
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Figure 4.9 Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among
College Graduates, with PLUS Loans
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars.
Thicker lines include borrowing from parental PLUS Loans; thinner lines exclude
PLUS Loans, as in Figure 4.1.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

and they drop considerably again over the early 2000s recession. This
pattern is not consistent with large increases in borrowing during the
late 1990s and a ﬂat, or even falling, borrowing proﬁle between 2000
and 2004. It would appear that the borrowing decisions of bachelor’s
degree graduates are insensitive to the cost of loans, and interest rates
therefore cannot explain the observed borrowing patterns.31
Borrowing Eligibility
Another set of possible factors deals with increased eligibility
to borrow (on both extensive and intensive margins). As Appendix
4B shows, major changes in the student loan market took place over
the 1990s, including the introduction of unsubsidized Stafford Loans
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Figure 4.10 Interest Rates on New Undergraduate Stafford Loans,
1965–2013
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NOTE: All federal loans were subsidized until 1992, when unsubsidized loans became
available.
SOURCE: Senate Committee on the Budget (2006); http://www.ﬁnaid.org/loans/
historicalrates.phtml (accessed April 17, 2014).

(which are more available to higher-income families than are subsidized Stafford Loans), increases in the federal statutory borrowing limits, and the development of private loans. In contrast, there was little
structural change in the loan market between 2000 and 2008 (although
there was considerable change after the 2007–2008 school year).
Except for a brief period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, federal loan eligibility was means tested and subject to a family-income
threshold (with the government paying interest while the student was
enrolled) until 1992. That year, unsubsidized loans ﬁrst became available. While interest accumulates on these loans from the time of disbursement, students have access to them regardless of family income.
Their availability opened up a large segment of the student population to federal loans, so it would not be surprising if increases in the
debt distribution followed. However, Figure 4.5 shows that borrowing
increased much faster in the late 1990s than between 1990 and 1996 for
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wealthier students—the group that would be expected to beneﬁt most
from unsubsidized loan eligibility. Why didn’t their borrowing increase
immediately after 1992? Three reasons suggest that unsubsidized loans
became more important in the late 1990s despite becoming available
for the 1992–1993 school year. First, total unsubsidized loan volume
was quite small initially. In 1992–1993, unsubsidized loan disbursements for all postsecondary students totaled $440 million (in 2011 dollars), just 1.9 percent of aggregate loan volume. In 1993–1994, disbursements had increased to $2.7 billion, an 8.9 percent share, and in
1994–1995, the numbers jumped to $9.5 billion, a 26.7 percent share.
From this point, the share increased slowly, to 32.5 percent by 1999–
2000 (College Board 2012a, Figure 6). Their impact thus would have
been muted for the 1996 graduating cohort relative to the 2000 cohort.
Second, the Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board of
Governors 2012) shows a pronounced jump between 1995 and 1998
(but not between 1992 and 1995) in both the median and mean values
of educational loans among families, and these increases were concentrated among families whose heads were college educated, were in
managerial or professional occupations, and had income in the secondhighest quintile. This pattern is consistent with increased loan volume
for the types of households that would beneﬁt most from unsubsidized
loans occurring several years after the program’s introduction. Third,
and perhaps most tellingly, the income distribution among graduates
with a Stafford Loan their senior year increased sharply (relative to the
income distribution of all graduates) between 1996 and 2000, but not
between 1993 and 1996.32 This is shown in Figure 4.11, with the lighter
lines representing the income distributions for Stafford borrowers and
the heavier lines those for all graduates.
Furthermore, it is possible to use a back-of-the-envelope calculation to quantify how important unsubsidized loans were to the increase
in total borrowing between 1996 and 2000. Figure 4.12 shows the difference in senior-year borrowing between 1996 and 2000 by percentile
(now on the x-axis). The solid line counts all borrowing, and the dashed
line nets out unsubsidized Stafford Loans. Throughout much of the distribution, the gap between the two years is signiﬁcantly reduced once
unsubsidized loans are taken out of the picture.33 Indeed, the mean gap
in the latter case is only 36 percent of the former; the mean squared
deviation, 66 percent. (Excluding the area above the 98th percentile, the
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Figure 4.11 Cumulative Distribution Function of Family Income, All
Graduates and Stafford Borrowers
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars.
Thicker lines represent family income for the set of all graduates; thinner lines represent graduates who took out a Stafford Loan their senior year.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

two ﬁgures are 24 and 23 percent, respectively.) In levels, the mean gap
is reduced by $460, and if this pattern held for previous years of enrollment, it could account for roughly $2,500, or about half, of the mean
increase in total debt of $5,200 between 1996 and 2000.34 However,
because of the factors mentioned above, this gap in senior-year borrowing probably overstates the gap for earlier years, when unsubsidized
loan volume was smaller. But the senior year alone can account for 9
percent of the $5,200 difference, and even conservative estimates for
previous class years would bring this share to a quarter.
Thus, unsubsidized loans were important for debt increases in the
late 1990s, but what about increases in federal borrowing limits? The
annual borrowing limit under the Stafford program, by far the largest
federal loan program, was ﬁxed—in nominal terms—between July
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Figure 4.12 Difference in Senior-Year Borrowing between 1996 and
2000, with and without Unsubsidized Loans
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NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars.
Thicker lines represent all formal student-level borrowing in senior year; thinner lines
exclude unsubsidized Stafford Loans.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

1993 and June 2007. The supplementary limits, which raise the maximum borrowing for independent students and some dependent students,
were ﬁxed between July 1994 and June 2008. However, the increase in
statutory limits in July 1993 applied only for students in their second
or higher class year, and the shift in supplementary limits in July 1994
applied only for students in their third or higher year. This means that
graduates of the class of 1996 experienced the same nominal limits as
the class of 2000; in real terms, borrowing limits declined slightly.35
Consequently, borrowing limits are not behind the debt increase of the
late 1990s.
The other major innovation of that time period was the rise of the
private loan sector (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2012). Too
new to be asked about explicitly in the 1996 NPSAS, private loans in
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that wave must be inferred by netting out institutional and state-level
loans from all nonfederal loans. For graduates of that class, 1.0 percent
took out a nonfederal loan their senior year, and most of these were
institutional or state loans: just 0.3 percent took out an “other” or private loan. By 2000, the numbers had increased to 6.2 and 4.6 percent,
respectively, and they continued to grow through 2008 before retrenching during the recession. The NPSAS data do not break out cumulative
borrowing by nonfederal sector, but one can compare cumulative total
borrowing to cumulative federal borrowing, and this is done in Figure
4.13 for the 1996 and later waves. The lighter lines represent cumulative
total borrowing, as in Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines show cumulative federal borrowing only. The difference between the two captures
nonfederal borrowing. For 1996, the gap occurs entirely below the 70th
Figure 4.13 Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among
College Graduates, Federal Loans
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Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 90

1/28/2015 8:23:00 AM

The Distribution of College Graduate Debt, 1990–2008 91

percentile and is small, reﬂecting that most of these nonfederal loans are
institutional or state-based and intended for lower-income borrowers.36
By 2000, the gap has widened, especially above the 75th percentile. In
fact, about half of the total increase in borrowing in the top quartile is
due to nonfederal—essentially private—loans. (For the same quartile
between 1996 and 2008, about three-quarters of the increase is due to
private loans, and between 2000 and 2008, all of it is, though much of
this latter increase is accounted for by observables.37)
Broadly speaking, informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate
changes, and statutory borrowing limits are unlikely to be factors behind
the debt increase of the late 1990s. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and
private loans, on the other hand, are probable culprits, at least in part.
Other Explanations
One factor for which we have been unable to control is the use
of tax credits, which came into existence in the late 1990s. Nicholas
Turner (2012) has shown that the value of educational tax credits is
largely capitalized into increases in net tuition (i.e., fewer institutional
grants), with suggestive evidence that students compensate by borrowing more. However, the timing of tax credit availability precludes them
from being a major factor for the borrowing increases observed during
the 1990s. Both the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits ﬁrst became
available during the 1998–1999 school year (and tax deductions not
until the 2002–2003 school year). As the Hope Credit was available
only for the ﬁrst two years of postsecondary education, it could not have
beneﬁtted students who graduated during the 1999–2000 school year
and took four or more school years to ﬁnish. Until 2003, the Lifetime
Learning program allowed a (nonrefundable) credit of 20 percent of the
ﬁrst $5,000 in tuition and fees, making its maximum value $1,000.38
But, according to the NPSAS data, only 20 percent of graduates’ families claimed the credit in the 1999 tax year, and only about 20 percent of
the claimants qualiﬁed for the maximum credit. Even if the credit were
completely capitalized into higher borrowing, it could explain only a
tiny portion of the increase in debt in the late 1990s.39
Another factor we did not examine explicitly is the use of home
equity loans and lines of credit for education ﬁnancing. There is some
evidence that these tools became less important over the 1990s. In the
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NPSAS, about 4 percent of the class of 1996 claimed to have used
them, versus 2.3 percent in 2000. Similarly, the Survey of Consumer
Finances shows that in 1989, 0.6 percent of all households were using
a home equity loan or line of credit to pay for education expenses; by
1995, the last year in which the purpose can be ascertained, the ﬁgure
had fallen to 0.4 percent. These levels are probably too small to have
had a meaningful impact on student borrowing.

CONCLUSION
Using NPSAS data, we have shown that the entire debt proﬁle of
college graduates grew much faster in the 1990s than in the 2000s, and
that this growth was concentrated especially in the late 1990s. Between
2000 and 2008, debt was remarkably stable for the bottom three quarters of the distribution—the increase that took place in the top quartile was driven by graduates at private, not-for-proﬁt institutions and
stemmed largely from greater private borrowing.
Statistical decomposition techniques consistently indicate that
observable characteristics of students and institutions—such as demographics, geography, attendance patterns, income, and costs—explain
about one-third of the overall debt increase across the two decades.
However, their explanatory power is stronger at the extensive margin
and in the middle of the distribution than in the right tail. Moreover, the
observables account for more than half of the increase between 1990
and 1996 and approximately all of it between 2000 and 2008, leaving the late 1990s as the period that remains unexplained. Among the
observables, cost tends to be the most important factor, often explaining
about half of the observable share, but EFC is also important, as is the
age structure in the 1990s and parental education in the 2000s.
In trying to unpack the puzzle of the late 1990s, we have ruled out
informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate changes, and statutory borrowing limits as likely explanations. Instead, the evidence is consistent
with the “unobservable” share being driven by the advent of unsubsidized Stafford Loans and private loans. This would imply that much of
the debt increase over the 1990s—a much greater increase than over the
2000s—was primarily due to supply-side and not demand-side factors.
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Indeed, while nominal costs of college have risen considerably, so has
ﬁnancial aid in the form of grants (Avery and Turner 2012; Greenstone
and Looney 2013; see also Appendix Table 4C.1.) Our ﬁndings show
that changes in costs account for only 20 percent of the increase in
distribution-wide borrowing between 1990 and 2008, and this is after
capturing the complex interplay between nominal prices and grants.
Of course, the partial-equilibrium analysis we have undertaken does
not account for the possible endogeneity between college costs and
ﬁnancial aid. Recent research on the incidence of federal ﬁnancial aid
indicates that in many cases, schools seem to capture much of the beneﬁt:
Nicholas Turner (2012) cannot rule out that schools offset one dollar of
student tax beneﬁts with one dollar of higher net tuition; Lesley Turner
(2012) ﬁnds that schools on average reduce institutional grants by $0.16
per dollar of Pell Grants ($0.80 for selective nonproﬁts); and Cellini and
Goldin (2012) conclude that Title IV–eligible for-proﬁts charge tuition
78 percent higher than comparable programs in non-Title IV–eligible
for-proﬁts. Whether these results hold speciﬁcally for loans, however, is
still an open question in which more research is needed.

Notes
1. From January 1, 2012, through September 16, 2013, we found 504 hits of the
search term “student debt” across the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report. For the same outlets, there were 673 hits between 1991
and 2011, inclusive.
2. See Martin and Lehren (2012) and Mitchell and Jackson-Randall (2012).
3. For example, collegerealitycheck.com and collegecompletion.chronicle.com (both
by the Chronicle for Higher Education); collegecost.ed.gov/scorecard/ and college
cost.ed.gov/catc/ (both by the federal government); projectonstudentdebt.org (by
The Institute for College Access and Success); and collegeportraits.org (by the
American Association of State Colleges and Universities).
4. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2013/08/22/remarks-president
-college-affordability-buffalo-ny (accessed April 17, 2014). Congress has also
investigated growing debt (Joint Economic Committee 2013).
5. We hope to investigate other groups in subsequent work.
6. The 2012 wave of NPSAS was released in late August of 2013. Although we have
requested these data, our analyses are currently limited to 2008 as an endpoint.
7. It also forms the sampling frame for two longitudinal surveys: the Beginning Postsecondary Students study (BPS), which tracks ﬁrst-time students, and the Bac-
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8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

18.
19.

calaureate and Beyond study (B&B), which tracks bachelor recipients. We use the
NPSAS rather than the B&B because the former is available earlier and more often.
The NPSAS was also ﬁelded in 1993. However, an error in the survey led to many
bachelor’s degree graduates not being asked the relevant questions on cumulative
borrowing, forcing us to exclude this wave.
Unfortunately, private, for-proﬁt institutions are too small a group to examine in
all but the 2008 wave. Even then, fewer than 4 percent of bachelor’s recipients
graduated from a private, for-proﬁt institution. Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner
(2010) document rising time to bachelor’s degree and attempt to explain the factors behind it.
Improper speciﬁcation of the model, such as omitted variables, would show up in
this component.
For example, in gender-wage discrimination, the reference coefﬁcient is often set
to that of men because the exercise is meant to examine how much of the gender
gap can be attributable to differences in characteristics under the assumption that
the return to those characteristics is the same as men’s (the “explained” part) and
how much is attributable to “discrimination” (the “unexplained” part, but see Note
10).
It is also more robust to functional form violations, such as when Y is a nonlinear
function of X. Because this functional form need not be known, the technique is
semiparametric. On the other hand, it is more sensitive to the common support
requirement that sets of covariate realizations are common to both groups.
This setup will make the distribution of XB resemble the distribution of XA; switching the coding of the dependent variable will cause the reverse.
This follows because fraction q of the population (and sample analogue) has Y ≤ Yq,
by deﬁnition of q.
We also experimented with using time to degree, which was available in every
wave except 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, the inclusion of this variable, conditional on the others, had a negligible effect on the decompositions. In order to
include the 1990 wave, we thus chose to exclude time to degree in the presented
results.
Expected family contribution measures a student’s family’s ability to pay for college expenses and is based on family structure, income, and certain assets (excluding home equity). The relationship between borrowing and EFC is likely nonmonotonic, as low EFC levels increase the likelihood of receiving grant aid, and
very high EFC levels are associated with a lower need to borrow. The cost of attendance is broader than tuition and fees and also includes room and board, books,
travel, and other expenses.
A polynomial in net cost implies parameter restrictions in the more ﬂexible model.
When we test these restrictions in the relationship between borrowing and cost
and aid structure, they are sharply rejected at all conventional signiﬁcance levels.
When the constituent variables diverge in their effects, we make note of it.
There is also a slightly positive role from demographics (an increasing minority
share) and an offsetting role from location (regional changes in graduates from the
Northeast to the South).
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20. Indeed, as Appendix 4B documents, unsubsidized Stafford Loans, which are not
means tested, became available in 1992, and this would be expected to increase
borrowing at the extensive margin.
21. Note that while the Oaxaca-Blinder results showed a small role for observables
at the extensive margin during this time period, the estimate was not statistically
different from zero.
22. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping the entire RIF procedure (with 100
replications) to account for estimation error in the density function.
23. The attendance coefﬁcient is largely driven by a shift from nondoctoral to doctoral
public institutions (see Appendix Table 4C.2).
24. For evidence of the growing role of amenities in driving students’ attendance decisions, see Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013).
25. Recall that the cost structure observables include quartics in list prices and grants
and their pairwise interactions. These relationships are highly nonlinear and nonmonotonic, so it is not quite accurate to say that “costs” rose; we are trading off
accuracy for expediency.
26. That borrowing increased less than predicted at this quantile is due to a change
in the coefﬁcients on marital status; speciﬁcally, married graduates borrowed less
than single graduates in 1990, but this relationship reversed in 1996. Since singles
increased as a share of graduates between 1990 and 1996 (Table 4C.2), borrowing
was predicted to have increased.
27. The explanatory shares of the cost structure are slightly lower when using cost of
attendance rather than tuition, reﬂecting a reduction in nontuition expenses that
partially offset tuition hikes over this period (see Appendix Table 4C.1).
28. The difference between the decomposition techniques over this time period may
stem from the functional form limitation of the RIF (i.e., linearity). However, isolating the role of speciﬁc observables through sequential reweighting yields similar relative magnitudes as RIF.
29. We unfortunately cannot observe direct transfers from parents to students. However, since parents are borrowing more through PLUS Loans, it is very unlikely
that the transfer motive has decreased.
30. In late summer of 2013, new legislation passed that will again tie federal borrowing rates to market rates. Although, prior to the legislation’s passage, much attention was given to the fact that subsidized rates would double to the unsubsidized
rate for the 2013–2014 school year, it was generally unmentioned that the rates had
differed at all only since 2009. Note also that, historically, Stafford rates were similar to or below the U.S. prime rate except during and after the Great Recession.
31. There is surprisingly little work on the elasticity of credit demand with respect
to price in the higher education context, and it would be a fruitful area for future
research.
32. We use the 1993 wave here because the data are for senior-year and not cumulative borrowing. While NPSAS separates survey school year Stafford borrowing by
subsidized and unsubsidized status beginning in 1996, it unfortunately does not do
so for cumulative borrowing.
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33. The notable exception is above the 95th percentile and is probably due to private
loans, which are discussed next. The negative section of the lines reﬂects the nominal annual borrowing cap for Stafford Loans.
34. This assumes a time to degree of 5.5 years, the average for the class of 2000 in the
NPSAS data.
35. These statements also apply to lifetime borrowing limits.
36. In 1996, the median recipient of institutional or state loans was below the 30th
percentile of the family income distribution of all students; the median recipient of
a private loan was at the 70th percentile.
37. That observables can account for most of the change between 2000 and 2008 is
likely in large part due to private loans being well established by 2000. An auxiliary analysis that examined the period between 1996 and 2008, with 1996 reference coefﬁcients, found a much smaller role for observables.
38. The threshold was raised from $5,000 to $10,000 in 2003. In all years, the credit
was subject to income phase-outs.
39. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that subtracts the real value of the credit from
cumulative borrowing—among all students, not just those claiming the credit—
shows that debt would have risen by about $500 less at most points of the distribution between 1996 and 2000. At the mean, this is less than 10 percent. At the 90th
percentile, it is about 5 percent.
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Appendix 4A
NPSAS Data Details
The National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) has been ﬁelded
eight times: in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. In each
case, the year references the spring semester or the end of the school year.
This chapter employs the restricted-use 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008
waves.1 The 1987 wave was not used because its sampling frame and question
bank were signiﬁcantly different from those of subsequent waves. The 1993
wave was not used because of an interviewing error that caused the cumulative
borrowing question—the key outcome of interest—to be not asked of some
graduates. Finally, the 2012 wave has only been partially released. (We plan to
update the study when the 2012 wave is fully released.)
The longitudinal comparisons in the chapter required that the data be harmonized across waves. Although each wave is similar to the preceding one,
there have been many variable name changes and some deﬁnition (or universe)
changes over time. In most cases, it was straightforward to rename variables
or recode values for consistency, although this often necessitated losing some
detail for categorical responses. The processing of the most important variables for the analysis is described in this section.2
The primary outcome variable is the cumulative borrowing of the student
from all sources for undergraduate education. The variable is called BORAMT1
in each of the waves we use, although its construction varies somewhat over
time. In 2004 and 2008, BORAMT1 is constructed as the greater of the student’s self-reported borrowing total, the cumulative federal borrowing total
taken from the National Student Loan Data System plus self-reported private
borrowing in the survey school year, or self-reported total borrowing in the
survey school year. In each case, the borrowing numbers exclude loans in the
name of parents or guardians (e.g., PLUS Loans), as well as informal loans
without a promissory note. This is the deﬁnition of cumulative borrowing we
use in the paper.
In 2000, there are two versions of the BORAMT1 variable: one that
matches the 2004 and 2008 deﬁnition, and one that also includes informal
loans. We use the ﬁrst version. In 1996, only the version that includes informal
borrowing is available. However, a separate variable (FAMLOAN) asks about
cumulative loans from friends and family, although this variable is present
only for the portion of the sample that conducted a CATI interview (about twothirds of the overall sample). We revise the BORAMT1 variable in 1996 by
subtracting from it FAMLOAN among the CATI part of the sample and use a
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revised sampling weight (see below) to correct for the smaller sample. In 1990,
historical data from National Student Loan Data System was not included.
All cumulative borrowing is thus self-reported. After applying the maximizer
decision rule used in the 2004 and 2008 waves, PARLOAN is subtracted from
BORAMT1, where PARLOAN represents informal borrowing for the 1989–
1990 school year. (There is no cumulative informal loan variable in the 1990
NPSAS, so cumulative loan totals, especially near the top of the distribution,
may be biased upward.)
The cleaned BORAMT1 variable is converted to year 2012 dollars using
the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deﬂator from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. We then applied the following ﬁve sample restrictions to
focus on our population of interest (the 2008 nomenclature of the variable[s]
used for the restriction is in parentheses):
1.

The respondent was enrolled in the fall term of the survey school
year at an institution in the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia
(COMPTO87 = 1).

2.

The respondent was enrolled at a primarily bachelor’s (or higher)
degree-granting institution (SECTOR9 = 3,4,6,7,9).

3.

The respondent was an undergraduate during the survey school year
(STUDTYP = 1).

4.

The respondent earned a bachelor’s degree during the survey school
year (COLLGRAD = 1).

5.

The respondent was not a foreign or international student on an education visa (SAMESTAT ≤ 2).

Additionally, because construction of a consistent, cumulative borrowing
amount in the 1996 wave required variables from the interview component of
the survey, the estimation sample for that wave was restricted to respondents
with a positive interview weight (CATIWT > 0). The WTA000 sample weights
were used for the 2000 and later waves (using late 2013 vintage weights), the
WTB000 sample weight was used for the 1996 wave, and the PSKEEPWT
sample weight was used for the 1990 wave.
The NPSAS is also used as the sampling frame for two longitudinal
studies, the Beginning Postsecondary Study (BPS), which follows ﬁrst-time
postsecondary students, and the Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B), which follows bachelor’s degree recipients. These two studies alternate NPSAS waves,
with BPS being drawn from the 1990, 1996, 2004, and 2012 NPSAS waves,
and B&B being drawn from the 1993, 2000, and 2008 NPSAS waves. Since
the population of interest for the longitudinal studies is oversampled in the
NPSAS, the effective sample sizes for college graduates is quite large in 2000
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and 2008 and somewhat smaller in 1990, 1996, and 2004. Final sample sizes,
rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with rules on disclosure, are found in
Appendix Table 4C.5.
The NPSAS is not the only data set that can be used to track how student debt proﬁles have changed over the last 20 years. Some longitudinal data
sets, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, ask about educational borrowing, as does the repeated,
cross-sectional Survey of Consumer Finances. These latter data sets have
the advantages of containing information on other forms of debt as well as
income and loan repayment information. However, they have a few disadvantages relative to the NPSAS. First, the sample sizes are much smaller. While
the NPSAS typically has several thousand college graduates in each wave (or
cohort), the other data sets often have only a few hundred per cohort, and this
makes examining entire distributions more difﬁcult. Second, the data on college expenses and ﬁnancing are not as detailed. The NPSAS beneﬁts from the
merge with administrative data on exact loan amounts and family ﬁnancials,
and it surveys students immediately after the school year. The other data sets
often gather loan data from retrospective questions, introducing the possibility
of recall bias.
While we believe NPSAS is the best data set to look at cumulative borrowing at graduation, the other data sets have a comparative advantage when
investigating the topics of loan repayment, default, and debt-income ratios,
and how and why these have changed over time. These are clearly important
topics, but they are beyond the scope of the current chapter.

Appendix Notes
1. These are available by license from the Department of Education’s Institute of
Education Sciences (IES) after an application process.
2. A complete list of variables used is available by request from the authors.
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Appendix 4B
A Primer on Student Loans
FEDERAL LOANS
The primary federal borrowing program for undergraduates is the Stafford
program, established in 1965 as part of the Higher Education Act that year,
and later named after Senator Robert Stafford in 1988.1 Originally intended
for lower-income students, all Stafford Loans were subsidized until 1992, with
the federal government paying the interest while the student was enrolled.2
Beginning that year, unsubsidized Stafford Loans became available for students regardless of their ﬁnancial background. These loans accumulate interest
while the student is enrolled, although repayment for either type of Stafford
Loan does not begin until six months after school leaving.
Stafford Loans account for the vast majority of federal lending to students. Among graduating seniors in the 2007–2008 school year, for example,
Stafford Loans accounted for 96 percent of federal borrowing, with about 60
percent of this volume as subsidized loans.3 While these loans require the student to ﬁll out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form,
they are not subject to credit checks and do not require a cosigner. There are
limits, however, to how much can be borrowed each year and over a student’s
lifetime, and these limits have changed over time.
The other major undergraduate federal student lending program is the
PLUS Loan, which consists of loans to the students’ parents (or legal guardians) rather than directly to the student herself. These also require the FAFSA
form to be ﬁled. Unlike the Stafford Loan, PLUS Loans are subject to a credit
check.
Both the Stafford and PLUS Loans were administered under the Federal
Family Educational Loan Program (FFELP) as well as the Direct program.
Under FFELP, private lenders made loans to students under the terms set by
the federal government and received subsidies to cover interest rate spread
and nonpayment. Under the Direct program, the federal government acted as
the lender. The FFELP ended in 2010, with all new loans operating under the
Direct program. From the point of view of the borrower, there is practically no
difference between the two programs, as terms and conditions are identical.
Table 4B.1 shows the annual limits (in nominal dollars) for the Stafford
program. Starting in July 2008, these limits were increased by $2,000 for each
class year for dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS
Loan), but this higher limit was available only as an unsubsidized loan.
101
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For independent students and dependent students whose parents were
denied a PLUS Loan, the limits in Table 4B.1 were increased by the amounts
shown in Table 4B.2, with these higher limits also available only as unsubsidized loans.
In addition to these annual loan limits, there are also cumulative lifetime
limits on Stafford borrowing. Through 1986, this aggregate limit was $12,500.
In 1987, the limit was raised to $17,500, and in October of 1992, it was raised
again to $23,000. For subsidized loans, this (nominal) cap is still in place. For
dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS Loan), the lifetime
Stafford limit was increased to $31,000 in July 2008, but amounts beyond
$23,000 must be unsubsidized loans. For independent students (or dependent
students whose parents were denied a PLUS Loan), the limit was increased
to $46,000 in July 1994 and to $57,500 in July 2008, but again the balance
beyond $23,000 must be unsubsidized loans.
The PLUS Loan for parents was initially capped at $4,000 per year (and
$20,000 per student lifetime), but this changed in 1993, with the annual limit
set to the net cost of attendance (list price minus grants) and an unlimited lifetime amount.

PRIVATE LOANS
Private educational lending (not to be confused with FFELP loans, above)
was practically nonexistent until the late 1990s, when attendance costs grew
enough relative to the federal borrowing limits to create a market for additional lending. Private loans do not require a FAFSA but often do require credit
checks and/or a cosigner. Their interest rates and fee structures are generally
more variable than federal loans, with terms that are often worse except for
the most creditworthy students. While there are no statutory borrowing limits, borrowing is functionally limited by the net cost of attendance as well as
creditworthiness.
Among graduating seniors in 2008, 20 percent took out a private loan that
year; these loans constituted 34 percent of total borrowing. (These numbers
were up from 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2000.) Private loan
volume decreased dramatically after 2008 in the wake of the Great Recession
as private capital dried up, but it is expected to grow again as the economy
improves, as long as education costs continue to grow faster than federal borrowing limits.
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Table 4B.1 Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by Calendar
Year and Class Standing
1977–1986
1987–June 1993
July 1993–June 2007
July 2007–June 2012

1st year
2,500
2,625
2,625
3,500

2nd year
2,500
2,625
3,500
4,500

3rd year
2,500
4,000
5,500
5,500

4th year +
2,500
4,000
5,500
5,500

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.

Table 4B.2 Supplemental Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by
Calendar Year and Class Standing
1986–1994
July 1994–June 2008
July 2008– June 2012

1st year
4,000
4,000
6,000

2nd year
4,000
4,000
6,000

3rd year
4,000
5,000
7,000

4th year +
4,000
5,000
7,000

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.

OTHER LOANS
In addition to the federal and private lending programs, some states and
educational institutions themselves have lending programs. These programs,
however, are very small relative to federal and private loans. Less than 2 percent of graduating seniors in 2008 received loans from states or educational
institutions, and these loans made up less than 2 percent of the total loan volume for the same set of students.
Finally, there are informal loans in which students borrow directly from
their parents or other relatives and friends. Because these loans do not appear
on credit reports, and because it is uncertain whether they are expected to be
repaid, NPSAS stopped collecting data on them after 2000.
Appendix Notes
1. Much of the material in this appendix, including the timeline of changes and statutory borrowing limits, is drawn from www.ﬁnaid.org and Dynarski and ScottClayton (2013).
2. Except for a brief period between 1978 and 1982, eligibility for subsidized loans
has been means tested throughout the life of the program.
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3. Almost all of the remaining 4 percent consists of Perkins Loans, which are intended
for very low-income students and function similarly to subsidized Stafford Loans
with slightly more generous terms. About 6 percent of graduating seniors in 2008
received Perkins Loans, while 51 percent received Stafford Loans.
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Appendix 4C
Supplemental Tables
Table 4C.1 Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS
(continuous variables), by Wave (000s of 2012 $)
1990
1996
2000
2004
2008
Family income,
dependent students
96.7
96.3
97.2
105.5
Mean
94.6
49.5
52.6
49.1
53.6
25th
51.8
81.9
85.5
84.8
93.7
Median
78.8
75th
116.0
121.4
125.8
125.8
137.3
Family income, independent
students
Mean
30.8
31.1
39.6
39.5
34.3
25th
8.8
7.3
11.2
11.5
9.0
Median
20.2
20.2
26.9
28.5
23.5
75th
46.5
43.3
55.1
56.3
49.4
Expected family contribution,
dependents
Mean
18.9
15.4
16.2
17.2
19.4
25th
5.0
4.4
5.1
4.5
5.1
Median
10.8
11.0
12.0
11.7
14.8
75th
23.3
21.0
23.3
21.8
27.1
Expected family contribution,
independents
9.9
Mean
7.2
8.0
7.9
6.0
2.1
25th
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.2
Median
3.1
3.9
2.9
2.0
12.5
75th
10.2
11.3
10.1
8.0
List tuition
8.4
Missing (%)
3.4
4.3
5.5
7.4
6.3
Mean
8.4
8.4
9.4
11.2
1.8
25th
2.8
2.7
3.5
4.2
3.3
Median
4.7
4.8
5.5
7.0
8.5
75th
12.6
10.9
11.8
14.5
(continued)
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Table 4C.1 (continued)
List cost of attendance
Missing (%)
Mean
25th
Median
75th
Total grants
Mean
25th
Median
75th
Tuition net of grants
Missing (%)
Mean
25th
Median
75th
Cost of attendance net of
grants
Missing (%)
Mean
25th
Median
75th

1990

1996

2000

2004

2008

8.8
17.9
10.0
15.9
23.8

3.4
17.5
11.8
14.8
22.2

5.6
18.4
11.4
15.7
22.7

5.5
19.6
12.3
17.1
23.9

7.4
22.9
13.9
20.0
29.8

2.2
0.0
0.0
3.1

2.8
0.0
0.3
3.8

3.4
0.0
0.7
4.7

3.9
0.0
1.6
5.7

4.9
0.0
2.2
7.2

8.4
4.3
0.8
2.4
5.3

3.4
5.6
1.4
3.4
7.4

4.3
4.9
0.9
3.1
6.8

5.5
5.5
0.9
3.6
7.6

7.4
6.2
1.0
4.3
9.3

8.8
15.7
8.2
13.7
21.0

3.4
14.8
9.3
13.2
18.1

5.6
14.9
8.9
13.4
18.4

5.5
15.7
9.1
13.8
19.6

7.4
17.9
10.2
16.0
23.3

NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Monetary amounts (in $000) are inﬂated to
2012 using the PCE index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Family income is
for the calendar year two years prior to graduation year; tuition (and required fees)
is for the ﬁnal year of enrollment for students who attended only one institution that
year and is adjusted for attendance intensity. Cost of attendance is tuition plus room
and board, books, travel, and other expenses (also adjusted for attendance intensity
by NPSAS).
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
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Table 4C.2 Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS
(Categorical Variables), by Wave
1990
1996
2000
2004
2008
Dependency status
Dependent
59.0
58.7
58.2
59.1
62.0
Independent
41.0
41.3
41.8
40.9
38.0
Age
Less than 21
3.9
1.5
2.0
6.1
6.9
21
26.2
26.0
25.0
22.5
23.8
22
26.1
22.9
24.0
23.5
23.6
23
12.1
13.4
12.6
12.4
12.8
24
6.1
6.8
6.3
6.3
6.3
25–29
10.3
16.0
13.5
12.7
12.4
30–34
5.5
4.3
5.7
5.7
4.9
Older than 34
9.9
9.2
10.8
10.9
9.3
Sex
Male
45.3
43.5
42.5
42.1
42.7
Female
54.7
56.5
57.5
57.9
57.3
Marital status
Single, divorced,
79.6
84.6
82.2
81.2
84.6
widowed
Married
19.7
15.1
16.9
17.5
14.4
Separated
0.7
0.3
1.0
1.3
1.0
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic
86.2
82.7
75.6
73.6
70.5
Black, non-Hispanic
5.7
6.0
8.2
9.2
10.0
Hispanic
4.0
4.5
6.8
7.7
9.4
Asian
3.6
5.9
6.2
6.2
7.2
Native American/other
0.4
1.0
3.3
3.2
2.9
Mother’s education
Unknown
7.1
10.3
9.2
2.5
2.7
Less than high school
7.4
5.0
6.8
6.8
6.1
High school/GED
39.2
36.1
31.0
32.1
28.1
Some college
19.6
18.2
19.1
23.5
26.2
Bachelor’s
17.3
19.6
22.7
21.9
22.4
Postgraduate
9.4
10.9
11.3
13.2
14.5
(continued)
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Table 4C.2 (continued)
Father’s education
Unknown
Less than high school
High school/GED
Some college
Bachelor’s
Postgraduate
Attendance pattern
Full-time, full-year, 1
school
Full-time, full-year, 2+
school
Full-time, part-year
Part-time, full-year, 1
school
Part-time, full-year, 2+
schools
Part-time, part-year
Years to degree
Unknown
Fewer than 4
4
5
6
7–9
10 or more
Institution sector
Public, nondoctoral
Public, doctoral
Private, NFP,a nondoc
Private, NFP, doc
Private, FPb
Institution region
New England
Mid East
Great Lakes
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1990

1996

2000

2004

2008

9.0
8.3
25.2
14.7
19.8
19.4

11.4
6.0
27.7
10.3
22.3
20.5

10.2
8.0
25.2
14.7
23.4
18.5

4.4
8.3
27.7
18.8
21.9
18.9

5.0
7.0
27.1
20.3
21.4
19.3

45.1

55.5

52.4

52.7

54.8

1.3

1.5

2.5

3.3

4.5

16.0
17.3

11.9
19.8

18.0
15.6

13.5
17.9

13.1
14.3

7.0

1.6

0.9

1.3

1.9

13.3

9.8

10.7

11.3

11.4

–
–
–
–
–
–
–

0.7
1.6
32.6
24.4
11.6
12.6
16.7

0.3
12.6
34.5
21.3
8.0
9.2
14.0

0.0
10.8
34.5
22.6
8.1
9.3
14.7

0.0
8.9
35.7
21.0
9.1
10.9
14.4

29.6
36.4
19.5
13.8
0.6

20.1
44.8
21.9
12.6
0.6

19.6
46.3
19.7
13.2
1.3

21.6
45.8
17.9
12.4
2.3

16.8
49.0
15.0
15.0
4.2

10.8
19.5
18.9

4.7
19.8
18.1

6.5
17.9
16.6

8.2
14.8
14.4

5.8
17.4
14.7
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Table 4C.2 (continued)
Plains
Southeast
Southwest
Rocky Mts.
Far West
In-state student
Yes, public
Yes, private
No
Major
Unknown
Humanities
Social sciences
Life sciences
Physical sciences/math
Computer science
Engineering
Education
Business
Health
Other

1990
6.7
18.3
8.2
3.8
13.8

1996
7.5
22.4
10.9
2.9
13.8

2000
8.6
22.7
10.5
3.7
13.5

2004
8.3
26.2
8.5
6.6
13.2

2008
7.9
25.4
11.5
4.0
13.5

60.1
22.0
17.9

58.5
22.5
19.1

58.1
21.8
20.1

61.5
22.2
16.3

60.7
22.2
17.0

6.7
13.9
14.6
4.8
1.8
2.3
7.1
7.8
22.5
8.9
9.7

2.3
12.6
17.3
10.0
3.7
2.5
6.1
8.8
19.5
9.4
8.0

2.5
13.2
16.8
7.2
2.4
4.4
4.8
9.2
20.1
9.0
10.4

1.5
12.5
15.5
6.6
2.6
5.3
5.3
10.3
20.5
6.9
13.0

0.8
13.6
14.7
9.5
2.4
2.4
6.3
8.1
21.0
7.8
13.5

Not for proﬁt.
For proﬁt.
NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Attendance pattern refers to the ﬁnal year of
enrollment. Years to degree refers to the difference between the calendar year of ﬁrst
postsecondary enrollment and the graduation year indicated. In-state students attend
an institution in their state of legal residence.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

a

b
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.3A Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Tuition
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
2.01
(0.49)
0.58
(0.47)
6.35
(0.97)
4.55
(0.92)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.13
(0.13)
0.66
(0.20)
0.92
(0.27)
0.43
(0.24)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.12
(0.06)
−0.02
(0.09)
−0.06
(0.11)
−0.11
(0.12)
Parental education
−0.07
(0.07)
0.16
(0.13)
0.16
(0.16)
0.13
(0.17)
Location, in-state status
−0.24
(0.20)
−0.55
(0.32)
−0.40
(0.40)
−0.24
(0.49)
School sector, attendance, major −0.11
(0.23)
0.54
(0.64)
−0.23
(0.47)
−0.14
(0.55)
Expected family contribution
0.25
(0.09)
0.72
(0.17)
0.88
(0.21)
0.98
(0.22)
Tuition and grants
1.14
(0.33)
0.72
(0.52)
1.65
(0.51)
0.44
(0.84)
Total
1.22
(0.40)
2.23
(0.57)
2.92
(0.75)
1.49
(1.06)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.52
(0.67)
1.99
(0.55)
1.63
(1.36)
−3.12
(1.30)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−1.90
(2.75)
−3.44
(1.72)
−2.44
(5.09)
−3.83
(4.11)
Parental education
0.29
(0.55)
−0.23
(0.49)
0.18
(1.01)
1.60
(1.07)
Location, in-state status
0.68
(0.81)
0.32
(0.59)
−0.21
(1.39)
−0.05
(1.55)
School sector, attendance, major
1.88
(1.86)
−0.57
(4.95)
5.60
(3.44)
3.36
(3.44)
Expected family contribution
−3.72
(0.85)
−1.23
(0.72)
−5.22
(1.62)
−1.13
(1.41)
Tuition and grants
2.92
(2.07)
−1.76
(2.20)
7.31
(4.27)
9.98
(4.07)
Constant
0.14
(3.78)
3.25
(6.14)
−3.42
(7.98)
−3.76
(6.69)
Total
0.79
(0.50)
−1.65
(0.55)
3.43
(0.95)
3.06
(1.33)
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Table 4C.3B Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Cost of Attendance
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
2.01
(0.49)
0.58
(0.47)
6.35
(0.97)
4.55
(0.92)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.13
(0.11)
0.63
(0.19)
0.76
(0.24)
0.25
(0.23)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.18
(0.07)
−0.02
(0.09)
−0.07
(0.12)
−0.13
(0.14)
Parental education
−0.06
(0.07)
0.17
(0.14)
0.15
(0.17)
0.14
(0.18)
Location, in-state status
−0.26
(0.20)
−0.54
(0.31)
−0.50
(0.41)
−0.32
(0.50)
School sector, attendance, major
0.09
(0.19)
0.12
(0.28)
−0.15
(0.45)
0.12
(0.57)
Expected family contribution
0.27
(0.10)
0.71
(0.18)
0.89
(0.21)
0.95
(0.22)
Attendance cost and grants
0.40
(0.19)
0.94
(0.28)
0.80
(0.41)
0.19
(0.42)
Total
0.73
(0.38)
2.00
(0.52)
1.88
(0.74)
1.19
(0.80)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.65
(0.67)
1.89
(0.55)
1.73
(1.34)
−3.21
(1.32)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
−3.02
(2.97)
−4.04
(1.72)
−4.43
(5.37)
−5.87
(4.50)
Parental education
0.39
(0.56)
−0.17
(0.48)
0.42
(1.02)
1.69
(1.09)
Location, in-state status
0.68
(0.84)
0.19
(0.60)
−0.40
(1.39)
−0.25
(1.57)
School sector, attendance, major
0.02
(1.69)
1.54
(1.56)
1.36
(3.46)
−1.73
(3.46)
Expected family contribution
−3.75
(0.85)
−1.58
(0.71)
−6.15
(1.59)
−2.22
(1.43)
Attendance cost and grants
0.72
(2.77)
−9.79
(3.30)
2.93
(6.41)
5.66
(5.47)
Constant
5.60
(4.27)
10.54
(4.09)
9.00
(9.07)
9.30
(7.89)
Total
1.28
(0.49)
−1.43
(0.50)
4.47
(0.96)
3.36
(1.11)
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.4A Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Tuition
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
5.12
(0.46)
8.45
(0.60)
6.78
(0.83)
9.41
(0.86)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.04
(0.12)
0.01
(0.04)
−0.05
(0.15)
−0.12
(0.31)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.13
(0.14)
0.07
(0.06)
0.05
(0.21)
0.01
(0.15)
Parental education
−0.04
(0.15)
−0.06
(0.09)
0.08
(0.33)
−0.10
(0.29)
Location, in-state status
0.11
(0.17)
−0.08
(0.15)
0.31
(0.46)
0.03
(0.39)
School sector, attendance, major
0.37
(0.16)
0.35
(0.17)
0.07
(0.53)
0.70
(0.52)
Expected family contribution
−0.32
(0.18)
−0.43
(0.11)
−1.12
(0.31)
−0.68
(0.20)
Tuition and grants
−0.12
(0.32)
−0.52
(0.25)
−0.83
(0.86)
−0.54
(0.85)
Total
0.18
(0.51)
−0.67
(0.33)
−1.50
(1.12)
−0.70
(1.02)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−1.06
(0.63)
−2.65
(0.67)
−1.58
(1.23)
−3.59
(1.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.05
(2.69)
1.21
(1.61)
1.38
(4.68)
−0.57
(4.29)
Parental education
−0.02
(0.47)
1.55
(0.49)
−0.92
(0.75)
−1.37
(0.83)
Location, in-state status
−0.39
(0.68)
0.71
(0.82)
0.18
(1.33)
−1.33
(1.43)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.78
(1.46)
−4.91
(1.44)
−3.65
(2.75)
−2.64
(2.69)
Expected family contribution
2.12
(0.88)
−5.55
(0.88)
5.85
(1.62)
1.13
(1.42)
Tuition and grants
−0.31
(1.96)
8.59
(2.09)
−8.68
(3.98)
−2.51
(3.61)
Constant
5.33
(3.58)
10.17
(3.05)
15.69
(7.18)
20.99
(6.40)
Total
4.94
(0.48)
9.13
(0.62)
8.28
(1.13)
10.10
(1.11)
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Table 4C.4B Recentered Inﬂuence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Cost of Attendance
Mean
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $)
5.12
(0.46)
8.45
(0.60)
6.78
(0.83)
9.41
(0.86)
Composition effects due to:
Age/dependency status
0.01
(0.12)
0.02
(0.05)
0.01
(0.13)
−0.07
(0.28)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.15
(0.14)
0.08
(0.06)
0.10
(0.20)
0.03
(0.15)
Parental education
−0.07
(0.15)
−0.08
(0.09)
−0.03
(0.34)
−0.16
(0.29)
Location, in-state status
0.13
(0.18)
−0.13
(0.16)
0.11
(0.46)
−0.15
(0.40)
School sector, attendance, major
0.39
(0.15)
0.42
(0.16)
0.39
(0.50)
0.78
(0.51)
Expected family contribution
−0.31
(0.18)
−0.45
(0.12)
−1.19
(0.33)
−0.73
(0.21)
Attendance cost and grants
0.21
(0.35)
−0.37
(0.25)
−0.61
(0.87)
−0.30
(0.82)
Total
0.51
(0.53)
−0.52
(0.35)
−1.22
(1.13)
−0.59
(1.04)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status
−1.09
(0.63)
−2.23
(0.65)
−1.97
(1.18)
−3.40
(1.20)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity
0.57
(2.88)
1.55
(1.59)
2.11
(4.97)
0.16
(4.56)
Parental education
−0.15
(0.48)
1.39
(0.49)
−1.18
(0.76)
−1.56
(0.83)
Location, in-state status
−0.32
(0.70)
0.87
(0.83)
0.61
(1.32)
−0.92
(1.46)
School sector, attendance, major
−0.80
(1.48)
−6.45
(1.37)
−2.76
(2.94)
−2.31
(2.60)
Expected family contribution
1.61
(0.86)
−5.99
(0.86)
6.10
(1.59)
0.63
(1.45)
Attendance cost and grants
2.58
(2.91)
21.80
(4.11)
−2.13
(5.85)
5.49
(5.57)
Constant
2.21
(4.28)
−1.98
(4.47)
7.20
(8.24)
11.91
(7.62)
Total
4.61
(0.49)
8.97
(0.63)
8.00
(1.12)
10.00
(1.12)

113

1/28/2015 8:23:09 AM

NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered inﬂuence functions and quantiles are calculated with
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coefﬁcients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.5 Sample Sizes
1990
College graduates
3,270
Weighted: college 724,000
graduates

1996
2000
2004
2008
1,340
12,230
5,170
23,340
897,000 1,217,000 1,448,000 1,822,000

NOTE: College graduates are oversampled in 2000 and 2008, as these years represent
sampling frames for the Baccalaureate and Beyond longitudinal studies. Sample sizes
are rounded to the nearest 10 (thousand for weighted numbers) to comply with disclosure restrictions.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 114

1/28/2015 8:23:10 AM

The Distribution of College Graduate Debt, 1990–2008 115

References
Avery, Christopher, and Sarah Turner. 2012. “Student Loans: Do College Students Borrow Too Much—Or Not Enough?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(1): 165–192.
Blinder, Alan S. 1973. “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural
Variables.” Journal of Human Resources 8(4): 436–455.
Bound, John, Michael F. Lovenheim, and Sarah Turner. 2010. “Increasing
Time to Baccalaureate Degree in the United States.” NBER Working Paper
No. 15892. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cellini, Stephanie R., and Claudia Goldin. 2012. “Does Federal Student Aid
Raise Tuition? New Evidence on For-Proﬁt Colleges.” NBER Working
Paper No. 17827. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
College Board. 2012a. Trends in Student Aid, 2012. New York: College Board.
———. 2012b. Trends in College Pricing, 2012. New York: College Board.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 2012. Report to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, the House of Representatives Committee
on Financial Services, and the House of Representatives Committee on
Education and the Workforce. Washington, DC: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market
Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973–1992: A Semiparametric
Approach.” Econometrica 64(5): 1001–1044.
Dynarski, Susan, and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2013. “Financial Aid Policy: Lessons from Research.” Postsecondary Education in the United States 23(1):
67–91.
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 2012. Survey of Consumer Finances.
Washington, DC: Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Firpo, Sergio, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 2009. “Unconditional
Quantile Regressions.” Econometrica 77(3): 953–973.
Greenstone, Michael, and Adam Looney. 2013. “Rising Student Debt Burdens:
Factors behind the Phenomenon.” Washington, DC: The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution. http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/rising_
student_debt_burdens_factors_behind_the_phenomenon/ (accessed June 4,
2014).
Jacob, Brian, Brian McCall, and Kevin Stange. 2013. “College as Country
Club: Do Colleges Cater to Students’ Preferences for Consumption?”
NBER Working Paper No. 18745. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 115

1/28/2015 8:23:10 AM

116 Hershbein and Hollenbeck
Jann, Ben. 2008. “The Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition for Linear Regression
Models.” Stata Journal 8(4): 453–479.
Joint Economic Committee. 2013. The Causes and Consequences of Increasing Student Debt. U.S. Congress. June. Washington, DC: Joint Economic
Committee.
Kantrowitz, Mark. 2012. “Who Graduates College with Six-Figure Student Loan Debt?” www.ﬁnaid.org/educators/20120801sixﬁguredebt.pdf
(accessed June 1, 2013).
Lewin, Tamar. 2013. “Financing for Colleges Declines as Costs Rise.” New
York Times, March 6, A:17.
Martin, Andrew, and Andrew W. Lehren. 2012. “A Generation Hobbled by the
Soaring Cost of College.” New York Times, May 12. http://www.nytimes
.com/2012/05/13/business/student-loans-weighing-down-a-generationwith-heavy-debt.html?_r=0.
Mitchell, Josh, and Maya Jackson-Randall. 2012. “Student-Loan Debt Tops
$1 Trillion.” Wall Street Journal, March 22. http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424052702303812904577295930047604846.
Oaxaca, Ronald. 1973. “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets.” International Economic Review 14(3): 693–709.
Quinterno, John, and Viany Orozco. 2012. The Great Cost Shift: How Higher
Education Cuts Undermine the Future Middle Class. New York: Demos.
Senate Committee on the Budget. 2006. “2002 Student Loan Law Takes Effect,
Lowers Interest Rates.” U.S. Senate Budget Bulletin. August 4. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate.
Turner, Lesley. 2012. “The Incidence of Student Financial Aid: Evidence from
the Pell Grant Program.” University of Maryland Working Paper.
Turner, Nicholas. 2012. “Who Beneﬁts from Student Aid? The Economic Incidence of Tax-Based Federal Student Aid.” Economics of Education Review
31(4): 463–481.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 116

1/28/2015 8:23:10 AM

5
Understanding Changes
in the Distribution of Student
Loan Debt over Time
Elizabeth Akers
Brown Center on Education Policy, Brookings Institution
Matthew M. Chingos
Brown Center on Education Policy, Brookings Institution
Alice M. Henriques
Federal Reserve Board of Governors

When outstanding debt passed the $1 trillion mark two years ago,
it prompted many to question whether the student lending market is
headed for a crisis, with many students unable to repay their loans
and taxpayers being forced to foot the bill. Commentators have also
expressed concerns that increasing education debt loads are making it
more difﬁcult for borrowers to start families, buy houses, and save for
retirement (Brown and Caldwell 2013). There is clear evidence that the
number of students taking on debt has been increasing and that debt
burdens have been growing. However, the large and growing economic
return to college education implies that many of these loans are ﬁnancing sound investments. Consequently, it is not obvious that the growth
in debt is problematic. Existing evidence is insufﬁcient to determine
what these changes mean for the ﬁnancial well-being of borrowers and
the health of the overall student lending market.
The returns to a college degree are higher than they have ever been.
In 2011, college graduates aged 23–25 earned $12,000 more per year
on average than high school graduates in the same group, and they
had employment rates 20 percentage points higher. Over the last 30
years, the increase in lifetime earnings associated with earning a college
117
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degree has grown by 75 percent, whereas costs have grown by 50 percent (Greenstone and Looney 2012). These economic beneﬁts accrue
to individuals, but also to society in the form of increased tax revenue,
improved health, and higher levels of civic participation (Baum, Ma,
and Payea 2013).
Today’s students are more likely than their predecessors to borrow
and to take out larger loans to pay for tuition, fees, and living expenses
while in college. Over the last 20 years, inﬂation-adjusted published
tuition and fees have more than doubled at four-year public institutions and have increased by more than 70 percent at private four-year
and public two-year colleges (Figure 5.1). The fact that the total outstanding balance on student loans recently passed $1 trillion, combined
with media reports of students with large debts—often in excess of
$100,000—have garnered a great deal of public attention. However, the
debt picture for the typical college graduate is not so dire. For example,
bachelor’s degree recipients in 2011–2012 who took on student loan
debt accumulated approximately $26,000 in student loan debt ($25,000
at public institutions, and $29,900 at private, nonproﬁt institutions)
(College Board 2013). Debt per borrower is growing rapidly (at an
annual rate of 1.2 percent above inﬂation at nonproﬁt institutions and
2.1 percent at public institutions), but it is still a manageable burden if
the graduate is able to ﬁnd gainful employment. Extremely high debt
levels remain quite rare: in 2012, only 5 percent of borrowers with education debt owed more than $100,000 (College Board 2013).
In the United States, student lending takes place through two channels, the federal lending programs and the private market for student
loans. The federal lending program exists because, in the absence of
government intervention, the private market would provide too few
students access to loans, which would result in underinvestment in
education at the national level. The basis for this theory is that, unlike
physical capital, human capital—or the skills that one obtains through
education—cannot effectively serve as collateral for a loan. This makes
student lending inherently risky, because a lender cannot foreclose on
a student’s education the same way it can foreclose on a home if the
borrower goes into default. More generally, the federal loan program
ensures that all students have access to higher education, regardless of
their ability to pay.
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Figure 5.1 Trends in Published Tuition and Fees, 1971–2012
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20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics (2012, Table 381).

Most student lending takes place through the federal government
because the interest rates offered in federal lending programs are below
those typically offered by private lenders. Interest rates on federal loans
are set by legislation and do not depend on the likelihood that a borrower
will default. The amount that students can borrow from the government
depends on whether they are ﬁnancially dependent on their parents (as
deﬁned by a federal formula) and on their year in college (including
whether they are a graduate student). Students from households judged
to have more ﬁnancial need are eligible to borrow a larger portion of
their federal loans through the subsidized loan program, in which the
government pays interest while the student is in school. Federal student
loans carry additional beneﬁts beyond the below-market interest rates
and in-school interest subsidies for eligible families. Borrowers who
face ﬁnancial hardship after leaving college are eligible for deferral or
reduction of monthly payments, and even forgiveness through a number
of repayment programs.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 119

1/28/2015 8:23:11 AM

120 Akers, Chingos, and Henriques

Some students also borrow from private ﬁnancial institutions,
usually after they have exhausted their ability to borrow from the government. Unlike the loans offered in the federal lending programs,
private lenders offer loans with interest rates that reﬂect a borrower’s
likelihood of default. This means that borrowers from low-income
households or borrowers attending colleges with lower completion rates
are likely to face the highest rates. In addition, private student loans
carry less generous repayment terms than federal loans, an important
distinction given that both federal and private student loans are more
difﬁcult to discharge in bankruptcy than other types of consumer debt.
Despite the signiﬁcant role that loans play in our nation’s higher
education system and the increased attention to rising debt levels, there
is little existing empirical evidence that attempts to explain these trends.
In this chapter, we examine how education loan balances have evolved
over time and measure the extent to which changes in degree attainment, tuition, demographics, and borrowing behavior have contributed
to the observed increase in student debt.

BACKGROUND AND DATA
The lack of empirical evidence available to support discussions
about perceived problems in the student loan market is at least partly
due to the limitations of existing data sources. The primary source of
data on student aid is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). These data, which are derived from the Department of
Education’s survey of all institutions participating in federal student aid
programs, report institution-level lending variables, including total outlays within the federal loan program and number of borrowers. While
this information is incredibly important, it does not tell the whole story.
For instance, we cannot tell how the use of private loans has changed or
how much debt students accumulate over time.
In addition to the data available through IPEDS, the Department of
Education publishes the ﬁndings from a few different longitudinal studies, including Baccalaureate and Beyond and Beginning Postsecondary
Students, both of which draw their participants from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study. These studies track a speciﬁc cohort of
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students for a set number of years. The Baccalaureate and Beyond study
collects data for 10 years following graduation from a bachelor’s degree
program, and the Beginning Postsecondary Students study collects data
for 6 years following initial enrollment in postsecondary education.
These longitudinal data sources enable us to observe cumulative debt
burdens for student borrowers, but only for a select cohort of students.
The most valuable feature of these studies for this area of research is
that they collect information on both earnings and education liabilities.
However, the small number of cohorts available and the relatively short
period of observation limit the usefulness of these data.
Two additional data sources not collected by the U.S. Department
of Education have been used to answer questions about the evolution of
the student loan market. First, the College Board has compiled annual
reports that summarize both public and proprietary data on student borrowing from both federal and private sources. The proprietary data are
collected through a survey of institutions administered by the College
Board. The annual, Web-based survey collects data from nearly 4,000
accredited undergraduate colleges and universities. Although this data
set succeeds in ﬁlling a void left by federal data, its usefulness is limited
by the fact that the data are self-reported by institutions and thus are
subject to inconsistencies in reporting and potential manipulation by
institutions.
Another data source that has been used to produce evidence on
the student loan market is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s
(FRBNY) Consumer Credit Panel. These data, which are based on
the proprietary data used in credit bureau reports, capture longitudinal information on the debt portfolio of all individuals who have ever
applied for credit. Researchers at the FRBNY have used this resource
to compile data on the market for outstanding student loan debt. The
primary shortcoming of these data for the purpose of understanding
the state of the student loan market is that they do not capture much
background information on borrowers, in particular, their level of educational attainment.
The Federal Reserve Board administers a nationally representative
survey that generates data with many of the features not available in the
previously discussed data sources. The Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) is administered every three years and collects information on
household ﬁnances. Unlike the Consumer Credit Panel, the SCF gen-
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erates cross-sectional data. A key advantage of the SCF is that it links
information on liabilities, including outstanding student loan debt, to
data on earnings and demographics. Unlike the other data sources, the
SCF is a household-level survey. This is advantageous for our analysis.
Since ﬁnancial decision making often takes place at the household level,
individual analysis could easily misrepresent an individual’s ﬁnancial
well-being. Although the SCF lacks some background variables that
would be useful to allow us to more fully understand the decision to
take out education loans, it does report educational attainment, which
is critical for this work. Since the SCF has been administered in a relatively consistent manner since 1989, it allows for thorough analysis of
changes over time for the full U.S. population. However, one limitation
of the SCF is that, owing to its sampling procedures, it does not capture
the liabilities of young adults living in a household headed by someone
else, such as a parent.
We use the SCF from 1989 to 2010 to track changes in student loan
debt over time. We measure student loan debt as the total outstanding
balance, measured in 2010 dollars, of all education debt held by households, calculated on a per-person basis (that is, we divided household
debt by two for households with two adults). We apply survey weights
throughout the analysis so that the results are representative of the U.S.
population of households.1

RESULTS
Trends in Debt over Time
The SCF data show a dramatic increase in education debt among
households with an average age between 20 and 40. Table 5.1, with key
indicators depicted in Figure 5.2, shows that the share of young U.S.
households with education debt more than doubled in 2010, from 14
percent in 1989 to 36 percent. Not only were more individuals taking out
education loans, but they were taking out larger loans—not necessarily
what you would expect as people cross the margin from being nonborrowers to borrowers. Among households with positive debt, the mean
per-person debt more than tripled, from $5,810 to $17,916. Median debt
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Table 5.1 Incidence and Amount of Debt over Time, Age 20–40
Those with debt
Incidence
Mean
Mean
Median
Year
(%)
debt ($)
($)
($)
Cell size
1989
14
806
5,810
3,517
971
1992
20
1,498
7,623
3,730
1,323
1995
20
1,475
7,521
3,577
1,429
1998
20
2,539
12,826
8,027
1,362
2001
22
2,881
12,939
6,156
1,307
2004
24
3,402
14,204
7,503
1,246
2007
28
4,583
16,322
9,728
1,144
2010
36
6,502
17,916
8,500
1,865
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.

Figure 5.2 Trends in Debt over Time, Households with Average Age
20–40, 1989–2010
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.
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Figure 5.3 Cumulative Distribution of Education Debt, Households with
Average Age 20–40, 1989/1992 and 2010
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.

grew somewhat less rapidly, from $3,517 to $8,500. Among all households, including those with no debt, mean debt increased eightfold,
from about $800 to about $6,500.
The change in the distribution of debt between 1989/1992 (combined to increase precision) and 2010 is depicted in Figure 5.3, which
shows the cumulative share of households with debt at or below a given
level (density plots are shown in Figure 5.4). In the earlier period, not
only was the incidence of debt low, but most borrowers had very small
loan balances. Only a trivial number of households had more than
$20,000 in debt (per person) in 1989/1992, whereas in 2010, about 10
percent of households—or more than a quarter of those with debt—had
balances exceeding $20,000. The incidence of very large debt balances
is greater now than it was two decades ago, but it is still quite rare. In
2010, 3 percent of all households, or about 8 percent of households with
debt, had balances in excess of $50,000.
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Figure 5.4 Distribution of Education Debt, 1989/1992 and 2010
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.

The focus on the age range 20–40 allows us to examine households
that are likely to be within the repayment period of student loans while
also capturing individuals who potentially take on graduate as well as
undergraduate debt.2 Because we focus on the remaining total balance
of education debt, the trends over time we observe will reﬂect changes
in both borrowing and repayment behavior.3 In order to examine repayment over time, we would ideally use a panel data set that tracks a
cohort of individuals over a long period of time. As a rough approximation using the SCF data, we track a group of age cohorts over time.
Speciﬁcally, we examine the education loan balances of the group that
was aged 20–25 in 1989 or 1992 at three-year intervals through 2007
and 2010, when those cohorts were aged 38–43 (we average over pairs
of survey years in order to increase the precision of the results).
The results of this descriptive analysis are shown in Figure 5.5.
The share of this group with any education debt declines over time
from 28 percent at ages 20–25 to 18 percent at ages 38–43. (The slight
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Figure 5.5 Tracking Cohort Debt over Time, Age 20–25 in 1989/1992
through Age 38–43 in 2007/2010
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.

uptick between ages 35–40 and 38–43 could reﬂect a small number
of loans taken for children in the household.) Among the remaining
borrowers, mean debt increases dramatically, from less than $7,000 to
more than $14,000. The combination of these two trends results in a
mean debt level (including those without any debt) that increases from
about $2,000 to about $2,500 over the roughly 20-year period that we
observe, an increase of about 25 percent. We interpret these data as
suggesting that many individuals are paying off their education loan
balances during this time period, but some individuals are still taking on
more debt (for graduate school or attending undergraduate programs at
non-traditional ages) as they age, pushing up the balance of those with
any debt.
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Explaining Changes in Education Debt
The large increases in education debt levels over the last two
decades documented in the SCF data and other data sources are often
attributed to the increases in tuition charged by colleges and universities. The tuition trends shown in Figure 5.1 certainly support that theory.
But there is also evidence that college students are relying more on debt
to ﬁnance college costs and paying less out-of-pocket (Greenstone and
Looney 2013), suggesting that student behavior is changing in ways
that favor loans over other ways of paying for college. Furthermore,
there have been shifts in the educational attainment level and demographic characteristics of the U.S. college-age population that could
impact observed student borrowing.
We begin by examining the extent to which changes in education
debt levels can be explained by changing population characteristics. We
primarily focus on educational attainment, given the fact that increased
debt due to rising educational attainment may reﬂect rational human
capital investments given the large and growing economic returns to
education. Table 5.2 shows that educational attainment of households
aged 20–40 rose between 1989 and 2010. The share of households with
no college experience fell from 41 to 31 percent, the share with at least
one person with a bachelor’s degree increased from 20 to 24 percent,
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics, Household Level, Average Age 20–40 (%)
Race/ethnicity of
Maximum education
household head
of household
High
Hisschool Some
GraduYear White Black panic Other Couple or less college BA
ate
1989 72
11
11
6
62
41
29
20
9
1992 71
14
10
5
61
37
29
25
9
1995 73
14
9
4
59
36
31
23
10
1998 71
14
11
4
62
36
32
21
11
2001 68
16
12
4
60
38
28
23
11
2004 67
15
14
4
58
34
31
23
12
2007 63
16
15
6
62
33
33
22
12
2010 62
15
17
6
58
31
32
24
13
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.
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and the share with at least one person with a graduate degree increased
from 9 to 13 percent.4
It is not surprising that education debt levels vary markedly by
educational attainment, but debt trends also vary noticeably along this
dimension, as shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. Among households with
some college but no bachelor’s degree, the incidence of debt increased
from 11 to 41 percent. Households where at least one member holds a
bachelor’s degree saw an increase from 22 to 50 percent, and households with at least one graduate degree went from 33 to 58 percent.
Among those with debt, the average per-person debt load increased
135 and 162 percent among households with some college and a bachelor’s degree, respectively. Households with a graduate degree saw an
increase of 311 percent, from just under $10,000 to more than $40,000.
Given the rising levels of educational attainment over the 21-year
period from 1989 to 1992 and the concentration of debt increases
among the more educated, to what extent do the changes in attainment
explain the changes in debt? We address this question by calculating
what the average debt in 2010 would have been had educational attainment remained at its 1989 level. We do this by calculating a weighted
average of mean debt (including those without debt, in order to reﬂect
changes in incidence) in 2010 by educational attainment, using the percentage of borrowers in the educational attainment category in 1989 as
the weights. From 1989 to 2010, average debt increased from $806 to
$6,502, a change of $5,696. Had attainment (measured as the maximum
value in two-person households) remained the same, average debt in
2010 would have been $5,343, a change of $4,538. In other words, the
change in attainment explains about 20 percent of the observed change.
We implement this approach for all years of data and report the
results in Figure 5.8. As attainment increases over time, the gap between
actual debt and the simulated debt with constant attainment grows.
These calculations only take into account educational attainment and
do so in a simple way by taking the maximum for households. We next
implement a multivariate decomposition that allows us to more accurately capture changes in educational attainment of the household and
also adjust for race/ethnicity. Table 5.2 shows that, between 1989 and
2010, the white share of the population fell and the Hispanic share rose.
To the extent that race and debt are correlated, these changes could also
have contributed to (or mitigated) rising debt levels.
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Figure 5.6 Incidence of Debt by Educational Attainment, 1989–2010
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.

Figure 5.7 Average Debt by Educational Attainment, among Those with
Debt, 1989–2010
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Figure 5.8 Reweighted (simple method, education only)
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF and the Digest of Education
Statistics.

To more carefully account for changes in educational attainment
and race, we implement a multivariate decomposition approach along
the lines of the one used by Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2012). As
above, we reweight the 1989 SCF to create a counterfactual distribution of debt in 2010 that captures what student debt would look like
if population characteristics had remained constant between 1989 and
2010. To do this, we stack the 1989 and 2010 data and run the following
logit regression:
I(Year = 1989) = β + δEdhh × Edsp + γRacehh + ϵ,
where I(Year = 1989) is a dummy variable identifying whether the
observation is from the year 1989 (as opposed to 2010), β is a constant,
Edhh × Edsp is a vector of dummy variables identifying the full set of
interactions between the educational attainment of the household head
and the spouse (with one of the spouse education categories identifying
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households where there is no spouse), Racehh is a vector of dummies
identifying the race of the household head, and ϵ is the error term. We
then obtain predicted values Î from the logit regression and calculate a
ܫመ
set of weights ሺͳ െ ܫመሻ (which we combine with the SCF survey weights).5
We ﬁrst conﬁrm that the reweighting procedure is working correctly
by reporting summary statistics for 1989, 2010, and 2010 with the
reweighting. Table 5.3 shows that the reweighting produces summary
statistics for 2010 that are nearly identical to the actual statistics for
1989, in all cases to within one percentage point.
We then apply these weights to the 2010 data to calculate an estimate of what debt would have been in 2010 had educational attainment
and race remained at their 1989 values. We ﬁnd that mean per-person debt (among all households) would have been $4,932 (instead of
$6,502) in 2010 had educational attainment and race remained at their
1989 values. In other words, the variables included in the decomposition exercise explain 28 percent of the observed change.6
We next explore how much changes in education debt can be
explained by rising college tuition. Ideally, we would implement this as
follows: 1) measure how much each individual paid for his or her education; 2) measure how much they would have paid 21 years prior (i.e.,
the number of years between 1989 and 2010); 3) calculate the causal
effect of price on debt; and 4) calculate how much debt they would have
taken out had they faced the prices from 21 years prior by multiplying
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics, Household Level, Average Age 20–40 (%)
2010
1989
2010
reweighted
Maximum education
High school or less
41
31
42
Some college
29
32
29
BA
20
24
20
Graduate
9
13
9
Race/ethnicity of household head
White
72
62
72
Black
11
15
11
Hispanic
11
17
11
Other
6
6
6
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF.
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the effect of price on debt by the difference between actual tuition paid
and the counterfactual tuition (from 21 years prior).
This is not possible for two main reasons. First, the SCF does not
contain information on how much respondents paid for their education or even the institutions they attended—only the highest degree
obtained. Second, it is far from straightforward to estimate the causal
effect of price on debt, and we are unaware of any research on the topic.
As a rough substitute, we instead deﬂate the 2010 distribution of debt
to a simulated 1989 level using data on published tuition and fees by
year, assuming that the percentage increase in debt is the same as the
percentage increase in published tuition.
Speciﬁcally, for each individual we calculate counterfactual debt in
2010 as the actual debt multiplied by the ratio of counterfactual tuition
(average tuition 21 years prior to when the respondent was age 20) to
actual tuition (average tuition when the respondent was age 20).7 For
example, a household with an average age of 34 in 2010 is assigned
an actual tuition from 1996 (i.e., at age 20) and a counterfactual tuition
from 1975 (i.e., 21 years prior to age 20). Tuition is calculated as a
weighted average of published tuition and fees at two-year, public
four-year, and private four-year institutions across the country, using
enrollment shares as weights (National Center for Education Statistics,
various years). We use published tuition and fees, even though net price
(tuition and fees less grant and scholarships) would be a better measure because the latter is not available for a sufﬁciently long period of
time.8 As a result, we likely overstate the contribution of rising prices
to growth in debt.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.4. The tuition
adjustment explains 58 percent of the 1989–2010 increase in mean
debt. Combining the tuition adjustment with the reweighting procedure, which adjusts for changes in educational attainment and race,
increases to 72 percent the share of the change explained. Our use of
published rather than net price implies that this is an overestimate, but it
still leaves 28 percent of the change unexplained. This remaining share
of the change could be the result of some combination of changes in
characteristics not measured in the SCF data and changes in borrowing
behavior.
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Table 5.4 Decomposition of Changes in Mean Debt, 1989–2010
Change from Share of change
Mean debt ($) 1989 ($)
explained (%)
1989 debt
806
2010 debt
No adjustment
6,502
5,696
0
Applying 1989 characteristics
4,932
4,126
28
Applying 1989 tuition
3,194
2,388
58
Applying 1989 characteristics
2,402
1,596
72
and tuition
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF and the Digest of Education
Statistics.

CONCLUSION
The media has provided many anecdotes about recent graduates
with large amounts of student loan debt who are in ﬁnancial distress,
often living in their parents’ basements. Data on the distribution of loan
debt, both from the SCF and other sources, indicate that extremely large
debt burdens remain exceptional cases. Our analysis of the SCF data
also provides some initial estimates of the role that different factors
have played in driving up student debt over the last two decades. Rising
educational attainment explains some of the trend, and debt data disaggregated by highest degree earned suggest that graduate education has
played a particularly important role, especially for the cases of large
debt balances.
Tuition is also a likely culprit, although the limitations of historical
data on tuition make it difﬁcult to tell exactly how much. Our analysis
suggests that inﬂation in published prices may account for upward of
60 percent of the increase in debt, leaving a signiﬁcant share of the
rise in debt that is unexplained. This fact, coupled with evidence that
students are substituting away from paying for college out-of-pocket
toward ﬁnancing (Greenstone and Looney 2013), suggests that behavioral shifts may account for some of the increase in education debt.
These analyses do not shed light on whether the increasing loan
burdens taken on to ﬁnance education are leading to ﬁnancial hardship
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for borrowers. To the extent that increases in attainment are the culprit,
at least some of the increase in debt has ﬁnanced sound investments.
But there are surely cases of investments in education that did not pay
off or did not even result in a degree. Expanding this analysis to examine debt-to-income ratios and other measures of ﬁnancial distress is a
ripe area for future research.

Notes
1. The use of survey weights in the SCF is particularly important because the sample
design oversamples high-income households to properly measure the full distribution of wealth and assets in the United States. This high-income sample makes up
approximately 25 percent of households in the SCF.
2. In addition, the SCF does not record the individual associated with loan origination. Therefore, with individuals no older than 40, we are more conﬁdent that the
loans on their balance sheets are associated with an adult rather than a child in the
household.
3. The SCF collects data on the size of loan at origination, but this refers to the date
of most recent loan terms, which includes consolidation. Thus, we are not able to
measure the size of loans taken out while enrolled for all households.
4. We ﬁnd similar attainment trends after converting the household-level SCF data
into individual-level data (assigning one-half the survey weight to each individual in a two-person household). These summary statistics are available from the
authors upon request.
5. Speciﬁcally, we use weights that are the product of the weights generated by the
logit regression and the original survey weights.
6. These types of reweighting exercises assume that the relative borrowing behavior
of demographic groups remains constant over time. This is obviously a strong
assumption, and understanding changes in borrowing behavior is left for future
research.
7. We calculate the years to use for tuition using the average age of the household
rounded to the nearest year.
8. Our tuition data series begins in 1971. We proxy for 1969 and 1970 tuition levels
using the 1971 value.
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College Costs and
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Perhaps no culprit has been more incriminated for the rising levels
of student loan debt in the United States than for-proﬁt postsecondary institutions. Two trends have drawn a great deal of attention to this
sector. First, students at for-proﬁt institutions disproportionately accrue
federal student loan disbursements, leading to concern about the use of
public funds and debt burden on students in the sector. Second, student
loan default rates are higher at this group of institutions than other sectors on average, calling into question relative employment prospects.
There is still much to learn, however, about the student context of these
high-level trends, and research on student lending and the for-proﬁt
sector remains underdeveloped. Using student-level nationally representative data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS), we analyze student borrowing trends over the past decade,
with a particular focus on the behavior of students in for-proﬁt institutions compared to students in other sectors.1
An impediment to understanding relative student outcomes in the
for-proﬁt sector is the unique nature of students served. Descriptive
research informs us that the sector disproportionately enrolls ﬁnancially
independent and low-income students (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012)
such that credit is necessary for many of these students to invest in their
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human capital. Therefore, we push further than previous research to also
ask whether borrowing patterns differ by various measures of ﬁnancial
need and available resources. We further examine preferences for borrowing relative to other available ﬁnancing options such as working,
grants, and family transfers to provide a better understanding of debt
behavior in the context of the ﬁnancial constraints these students face.
As expected, we ﬁnd that students at for-proﬁt institutions are much
more likely to borrow than students in public and nonproﬁt institutions.
We also ﬁnd that, over the past decade, the incidence of borrowing has
risen more steeply than borrowing in other sectors. These high borrowing rates lead to higher average borrowing by students in for-proﬁt
institutions than students in public and nonproﬁt institutions. Published
tuition in the for-proﬁt sector has risen substantially over the last decade,
following patterns similar to those making headlines in the public and
nonproﬁt sectors. But unlike other sectors, grant aid has not risen with
tuition in the for-proﬁt sector, leading to increases in the net price that
students pay. In particular, we observe increases in institutional aid in
the private nonproﬁt sector that accompany tuition increases but ﬁnd
little evidence of this type of support in the for-proﬁt sector. Student
borrowing in the for-proﬁt sector has risen dramatically to meet the rising net price.
Our examination of ﬁnancial resources reveals that students attending for-proﬁt institutions have the lowest available personal and family
resources to contribute to higher education costs, relative to students
in other sectors. Not only do they have the lowest calculated expected
family contribution (EFC) according to ﬁnancial aid formulas, but it is
also less likely that they or their parents own a home or have substantial
investment or business assets. Given their relative lack of resources, it
is not surprising that these students turn to the credit market to ﬁnance
their education. Students in the for-proﬁt sector also work longer hours
and are more likely to work full time than students in the public fouryear or private nonproﬁt sectors (and at levels that are generally similar
to public two-year college students). Therefore, the high borrowing
rates of for-proﬁt students do not appear to simply reﬂect preferences
for debt over working. Rather, they both seem to be working and borrowing at relatively high rates.
Paradoxically, students in for-proﬁt institutions are most similar
to public community college students in the degrees they seek, their
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demographics, and their ﬁnancial resources, yet their costs and their
debt burdens are on par with students in private nonproﬁt institutions
who typically seek bachelor’s degrees from institutions with longstanding reputations and higher expected postcollege incomes. Why
are the most disadvantaged students attending relatively expensive forproﬁt institutions?
We cannot provide an answer here, but our ﬁndings highlight the
policy importance of the question. An economically rational student will
decide whether to attend higher education by comparing the expected
beneﬁts of school, such as higher earnings, against expected costs,
including tuition and forgone earnings. The answer to the question,
therefore, may be that advantages offered by for-proﬁt colleges, such
as lower opportunity costs associated with convenient class schedules
and streamlined programs, make for-proﬁt education an appropriate
choice for judicious and shrewd students. This may be of little concern
for policymakers. On the other hand, policymakers may be rightfully
concerned if students are making choices while lacking information or
being misled.

BACKGROUND ON FOR-PROFITS AND DEBT
Across all sectors of higher education, student borrowing plays
an important role in ensuring access to higher education for low- and
middle-income students. Yet, evidence that credit constraints affect
educational attainment is mixed. Ellwood and Kane (2000) and Belley
and Lochner (2007) ﬁnd some support that credit constraints impact
college going, while Cameron and Taber (2004) and Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2008) ﬁnd little evidence in that regard.
Whether students borrow “too much” or “too little” is subject to
debate, though analyses of typical debt burdens and returns to college
do not indicate that average student borrowing behavior, even at current higher levels, is a serious concern (see Avery and Turner [2012]
and Baum and Schwartz [2006] for a more detailed discussion). Loans
can promote access to higher education by lowering costs, and research
indicates that social beneﬁts to higher education can exceed private beneﬁts (Wolfe and Haveman 2002). Therefore, a robust educational credit
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market can have both equity and efﬁciency beneﬁts. On the other hand,
debt burdens can lower expected future consumption, since relatively
large portions of some borrowers’ incomes will be dedicated to making
loan payments. Evidence also indicates that high debt can potentially
alter choices about early career decisions (Field 2009; Rothstein and
Rouse 2011) and other choices (Gicheva 2011).
If not properly managed, student debt can impair access to other
credit markets, making it more difﬁcult for students to borrow money
to purchase assets such as houses or to guard against income or asset
shocks. Debt burdens, therefore, should be considered in relation to
the expected beneﬁts associated with borrowing. For student loans, the
prominent private beneﬁt is higher expected earnings associated with
completed college. For the average student, college earnings premiums
have grown, even when taking into account increasing college costs
(Avery and Turner 2012). Therefore, modest increases in student borrowing for the average student may not be a source of public concern.
Returns to college investments, however, are heterogeneous across
student characteristics and abilities, as well as institutions. Therefore,
not every student will earn the average wage premium to college, and
students are not evenly stratiﬁed across school sectors and types. In fact,
several recent studies on the returns to for-proﬁt college attendance suggest that for-proﬁt students generate earnings gains that are lower than
those of students in other sectors (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Turner 2012). Among associate’s degree
students, estimates of returns to for-proﬁt attendance are generally in
the range of 2–7 percent per year of education, compared to upward of
9 percent in the public sector (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005;
Jepsen, Troske, and Coomes 2014).2 Assessing returns from a different
angle, Cellini (2012) calculates that the earnings gains needed to offset
the cost of one year of an associate’s degree program in a for-proﬁt
college must be equal to or greater than 8.5 percent for students to see
net beneﬁts. Current estimates fall just short of this threshold. Still, the
literature on the returns to for-proﬁt education is quite thin. We know
little about how returns have changed over time, and this has important
implications for our understanding of the temporal patterns of student
borrowing discussed below.
Complicating the policy discussion is that publicly subsidized
federal student loans are the most common source of borrowing for col-
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lege students. Federal loans include Stafford Loans, Perkins Loans, and
PLUS Loans for parents. While these loan programs have been widely
touted as improving access to higher education for low-income students
in “traditional” nonproﬁt and public institutions, they have come under
increasing scrutiny for their role in supporting the growth of the forproﬁt sector.
For-proﬁt students receive a disproportionate share of federal aid.
In recent years, for-proﬁt students composed just over 10 percent of
postsecondary enrollment but received about double that proportion of
federal Pell Grant and subsidized student loan disbursements (College
Board 2013). As we show below, tuition averages about $10,000 per
year, and for-proﬁts may be raising tuition to maximize their federal aid
(Cellini and Goldin forthcoming). Of course, another explanation for
the high aid receipt is that for-proﬁts tend to enroll more disadvantaged
students than nonproﬁts. Deming, Goldin, and Katz (2012) report that
among ﬁrst-time college students, for-proﬁt institutions serve a higher
proportion of women, minority students, GED recipients, and single
parents than other sectors. Many of these characteristics are associated
with lower ﬁnancial resources. We explore these patterns further using
NPSAS data in the analysis that follows.
Disproportionate borrowing alone may not be a problem if disadvantaged students can easily pay back their debt after graduation.
More troubling is that student loan default rates are much higher in the
for-proﬁt sector than in other sectors. Three-year cohort default rates
from 2009 are over 22 percent in the for-proﬁt sector compared to 8.4
percent for public community colleges. Two other estimates produced
by the U.S. Department of Education, but not used for Title IV eligibility, yield even higher default rates for for-proﬁt students. Estimates of
“cumulative lifetime default rates” based on the number of loans, rather
than borrowers, yield a rate of about 31 percent for cohorts graduating between 2005 and 2009. The highest estimate uses dollars, rather
than loans or borrowers, to estimate defaults and is used in the president’s budget. By this measure, lifetime defaults are around 48 percent
for two-year for-proﬁt students (U.S. Department of Education 2011).
These patterns have raised the suspicions of policymakers and led the
Obama administration to propose new regulations on restricting federal student aid to for-proﬁt institutions (see Darolia [2013b] for further
discussion).
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There is a small but growing literature on for-proﬁt colleges in
economics. Many studies describe student demographics and program
offerings at for-proﬁt institutions (Apling 1993; Bailey, Badway, and
Gumport 2001; Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Rosenbaum, DeilAmen, and Person 2006; Turner 2006).3 Administrative licensing data
has added to our knowledge of these institutions in recent years and
allowed for causal studies of competition in the two-year college market (Cellini 2009) and a more accurate count of for-proﬁt institutions
(Cellini and Goldin forthcoming). And, as noted above, several authors
have exploited new sources of student-level data to estimate the labor
market returns to a for-proﬁt education (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012;
Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012; Lang and Weinstein 2013; Turner
2013).
Several studies on the relationship between ﬁnancial aid policy
and institutional behavior are particularly relevant to this study. Cellini (2010) ﬁnds that for-proﬁt college openings and closings correlate
with the generosity of federal aid in the Pell Grant program. Cellini
and Goldin (forthcoming) ﬁnd that for-proﬁt institutions participating
in federal grant and loan programs charge tuition that is 78 percent
higher than similar programs in institutions that are not eligible for aid.
In absolute terms, they ﬁnd that the dollar value of tuition difference
is similar to the value of the aid the institution receives, suggesting
that institutions may capture federal student aid. Turner (2013) looks
more closely at the incidence of the Pell Grant program and ﬁnds that
for-proﬁt institutions behave no differently than nonselective nonproﬁt
institutions, capturing around 20 percent of students’ Pell Grant awards
through reductions in institutional aid. Finally, Darolia (2013a) ﬁnds
that the loss of federal aid because of high cohort default rates leads
to declines in annual enrollment at for-proﬁt colleges that exceed 16
percent. This indicates that the federal government has powerful policy
levers at its disposal to determine where and if students attend college
by regulating which institutions can disburse aid.
We build on this literature and focus on changes over time in student borrowing in the for-proﬁt sector. We begin to untangle the myriad
of possible explanations for the time trends we observe, bringing new
data to bear on questions of student resources and work behavior. Our
results have important implications for the design of federal student aid
policies and the regulation of for-proﬁt colleges.
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DATA
To examine trends in postsecondary borrowing and ﬁnancing
behavior of undergraduate students in the United States, we use the four
most current available complete waves of the NPSAS. Coordinated by
the U.S. Department of Education, NPSAS combines institutional and
governmental records with student surveys to produce nationally representative repeated cross-sectional student-level data with information
on how students pay for their postsecondary expenses. The advantages
of these data are their relatively large sample sizes and particularly
detailed information about students’ ﬁnancial backgrounds and college
ﬁnancing strategies.
We use study waves from the 1995–1996, 1999–2000, 2003–2004,
and 2007–2008 school years.4 Each wave contains information on
between 41,000 (in 1995–1996) and 105,000 (in 2007–2008) undergraduate students surveyed at random from institutions participating
in federal student aid programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.5 For our analysis, we use measures of borrowing, aid,
and other amounts for that year, with all dollars reported in constant
2008 terms. We restrict the sample to undergraduate students but consider yearly ﬁgures similarly across the year students are in school and
enrollment intensity.
We group schools into four distinct types: 1) for-proﬁt institutions, 2) public institutions that offer programs of two years or less,6 3)
public institutions that offer four-year programs, and 4) private, nonproﬁt institutions. Note that both the for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt groups
include all levels of institutions—less-than-two-year, two-year, and
four-year—but the composition of the institutions in each sector differs
substantially. In 2007–2008 almost 95 percent of private not-for-proﬁt
postsecondary institutions were four-year colleges, compared to just 47
percent of for-proﬁt institutions (National Center for Education Statistics 2013, Table 306).7 We include unweighted counts of observations
by year and school sector in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 Sample Summary
Forproﬁt
(1)
Student characteristics (2007–2008)
32
Enrolled in a certiﬁcate program
(%)
40
Enrolled in an associate’s degree
program (%)
27
Enrolled in a bachelor’s degree
program (%)
1
Coursework only (no program
enrollment) (%)
33
Male (%)
67
Female (%)
53
Minority (%)
28.3
Age at time of survey
22.7
Age at the start of postsecondary
education
3.6
Years delayed entry into
postsecondary education
11
First-generation immigrant (%)
14
Second-generation immigrant (%)
7
Current or past military service (%)
83
Parent(s) completed high school or
higher (%)
19
Parent(s) completed bachelor’s
degree or higher (%)
76
Independent (%)
30
Single parent (%)
0.9
Number of dependents
2.9
Risk index
Sample size (unweighted)
5,380
1995–1996
4,620
1999–2000
8,900
2003–2004
14,200
2007–2008

Public Public Private
two-year four-year nonproﬁt
(2)
(3)
(4)
8

0

2

79

4

4

2

91

92

11

2

1

44
56
40
27.7
21.4

46
54
34
23.5
19.3

43
57
33
24.4
19.7

2.6

0.8

1.2

12
14
5
87

9
13
3
94

7
13
4
94

30

48

52

57
17
0.6
2.7

33
7
0.2
1.3

34
8
0.3
1.3

7,190
8,770
22,830
31,980

16,070
20,330
19,230
36,880

12,890
11,120
14,200
21,660

NOTE: Survey weights used. Sample sizes rounded to the nearest 10.
SOURCE: NPSAS.
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STUDENT FINANCING TRENDS: SIMILARITIES
AND CONTRASTS
We begin by describing borrowing behavior over time. In the sections that follow, we examine various explanations for these substantial
differences in student borrowing both across sectors and over time
within the for-proﬁt sector. The relatively high sticker costs of for-proﬁt
colleges and relatively low grant aid and personal ﬁnancial resources
available to students who attend these schools leave a relatively large
amount of unmet need for students. While for-proﬁt students appear to
be working at comparatively high rates, this behavior does not appear
to prevent students from borrowing at high rates or levels.
Borrowing
Table 6.2 presents the average borrowing behavior of students
for the 2007–2008 school year. A remarkable 87 percent of for-proﬁt
students borrow money of some kind, compared to just 14 percent of
public two-year students, 48 percent of public four-year students, and
60 percent of private nonproﬁt students.8 Not surprisingly, most student
borrowers obtain loans through federal programs. In the for-proﬁt sector, 81 percent of students receive federal loans. Relative to students in
other sectors, for-proﬁt students are much more likely to supplement
federal borrowing with borrowing from nonfederal sources, but just 6
percent borrowed only from nonfederal sources, as shown in the bottom
part of the table.
Figure 6.1 displays the trend of percentage of students who borrow
(from any source) from 1996 to 2008. While the relative position of
schools in this trend stays constant, and all schools experience a positive upward trend of the percentage of students borrowing, the for-proﬁt
sector experienced a 30 percentage point increase in the proportion of
students borrowing since 1996, whereas the increase for the other three
sectors were all below 15 percentage points. The upward trend in borrowing is notable in the most recent period, climbing from 75 percent
in 2004 to 87 percent in 2008.
In addition to the high (and climbing) proportion of students borrowing, the ﬁrst row of Table 6.2 reveals that for-proﬁt students also
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Table 6.2 Average Per Student Borrowing (2007–2008)
Public
Public
Private
For-proﬁt two-year four-year nonproﬁt
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Rates of student borrowing (%)
Borrowed any loans
87
14
48
60
Borrowed federal loans
81
11
43
56
Borrowed nonfederal loans
41
5
15
25
Borrowed both federal and
36
2
10
21
nonfederal loans
Borrowed federal, but not
45
9
33
34
nonfederal loans
Borrowed nonfederal, but not
6
3
5
4
federal loans
Average per student borrowing,
including all students ($)
Total loans
7,319
632
3,713
6,530
Federal loans
4,842
457
2,793
4,227
Subsidized federal loans
2,256
253
1,350
2,007
Parent PLUS Loans
485
23
570
1,190
Nonfederal loans
2,477
175
920
2,303
Private loans
2,423
172
856
2,210
Average loan amount for those
who borrow each loan type ($)
Total loans
8,457
4,424
7,769
10,955
Federal loans
5,975
4,053
6,454
7,602
Subsidized federal loans
2,888
2,768
3,870
4,214
Parent PLUS Loans
9,099
7,073
9,558
13,657
Nonfederal loans
6,026
3,586
6,156
9,087
Private loans
5,990
3,652
6,142
9,225
NOTE: Survey weights used. Total loans include parent PLUS Loans.
SOURCE: NPSAS.

have the highest average yearly total loan amounts when considering all
students (whether they borrow or not). The for-proﬁt sample has an average debt load of over $7,000 per year, a ﬁgure even higher than private
nonproﬁt students, who borrow about $6,500 per year. We display the
trend of average student borrowing in Figure 6.2. Per-student borrow-
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Figure 6.1 Percentage of Students Borrowing
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ing is increasing in all sectors, but the rate of increase and the relative
position of for-proﬁt institutions is the highest among all sectors.
These are annual borrowing ﬁgures, such that total debt would
depend on the accrual over the whole time the student is in college,
and could therefore be lower for for-proﬁt than private nonproﬁt students overall, as for-proﬁt programs are generally shorter (more on this
below). If we assume that the average for-proﬁt student attends for two
years and the average nonproﬁt student attends for four, the total amount
borrowed comes to $14,000 for for-proﬁts and $26,000 for nonproﬁts.9
Note that the average per student borrowing in Table 6.2 and Figure
6.2 display averages that are taken across all students rather than just
borrowers. Averages conditional on borrowing are listed in the bottom
part of Table 6.2. Averages for for-proﬁt student borrowers increase
modestly to about $8,400, since almost all students borrow, but the
ﬁgures become much higher for other sectors because of lower propor-
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Figure 6.2 Average Loan Amount
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tions of borrowers. Notably, when considering loan volume of only the
60 percent of students who borrow in the private nonproﬁt sector, average loan amounts exceed those of for-proﬁt students, at almost $11,000,
while the average loan volume among borrowers in public two-year and
four-year institutions remains below that of for-proﬁt students.
Table 6.2 also displays the composition of loans across sectors.
In dollar terms, federal loans make up the largest portion of for-proﬁt
student borrowing, and just under half of these loans are federally subsidized. About a third of for-proﬁt student loans are from private lenders.
Overall, the patterns of for-proﬁt student borrowing look similar to
private nonproﬁt borrowing. Figure 6.3 presents the categorization of
student loan types by school sector over time. Although borrowing has
increased across all sectors, the for-proﬁt sector saw borrowing increase
by the largest loan dollar amount between 1996 and 2008.
It is also worth noting that private loan dollars increased most substantially in the for-proﬁt sector. This trend could be interpreted in a
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Figure 6.3 Average Student Loan Borrowing
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couple of different ways. Since private lender loans often have less
favorable terms than federal loans, this could be troubling given the
expected debt burden on this group of students coming from relatively
disadvantaged backgrounds. On the other hand, given some of the concern about public funding at some for-proﬁt institutions, a shift toward
more private loans may be welcome to those who believe subsidized
public funds should not be used at for-proﬁt institutions. These trends
would need to be evaluated after the changes to the federal loan program delivery system in 2010, though more current data similar to that
analyzed here is currently not available.
Credential and Demographic Differences
Differences among student bodies present a challenge when comparing ﬁnancing strategies across school types, as dissimilarities in
student demographics and the credentials that students seek may both
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be important drivers of borrowing behavior. Table 6.1 shows student
characteristics across the sector from the 2007–2008 school year.
A number of differences are apparent across school sectors, including the credentials sought by students. About one-third of for-proﬁt
students are enrolled in certiﬁcate programs, over a third are enrolled in
associate’s degree programs, and less than a third are enrolled in bachelor’s level programs (column 1). This is compared to about 80 percent
of students at public two-years that are seeking associate’s degrees, and
over 90 percent of students at public four-years and private nonproﬁts
enrolled in bachelor’s degree programs. Over 10 percent of students at
public two-year institutions are not enrolled in a degree or certiﬁcate
program, compared to just 1–2 percent of students in the other sectors.
These differences in credentials across sectors should be considered
in relation to student borrowing behavior. If, as the research described
earlier suggests, short-term credentials in for-proﬁt colleges yield lower
returns than other credentials and sectors, then policymakers and students should carefully consider whether the debt burden of for-proﬁt
attendance is worthwhile. A complicating consideration is that forgone
wage costs for a short-term credential could also be expected to be
lower. Still, much more research on college wage premia across sectors
and for various subbaccalaureate degrees, diplomas, and certiﬁcates is
needed before assessing whether the debt of the average for-proﬁt student has a reasonable chance of being repaid.
Students vary across sectors demographically, as displayed in
Table 6.1. Although for-proﬁt students’ borrowing patterns are similar
to private nonproﬁt students’, their demographics are a stark contrast.
For-proﬁt students are demographically most similar to public two-year
students, but even between these two sectors, many important differences remain. For-proﬁts have the highest proportion of female and
minority students, and these come from families with the lowest levels
of parental education. For example, 83 percent of for-proﬁt students in
the sample have at least one parent who completed high school, compared to 94 percent of private nonproﬁt school students. As well, only
19 percent of for-proﬁt students in the sample have a parent who completed at least a bachelor’s degree, as compared to 30 percent of public
two-year students, 48 percent of public four-year students, and 52 percent of private nonproﬁt school students.
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Furthermore, for-proﬁt students are, on average, the oldest students
in the sample, with the highest age at the start of postsecondary education (22.7), and the longest number of years between secondary and
postsecondary studies (3.6). Reﬂective of their older average age, most
for-proﬁt students are independent (76 percent), as compared to public
two-year (57 percent), public four-year (33 percent), and private nonproﬁt (34 percent) students. Students who attend for-proﬁt colleges are
also the most likely to be a single parent, and they have the highest
average number of dependents among the sectors. Taken together, these
characteristics suggest that for-proﬁt students may most likely need to
support dependents and be less likely to have access to the ﬁnancial
resources of parents, spouses, or other custodians. Access to credit for
education may be particularly important for these students. We examine
more detailed measures of need, assets, and parental support in subsequent sections.
Finally, NPSAS publishes a “risk index” for each student, which is
an index of characteristics potentially related to postsecondary success:
delayed enrollment into postsecondary education, enrolling part-time,
being an independent student, having dependents, being a single parent,
working full time while enrolled, and not having a high school diploma.
This index reﬂects the higher average number of postsecondary risk factors belonging to for-proﬁt students (3.0) and public two-year students
(2.7) as compared to public four-year students (1.2) and the private nonproﬁt students (1.3). As we will show in the following sections, these
demographic differences are related to differences in resources and constraints of students across school sectors. Therefore, it is important to
consider these differences when assessing borrowing behavior across
different types of students.
Costs of Education
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for disproportionate borrowing of for-proﬁt students is simply the high cost of for-proﬁt institutions.
Table 6.3 displays measures of costs of education for the 2007–2008
school year. Although private nonproﬁts have average yearly gross
costs over $7,000 higher than for-proﬁts (as displayed in column [4]),
for-proﬁts have much higher average tuition and fees than either of
the public sectors. For example, compared to students at public two-
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Table 6.3 Average Per Student Costs, Grant Aid, and Institutional Aid,
2007–2008 ($)
ForPublic Public Private
proﬁt two-year four-year nonproﬁt
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Gross tuition and fees
9,807
1,133
5,391 17,519
Tuition and fees minus grants
7,814
700
3,447 10,252
Total grants
2,091
878
2,733
7,629
Total federal grants
1,456
504
838
964
State grants
141
139
681
792
Institution grants
119
77
811
5,069
Outside grants (private and employer)
374
159
403
804
Merit aid
61
57
619
2,414
Veteran and Department of Defense
208
93
138
146
aid
Total institutional aid
181
89
899
5,232
NOTE: Survey weights used.
SOURCE: NPSAS.

year colleges, the gross tuition and fees of for-proﬁt students is nearly
nine times higher: for-proﬁts average $9,807 of gross tuition and fees,
compared to just $1,133 for community colleges. The trend of gross
tuition and fees for the sample is included in Figure 6.4. Here we see
the highest and most rapid growth at private nonproﬁts, but for-proﬁts
and publics also experienced a fairly steep increase over this period,
with for-proﬁt tuition and fees growing about 35 percent for students
in the sample.
Grants are perhaps the most important source of nondebt ﬁnancing, since they lower the net cost of education to the student and do not
need to be repaid. Grants can come from a number of different sources.
For example, the federal government offers the Pell Grant for lowincome students, and other grants are available to targeted groups such
as teachers and children of veterans. State governments and individual
institutions also make grants available to students based on income,
merit, or other characteristics (e.g., sports). Finally, private employers and foundations may provide funds to students of their choosing in
order to help subsidize education costs.
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Figure 6.4 Average Gross Tuition and Fees
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As shown in the third row of Table 6.3, for-proﬁt students have
the second-lowest level of total grant aid, at $2,091 per year, more than
public two-year students and close to the grant aid received by public
four-year students. Private nonproﬁt students receive by far the largest amount of grant aid, at $7,629 annually. The trend of total grants
is displayed in Figure 6.5. Given prior observed trends of increasing
sticker prices in the private nonproﬁt sector, the increasing grant aid
in this sector is consistent with a “high cost, high subsidy” strategy of
college pricing.
Breaking down the sources of grant aid reveals that for-proﬁt students have higher average levels of federal grants than all other sectors
but lower levels of every other type of grant aid. For-proﬁt students not
only have higher levels of total federal grant aid ($1,456), but they also
receive slightly more grant aid through federal veterans and Department of Defense programs, such as the G.I. Bill. For-proﬁt students
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Figure 6.5 Average Total Grants
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receive an average of $208 in veterans and Department of Defense
grants compared to $146 in the nonproﬁt sector, but in relative terms
the value of military aid is quite low—just 10 percent of the value of
other federal grant aid.
The biggest difference in aid across sectors in Table 6.3 appears to
be funding that comes from the institution. For-proﬁt students receive
remarkably little institutional aid. Institutional grants average just $119
in the for-proﬁt sector. The same ﬁgure is almost 7 times higher for
public four-year students and over 40 times higher for private nonproﬁt
students, at $5,069.
The last row of Table 6.3 shows the average of all sources of institutional aid (which can include grants, loans, work-study, and other types
of aid) across sectors. Of course, grants make up the largest portion of
total institutional aid across all sectors, so again we see a great disparity
in the amount of institutional aid provided across sectors. We plot the
trend of institutional aid in Figure 6.6. Here we see a large increase in
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Figure 6.6 Average Institutional Aid
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institutional aid in the private nonproﬁt sector and almost no movement
in institutional aid in the for-proﬁt sector between 1996 and 2008.
Finally, when accounting for grants, education prices net of grant
aid in the for-proﬁt sector remain relatively high, as shown in the second row of Table 6.3 for the 2007–2008 school year. Moreover, the gap
between the price of for-proﬁt and public colleges has been increasing
over time, as shown in Figure 6.7. Most striking, however, is that the
gap between gross prices of for-proﬁt and private nonproﬁt education
closes substantially when taking into account grant aid.
Institutional aid, particularly institutional grants, appear to be
ﬁlling the gap between cost and need in the nonproﬁt sector, thereby
mitigating the rise in student borrowing for this group of institutions.
Presenting difﬁculty for for-proﬁt students, however, is that the upward
trend in this sector’s prices is not met by a similarly rapidly increasing trend. While institutions in the nonproﬁt sector appear to be trying
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Figure 6.7 Average Tuition, Net of Grants
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to make tuition increases less painful for their students (or at least for
some of their neediest students), for-proﬁts have not made the same
effort: over the years we observe that they appear more reliant on student debt to cover the high cost of tuition.
Need and Available Financial Resources
Tuition and fees can be considered endogenous if we assume that
students have various education options from which to choose. This
returns us to the question of why students—particularly disadvantaged
students—attend for-proﬁt colleges given their relatively high costs.
Here, we examine more closely issues of student need and available
ﬁnancial resources that might explain the patterns of attendance and
borrowing that we observe.
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Consistent with the demographic patterns described earlier, we
observe relatively fewer personal ﬁnancial resources for students in
the for-proﬁt sector, as displayed in Table 6.4. In isolation, the lack of
ﬁnancial resources available to for-proﬁt students may be sufﬁcient to
explain why borrowing is so high in the sector, but it does not appear
to explain the steep increase in borrowing in the last decade. As shown
in Table 6.4, based on need and resources, for-proﬁt students are most
similar, but in many ways still less afﬂuent, than public two-year students who pay much lower costs. As noted above, for-proﬁt students
pay similar costs to private nonproﬁt students, but differences in the
observed ﬁnancial positions between for-proﬁt and private nonproﬁt
students are sizable.
Table 6.4 Average Per Student Need and Resources, 2007–2008
ForPublic
Public
proﬁt two-year four-year
(1)
(2)
(3)
Expected family contribution ($)
4,759
8,387 12,243
Student budget minus expected
15,822
3,423
7,480
family contribution ($)
Student budget minus expected
13,782
2,681
5,188
family contribution and grants ($)
Adjusted gross income ($)
31,739 46,225 63,401
Percent of the poverty line (%)
198
283
350
Parent(s) and/or student own a
46
63
73
home (%)
Parent(s) and/or student own >
9
18
24
$10,000 in investments (%)
Receive help from parents
Tuition and fees (%)
47
51
63
Other educational expenses (%)
42
49
59
Housing (%)
75
79
71
Other living expenses (%)
61
61
66

Private
nonproﬁt
(4)
14,367
16,678
9,865
72,180
387
76
27

74
66
74
73

NOTE: Survey weights used. Student budget is a measure of “total” direct educational
expenses, including tuition, fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation,
and other living expenses. Investments include business and farming assets. Survey
responses about help from parents was only solicited from students under 30.
SOURCE: NPSAS.
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Students and/or their families’ expected family contribution (EFC)
to college costs is typically calculated when applying for ﬁnancial aid.
Reﬂective of their relative lack of resources, for-proﬁt students’ average
EFC is about half that of public two-year students and less than a third
of that of public four-year and private nonproﬁt students.
We present the trend of EFC in Figure 6.8. Between 1996 and 2008,
EFC increased for public four-year and private nonproﬁt students—perhaps mitigating the need for additional student borrowing in that sector
even during times of increasing tuition. In contrast, we observe that
EFC stayed effectively stagnant, and even declined, for for-proﬁt students between 1996 and 2008. This trend indicates that the gap between
resources available to for-proﬁt students and other sectors may be growing, but it suggests that the increases in student borrowing we observe
were likely not driven by the increasing enrollment of needy students
in the for-proﬁt sector.
Figure 6.8 Average Expected Family Contribution
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Consider students’ remaining budgets after taking into account
EFC, which gives a measure of how much the typical student will need
to cover after subtracting available family resources.10 Here, we observe
that the highest average gaps in costs versus resources (not taking into
account grants or other ﬁnancing strategies) are in the for-proﬁt and private nonproﬁt sectors, almost ﬁve times that of public two-year students
and over twice as much as public four-year students. When considering student budget minus both EFC and grants, the picture gets even
bleaker, as the high grant aid in the private nonproﬁt sector allows the
for-proﬁt sector to stand alone with the highest average gaps between
college costs and resources by some margin.
The measure of EFC described above masks some dispersion of
income at the lower end of the income distribution, as students below
certain income thresholds are all counted as having a zero EFC; we
therefore examine other measures of available ﬁnancial resources in
Table 6.4. For-proﬁt students undoubtedly have fewer assets with which
to contribute, or with which to securitize other credit, for educational
expenses. For-proﬁt students have by far the lowest average annual
household income, at just $31,739, and are closest, on average, to the
poverty line. Even public two-year students seem to be much better off
than their for-proﬁt counterparts, with incomes averaging $46,225. As
well, for-proﬁt students have the lowest homeownership (46 percent vs.
63 percent for community college students) and extremely low personal
or business investment rates (just 8 percent own more than $10,000 in
investments vs. 18 percent of community college students).
Table 6.4 also reports survey responses of students about the ﬁnancial assistance they received from their parents. Among respondents,
for-proﬁt students are least likely to get help from parents for tuition,
fees, other educational expenses, and other living expenses across the
sectors. Since for-proﬁt students are most likely to be independent,
older, and come from more disadvantaged backgrounds, it is not surprising that aid from parents is relatively low. However, it reinforces the
ﬁnancial challenges faced by many of these students.
Aid Application
Differences in ability to obtain grants, loans, or other types of ﬁnancial aid can be affected by students’ choices to apply for aid, as well as
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their knowledge of different ﬁnancing options. In Table 6.5, we provide
a summary of survey responses that yield some insight into these differences. Almost all for-proﬁt students apply for ﬁnancial aid (96 percent)
and federal aid speciﬁcally (91 percent). Students in the for-proﬁt sector
were also least likely to not have information about how to apply for aid
or believe they were ineligible for aid.
Therefore, it appears as though for-proﬁt students are obtaining
information about aid application. The source of such information may
be important, however. Interestingly, for-proﬁt students were most
likely to talk with staff about ﬁnancial aid. This is perhaps not surprising, given the lack of ﬁnancial resources by many students in the
sector. Some have concern, however, that for-proﬁt ﬁnancial aid ofﬁces
may not be protecting students’ best interests in ﬁnancing and enrollment decisions (Government Accountability Ofﬁce 2010). Although
the extent of mistreatment is unknown, it may be worth considering the
types of incentives involved at for-proﬁt institutions.
An important source of knowledge about ﬁnancial aid on which
many students rely is family and friends, but for-proﬁt students appear
Table 6.5 Financial Aid Application, 2007–2008 (%)
ForPublic Public Private
proﬁt two-year four-year nonproﬁt
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Applied for any aid
96
59
79
87
Applied for federal aid
91
43
62
70
Talked with staff about ﬁnancial aid
71
42
45
51
Discussed ﬁnancing decisions with
52
54
71
70
family/friends
Researched ﬁnancial aid on the
35
34
45
45
Internet
Compared lender options
30
14
25
30
Reason did not apply for aid
Did not want to take on debt
39
40
42
36
Forms too much work
15
19
19
18
No information on how to apply
16
24
21
17
No need
55
48
54
62
Thought ineligible
53
60
63
64
NOTE: Survey weights used.
SOURCE: NPSAS.
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to be soliciting and/or receiving less advice from this group, with about
an 18 percentage point lower rate than for the public four-year and private nonproﬁt students. The rate of discussion of ﬁnancing with family
and friends, as well as researching aid on the Internet, is similar to that
of public two-year students, suggesting that information on aid options
may be lacking for these students (especially if one assumes college
staff to not be operating in the best interests of students). Because of
the high unmet need of for-proﬁt students relative to public two-year
students, however, this lack of information may be particularly harmful
to the former group.
Work Behavior
Working while in school may be an alternative to borrowing for
some students. Consider a simple budget equation for students. The
most common ways to pay for college costs are grants, savings, parental/family transfers, working, and borrowing. The economically rational
student will not turn down grants, since they are relatively cost-free,
and we have already shown that students’ and families’ assets are lower
in the for-proﬁt sector, such that these students would be expected to be
able to rely less on savings and parental/family transfers than students
in other sectors. Therefore, students with resource constraints may be
faced with the choice of borrowing and/or working to cover college
costs. Could high levels of borrowing simply reﬂect for-proﬁt students’
preferences for debt over working?
Working can have beneﬁts to future labor market outcomes through
the accrual of soft skills (Light 2001), although competing evidence
shows there could be a penalty to grades (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). Moreover, there is evidence that increased working may lead
to less credit accrual (Darolia 2014) and therefore potentially longer
time to earn a degree. Considering observed relatively high work rates
for for-proﬁt students in conjunction with high borrower rates, forproﬁt students may be uniquely facing challenges associated with both
working and borrowing.
Table 6.6 provides average working behavior of students in the
sample across the sectors. Interestingly, a similar proportion (76–83
percent) of students work at least some amount (including work-study
and all types of employment) while enrolled across all sectors. Differ-
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Table 6.6 Average Per Student Employment and Work, 2007–2008
ForPublic Public Private
proﬁt two-year four-year nonproﬁt
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
76
76
83
76
Works while enrolled (%)
24
26
43
41
Works full-time while enrolled (%)
16,258 16,859 11,429 13,271
Earnings from work while enrolled
($)
26
26
33
33
Hours worked per week while
enrolled
64
56
78
71
Works off campus while enrolled (%)
20
19
17
20
Distance from school to work (miles)
86
86
84
80
Worked in summer prior (%)
25
27
31
28
Job is related to coursework or major
(%)
42
44
31
30
Can afford school without working
(%)
Reason for working
47
44
48
51
Minimize debt (%)
68
66
72
64
Pay educational expenses (%)
78
71
80
85
Pay living expenses (%)
6
6
7
8
To send money home (%)
38
32
43
35
Job limits access to campus facilities
(%)
53
41
63
42
Job limits class schedule (%)
45
34
58
34
Job limits number of classes (%)
39
29
47
26
Job limits choice of classes (%)
NOTE: Survey weights used. Average earnings, hours worked, and distance from
school to work include only respondents with values.
SOURCE: NPSAS.

ences become more apparent when examining full-time work behavior.
Only about a quarter of four-year students in public and nonproﬁts work
full time, compared to 43 percent and 41 percent in public two-years
and for-proﬁts, respectively. As well, among students who work, forproﬁt and public two-year students work the most average hours per
week, almost 25 percent more than their public four-year and private
nonproﬁt counterparts. Reﬂective of this behavior, these two sectors
have the highest earnings from work while enrolled. As shown in Fig-
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ure 6.9, hours worked by students, as well as work participation rates
(not shown), stay relatively ﬂat over the time period examined among
all sectors. This suggests that either these students cannot add more
work in order to meet debt or that they do not use earnings to substitute
for debt. For-proﬁt and public two-year students are also most likely to
have jobs off campus, which may increase commuting times and reduce
campus integration.
In survey responses, less than a third of for-proﬁt and public twoyear students indicate that they can afford school without working
(Table 6.6). For-proﬁt students are also most likely to report that they
work in an effort to minimize debt. Therefore, even though student loan
rates and amounts are high in this sector, students are still working in an
effort to lower the amount they have to borrow.
Notably, students in the for-proﬁt sector are among the least likely
to report that their job limits access to campus facilities, class schedules, the number of classes the student can take, and the choice of
Figure 6.9 Average Hours Worked
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classes. These responses may reﬂect an advantage associated with forproﬁt colleges, namely, that course delivery is structured in a manner
that allows working and schedule-constrained students to attend. These
conveniences may be attracting students to this sector, even considering
large tuition and fee costs.
Estimations
We have shown that students in the for-proﬁt sector have relatively
higher borrowing amounts on average, and that borrowing has risen
more sharply for these students in the past decade. Our descriptive
analysis suggests that these patterns are driven by high (and climbing) tuition, no commensurate increase in grant aid (as in the nonproﬁt
sector), and the fact that students in the for-proﬁt sector have fewer
ﬁnancial resources than others. To give a picture of relative borrowing
after controlling for available resources, we estimate regressions of the
following form:
Debt = α + βSector + ηX + ε.
Here, Sector is a vector of indicator variables for borrowing at forproﬁt, public four-year, or private nonproﬁt institutions (with public
two-year colleges as the omitted base group), with parameter vector β;
X is a vector of covariates with parameter vector η; α is the intercept,
and ε is the error. We make no claims to causal inference in these estimations, and indeed, we would expect many of these decisions to be
endogenously determined (for example, the decision to work or borrow). Nonetheless, the results provide some measure of relative debt
levels, conditional on observable college costs, ﬁnancial resources, and
student characteristics.
We present estimates of total debt and by federal and nonfederal
loan programs in Table 6.7. Column (1) in the table displays estimates
including only student characteristics as covariates. In the subsequent
columns we add measures of college costs, ﬁnancial resources, and
ﬁnancing strategies to the vector of covariates.
After accounting for just student characteristics, we observe that
for-proﬁt students have the highest levels of debt, over $6,500 more
annually than public two-year students (column [1]). When accounting
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Table 6.7 Estimations of Debt, 2007–2008
Nonfederal
Total loans
Federal loans
loans
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
For-proﬁt
6,568***
4,118***
2,883***
1,235***
(64)
(68)
(52)
(43)
Public four-year
1,255***
985***
1,032***
−47
(77)
(74)
(57)
(47)
Private nonproﬁt
4,171***
890***
737***
153***
(84)
(91)
(70)
(58)
Enrolled in a certiﬁcate
−1,533***
−699***
−735***
36
program
(216)
(207)
(160)
(131)
Enrolled in an associate’s
−1,191***
−358*
−602***
243*
degree program
(211)
(202)
(156)
(128)
Enrolled in a bachelor’s
192
645***
55
590***
degree program
(201)
(192)
(148)
(121)
Coursework only (no
−1,545***
−577***
−817***
240*
program enrollment)
(220)
(210)
(162)
(133)
Independent
−454***
−179***
49
−228***
(52)
(57)
(44)
(36)
Single parent
−177***
−398***
−225***
−174***
(59)
(57)
(44)
(36)
Tuition and fees ($000s)
275***
140***
135***
(3)
(3)
(2)
Grants ($000s)
−63***
19***
−82***
(4)
(3)
(3)
EFC ($000s)
−23***
−17***
−6***
(1)
(1)
(1)
Parent(s) and/or student own
40
−8
48*
a home
(41)
(32)
(26)
Parent(s) and/or student own
−1,219***
−738***
−481***
> $10,000 in investments
(42)
(33)
(27)
Works while enrolled
355***
177***
178***
(43)
(33)
(27)
Earnings from work while
−8***
−7***
−1
enrolled ($000s)
(1)
(1)
(1)
Observations (unweighted)
84,890
84,890
84,890
84,890
2
Adjusted R
0.232
0.299
0.228
0.136
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Survey weights used. Standard errors
included in parentheses. Sample size rounded to the nearest 10. All estimates include
controls for credential, age, class level, race/ethnicity, gender, number of dependents,
and an indicator for being a ﬁrst-generation immigrant. Investments include business
and farming assets.
SOURCE: NPSAS.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 165

1/28/2015 8:23:40 AM

166 Cellini and Darolia

for college costs and ﬁnancial factors in column (2), we see a decline in
this marginal amount to about $4,100. The gap between for-proﬁts and
public four-years also declines but remains over $3,000. Accounting for
these factors, however, increases the gap between for-proﬁt and private
nonproﬁt students. Columns (3) and (4) split estimates for federal loans
and nonfederal loans, with similar apparent trends. Independent students appear to borrow fewer nonfederal loans, but a relatively similar
amount of federal loans, with a possible explanation being that they
have restricted access to the private educational credit market because
of a lack of cosigners.
Unsurprisingly, rising tuition and fees are associated with higher
borrowing amounts, while higher EFC is associated with lower borrowing amounts. Higher grants appear to be positively correlated
with federal loan amounts but negatively correlated with nonfederal
loan amounts, holding all else equal (column [4]). Owning substantial
investment or business assets is related to lower borrowing amounts,
indicating that students with more assets are unsurprisingly able to
borrow less. Interestingly, working while enrolled is associated with
higher borrowing, suggesting that students that lack ﬁnancial resources
choose to both borrow and work instead of wholly substituting one for
the other. We also observe a small decrease in federal loan amounts
associated with increasing earnings.
Many determinants of borrowing and college going are unobserved
in the data, and therefore these results should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, they provide some evidence that borrowing in the
for-proﬁt sector is high relative to the other sectors, even after controlling for a set of plausible, though incomplete, set of explanatory
factors, including costs and ﬁnancial resources that could explain these
differences. Potential unobserved explanatory factors could lead to different levels of policy concern. It should be troubling for policymakers
and regulators if this higher borrowing is explained by misleading
guidance or fraud from the colleges. Less worrying would occur if the
unexplained borrowing is driven by preferences for borrowing or other
student choices.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on data from the NPSAS, we ﬁnd that for-proﬁt students
are much more likely to incur debt to ﬁnance their education than students in the public and nonproﬁt sectors. Nearly 90 percent of students
in for-proﬁt institutions borrow and 81 percent participate in federal
loan programs. More notable is that the proportion of for-proﬁt students
borrowing increased by 30 percentage points between 1996 and 2008,
compared to a growth of less than 15 percentage points among students
in other sectors.
We document that the borrowing behavior, loan volume, and costs
of attendance for for-proﬁt students is most similar to that of private
nonproﬁt students, except that borrowing for nonproﬁt students did not
increase as steeply in the period we observe. Our descriptive analysis
suggests that while both sectors experienced steep increases in tuition
and fees, the private nonproﬁt sector mitigated their tuition hikes with
increases in institutional grant aid for needy students. We observe no
such increase in institutional aid among for-proﬁts. In 2007–2008 the
dollar value of institutional grant aid in nonproﬁt institutions was more
than 40 times higher than that in for-proﬁts. The discrepancy may be
explained by the structure of the organization: since the proﬁts of forproﬁt institutions are distributed to shareholders, there is little incentive
to provide institutional aid to students or otherwise reinvest those profits back into the institution, as is required of nonproﬁt institutions.
In contrast to several similarities found between nonproﬁts and forproﬁts in college costs and borrowing, the students at for-proﬁt colleges
come from much more disadvantaged backgrounds and have fewer
ﬁnancial resources than students in nonproﬁts. We show that for-proﬁt
students appear most similar to public two-year college students in the
credentials they seek, their demographics, their ﬁnancial resources, and
their work behavior.
Our analysis leads us to question why disadvantaged and ﬁnancially constrained students are choosing expensive for-proﬁt colleges
over lower-cost community colleges. The answer is not clear.
If we assume that students have full information about their college options and the likely labor market returns to their education, then
one possibility is that students choosing for-proﬁts do so because these
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institutions offer programs, courses, and schedules that better meet
their needs than other sectors. Our data on working students, described
above, suggest that these students may ﬁnd for-proﬁt colleges the most
convenient option and may be willing to pay a higher price for that
convenience. Relatedly, work by Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person
(2006) ﬁnds that some top-performing for-proﬁt colleges provide better
advising and student services than public sector institutions. This kind
of advising may set these colleges apart and justify the high price, at
least for some students.
Another possibility is that lower-cost public institutions may be
capacity constrained, especially in high-demand ﬁelds and in states
or localities where public higher education budgets are tight. In this
scenario, public institutions may simply not be available for students
wishing to pursue certain types of training, leaving for-proﬁt institutions
as the only timely option. Indeed, Cellini (2009) ﬁnds that infrastructure investments in California community colleges drive out for-proﬁt
institutions, providing evidence that public institutions and for-proﬁts
compete for students. From a policy perspective, this evidence suggests
that investments in public institutions may be worthwhile, especially
if they increase capacity to allow more students to access lower-cost,
high-quality public education. Without additional public funding, however, for-proﬁt colleges may be the only option for some students in
high-demand ﬁelds or in geographic areas with few public alternatives.
Still, the high default rates on student loans in the for-proﬁt sector
raise concerns that students are borrowing more than they can reasonably expect to repay given the returns to their certiﬁcate or degree
program. As noted previously, Cellini’s (2012) analysis of the costs of a
for-proﬁt education suggests that the returns to attendance would need
to be over 8.5 percent per year of education to fully offset the cost
to students. Adding taxpayer costs to the equation would require 9.8
percent returns. Literature on the returns to for-proﬁt degrees and certiﬁcates is still underdeveloped, but recent studies suggest that returns
to for-proﬁt associate’s degrees are between 2 and 8 percent per year, as
of the early 2000s (Cellini and Chaudhary 2012; Turner 2012). Much
more research on the returns to education and whether returns have
changed over time is needed to fully understand the temporal patterns
of student borrowing.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 168

1/28/2015 8:23:41 AM

College Costs and Financial Constraints 169

If students were aware of the costs and returns described here, then
it would be surprising that so many would choose for-proﬁt institutions. It could be that students are overly optimistic or simply believe,
even with knowledge about the distribution of earnings outcomes, that
they are above average. More troubling for policymakers, however, is
the potential for students to be misinformed or misled about the earnings they can expect after completing their education, or about the true
cost of their debt. For example, the Government Accountability Ofﬁce
(2010) documented conversations of for-proﬁt staff misrepresenting
starting salaries of graduates and claiming that debt did not have to be
repaid. It is unclear how widespread these practices are. Still, our data
on ﬁnancial aid applications reveal that a much higher proportion of
for-proﬁt students talked to staff about ﬁnancial aid (71 percent) than
students in other sectors (42–51 percent). Even if college staff members
are equally misrepresenting costs and outcomes across all sectors, forproﬁt students are much more likely to come into contact with them
than students in other sectors.
Finally, we must consider the role of federal student aid policy in
affecting both the behavior of institutions and the choices of students.
Since for-proﬁt institutions are beholden to the (proﬁt-maximizing)
interests of shareholders, there is, of course, an incentive to generate
as much taxpayer support as possible. For-proﬁt institutions receive
about 74 percent of their revenue from federal student aid (Deming,
Goldin, and Katz 2012) and are allowed to receive up to 90 percent,
under the so-called 90-10 rule. Veterans’ beneﬁts do not count toward
the 90 percent, so there is an added incentive to recruit military students to capture additional taxpayer dollars. As noted earlier, Cellini
and Goldin (forthcoming) ﬁnd that tuition is much higher in for-proﬁt
certiﬁcate programs that receive aid relative to those that do not, and
Turner (2013) ﬁnds additional evidence of aid capture in the Pell Grant
program. The patterns we document appear to be consistent with these
articles in suggesting that high levels of student borrowing may support
high tuition levels and the crowding-out of institutional aid in the forproﬁt sector.11
We suggest that policymakers look closely at student borrowing in
the for-proﬁt sector and the incentives created under the current federal
student aid system. Given the large public investment in students in the
for-proﬁt sector, policymakers should make efforts to ensure that col-
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leges are contributing to positive student outcomes and that students
and taxpayers are protected. Recent efforts at regulation based on the
“gainful employment” of graduates may be warranted.12 However,
policymakers should think carefully about the metrics used to measure
student outcomes. Single measures, such as the amount of borrowing
alone, may be too narrow of a metric on which to judge the multi-faceted goals and outcomes of education. And, as we show here, other
factors that affect student borrowing behavior, such as backgrounds,
resources, and constraints, are not evenly distributed across sectors.
As noted previously, whether or not the level of borrowing needed to
ﬁnance a for-proﬁt college education is a worthwhile investment for the
average student depends crucially on the labor market returns to forproﬁt degrees and certiﬁcates. Much more research remains to be done
to investigate this issue and answer questions about student choice,
cost, debt, and information in the for-proﬁt sector.

Notes
1. The NPSAS is nationally representative of students who attend postsecondary
institutions eligible to disburse federal ﬁnancial aid.
2. Lang and Weinstein (2013) ﬁnd that for-proﬁt certiﬁcate students have lower
returns, but associate’s degree students have higher returns than students in public
community colleges. They attribute the latter ﬁnding to a selection problem: students in community colleges are more likely to go on to a bachelor’s degree and
are not included in their sample.
3. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System severely undercounts the
number of two-year for-proﬁt colleges in the United States. For many years the
survey relied on snowball sampling and did not require their participation. In
recent years, greater efforts have been made to track down institutions receiving
federal ﬁnancial aid, but many colleges remain unaccounted for in the data (Cellini
and Goldin forthcoming).
4. The full 2011–2012 wave of the NPSAS was not yet available at the time of
this writing. Future research will incorporate these data. It is worth noting that
the higher education landscape continued to evolve post-2008, such that trends
observed after the period analyzed here may lead to an update of the inferences
we draw.
5. Note that many for-proﬁt institutions (particularly those that do not offer degrees)
do not participate in Title IV programs and are therefore not represented in the
NPSAS. See Cellini and Goldin (forthcoming) for a discussion of these institutions.
6. We refer to these institutions in the text as public two-year colleges and community colleges for ease of exposition.
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7. Adding students in two-year nonproﬁt institutions to the public two-year and lessthan-two-year group made very little difference in the analysis. We believe that our
categorization allows for the cleanest comparisons across institution types.
8. In this and all subsequent tables we use survey weights unless otherwise noted.
9. Calculations of cumulative debt are not straightforward in the NPSAS.
10. “Student budget” is a measure of “total” direct educational expenses in NPSAS,
including tuition, fees, room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and
other living expenses.
11. We have also considered the role of federal student loan limits in encouraging
borrowing, but despite small increases in the limits for freshmen and sophomores
around 2007, the aggregate limit on Stafford Loans has remained stable at $23,000
since 1992 (http://www.ﬁnaid.org/loans/historicallimits.phtml (accessed April 17,
2013).
12. See the Department of Education’s Web site for a discussion of the negotiated
rulemaking process for details on the latest proposed regulations: http://www2.ed
.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2012/gainfulemployment.html (accessed
April 17, 2013).
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Private Student Loans
and Bankruptcy
Did Four-Year Undergraduates Beneﬁt from the
Increased Collectability of Student Loans?
Xiaoling Ang
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Dalié Jiménez
University of Connecticut School of Law

What effect will a law that virtually eliminates the possibility that
a loan will be discharged in bankruptcy have on the pricing and availability of that loan? This chapter seeks to answer that question by investigating the effect of bankruptcy discharge on private student loans
(PSLs). We use a unique data set and ﬁnd some unexpected results.
On April 20, 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) into law.1 The bill
was the result of intense political wrangling dating as far back as 1999.2
Proponents of the bill argued that the signiﬁcant increases in bankruptcy ﬁling rates were the result of strategic debtors taking advantage
of lax bankruptcy rules; a problem that they thought would be solved
by increasing the hurdles to a bankruptcy discharge.3 Opponents argued
that the vast majority of debtors ﬁled bankruptcy for reasons largely
beyond their control: loss of a job, divorce, medical issues, or a death in
the family. Many argued that instead of further limiting bankruptcy protection, Congress should focus on regulating the availability of credit.
Proponents of bankruptcy reform predicted that its effect would be
to reduce the cost of consumer credit by reducing the “bankruptcy tax”
implicitly spread to all consumers in their cost of credit. Opponents of
the bill hypothesized that consumer lenders were providing a rebate of
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the bankruptcy tax to high credit-scoring borrowers, and thus expected
no change in the cost of student loans as a result of BAPCPA.4 In this
chapter, we report on our tests of some of the predictions made by both
groups as they relate to the market and pricing of private student loans.
The 2005 amendments added private student loans (PSLs), that is,
loans originated by the private market and not insured by any federal
or state institution, to the list of debts presumptively nondischargeable
in bankruptcy. Through a series of legislative changes that began in
1976 and culminated in 1998, loans made, guaranteed, or insured by the
federal or state governments, as well as loans made by nonproﬁt institutions, were already presumptively nondischargeable before 2005.5
This special treatment granted to PSLs ran counter to two of the
fundamental policies behind the bankruptcy laws: the equality of treatment of creditors in bankruptcy and the fresh start for the debtor.6
Neither of these policies has ever been absolute—tax debts and debts
obtained by fraud, for example, have both received priority over other
unsecured creditors and been nondischargeable as far back as the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.7 Nonetheless, most of the 19 so-called “riﬂe-shot”
exceptions to discharge exist for strong policy reasons. For example,
when domestic support obligations were added to the list of exceptions,
the rationale was that this would “provide new protections for parents”
and “strengthen their ability to collect child support.”8 The rationale for
adding federal and state loans to the list of presumptively nondischargeable debts was to protect the public ﬁsc.
PSLs are very different from the other kinds of student loans that
were nondischargeable before the 2005 bankruptcy reform. A brief synopsis of their features is instructive because it highlights how extraordinary the law change was. Unlike federal student loans, PSLs are riskpriced at origination. Only creditworthy individuals (or individuals with
creditworthy borrowers) are eligible to obtain PSLs.9 Since the majority
of undergraduate students do not have a signiﬁcant credit history, most
PSLs require students to secure a cosigner who will be responsible for
the loan if the student does not repay. In fact, 90 percent of all PSLs
required a cosigner in 2011, even if the student had a good credit history
or was attending graduate school.10 The cosigner is liable for the loan as
much as the student is, even if the student does not ﬁnish school or dies.
PSL borrowers take on the risk of interest rate changes over the
typical 15–20 year repayment period. The typical PSL is a variable-rate
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loan, indexed to LIBOR or similar.11 Students are offered loans at an
“index-plus” variable interest rate. That “plus” (the interest rate charged
above the index) is the risk premium, presumed to be closely related to
the risk-of-loss that the lender places on that borrower. In this chapter,
we refer to that plus as the “margin.” All things being equal, a borrower
with a higher credit score should receive a loan with a smaller margin than a borrower with a lower credit score. In 2011, initial variable
PSL interest rates varied between 2.98 percent and 19 percent for the
riskiest borrowers.12 Finally, funding for PSLs during the period of our
study came primarily from the secondary market through asset backed
securities.13
When BAPCPA became effective on October 17, 2005, every outstanding PSL—no matter when originated—became presumptively
nondischargeable for both borrowers and coborrowers. Loans that were
originated before BAPCPA presumably priced in the cost of bankruptcy
dischargeability in their margins (risk premiums), but those loans
became presumptively nondischargeable all the same.14
The nondischargeability of PSLs is problematic from at least two
perspectives: the concern that billions in outstanding student loans may
be stiﬂing the economy and the general lack of protections offered to
delinquent borrowers.
Standing at over $1 trillion, student loan debt is the second largest type of debt Americans carry, surpassed only by mortgage debt. In
recent years, regulators, policymakers, and academics have worried
publicly over the effect this amount of debt has on our economy. PSLs
are a small but signiﬁcant feature of the American postsecondary education ﬁnance system and may become more prominent to the extent
that other forms of aid do not keep pace with increasing costs of attendance. As of 2011, 15 percent of student loan debt had been originated
by for-proﬁt companies (typically, but not exclusively, banks) in the
form of PSLs.15 The current $150 billion in PSL outstandings is especially concerning because of the lack of protections for borrowers who
cannot repay.
Outside of bankruptcy, federal student loans have protections for
borrowers in ﬁnancial distress. These include the ability for borrowers
to enter into income-based or income-contingent repayment plans, temporarily suspend payments for up to 2 years, and extend the term of the
loan for up to 30 years.16 Federal loans are also eligible for cancellation
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in the case of total or permanent disability, the death of a student or parent taking out a PLUS Loan, where the school that the student attends
closes while the student is enrolled, or in some cases, if the student
becomes a teacher or works in public service.17 None of these features
are found in the typical PSL. Student borrowers with federal and private
loans will have a difﬁcult time discharging either federal loans or PSLs,
but they will have a much tougher time living with delinquent private
loans because of the lack of protections for those in default. In addition,
some students may have a disproportionate amount of PSL debt relative
to federal loans because students need not exhaust their federal loan
opportunities before obtaining a PSL. The CFPB found that “more than
54 percent of PSL borrowers do not exhaust their Stafford Loan eligibility, or do not even apply for federal aid.”18
We would ideally like to be able to compare federal and PSL default
rates and bankruptcy ﬁling rates. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare the default rate of federal loans versus PSLs, owing to differences
in the methodology of calculating those rates and the lack of availability of data. The Department of Education (DOE) does not report how
many individuals with federal student loans have ﬁled for bankruptcy.
The DOE publishes “cumulative lifetime default rates” for loans that
enter repayment during a ﬁscal year and have defaulted through the end
of the ﬁscal year. As an example, for the cohort that graduated or left
school in 2006 that had federal student loans, the DOE estimates that
9.2 percent will default over their lifetime.19 In contrast, what we know
about PSL default rates is limited to the origination-year level (also
called “vintages”) or alternatively to loans outstanding at the end of a
year. The CFPB found that lenders’ underwriting practices had a signiﬁcant effect on PSL default rates. While some securitized trusts have
“default rates expected to reach 50 percent,” some depository institutions that never securitized their loans have default rates of less than 4
percent.20 The nine lenders in our study had approximately $8.1 billion
in cumulative defaults as of 2011, a ﬁgure made up of approximately
850,000 distinct loans.21 Between 2005 and 2011, as few as 0.2 percent
of outstanding PSLs and as high as 1.1 percent of all outstanding loans
made by the lenders in our study were included in a bankruptcy ﬁling.22
This chapter relies on a unique large data set that sheds some light
on the typically opaque private student loan market. Per a congressio-
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nal mandate, the CFPB collected data that have never been available
before.23 Our data set covers loan-level information for all PSL originations made by the nine largest PSL lenders between 2005 and 2011. The
data are de-identiﬁed but include borrowers’ and coborrowers’ credit
scores, amount borrowed, the student’s year in school, and the name
of the school the student is attending. We merge these data to DOE
administrative data sources that provide school-level information about
federal student loans as well as institutional characteristics.
Lenders use most of these variables in their underwriting. Credit
scores in particular are highly correlated with loan grants and pricing.
However, we do not observe all variables that lenders have available
for underwriting purposes. For example, lenders may have asked about
coborrowers’ employment or income or have included information
from a credit report (e.g., the fact that someone has a large number of
credit cards) that we do not observe. The granular information from the
credit report is “baked in” the credit score number, but income is not.
We ﬁnd that excluding PSLs from discharge in bankruptcy decreased
the average credit score of borrowers and increased the volume of loans
but also increased the overall cost of loans. This latter ﬁnding runs
counter to general economic theory as well as the arguments of both
proponents and opponents of BAPCPA. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the
credit score composition of borrowers after the law changed skewed
toward the lower end of the credit score spectrum, but the average borrower credit score only decreased slightly in practical terms. We also
ﬁnd that the overall cost of PSLs at four-year undergraduate institutions
increased by an average of 35 basis points (0.35 percent) as a result of
the law change. Finally, we observe that the volume of loans originated
tripled after BAPCPA and ﬁnd that 60 percent of that increase is attributable to the law change.
The ﬁrst section of this chapter provides some background on PSLs
and a brief literature review. The second section describes the competing theories predicting the effect of BAPCPA on credit and bankruptcies. The third section describes our unique data set, its limitations, and
our empirical strategy. We report our results in the fourth section. Following that, we attempt to explain our surprising ﬁndings and consider
welfare implications. We conclude by discussing next steps.
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE
Since 1976, federal student loans have received some form of
bankruptcy protection. The stated purpose when the ﬁrst restriction
on the dischargeability of federal loans passed in Congress was a concern that students were using bankruptcy opportunistically to wipe out
their student debt on the eve of a “lucrative career.”24 There has never
been empirical evidence of widespread strategic default with regard to
student loans. Even as far back as 1977, the evidence pointed to the
contrary—strategic defaults are a rarity.25 Nonetheless, by 1998, federal loans became nondischargeable “unless excepting [them] from
discharge . . . would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor’s dependents.”26 In 2005, PSLs were added to the list.27 In this
section, we explain the legal implications of this treatment and put it in
context of the empirical studies that have examined its effect to date.
Congress never elaborated on the meaning of “undue hardship.”
The sole mention of the phrase in the congressional record comes from
opponents of the amendments who called it “vague” and argued that
the provision itself “may create an undue hardship for good faith bankrupts” because “the standard is a very hard one. It will be very difﬁcult to meet. Worse, it will be variously interpreted by different judges
around the country and even in the same judicial district.”28 As we discuss below, there is some evidence that this is what happened.
The nondischargeability provision has been amended ﬁve times
with the same “undue hardship” language, with no clariﬁcation from
Congress.29 In the meantime, courts have settled on two interpretations
of the phrase. Almost all courts use the fairly rigid Brunner test to evaluate whether a debtor can overcome the presumptive nondischargeability of student loans.30 Rebutting the presumption can be a difﬁcult task.
To do so, the debtor must ﬁle an “adversary proceeding” (effectively a
lawsuit) with the bankruptcy court against her student loan creditors.
She must convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
repaying her loans would present an undue hardship.31 The bankruptcy
court must determine whether the debtor has met the threshold for dischargeability, even if the creditor does not respond to the suit.32 If the
debtor loses the lawsuit, or does not ﬁle one in the ﬁrst place, her student loans are unaffected by the bankruptcy.33
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A handful of empirical studies have examined debtors seeking to
discharge student loans in bankruptcy and how they fared in the courts.
Three key ﬁndings pertain to this study: 1) an almost inﬁnitesimal number of student loan borrowers seek to discharge their student loans in
bankruptcy; 2) discharge seekers are outliers—they have high educational debt relative to the population and ﬁnd themselves in especially
miserable situations; and 3) about half of discharge seekers are successful, but the reasons for their success are not entirely explainable by
objective factors.
Only a handful of individuals attempt to discharge their student
loans in bankruptcy. In the only nationwide study on the subject, Jason
Iuliano estimates that of the individuals who ﬁled bankruptcy in 2007,
only 0.1 percent had student loans and sought to discharge those loans.34
That percent amounted to 213 individuals out of the 169,774 who ﬁled
a bankruptcy case in 2007 and had a student loan.35
Based on Iuliano’s study as well as two studies from Rafael Pardo
and Michelle Lacey, we can establish a picture of the “typical” discharge seeker.36 All three studies ﬁnd that the average discharge seeker
is over 41 years old, well past typical college age.37 Between 62 and 80
percent of discharge seekers were unmarried, but most had one or more
dependents, which is suggestive of a number of single-parent households.38 Fewer discharge seekers tended to be employed at the time
they ﬁle bankruptcy relative to the rest of the bankrupt population.39
Unsurprisingly, discharge seekers are in more ﬁnancial distress. “They
make less money, own fewer assets, and have more liabilities, including
educational debt” than nondischarge seekers.40 The average educational
debt load varies between $47,137 in the oldest study to $80,476 in the
study with the most recent data.41 Discharge seekers are also in dire
straits: more than half of them suffered from a medical condition themselves or had one or more dependents with a condition.42 The majority
of the discharge seekers seem to have tried various avenues to mitigate
or resolve their student debt issues before ﬁling bankruptcy.43
Discharge seekers are more often than not successful in obtaining
at least a partial discharge: 57 percent of the adversary proceedings in
Pardo and Lacey’s study of bankruptcy cases ﬁled between 2002 and
2006 in the Western District of Washington resulted in at least a partial
discharge.44 In Iuliano’s study, 39 percent (or 81 individuals out of the
almost 1 million nationwide bankruptcies in 2007) received either a
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full or a partial discharge of their student loans.45 This may seem like
favorable odds, but it is likely a result of a selection bias. The more
downtrodden and unfortunate, the more likely one might be to seek a
discharge. These odds are nonetheless hard to predict: Pardo and Lacey
argue that the undue hardship standard is not applied consistently.46
Their 2005 study ﬁnds few statistically signiﬁcant differences between
debtors who were granted a discharge of their student loans versus
those who were denied.47 Troubling from an equal justice perspective,
Pardo and Lacey also ﬁnd that “factors unrelated to the command of the
law (e.g., the identity of the judge assigned to the debtor’s adversary
proceeding), rather than factors deemed relevant by the legal doctrine
(e.g., the debtor’s income and expenses), account for the substantive
outcomes” in the case.48
Iuliano and Pardo and Lacey’s studies do not distinguish between
federal and private loans, but they nonetheless give us a sense of who
might seek and who might get their student loans discharged. Only one
study has examined the effect of the bankruptcy reform on the availability of PSLs.49 Mark Krantowitz from the Web site FinAid.org issued
a report shortly after the law came into effect ﬁnding a small expansion
in loan availability to borrowers with lower FICO scores. 50 Using data
from student loan securitizations,51 he found a 1.2 percent increase in
loans to borrowers with FICO scores less than 650 (typically considered
subprime borrowers) after BAPCPA.52 However, when looking only at
loans originated without a coborrower, Krantowitz found that credit
contracted after BAPCPA by 1.7 percent for subprime borrowers. He
also found a modest increase (5.2 percent) in PSL availability to borrowers with a FICO score between 651 and 710 (generally considered
prime).53 Krantowitz also found that in some of his sample the average
FICO score post-BAPCPA dropped from 719 to 715, further indicating
a slight credit expansion to borrowers with lower creditworthiness.54
Until now, Krantowitz’s report has been the only analysis attempting to answer the question of the effect of BAPCPA on the pricing and
availability of private student loans. His ﬁndings that credit moderately
expanded are consistent with the hypotheses we discuss in the next part
of this chapter.
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Under the dominant legal and economic theory behind the latest
round of bankruptcy reform, the “easy” availability of bankruptcy was
thought to have one of two effects: increasing the cost of credit for
everyone to account for strategic borrowers or rationing credit, leading
to a suboptimal amount of available credit. Opponents of bankruptcy
reform, on the other hand, argued that there was no empirical evidence
for this view: household credit increased dramatically, even as bankruptcy ﬁlings were increasing in the late 1990s. In their view, lenders
in particular stopped rationing credit as early as the 1980s, just after the
Supreme Court effectively lifted usury cap restrictions and after credit
scoring had improved enough that lenders were better able to identify
high-risk borrowers.55 Each of these predicted effects yields some intuitions about what might happen to the cost of credit (speciﬁcally PSLs)
post-BAPCPA. In this part, we develop three models to more formally
theorize the expected result from the increased protection of PSLs in
bankruptcy. In a later section, we compare the models’ predictions to
our results and discuss the similarities and (surprising) differences.
The majority of the 2005 bankruptcy reforms were directly responsive to a view of the world that assumed consumers were not only perfectly rational but also engaging in strategic behavior. We refer to this
as the “bankruptcy tax” view. According to this view, strategic consumers impose a cost on the system by forcing lenders to either pass on
the cost of opportunism to borrowers as a whole or ration credit. Portions of BAPCPA, including the PSL nondischargeable provision, were
designed to ameliorate these problems. Some BAPCPA proponents
posited that current strategic behavior was causing a “bankruptcy tax”
of “$400-a-year on every household in the country.”56 Alternatively
or in conjunction with a bankruptcy tax, lenders may ration credit in
a world where bankruptcy is easy “in order to maintain underwriting
standards.”57 One of the aims of bankruptcy reform was to reduce the
number of opportunistic borrowers. In support of BAPCPA, Judge Posner theorized that “by increasing the rights of creditors in bankruptcy . . .
[bankruptcy reform] should reduce interest rates and thus make borrowers better off.”58

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 183

1/28/2015 8:23:45 AM

184 Ang and Jiménez

We can model this straightforwardly. Let x be a measure of the
credit quality of a borrower and f(x) denote the probability with which
type x borrowers repay their loans, regardless of the loan amount. Let r
be one plus the rate of return of the loan for the creditor conditional on
the borrower repaying their loan,59 and let c(x) be the average recovery
rate of loans that are not repaid in full.60 For these purposes, assume
that repayment rates and the average proportion repaid are increasing in
x, so f’(x) > 0 and c’(x) > 0. Let z(r) represent the original balance of a
loan a borrower is willing to accept, which depends on the interest rate.
Assume also that consumers are risk averse, so that z'(r) and z"(r) < 0.
Further assume that the creditor is risk neutral and rational. Then for
each borrower of type x, the creditor maximizes expected repayment or
recovery net of the loan amount, as shown in Equation (7.1).
(7.1)

 ݂ ሺݔሻݖሺݎሻ ݎ ൫ͳ െ ݂ሺݔሻ൯ݖሺݎሻܿሺݔሻ െ ݖሺݎሻ


A rational, risk-neutral creditor will only originate a loan for which
expected repayment net of loan amount is nonnegative such that
(7.2)

݂ሺݔሻ 

ͳ െ ܿሺݔሻ

 ݎെ ܿሺݔሻ

As the average recovery rate of the loans not repaid in full, c(x)
increases, the right-hand side of Equation (7.2) decreases, so if repayment rates are increased by BAPCPA, creditors would be willing to
make loans to borrowers with lower values of x, so access to credit
should expand.
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions of Equation (7.1) and then differentiating implicitly yields Equation (7.3),
(7.3)

݀ݎ
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This implies that for any type x borrower, rates of returns conditional on borrowers repaying the loan in full should decrease if bankruptcy protection increases the recovery rate of loans that default, which
would correspond to a decrease in interest rates for borrowers of all levels of credit quality, as shown in Figure 7.1, which illustrates the equilibrium price schedule for a PSL of a given size by credit quality. Prior
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Figure 7.1 Effect of BAPCPA on Cost of a PSL of Fixed Size by
Credit Quality
r
(1+interest rate)
P0

P1

P0
P1
x
(credit quality)

to BAPCPA, P0 traces out the relationship between the cost of credit,
captured by r, and credit quality, x. After BAPCPA, the increase in c(x),
the return given less than full payment at a given interest rate, resulting from higher rates of recovery conditional on bankruptcy, should be
offset by a decrease in interest rates for borrowers, so the price schedule shifts from P0 to P1. Note that the size of the decrease may vary by
credit quality.
Consider the case where the borrower is von Neumann-Morgenstern
(VNM) rational, as assumed by proponents of bankruptcy reform.61 In
that case, his utility function can be expressed as
U(z,r;x) = g(x)u(z,r) + (1 − g[x])v(z,r),
where g(x) is the borrower’s ex ante belief about the probability that he
will repay the loan, u(z,r) is the expected utility from successfully being
able to pay back his loan when he borrows z at interest rate r − 1, and
v(z,r) is his expected utility of not being able to pay back a loan that he
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borrows at these terms. The larger the loan, the better off he is when he
is able to pay it back, so u1 > 0, and the worse off he is when he is unable
to pay it back, so v1 < 0. From the ﬁrst order conditions
݃ሺݔሻ
െݒଵ ሺݖǡ ݎሻ
ൌ
,
ͳ െ ݃ሺݔሻ
ݑଵ ሺݖǡ ݎሻ

which implicitly deﬁnes z(r). Note that consumer overoptimism or positive cognitive bias can be captured by g(x) > f(x). In other words, the
borrower’s belief about his ability to repay the loan is greater than his
actual probability of repaying the loan.
The new treatment of PSLs in bankruptcy—making them presumptively nondischargeable and effectively very unlikely to be discharged—makes the consequences of default more severe; a severity
that increases with the size of the loan. We model this as the expected
utility of not being able to repay a loan, v(z,r), becoming v̂(z,r), and v̂1.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the effect of BAPCPA on the supply of and demand
for PSL for a borrower of a ﬁxed credit quality, x. Assuming that abilityto-repay conditional on credit quality is not affected by BAPCPA—that
is, there is no additional strategic default after BAPCPA—then g(x) is
unchanged and
݃ሺݔሻ
െݒଵ ሺݖǡ ݎሻ െݒොଵ ሺݖƸ ǡ ݎሻ
ൌ
ൌ
,
ݑଵ ሺݖƸ ǡ ݎሻ
ͳ െ ݃ሺݔሻ
ݑଵ ሺݖǡ ݎሻ

so ẑ < z.62 This implies that the VNM borrower’s demand curve shifts
down, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. Supply responds as described in
Equation (7.3) and shifts from S0 to S1.63 Equilibrium moves from E0
to Ê1.
Note that the magnitude of this shift is determined by the relationship between the change in the expected utility of not being able to
repay a loan and the average recovery rate of loans that are not repaid in
full, c(x), so, a priori, it is not possible to determine whether loan sizes
will increase, decrease, or remain the same as a result of BAPCPA.
Similar to Judge Posner’s prediction for the law change, this simple
model would thus predict that the price of the loans—in our parlance,
the loan margin—will decrease after the law change and the effects on
credit quality and volume are an empirical question.
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Figure 7.2 Effects of BAPCPA on Supply and Demand of PSL for
Consumers of a Fixed Credit Quality
r
(1 + interest rate)
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As an alternative model, we also consider credit provision in the
private student loan market in a Stiglitz-Weiss model in Appendix 7C.64
For this model to hold, we assume that there is credit rationing in the
private student loan market, as some BAPCPA proponents argued.65
The Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that the cost of credit will remain
the same (because of rationing); the supply of credit will increase
(increased volume of loans originated, as opposed to the ambiguous
effect on quantity in the simple model); and that lenders will on average
lend to riskier borrowers (in our data, lower credit scores).66
Opponents of BAPCPA have argued that the assumptions of strategic rationality on the part of consumers are too simplistic. Incorporating
behavioral research ﬁndings and empirical research of actual debtors in
bankruptcy, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger propose a behavioral
model of consumer bankruptcy that relaxes the assumption of consumer
rationality but retains the assumption of lender rationality.67 This is captured by the model presented above, since f (x) and g(x) can differ. Positive consumer biases, including optimism, present bias, and probability
neglect, correspond to cases where g(x) > f(x).
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If we assume, for example, that borrowers are present biased, then
they focus on the interest rate, and do not fully consider their probability of bankruptcy or the consequences of BAPCPA upon bankruptcy.68
These behaviors could be captured by setting g(x) = 1 (assuming that a
borrower believes he will deﬁnitely repay the loan) or by setting v̂ (z,r)
= v(z,r) (borrower ignores the consequences of bankruptcy), respectively. This would mean that borrowers’ demand curves do not shift
in response to BAPCPA. Instead, these loans will appear “cheaper” to
borrowers because they are not fully accounting for the costs or are
overly optimistic about their likelihood of repayment, and therefore
loan originations and loan amounts should increase at any given credit
quality, as shown in Figure 7.2. BAPCPA causes the supply curve to
shift downward for individuals of credit quality x, which means that
the price of credit, r, decreases. In response to this shift, the new equilibrium moves along the demand curve from E0 to E1, so the loan size
demanded increases, in contrast to the loan size decrease we see in Ê1,
the case where borrowers internalize the cost of nondischargeability.
Block-Lieb and Janger go further than this model. They theorize
that “consumer lenders already provide a rebate of the bankruptcy tax”
to subprime and less credit-worthy consumers.69 This model is really
a special case of the competitive model with present-biased consumer
above. If, as Block-Lieb and Janger predict, the charge-off rate does
not change post BAPCPA, then c(x) does not change, and so the supply
curve does not shift. Also, if consumers understand that c(x) does not
change, or if they do not factor in nondischargeability in bankruptcy
into v(z,r), the demand curve does not shift. Therefore, prices and borrowing decisions will remain the same.
To summarize, depending on what assumptions we make and what
model we use, we would expect a variety of different outcomes for
the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private student
loans presumptively nondischargeable, as shown in Table 7.1.
Incorporating all of these leads to the following hypotheses, which
we test with our analysis:
• H0 — Price, average credit quality or loan amount, and total loan
volumes will remain the same.
• H1 — Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the
same or decrease for originations after the law change.
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• H2 — Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower
credit quality than they were willing to lend before the law
change.
• H3 — Overall loan volumes should increase.
• H4 — Average loan amount should also increase independent of
tuition and fees.
Table 7.1 Expectation of Outcomes by Theory
Simple
Block-Lieb
Competitive (CP) Stiglitz-Weiss
CP + Present& Janger
Outcome
Model
(credit rationing) Biased Consumer (CP + ∆c(x)=0)70
Price
Decrease
No change
Decrease
No change
Credit quality
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
No change
Loan amount
Ambiguous
Increase
Increase
No change
Loan volume
Ambiguous
Increase
Increase
No change

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
Our data set was created by CFPB economists in preparation for
the congressionally mandated report on PSLs issued in 2012.71 The data
set includes PSL originations from the nine largest PSL lenders in the
period between the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 and the last quarter of 2011.72
The data do not allow us to identify the lender for a given loan, but it
does contain origination information at the individual loan level. The
variables available in the data set include the loan amount, credit score
of the borrower, credit score of any coborrowers, interest rate for ﬁxedrate loans, margin and the index used for variable rate loans, and the
state of residence of the borrower.73 This data set was merged to two
public administrative data sets maintained by the Department of Education: the Integrated Postsecondary Education System (IPEDS) and the
Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS).74 IPEDS “gathers information from every college, university, and technical and vocational institution that participates in the federal student ﬁnancial aid
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programs.”75 It includes data on “enrollments, program completions,
graduation rates, faculty and staff, ﬁnances, institutional prices, and student ﬁnancial aid programs.”76 The PEPS data include school-level data
on topics such as school characteristics, cohort default rates, and eligibility status.77 We used these additional variables in the school-level
analysis.
In order to compare PSLs to federal loans for the difference-indifferences (DD) analysis, we also made use of data from the DOE’s
Title IV Program Volume Reports for Direct Loans and Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans at the school level in the
2004–2005 and 2005–2006 academic years.78
While the PSL data set includes originations on a variety of school
types, for purposes of this study, we restricted the data set to originations for undergraduates at four-year institutions from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2005 and 2006. We limited ourselves to this smaller (though still considerable) sample because we thought the heterogeneity of school and
program type (certiﬁcate, medical school, law school) might obscure
the effect. We also limit ourselves to this time period to avoid conﬂating
the effects of other major policy changes, such as the 2006 implementation of the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005, which modiﬁed eligibility and application requirements for Title IV funds, with the
effects of BAPCPA.79
Our outcome variables include the credit worthiness of student loan
applicants (measured by the highest FICO score between the borrower
and coborrower), the margins (interest above the index), the lender
charged on the loan, the size of the loan, and the total number of loans
originated. Table 7.2 presents summary statistics for private student
loans originated in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 (before the law changed)
and the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 (after the law changed). Of note is the
overall small reduction in mean and median FICO scores in 2006; this
is true both for borrower FICO scores and for maximum FICO score
(if the borrower applied with a coborrower, the maximum of the two
scores). The average original balance and the number of loans originated increased; the latter more than tripled in the postperiod.
In Figure 7.3, we plot the distribution of maximum FICO scores
before and after BAPCPA. We observe that the distribution shifts
slightly to the left, so that FICO scores decrease after BAPCPA.
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Table 7.2 Summary Statistics for Loans Originated in the First Quarter
of 2005 and First Quarter of 2006
Before BAPCPA
After BAPCPA
(Q1 2005)
(Q1 2006)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
1
0.82
1
0.80
Has a coborrower
(0.40)
700
714.96
718
720.34
Maximum FICO score
(47.45)
(47.50)
660
648.65
662
651.02
Borrower’s FICO score
(67.48)
(65.44)
3
2.54
3
2.62
Year in school
(1.15)
(1.15)
4.85
4.63
4.75
4.18
Margin (%)
(1.06)
(1.59)
7,650
10,015
6,271
8,614
Original balance ($)
(785.4)
(6,956)
29
28.67
28
28.67
Deferral term (months)
(14.8)
(15.1)
7,795
11,091
7,229
11,485
Tuition and fees ($)
(8,200)
(8,011)
15,318
4,960
Loans originated
NOTE: Maximum FICO score is the maximum of the borrower and all coborrower
scores. Standard deviations in parentheses. Restricted to loans originated in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2005 and 2006 to undergraduates at four-year institutions for which a borrower or coborrower’s FICO score was reported.

Figure 7.4 displays the changes in margins between the ﬁrst quarter
before the law change and the same quarter one year later. Before the
law changed, some lenders were originating PSLs that had a zero or
below zero margin; in other words, they were not charging a premium
above the index for some loans. After the law changed, surprisingly,
premium-free or less-than-index loans were no longer being originated,
and the distribution shifts toward higher margins.
Figure 7.5 presents the distribution of the original balances of the
loans originated in the ﬁrst quarter before the law changed (Q1 2005)
and the same quarter after the law changed (Q1 2006). Original balances are positively skewed in both time periods, but slightly higher
after BAPCPA.
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Figure 7.3 Distribution of Maximum FICO Scores Shifts toward Less
Creditworthy Borrowers in the Post BAPCPA Period
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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Figure 7.4 Distribution of Margins Increased in the Post BAPCPA Period
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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Figure 7.5 Distribution of Original Balances Increased in the Post
BAPCPA Period
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SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of CFPB private student loan data.
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Limitations
The available data impose some limitations on our analysis. The
ﬁrst limitation is related to the timing of bankruptcy reform, the second
with the available data.
First, bankruptcy reforms, including changes to the dischargeability
of PSLs, were debated in Congress as early as the mid-1990s, and by
1999 and 2000, the House and Senate had passed bills that included language adding PSLs to the list of presumptively nondischargeable loans
in bankruptcy. These bills were vetoed by President Clinton in 2000.80
The upsurge of Republican congressional members in the 2004 election
and the public support of bankruptcy reform by sitting President Bush
meant that the bill, as one newspaper phrased it in an opinion piece a
month before the bill’s passage, “gained the momentum of a runaway
freight train.”81 The bill was introduced in the Senate on February 1,
2005, passed by both houses on April 14, 2005, was signed into law by
President Bush on April 20, 2005, and became effective on October 17,
2005.82
Despite the lack of a “surprise” factor for the law change, lenders
are unlikely to have made preemptive changes to their underwriting
algorithms, primarily because by doing so they could lose the beneﬁt
afforded by the law’s protection for at least some of the loans they would
originate in anticipation. This is because BAPCPA did not apply retroactively: PSLs were not affected unless and until a bankruptcy case was
ﬁled after the law became effective. This means that PSLs only became
presumptively nondischargeable for bankruptcies that were ﬁled on
or after October 17, 2005, and they became so regardless of when the
loans were originated.83 Prior to that date, the loans were dischargeable
like most other forms of unsecured debt, such as credit card debts.
Our earliest data are from Q1 2005, before the law was passed or
took effect. The law took effect at the very end of Q3 2005, so we use
Q1 2006 as the effective postperiod. Figure 7.6 shows the timeline of
the law changes and the available data.
We note one additional limitation to using ﬁrst-quarter originations. Because the academic year traditionally runs from August to
May, many student loans are originated over the summer or the fall.
Beyond the fact that there are fewer originations in Q1 than Q3, loans
originated in Q1 differ from loans originated in other quarters. Table 7.3
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Figure 7.6 Major Events in Bankruptcy Reform and Our Data Set
Observations
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presents a comparison of ﬁrst quarter 2006 originations to third-quarter
originations in 2005 and 2006. Columns (2)–(5) present the results for
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the outcome variables with
controls for quarter of origination and school ﬁxed effects. Compared to
ﬁrst-quarter loans, third-quarter loans tend to have signiﬁcantly larger
original balances, are more likely to be originated through the school
channel, are more likely to be made with coborrowers, and have slightly
higher maximum FICO scores. To mitigate these seasonal differences,
we restrict our analysis to comparing Q1 2005 data (the ﬁrst quarter
available) to Q1 2006 data.
Empirical Strategy
We analyze changes in loan characteristics—that is, changes in
loan amount, debtor credit quality, and margin (risk premium cost)—at
the loan level. We implement three methods in this analysis: 1) OLS
regression, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and 3) propensity-score
matching. We then collapse the data and analyze the volume of loans
originated at the school level using the same three methods and also
perform a DD analysis using volumes of federal loans as a comparison
for PSL volumes.
Loan-level analysis
We can think of the price and terms of credit in terms of the expected
returns for the creditor conditional on repayment, the amount of the loan
extended, and the credit quality of the borrower. In our data set, these
characteristics most closely correspond to margin (the risk premium),84
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Table 7.3 OLS Regressions Comparing First-Quarter 2006 Originations
with Third-Quarter 2006 Originations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Total
Original
originations balance
2006 Q1
16,017
2005 Q3
37,795
1,927***
(78.89)
2006 Q3
26,127
2,689***
(74.17)
Constant
9,936***
(61.80)
Observations
79,913
R2
0.148

School
channel

Has a
cosigner

0.0420*** 0.0250***
(0.00388) (0.00356)
0.00796** 0.0499***
(0.00365) (0.00334)
0.248*** 0.821***
(0.00304) (0.00279)
79,939
79,939
0.293
0.079

FICO
score
6.563***
(0.473)
1.798***
(0.445)
716.5***
(0.371)
79,939
0.098

NOTE:*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted
to four-year undergraduates in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 and the third quarters of 2005
and 2006. Columns (2) through (5) represent separate OLS regressions and include
school-level ﬁxed effects.

original balance, and the maximum FICO scores among borrowers and
coborrowers on a loan.85 To evaluate how these characteristics changed
as a result of BAPCPA, we implement three techniques.
As a ﬁrst approach, we run OLS regressions of these characteristics,
y, on post, a dummy variable for receiving a loan after the implementation of BAPCPA, and a vector of control variables, X, that would be
included in an underwriting model, such as type of school attended,
tuition and fees, credit score, year in school, and a constant, as shown
in Equation (7.5).86 The sample is restricted to individuals with valid
FICO scores, as this is the dominant measure of creditworthiness used
in the data set.
(7.5)

yi = βpost posti + βx Xi + εi

Note that H2 discussed in the analytical framework implies that the
coefﬁcient on βpost < 0 when the outcome under consideration is the
maximum credit score among all borrowers and H1 implies that at each
maximum credit score, the interest rate should decrease, so βpost < 0.
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(7.6)
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We also perform this analysis with interactions between school and
borrower characteristics, which are observable to the creditor, and an
indicator for the postperiod. Let Xi be a vector of school or borrower
characteristics, ܺ ൌ ሾݔଵ ݔଶ ݔ ڮே ሿᇱ . Then the interaction terms
can be written as in Equation (7.6). For a borrower with characteristics
Xi , the estimated effect of BAPCPA on the outcome variables is given
by
ே
ߚ௦௧ ݐݏ   ߚ
ୀଵ

ݔ ൈ ݐݏ 

ൈ௦௧

Effectively, βj × post can be interpreted as the contribution of having
one more unit of xj to the magnitude of the effect of the policy. For
example, if two borrowers have identical characteristics except that one
has a coborrower and the other does not, we would expect the effect of
BAPCPA on their outcomes to differ by βcoborrower × post on average.
Since the lender data set only contains data for originated loans, one
concern is that the composition of borrowers in the data set may change
in response to changes in the loan offers by creditors. In order to separately identify effects due to changes in terms for borrowers who would
have received loans in the absence of BAPCPA and the effects of the
change in the composition of borrowers, we employ two techniques: the
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and propensity score matching.
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was initially developed in
the context of wage discrimination, where wages are only observed
for individuals who are employed.87 In the context of this study, we
consider the group that was exposed to BAPCPA, that is, borrowers
who received loans in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006.88 First, we run regressions of the outcome variables on their characteristics for both samples
restricted to the pre group, which received loans before BAPCPA (in
Q1 2005), and the post group, which received loans after BAPCPA (in
Q1 2006), as in Equations (7.7) and (7.8).
(7.7)
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(7.8)
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An estimate of the difference in average loan terms for the groups
due to the changes in the characteristics of the individuals in the group
(“endowments”) is captured in the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of
Equation (7.9). An estimate of the effects of the program on the loan
terms for individuals who would receive loans in the absence of BAPCPA is captured by the effect due to coefﬁcients in the second term
of the right-hand side of Equation (7.9). The effect due to coefﬁcients
can be thought of as the change in how the underlying underwriting
model classiﬁes borrowers with a certain set of observable characteristics (e.g., a certain credit score).
(7.9)
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It follows that for margins, the effect due to the program corresponds to an average of the effects characterized by H2. These results
are invariant to omitted reference groups when dummy variables are
added; that is, the program effect estimates do not vary with the omitted
category when we use indicator variables for the values of a categorical
variable as controls.89 Since Kline has shown that the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition is a reweighting estimator, we can also interpret the
Blinder-Oaxaca results causally.90
To further isolate the effect of BAPCPA, we use propensity score
matching methods to understand its effect on individuals who received
loans after BAPCPA but who, based on their observable characteristics, would have been approved for loans in the absence of BAPCPA.
We estimate the effects on this population using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching, matching observations from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2006 with a single observation from the ﬁrst quarter of 2005. This
allows us to reduce the bias due to potential confounding variables.
During this time period, underwriting of student loans was largely
based on automated underwriting and primarily based on the characteristics we observe—namely, credit score, amount of loan, and school
characteristics. In other words, conditional on borrower and coborrower
characteristics, approval for a loan is deterministic because lenders are
making decisions based on observable characteristics run through an
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algorithm. We thus have reason to believe that propensity score methods are appropriate because our sample satisﬁes the strong ignorability
and conditional independence assumptions in Equation (7.10), where S
is post-BAPCPA status, as discussed in Rosenbaum and Rubin.91


(7.10)
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The effect of the program on individuals in the common support of
the characteristics of those observed in the pre- and postperiods can be
estimated by Equation (7.11), where τ is the treatment effect and p is
the propensity score estimated by a probit regression, and S = 1 if the
individual is observed post BAPCPA and 0 otherwise.92
H2 implies that the composition of borrowers may change, owing
to the availability of credit to individuals who would not have been
offered credit prior to the policy change. Lenders’ ex ante assessment
of borrower credit quality, x, may be determined by multiple factors,
including credit score, school attended, and year in school. Therefore,
there may be differences in the observable characteristics of borrowers
between the pre- and postperiods. The propensity score analysis thus
cannot tell us anything about the type of borrower that is able to get a
loan after BAPCPA. It can only tell us the effect of BAPCPA on borrowers in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 that would have been approved for a
loan before the law changed.
School-level analysis
To test the hypothesis that loan volumes increase because of BAPCPA, H3, we collapse our loan origination data set to the school level.
Since our unit of observation is now a school, we are able to use the
three methods described above—1) OLS, 2) Blinder-Oaxaca, and 3)
propensity-score matching—to examine loan volumes. We also implement a DD strategy using federal loan volumes for comparison.
First we compare the log number of private student loans in the
lender data sample at each school in the preperiod to the postperiod.
Note that in order to understand the magnitude of the effect, we must
exponentiate the coefﬁcients on post in the OLS speciﬁcation and
the analogues in the Oaxaca decomposition and the propensity score
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matching models. We also run a school ﬁxed effects model in order to
consider the within school effects. All models are weighted by full-time
equivalent enrollments.
We also perform a DD analysis using available information on the
volume of both Direct and FFELP Loans at a given school for the 2004–
2005 and 2005–2006 academic years. We assume that in the absence
of BAPCPA, the change in PSLs would parallel the change in federal
loans and that the change in federal loans is proportional across quarters. We can then estimate the effect of the program on loan volumes
using a DD strategy. We believe that our assumption of PSL volume
moving in a parallel fashion to federal loan volume in the absence of
BAPCPA is likely, since they are subject to the same demand shocks,
such as enrollments and changes in tuition costs. Although we do not
have quarterly data for federal loans, annual average loans per student
grew steadily from 2000 through 2005.93
We combine Direct Loan and FFELP Loan totals at the institutionyear level, append the resultant data set to the school-level origination
data, and merge the appropriate IPEDS and PEPS data at the institutionyear level. We then consider PSLs the treated group, so the coefﬁcient
of interest is βpsl×post in Equation (7.12), and the comparison groups are
subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans, Parental PLUS Loans,
combined Stafford Loans, and all federal loans. We use a similar strategy to estimate the effects of the program on average loan size at a given
school by stacking the loan-level origination data with the Title IV Program Volume Reports and weighting by the number of originations.94
(7.12)
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One challenge with using federal loans as controls for PSLs arises
from the fact that federal loans have deﬁned maximum loan amounts.95
This means that loan demand for federal loans is effectively top-coded,
which leads to downward bias in estimates of ߚ௦௧ൈ௦ .96 As a result, as
shown in Appendix 7B, we are likely to underestimate the true effect
with the DD analysis.
We make two assumptions in our DD analysis. This is necessary,
since data on federal loans are only available at the academic-year level.
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 7.6. First, we assume that all
of the federal student loans originated in academic year 2004–2005 are
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originated by April 20, 2005. It is likely that the majority of federal loans
are originated by this point in time, since the academic year ends at the
close of the second quarter, and the law took effect midway through the
second quarter. This allows us to associate academic year 2004–2005
with the pre-BAPCPA period and academic year 2005–2006 with the
post-BAPCPA period. Second, we assume that at any given institution,
the proportion of the academic year’s federal loans originated is constant: if x percent of academic year 2004–2005 federal loans at school y
are made in Q1 2005, then x percent of academic year 2005–2006 federal loans at school y are made in Q1 2006. Similarly, we assume either
that the absolute difference or the proportional difference in average
federal loan size between quarters is constant within schools across academic years, in the speciﬁcations that consider average original balance
and log original balance, respectively. Academic year volumes are a
noisy measure of quarterly volumes, which means our results are biased
toward zero, and the true effect is likely larger than what we observe.97

RESULTS
We analyzed the loans originated in the ﬁrst quarters of 2005 and
2006 using OLS regression, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, and propensity score matching. These methods produced similar results displayed in Appendix 7A, Tables 7A.1–7A.5. All of the results we discuss in this section are statistically signiﬁcant to the 95 percent level or
higher unless noted.
Loan-Level Analysis
Table 7A.1 uses OLS to estimate Equation (7.5) for tuition and fees,
with various combinations of controls for a borrower’s year in school,
school type, maximum FICO scores, linear splines for FICO scores,
and school ﬁxed effects.98 Once school ﬁxed effects are introduced,
the results are stable across speciﬁcations. As predicted by H2, lenders
are lending to borrowers who have worse credit after the law changed,
as evidenced by the 5.3 point average decrease in FICO scores shown
in column (3). Contrary to the prediction from H1 that for a given
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credit quality the consumer price of borrowing will decrease owing to
increased collections, the margins increase by 30 basis points in column
(5). Mean original balance also increased by $1,189.
Because of their credit quality, some applicants would have been
able to receive a PSL both before and after BAPCPA. To understand
how BAPCPA may have affected the borrower population through
changes in underwriting, we turn to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The results displayed in Table 7A.2 show a 26 basis-point increase
in margin but no signiﬁcant change in loan amount. In column (2) of
Panel A, the 0.398 decrease in credit scores due to endowments suggests that some of the characteristics of borrowers may have changed
that resulted in average lower FICO scores. This result is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level but disappears when school ﬁxed effects are
added in column (3). This suggests that the composition of schools to
which the sample creditors are lending may have changed and merits
further investigation.
Consistent with the OLS results in Table 7A.1, column (5) of Panel
B shows a within-school effect of a 35-basis-point increase in margins,
11 basis points of which are attributable to changes in the composition of students (endowments in Blinder-Oaxaca terminology), and 26
basis points of which are attributable to changes in underwriting (coefﬁcients). Recall that we deﬁned r as one plus the rate of return of the
loan for the creditor conditional on the borrower repaying their loan.
This suggests that for a given set of borrower characteristics, lenders
are increasing r, so, inconsistent with the prediction from H1, lenders
increased the price of loans in response to BAPCPA.
Similarly, in Panel C, the overall change in original balance due to
BAPCPA is insigniﬁcant, but changes in borrower characteristics predict a $116 increase in borrowing due to endowments (changes in the
composition of students after the law changed).
Table 7A.3 presents the results from the propensity score matching, where the propensity score is calculated by a probit regression of
borrower characteristics on whether or not an individual appears in the
post-BAPCPA observations. For each speciﬁcation, the raw difference
in means is reported above the difference in means for the matched
pairs, labeled as the average treatment on the treated effect. For maximum FICO scores, these results can be interpreted as the type of students, based on schools attended and school year, that the lenders would
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have successfully extended credit to pre-BAPCPA. The result in column (3) of a 4.2 point average decrease in FICO scores is consistent
with the previous results and suggests that within a given school, lenders are extending credit to individuals with slightly lower credit scores
in the postperiod.
For margins and original balances, the results in Table 7A.3 can be
interpreted as the effects of the program on the loan terms of individuals
who would have been granted loans prior to BAPCPA, based on their
characteristics. Consistent with the OLS and Blinder-Oaxaca result, the
result in column (5) suggests a 30-basis-point increase in the average
margin experienced by a borrower. As also shown in that column, average original balances increased by $1,157 post-BAPCPA.
Overall, these results suggest that credit did expand to some individuals who previously did not have access to private student loans
prior to BAPCPA either because of their observable credit quality
through their FICO scores or the characteristics of the schools that they
attended. This is consistent with H2, and as can be seen from Figure 7.3,
it was signiﬁcant to a number of borrowers with low credit scores. Consistent with the previous methods presented, margins actually increase
by a signiﬁcant amount post-BAPCPA. This is inconsistent with the
theoretical prediction of H1 that the price of loans, as captured by the
margin, should not increase, since collection given bankruptcy should
increase the value of defaulted loans for creditors.
School-Level Analysis
As predicted by H3, when we collapse our data set to the school
level, we observe a signiﬁcant increase in the volume of PSLs after the
implementation of BAPCPA. As shown in Table 7A.4, once we control
for school characteristics, including tuition and fees, graduation rates,
Carnegie classiﬁcation, log full-time equivalent students, and the percent of the student body that is black and Hispanic, we observe a 174.3
percent increase in PSL originations in the OLS speciﬁcation in column
(6) of Panel A.99 The corresponding Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition in
column (6) of Panel B suggests that a 192.1 percent increase is due to
a change in underwriting due to BAPCPA.100 Similarly, the propensity
score matching result yields a 215.2 percent increase in loans due to
BAPCPA in column (6) of Panel C.
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An OLS regression of log borrowers on BAPCPA with school ﬁxed
effects, restricted to students at schools where the creditors issued loans
before the policy change, yields an estimate of a 243.0 percent increase
in loan volumes. Note that these volumes may be attenuated owing
to measurement error and may underestimate the effect of the policy
change, since we do not observe other ﬁrms that enter due to the construction of the sample.101
The DD results for loan volumes in Table 7A.5 are qualitatively
similar to estimates in Table 7A.4. With all of our comparison groups,
we observe an approximate 60 percent increase in the number of private student loan originations, and a similar increase in the number of
distinct borrowers in each loan type. When we compare average original balance to Stafford Loan balances, we observe an effect of the law
change of an approximately $600 increase in the average original balance of PSL. This is smaller than our point estimate using other techniques, and we believe that that DD estimate may be biased downward,
owing to the loan limits for federal loans.102
We add Parent PLUS Loans as comparison in column (4) because
they are a close substitute for PSLs, and because PLUS loan eligibility
is based on the parents’ creditworthiness. Doing so leads us to estimate a $121 decrease in the average size of the PSL. In our sample of
PSLs the original rate is negatively correlated with original balance (ρ
= −0.0975), so it is possible that marginal individuals who would have
applied for smaller PLUS Loans in the absence of the policy change
make have substituted PSLs for PLUS Loans because of potentially
lower interest rates.103

DISCUSSION
Recall our hypotheses from Table 7.1. While not every model predicted every outcome of interest, those that did were heading in the
same direction. Our prediction was that credit would expand; in other
words, borrower credit quality would stay the same or decrease, and
average loan amounts as well as the volume of loans would stay the
same or increase. Our models predicted the prices would either stay the
same or decrease. Our results are mostly consistent with these hypoth-
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eses: credit expanded among all dimensions after BAPCPA. The ﬁrst
quarter after the law changed saw a dramatic 309 percent increase in the
number of loans originated; we estimate that 60 percent of that increase
was caused by BAPCPA.104 Additionally, borrowers with lower credit
scores were moderately more able to obtain PSLs as a result of BAPCPA. The decrease in the average maximum credit score was small
in magnitude, a drop similar to the effect of applying for two credit
cards within a few days. Credit also expanded at the loan level; the
average original balance of the loans increased by between $1,100 and
$1,400, even after controlling for tuition and fees, year in school, having a coborrower, maximum FICO score, and school ﬁxed effects. All
of this is not unexpected. The most surprising ﬁnding of our study is
that contrary to our hypotheses, both from the point of view of reform
proponents and opponents, average loan prices (in our parlance, lender
margins) increased during this period.105 Our estimates show that margins increased by between 30 and 40 basis points, even for students
who would have received a loan before BAPCPA.
An expansion of credit coupled with an increase in price sounds
eerily similar to what happened in other consumer credit markets during the pre-Great Recession bubble. The secondary market for all consumer credit—mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, etc.—increased
dramatically before the Great Recession. Consumer credit ABS issuances peaked before 2005, but it is widely theorized that, securitization
demand drove both an expansion of credit as well as an increase in
prices in markets such as housing.106 One potential story here is that
we are not observing BAPCPA so much as securitization demand. This
account would be consistent with Block-Lieb and Janger’s prediction
that lenders would not relax underwriting standards or originate more
loans after BAPCPA because they had no reason to expect increased
charge-offs after the law changed.107 If BAPCPA did not cause shifts
in supply, then lenders would have only relaxed their underwriting criteria in order to meet the demand from the securitization market. We
cannot discount that securitization had an effect on our ﬁndings; however, as we discuss below, we ﬁnd evidence that is inconsistent with this
hypothesis.
As shown in Figure 7.7, PSL Asset Backed Securities (PSLABS)
outstandings increased in a steep linear fashion between 2003 and 2007.
We note that the growth in outstandings in the period we studied (repre-
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Figure 7.7 Outstanding Private and Mixed Private/Public Student Loan
Asset Backed Securities
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SOURCE: U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (see Note 108).

sented by the vertical lines in Figure 7.7) is similar to that in the period
that came before it (2004–2005) and after 2006–2007. In other words,
PSLABS were increasing steadily between 2003 and 2007.
Given this stable increase, we compare our results among our four
outcomes of interest (maximum FICO score between borrower or
coborrower, margin charged on the loan, original balance of the loan,
and the volume of loans originated) between the ﬁrst quarters straddling bankruptcy reform (Q1 2005 to Q1 2006) and the same quarters
one year after reform (Q1 2006 to Q1 2007).109 Table 7.4 reports the
raw means for the three periods.110 Credit expands the year after the law
changes (2006–2007), but the growth is much more muted than in the
period spanning bankruptcy reform. For example, between Q1 2006
and Q1 2007, the mean maximum FICO score decreased one point;
noticeably less than the ﬁve-point decrease after BAPCPA. Similarly,
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Table 7.4 Raw Means of Outcomes of Interest in the First Quarters of
2005, 2006, and 2007
Q1 2005
Q1 2006
Q1 2007
Mean
Mean
Mean
Maximum FICO score
720
715
714
Margin (%)
4.2
4.6
5.1
Original balance ($)
8,614
10,015
10,147
Loans originated
4,960
15,318
19,658

loan volumes increased 128 percent between Q1 2007 and Q1 2006, but
this is not the astounding 309 percent increase we observe between Q1
2005 and Q1 2006. Continuing the puzzling trend, margins increased
50 basis points between the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 and the ﬁrst quarter of
2007.
If securitization were a principal driver of the expansion of credit
we observe between before and after bankruptcy reform, we would
expect similar effects in the cost and availability of credit between
the bankruptcy reform period (2005–2006) as well as the period after
(2006–2007). That is not what the data show: the changes in borrower
composition and the spike in loan volumes are quite pronounced in the
period around bankruptcy reform, while not nearly as much in the same
period one year later.
Figure 7.7 depicts securitizations outstanding, which are necessarily
cumulative. Figure 7.8 presents annual PSLABS issuances, which is a
closer analogue to loan originations—closer but with one caveat. When
comparing securitization issuances and loan originations, it is important
to consider that PSLABS issuances necessarily lag originations. This
is because it takes some time to package and securitize loans that are
made during a particular time period. In addition, the typical securitization trust contains loans originated during multiple years as part of the
risk spreading investors require. The “youngest” loans included in a
portfolio of PSLABS were typically originated 3–6 months prior to the
issuance of the securities.111 Because of this lag, if the secondary market was the reason for the large expansion of credit we observe in the
time period around bankruptcy reform (and not BAPCPA), we should
observe an increase in securitizations in 2005 (or before) relative to
later years. The expected increase should attenuate in 2006 and later
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Figure 7.8 Issuances of Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities
Peaked in 2006 before Declining Dramatically during the
Great Recession
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SOURCE: CFPB PSL report (see Note 112).

to account for the “cooling off” in credit expansion that we discussed
above. We observe the opposite. As shown in Figure 7.8, securitization
issuances spike in 2006, the year immediately after BAPCPA became
effective.
Because of the lag in issuing securities, PSLABS packaged and
offered to investors in 2006 were primarily made up of loans originated before bankruptcy reform. Regardless of when these loans were
originated, however, when BAPCPA became effective on October 17,
2005, all private student loans became presumptively nondischargeable
and thus more valuable to investors. It is thus not surprising to observe
a spike in securitization issuances in 2006 as shown in Figure 7.8 and
a corresponding faster increase in PSLABS outstanding between 2005
and 2006, as shown in Figure 7.7. The expected recovery of PSLs was
higher now that they (effectively) could not be discharged in bank-
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ruptcy. This likely increased the demand for PSL securities from the
secondary market but only after BAPCPA was enacted.113 This latter
increased demand, however, could not be the cause of what we observe
during the 2005–2006 period.
Demand for PSLABS was progressively increasing well before
BAPCPA was enacted. It is likely responsible for expansion of the PSL
market.114 However, a steady expansion of PSLABS from 2003–2007
and a spike in PSLABS issuances in 2006 (which necessarily included
few loans originated post-BAPCPA) are inconsistent with a hypothesis
that the sudden expansion of credit we observe between Q1 2005 and
Q1 2006 (around bankruptcy reform) was caused by securitization.
Instead, what we know about securitization volumes in the period during this time is more consistent with a story that bankruptcy reform
further stoked the ﬁres of the secondary market, leading to the peak in
PSLABS issuances in 2006.
If securitization does not explain the expansion of credit we observe,
then what accounts for the puzzling increase in margins? One plausible
explanation is that the increased prices are driven by lender advertising.
We’ve reported evidence that the composition of borrowers changed
after BAPCPA: in other words, credit expanded to borrowers who
would not have received loans before the law changed. The data also
show that borrowers who would have received loans before BAPCPA
obtained loans in increasing numbers after the law change.
There is reason to think that advertising might have been well targeted to the relevant population. Advertisements for PSLs could have
come through regular channels (such as television, direct mail, and
the Internet). Lenders could have also targeted students directly. During this period, the lenders in our study were part of FFELP and were
federal as well as private student loans. If a student had applied for a
FFELP loan from a lender, they would have some information about
both the appetite and credit proﬁle of the student, not to mention their
contact information. Armed with this knowledge, the lender could reach
out directly to students and promote their PSL product. This focused
advertisement would lead to increased student demand for PSLs, which
would have driven up the cost of the loans. There is anecdotal evidence
of a growth in direct-to-consumer marketing during this time period
and continuing for a few years.
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We need much more information than we have available to test this
theory. Ideally, we would have some data on advertising trends over
time. We would also really want to have data on how margins were
changing before 2005. It seems plausible that lenders began trying to
fan demand as a result of securitization before BAPCPA. In that case,
BAPCPA may have further increased marketing efforts. The increase in
margins that we observe may be part of a broader trend that continues in
the period one year after bankruptcy reform; potentially a lagging result
of the increase in advertisement the previous year. Regrettably, the data
available do not allow us to corroborate these suppositions.
As a ﬁnal note, we brieﬂy discuss the potential welfare effects of
bankruptcy reform vis-à-vis PSLs. Our data do not allow us to draw conclusions about whether the expansion of credit was welfare-enhancing.
Robert Lawless and others have noted that a rapid expansion of credit
is usually correlated with increased bankruptcy ﬁlings.115 Comparing
PSLs to loans issued by nonproﬁt institutions, the CFPB found that
“more careful underwriting ([by nonproﬁts] relative to [PSL] lenders)
reduced default rates.”116 It is worth remembering, however, that in
terms of less-than-prime borrowers, the credit expansion we observe
was modest: the effect on the average credit score was the same as
applying for multiple credit cards within a short period.
Arguably, however, an expansion of credit is precisely what supporters of the special treatment for PSLs intended. As then Representative Lindsey Graham (R-SC) stated during the 1999 debates arguing for
the passage of the law:
There is a growing industry in the private sector. There is a $1.25
billion loan volume for where private lenders who will loan money
to students for their college expenses as the federally guaranteed
program does not in every occasion meet the needs of the student,
and we are trying to give the private lender the same protection
under bankruptcy that the federally guaranteed loan program has
and nonproﬁt organizations have. We are trying to make sure
they are [sic] available loans, loans are available to students to
meet their ﬁnancial needs, and this would have a beneﬁcial effect,
make sure that the loan volume necessary to take care of college
expenses are available for students . . . 117

The congressional record is bare of any other explanations for the
purpose of the special treatment of PSLs. John Pottow has theorized
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that nondischargeability can be justiﬁed “as an attempt to make private
loans ‘cheaper’ for students” and to create a “a robust private lending
market . . . a bountiful capital supply available for loans.”118
A bountiful capital supply was indeed available for loans immediately after BAPCPA, although the capital supply disappeared almost as
quickly as it had appeared. After growing 20 percent per year between
2005 and 2007, PSL originations in our sample peaked at $10.1 billion and dropped to pre-2005 levels in 2010–2011.119 Of course, other
intervening factors likely played a role here, the Great Recession and
credit crunch in particular. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a
law’s purported positive effects (increasing availability of credit) may
be short lived, while its potential negative ones (nondischargeability in
bankruptcy) continue on.
The increase in the risk premium lenders charge for a loan, on the
other hand, does not seem welfare enhancing to borrowers. A 35-basispoint increase in the price of a $10,000 15-year loan can translate to an
added cost to the borrower of almost $25 per year or $365 over the life
of the loan.120 This increase becomes more signiﬁcant when one considers that the lenders in the sample made an additional 10,358 loans in the
postperiod. If we take our $25 per year increase as an average for all
loans, this would mean that BAPCPA may have cost student borrowers
an additional $382,950 per year in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006.121

CONCLUSION
The 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were a watershed
moment almost a decade in the making. Proponents of bankruptcy
reform blamed rapidly rising bankruptcy ﬁlings on strategic consumers using the Bankruptcy Code to escape their debts. They argued
that reform was necessary to prevent strategic borrower behavior and
reduce the cost of consumer credit. Opponents of the proposed bankruptcy reforms pointed to the dearth of data supporting the strategic
consumer story and instead cited behavioral experiments establishing
consumers’ less-than-perfect rationality and empirical evidence that
the majority of bankruptcy ﬁlers had very low income and few assets.
Opponents predicted that there would be no discernible change in the
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cost of consumer credit or loan volumes. In this chapter, we developed
and tested theoretical models predicting the effects of the part of the law
change on PSLs granted to students at four-year undergraduate institutions.122 Using a unique data set of PSL originations before and after the
law change, we tested those predictions using OLS regression, BlinderOaxaca, matching, and DD methods.
Some of our ﬁndings are unsurprising: the law change caused a
moderate expansion of credit for less creditworthy borrowers, although
the average borrower credit score decreased only slightly in practical terms. Loan volumes also tripled; we attribute 60 percent of that
increase to the law change. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, we
ﬁnd that the overall cost of private student loans at four-year undergraduate institutions increased by an average of 35 basis points as a
result of the law change. We posit that the larger cost may have been
driven by increased demand for PSLs from students as a result of lender
advertising. We speculate that the increased marketing may have started
before BAPCPA.
Our analysis so far suggests that this is a story about distributions—
that is, that certain students may have seen an increase in the cost of
their loans and others might have seen a decrease. In future work, we
intend to investigate the variation in credit quality and margins to see
whether the effect of BAPCPA was different across types of schools
(e.g., higher versus lower prestige); types of borrowers (e.g., prime versus subprime); or types of loans (e.g., those marketed through the school
versus those marketed directly to the consumer).123 We expect that this
will give us a more complete picture of the effects of BAPCPA.124
Notes
This chapter conforms generally to the Bluebook legal style of citation. For the latest
edition, see The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, 19th ed. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Law Review Association, 2010).
1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
2. In 1999 and 2000, the House and Senate passed bills that were vetoed by President
Clinton. Clinton vetoes bankruptcy bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/121900/upd_075-5725.shtml; 145 Cong.
Rec. H2655-02 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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3. For more information on the history and motivation of BAPCPA, see Susan
Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1483 (2006).
4. Id. at 1562.
5. See, e.g., Section 439A of the Higher Education Act, codiﬁed at 20 U.S.C. 1087-3
(1976); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1979) (Pub.L. 96-56, § 3 (1979)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)
(8) (1990) (see Pub.L. 101-647, § 3621(1) (1990)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1998)
(see Pub.L. 105-244, § 971(a) (1998)).
6. The ﬁrst policy prescribes that similarly situated creditors not receive an advantage
over others—sometimes termed “equity is equality”—for our purposes, unsecured
creditors are all asked to share the loss equally. The second policy prescribes that
the debtor should exit bankruptcy unshackled from the debts that were weighing
down her economic productivity, or in bankruptcy parlance, that the debtor receive
a “fresh start,” or a discharge of her debts. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle
R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of
the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 UNIV. OF CIN. L. REV. 405, 413-419 (2005)
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey (2005)]; National Bankruptcy Review Commission,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 179 (1997), available at http://govinfo
.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.pdf.
7. An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy in the United States, 30 Stat.
544 Section 17 (July 1, 1898). Exceptions to discharge have also been added for
various kinds of fraud or false representations or violations of the law. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(9), (a)(11), (a)(12), (a)(13) & (a)(19). Many
are also concerned with excepting taxes or duties owed to a state or federal entity.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1), (a)(7), (a)(11), (a)(12), (a)(14), (a)(14A), (a)
(17), (a)(18) & (a)(19). The stated reason for the change here was the possibility
for fraud and strategic ﬁling by debtors seeking to start their postgraduation career
without any student loans.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), (a)(15). 108 Cong. Rec. H156 (2004) (statement of Rep.
Cantor). Senator Sessions also stated that the bill would “also provide[ ] tremendous beneﬁts for women and children.” 109 Cong. Rec. S1915 (2005) (statement
of Sen. Sessions).
9. What are the main differences between federal student loans and private student
loans? CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 26, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/545/what-are-main-differences-between-federal-studentloans-and-private-student-loans.html.
10. In our sample, 80 percent of student borrowers in Q1 2005 applied with a coborrower. That proportion had risen slightly to 82 percent in Q1 2006. Federal loans
have no cosigners, but Federal PLUS Loans are available to parents of undergraduates who qualify for federal loans.
11. See Appendix Figure 1 at page 96 of the CFPB PSL REPORT for a graphical representation of the various indices used to calculate PSL interest rates from 2004–
2012. Most federal loans are ﬁxed rate. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STU-
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Private-Student-Loans.pdf [hereinafter CFPB PSL REPORT].
Id. at 12. By comparison, rates for federal student loans that did not require
cosigners in 2011 were either 4.5 percent or 6.8 percent ﬁxed, depending on the
type of loan. A 4.5 percent ﬁxed rate was available for undergraduate students taking out a subsidized Stafford Loan; 6.8 percent was available for undergraduate
unsubsidized Stafford Loans and for graduate student subsidized and unsubsidized
Stafford Loans. FinAid, Historical Interest Rates, http://www.ﬁnaid.org/loans/
historicalrates.phtml. The federal loan program has had multiple instances where
loans were offered as variable rates but has always had a cap of 8.25 percent APR
for Stafford Loans and 9 percent for PLUS Loans. Id.
Federally insured Stafford Loans issued by banks were also securitized during this
time period. CFPB report at 17-18. For an explanation of asset-backed securitization, see CFPB report at 104.
There was no “consumer rebate.”
Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.consumerﬁnance.gov/newsroom/
student-debt-swells-federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion.
Income-Based Plan | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
For a full list, see Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness
-cancellation#death-discharge (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
Id. at 10.
Department of Education, Default Rates: Cohort Default Rates 2005-09, http://
ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/010512DefaultRates20052009.html.
CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 64-65.
Id. at 64.
Id.
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1035, Pub. L.
111-203 (2010).
Pardo & Lacey, supra n. 6, at 427; see id. at note 112 and 113 for citations to illustrative cases.
The GAO found that despite a general default rate on educational loans of 18 percent, less than 0.75 percent of all education loans were discharged in bankruptcy.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 132 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6094.
The GAO also found that the majority of students were not ﬁling for bankruptcy
immediately upon graduation. The average time between when a student obtained
a loan and when they ﬁled for bankruptcy in the GAO sample was 41 months.
Id. at 6103-04. In addition, lucrative careers were not signiﬁcantly represented
among those who sought to discharge their student loans. While 72 percent of the
individuals who discharged student loans in the GAO sample were employed, the
top occupations were teacher (10 percent), clerk (8 percent), salesman (6 percent),
housewife (5 percent), and student (4.5 percent). Id. Also, the individuals seeking
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the protection of the bankruptcy laws were not particularly well off. The average
earnings for the individuals studied for the year prior to ﬁling for bankruptcy were
$5,361 in 1977 dollars ($20,787.42 today). Id. at 6105.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005).
The design of bankruptcy protections for student loans has clear welfare implications: in 2011, Felicia Ionescu modeled the effect of alternative bankruptcy
regimes for federal student loans under uncertainty about college completion and
future earnings, and concluded that nondischargeability beneﬁts high ability, low
income students, and that welfare effects differ by bankruptcy regime. Felicia
Ionescu. Risky Human Capital and Alternative Bankruptcy Regimes for Student
Loans, 5 J. HUMAN CAPITAL 153 (2011).
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 154-55 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6115-16 (section 439A, effective September 30, 1977). Representative Edwards
advised that “[i]f the exception to discharge is to be enacted, we must provide for
a more deﬁnite standard that will not encourage forum shopping.” Id. That, unfortunately, did not happen.
See Higher Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-482 § 439, 90 Stat. 2081
(Oct. 12, 1976)(section 439A, effective September 30, 1977); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(8) (1979) (Pub.L. 96-56, § 3 (1979)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1990) (see Pub.L. 101647, § 3621(1) (1990)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (1998) (see Pub.L. 105-244, § 971(a)
(1998)); 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2005) (see Pub.L. 109-8, § 220 (2005)). For an
empirical account of undue hardship determinations made by bankruptcy courts
arguing that the legal outcomes in the determination of undue hardship can be best
explained by “differing judicial perceptions of how the same standard applies to
similarly situated debtors,” see Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 486.
Brunner v. N. Y. State Higher Educ. Servcs. Corp., 831 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
This is a three-part test; the debtor is required to meet all parts:
(1) That the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses,
a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to
repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this
state of affairs is likely to persist for a signiﬁcant portion of the repayment
period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor had made good faith
efforts to repay the loan.

Id. at 396. At least one court has referred to the standard as the “certainty of hopelessness.” Daniel A. Austin, Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy: An Empirical
Assessment at 5 (May 27, 2014)(forthcoming Suffolk U. L. R.), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442312 (quoting In re Roberson,
999 F. 2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993)). Note, however, that recently some courts seem to
be relaxing the standard. Id.
31. See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001; Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J.
495, 496 (2012).
32. United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
33. In other words, the loans continue to accrue interest and fees while the individual
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is in bankruptcy and she is still liable for all that the contract obligates her to pay
even after she receives her bankruptcy discharge.
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 504-05.
Id. Using a different sampling protocol drawing from cases between 2005 and
2013 in 10 judicial districts, Daniel Austin estimates that less than 0.33 percent of
individuals with student loans seek to discharge them in bankruptcy. See Austin,
supra n. 30, at 5.
Pardo and Lacey’s 2005 study offered the very ﬁrst empirical evidence of outcomes in undue hardship cases. The study suffered from serious limitations, since
it was based on published judicial opinions, rare and nonrandom events in themselves, and was composed of only cases that went to trial and produced a published opinion. Not all trials produce a published opinion and not all attempts to
discharge student debt go to trial. Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6. Their 2009
study examined a data set of 115 student-loan discharge proceedings—for both
private and federal loans—that were ﬁled between 2002 and 2006 in the Western
District of Washington. Rafael I. Pardo and Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student
Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L. J. 179,
200 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey (2009)].
See Iuliano, supra note 31, 509 (mean age 49 and median 48.5); Pardo & Lacey
(2005), supra note 6, at 442-43 (mean 41.5, median 41); Pardo & Lacey (2009),
supra note 36, at 204 (mean: 45; median not reported).
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 508 (68 percent unmarried, 46 percent had dependents);
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 445-47 (62 percent unmarried, 56 percent
had dependents); Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 204 (80 percent unmarried, 38 percent had dependents).
See Iuliano, supra note 31, at 508 (60 percent of discharge seekers were employed
versus 81 percent of the overall bankruptcy population); Pardo & Lacey (2009),
supra note 36, at 204 (58 percent were employed).
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 511.
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 474 (mean: $47,137); Iuliano, supra note
31, at 510 (mean: $80,746). See also Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 207
(mean: $76,139).
Iuliano, supra note 6, at 518 (52 percent); Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36,
at 204 (55 percent).
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6, at 477.
Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra note 36, at 184.
Iuliano, supra note 31, at 505. Most of those discharges came about as a result of
a settlement with a student loan creditor (56 cases or 69 percent of all debtors who
obtained relief). Only in 22 percent of cases in which a debtor obtained a partial
discharge or more did the bankruptcy judge make a determination that the debtors
satisﬁed the undue hardship standard. Id. at 512.
Pardo & Lacey (2005), supra note 6.
Id. at 433.
Pardo & Lacey (2009), supra n. 36, at 185.
Mark Krantowitz, FINAID.ORG, IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY EXCEPTION FOR PRIVATE
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50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.
58.

59.

60.
61.

62.
63.

STUDENT LOANS ON PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN AVAILABILITY (Aug. 14, 2007), http://
www.ﬁnaid.org/educators/20070814pslFICOdistribution.pdf.
Id. at 2.
Krantowitz’s data came from PSLs included in the prospectuses of asset backed
securitizations (student loan asset backed securities, or SLABs for short) done
between 2002 and 2007. Krantowitz, supra note 49 at 1. One issue with Krantowitz’s analysis is that one of the SLABs examined included loans that may have
been nondischargeable before BAPCPA because of the involvement of a nonproﬁt
entity. In the case of one of the SLABs examined in the report, First Marblehead, the loans were guaranteed by The Education Resources Institute, or TERI,
a national nonproﬁt. Id. at 5. It is not entirely unclear that these loans would have
been nondischargeable prior to BAPCPA, id., but the uncertainty can also cloud
the results
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5. The report noted that the prospectuses for the SLABs examined did not
disclose any change in underwriting criteria for loans originated after BAPCPA.
Id.
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3, at 1511-14. See also Marquette Nat’l Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
Id. at 1484 (citing 151 CONG. REC. S1813, S 1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Hatch insisting that there is a “bankruptcy tax” of “$400-a-year
on every household in the country,” which could amount to a “mortgage or a rent
payment” for many families).
Id.
Id. citing Posting of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.beckerposner-blog.com (Mar. 27, 2005, 02:20 PM) (“If bankruptcy is more costly, there
will be less of it.”).
In other words, r can be thought of as the present discounted value of the ﬂow of
payments made by a borrower who follows the repayment schedule. Therefore,
for a given loan term and conditions, a higher value of r implies a higher interest
rate for borrowers.
This includes partially paid loans for which the remaining outstanding balance is
sent to collections.
“To model decision-making under uncertainty, almost all game theory uses the
theories of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and of Savage (1972). That is,
if the consequence function is stochastic and known to the decision-maker . . . then
the decisionmaker is assumed to behave as if he maximizes the expected value of
a [utility] function . . .” Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game
Theory 5 (1994).
We would expect BAPCPA to diminish the opportunity for strategic default, even
if there was rampant strategic behavior pre-BAPCPA.
Note that neither the shift in demand nor supply need be parallel. Consider the
dz
– is a function of r, so shifts
case where v̂(z,r) = v(kz,r) where k is a constant. Then dk
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64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

do not have to be parallel. It follows from Equation 7.3 that shifts in supply also
do not have to be parallel.
Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
This assumption is based on our informal understandings of the market. More
research is needed.
A number of scholars have argued that the Stiglitz-Weiss model is no longer applicable in a world of sophisticated credit scoring models, and “big data” number
crunching lenders can differentiate between good and bad risks and thus can price
products according to risk. Risk-based pricing is very much alive in the context
of PSLs and can be seen in our data. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3 and
Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1255 (2002).The rise of the
securitization market has also been cited as a reason why credit rationing may no
longer occur as in the Stiglitz-Weiss model, given that there is more capital available to lenders. See generally Engel and McCoy. In any event, the Stiglitz-Weiss
model predictions are very similar to the competition model above. The primary
difference is that the Stiglitz-Weiss model predicts that loan pricing (lender margins) should remain the same for originations after the law change.
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3.
Students may be unaware of the law change or what it means for their private
student loans or they may suffer from a number of other behavioral biases other
than present bias, such as optimism bias or probability neglect. Cass Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L. J. 61 (2002).
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3 at 1562.
We consider the Block-Lieb hypothesis to be a distinct model even though it can
be described as a subset of the CP model.
CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11.
Id. at 7. “The participating lenders included: RBS Citizens N.A., Discover Financial Services, The First Marblehead Corporation, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
PNC Bank, N.A., Sallie Mae, Inc., SunTrust Banks, Inc., U.S. Bank National
Association, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A..” Id. at 109.
Most of the PSLs in the data set had variable interest rates that varied according
to an index, such as LIBOR or the Prime Rate. The “margin” on those loans is the
premium “added to the current index value to determine the total interest rate for
the loan. The margin is set at the time of origination and varies based on the credit
worthiness of a borrower. This variation in margin value is one way that a creditor
might establish ‘risk-based’ pricing.” Id. at 108.
Details of this merge are described id. at 93-95.
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System – About IPEDS, INSTITUTE
OF EDUCATION SCIENCES, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/about/ (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
Id.
Postsecondary Education Participants System (PEPS) homepage, FED. STUDENT
AID, http://www2.ed.gov/ofﬁces/OSFAP/PEPS/index.html (accessed Apr. 11,
2014).
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78. “Title IV” refers to the part of the Higher Education Act of 1965 that covers
the administration of federal ﬁnancial aid programs. Title IV Program Volume
Reports | Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/
data-center/student/title-iv (accessed Apr. 11, 2014). The Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) was in effect from 1965–2010 and was a publicprivate partnership whereby private lenders would originate federal loans. It was
eliminated in 2010 when it was projected it would save $68 billion over 11 years.
Tracey D. Samuelson, Student Loan Reform: What Will It Mean For Students?
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2010/0330/Student-loan-reform-What-will-it-mean-for-students.
79. We do this because changes in the rules for federal loans might lead to changes
in the demand for federal student loans or PSLs not due to BAPCPA and it would
be impossible to disentangle them. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.
Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 27, 2006), http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/
GEN0605.pdf (accessed June 6, 2014).
80. ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2.
81. Editorial, Banks Win, You Lose, Wilmington Star-News, Mar. 10, 2005, at 8A. But
see Michele Heller, Bankruptcy Bill Backers Not Quite Ready to Party, AMERICAN
BANKER, Apr. 1, 2005.
82. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub.L. 109–8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
83. To the extent that lenders made changes to their underwriting criteria in anticipation of the law taking effect, the effects that we report should be interpreted as
smaller than the true effect.
84. While the lender data also contain information about the initial interest rate disclosed to the borrower, the salient measure to lenders is their returns from the loan
net of their cost of funding, which is more closely described by the margin over
the index, since the index is likely chosen to correspond to the index of the source
of funding.
85. Discussions with industry participants suggest that private student loans over the
2005–2011 period were underwritten based on the highest credit score among borrowers and coborrowers.
86. The constant is subsumed in Xi.
87. See Alan S. Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates, 8 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 436 (1973); Ronald Oaxaca, Wage Differentials in
Urban Labor Markets, 14 INT’L ECON. REV. 693 (1973).
88. This group is an analogue to the minority group in the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition.
89. Ronald Oaxaca & Michael Ransom, Identiﬁcation in Detailed Wage Decompositions, 81 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 154 (1999).
90. Paul Rosenbaum & Daniel Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in
Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41 (1983).
91. Id.
92. Support is deﬁned in the statistical sense; the common support is the set of covariate values that are in the distribution of covariate variables of both the treated and
control group.
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93. See Trends in Student Aid, 2013. College Board. http://trends.collegeboard.org/
sites/default/ﬁles/student-aid-2013-full-report.pdf (accessed June 3, 2014).
94. See Title IV Program Volume Reports: Federal Student Aid, FED. STUDENT AID,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/title-iv (accessed Apr. 11, 2014).
95. For example, during the sample period the annual Stafford Loan limits were
$2,625 for dependent freshmen, $3,500 for dependent sophomores, and $5,500
for upperclassmen. PLUS Loans were limited to cost of attendance minus the
expected family contribution. Borrowers qualify for subsidized Stafford Loans
based on ﬁnancial need.
96. See Appendix 7A for additional detail.
97. See generally Steve Pischke, Lecture Notes on Measurement Error (Spring
2007), http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/spischke/ec524/Merr_new.pdf (accessed July
27, 2014).
98. School ﬁxed effect is simply a dummy variable for each school. Sample sizes
may increase between speciﬁcations 2 and 3 because the school ﬁxed effect is
from the lender data sample, whereas the school type is from the merge with the
PEPs data, and tuition and fees are imputed from the merge with IPEDS.
99. This is obtained from subtracting 100 percent from the 274.3 percent marginal
effect.
100. As above, we attribute the change to a change in underwriting standards for
a given type of students, to the effect due to coefﬁcients in a Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition.
101. This corresponds to a coefﬁcient on postperiod of 1.233. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation yields that 92 percent of the threefold increase in PSL origination
volume in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 can be explained by the law change.
102. It is also important to note that we do not observe changes in school aid.
103. Parent PLUS loans in this period were ﬁxed at 4.17 percent in the 2004–2005 academic year and 6.10 percent in the 2005–2006 academic year for credit-worthy
parents, whereas PSLs offered were typically variable rate loans and had initial
rates of as much as 19 percent for the riskiest borrowers. See Interest Rates on
the Federal PLUS Loan, PARENTPLUSLOAN.COM, http://www.parentplusloan.com/
plus-loans/plus-loan-interest-rate.php (accessed June 9, 2014).
104. At the same time, PSL asset-backed securities (PSLABS) also increase two-fold,
going from just under $8 billion to over $16 billion dollars between 2005 and
2006. CFPB PLS REPORT, supra note 34, at 18.
105. H0 predicted that none of the outcomes of interest would change, but we found
that they all did.
106. Non-GSA Mortgage-related ABS issuances peaked in 2003 at over $3.2 billion.
That peak was followed by a drop to $2.3 billion in 2004 and slight recovery to
$2.7 billion in 2005. US Mortgage-Related Securities Issuance and Outstanding
(xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3,
2014), http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014).
GSA backed securities also peaked in 2003 at 2.8 billion. US Agency Mortgage
Securities Issuance and Outstanding (xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014).
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107. One possible indication of this is the low percentage of PSLs that are ever
involved in a bankruptcy. While we only have data for 2005 onwards, in 2005 less
than 0.4 percent of all outstanding loans were in bankruptcy. CFPB PSL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 64.
108. US ABS Issuance and Outstanding (xls), SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA) (June 3, 2014), http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx (accessed June 11, 2014).
109. We are not aware of any signiﬁcant legal changes between Q1 2006 and Q1 2007
that would affect our sample. In particular, federal loan interest rates and amount
caps remained the same during this time period.
110. Ideally, we’d also like to look at the period before 2005, but unfortunately, we do
not have that data.
111. See, e.g., SLC Student Loan Trust 2005-3 at S-19, The Student Loan Corporation (Dec. 1, 2005), available at https://www.navient.com/assets/about/investors/
debtasset/SLC-Loan-Trusts/2005-3/20054.pdf (6 months) (accessed June 11,
2014); SLM Student Loan Trust 2003-14 at S-43, Sallie Mae Servicing (Nov. 6,
2003), available at https://www.navient.com/assets/about/investors/debtasset/
SLM-Loan-Trusts/01-05/2003-14/200314.pdf (3 months) (accessed June 11,
2014).
112. CFPB PSL Report, supra note 11, at 18. Unfortunately, we do not have data
before 2004.
113. See Andrea Murad and Jeffrey Prackup, Private Student Loan ABS Tutorial,
FITCH RATINGS 2 (“The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 codiﬁes this treatment by broadly deﬁning an education loan under
the bankruptcy code to include all education loans made to borrowers or to parents of borrowers attending Title IV eligible institutions. This treatment aids lenders in collecting on private loans and results in higher recoveries relative to other
unsecured consumer loans.”), available at http://www.ihep.org/assets/ﬁles/gcfpﬁles/Private_Student_Loan_ABS_Tutorial.pdf (accessed June 12, 2014).
114. We cannot isolate all possible causal factors and run our analyses in a vacuum,
but to the extent policymakers cannot pass laws in a vacuum either, it is valuable
to understand the effect of the law.
115. See Bob Lawless, One More Time, with Feelings, CREDITSLIPS (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/08/one-more-time-with-feeling.html;
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 3.
116. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 30. The CFPB also found that default rate
for nonproﬁt institution loans were “approximately half of their for-proﬁt market
counterparts.” Id.
117. 145 Cong. Rec., supra note 2. (statement of Rep. Graham).
118. In other words,
[i]f an otherwise dischargeable unsecured debt is rendered nondischargeable by the law, then the bankruptcy-state scenario regarding that debt
becomes worse for the debtor (it does not go away) and better for the
lender (it does not go away). In a world of competitive, zero-proﬁt lend-
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ing markets, this increased payoff for the lender must be translated ex ante
into an improved cost of capital for the borrower.
Furthermore, we might also expect, in “a robust private lending market . . .
[to ﬁnd] a bountiful capital supply available for loans.” John A. E. Pottow,
The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. BUS. L. J. 245, 262 (2006).
119. CFPB PSL REPORT, supra note 11, at 17.
120. Assuming the loan would have been at 8 percent but instead was at 8.3 percent.
121. This calculation is incredibly simpliﬁed, but it was computed by multiplying the
$25/year additional cost by the number of PSLs originated in Q1 2006 (15,318).
122. We consider the Block-Lieb hypothesis to be a distinct model even though it can
be described as a subset of the CP model.
123. We intend to apply techniques that take the distribution of borrower characteristics into account, including quantile regression, the DiNardo, Fortin, Lemieux
decomposition. John DiNardo, et al., Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973–1992: A Semiparametric Approach, 64 ECONOMETRICA 1001
(1996).
124. There is another avenue of further research. This chapter focuses on undergraduates at four-year institutions. Given the diversity of educational options available,
such as two-year schools, certiﬁcate programs, and postgraduate education of
various kinds, another extension of this work would be to consider the effects of
BAPCPA on loans in these other educational markets.
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Appendix 7A
Tables
Table 7A.1 Loan-Level OLS Analysis, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006
(1)
Maximum FICO score
Post
N
R2
Margin
Post
N
R2
Original balance
Post

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

−5.825*** −5.890*** −5.262***
(0.0811)
(0.0752)
(0.679)
19,759
19,759
20,170
0.013
0.083
0.192
0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0033***
(4.5e-05) (4.5e-05) (0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00022)
19,759
19,759
20,170
20,170
20,170
0.042
0.042
0.200
0.327
0.389
1,326***
(16.68)
19,759
0.0159

1,325***
(16.88)
19,759
0.0161

1,268***
(104.7)
20,170
0.181

1,198***
(104.1)
20,170
0.186

1,189***
(103.6)
20,170
0.187

N
R2
Controls
Tuition and fees
X
X
Year in school
X
X
X
X
X
School type
X
X
Has a coborrower
X
X
X
Maximum FICO score
X
Spline of maximum
X
FICO score
School ﬁxed effects
X
X
X
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Each cell
corresponds to a separate regression. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the ﬁrst
quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point intervals.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and
PEPS.
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Table 7A.2 Loan-Level Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions, Q1 2005 and
Q1 2006
(1)
Before BAPCPA
After BAPCPA
Difference
Endowments
Coefﬁcients
Interactions

Before BAPCPA
After BAPCPA
Difference
Endowments
Coefﬁcients
Interactions

Before BAPCPA
After BAPCPA
Difference
Endowments

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 226

(2)

720.4***
(0.654)
715.0***
(0.388)
5.439***
(0.761)
−0.329***
(0.0941)
5.967***
(0.761)
−0.199*
(0.113)

(3)
(4)
Panel A: Max FICO
720.4***
720.3***
(0.654)
(0.706)
715.0***
715.0***
(0.388)
(0.402)
5.439***
5.377***
(0.761)
(0.812)
−0.398*
−0.939
(0.219)
(1.200)
6.018***
1.058
(0.726)
(4.741)
−0.181
5.257
(0.117)
(4.840)

11,171***
(42.67)
11,183***
(37.65)
−12.11
(56.90)
−18.66*
(10.53)
−7.194
(56.12)
13.75***
(4.836)

Panel B: Original balance
11,171***
11,221
11,221
(42.67)
(0)
(0)
11,183***
11,288
11,288
(37.65)
(0)
(0)
−12.11
−66.82
−66.82
(56.91)
(0)
(0)
−13.41
−399.4
−255.1
(10.85)
(0)
(0)
−11.60
112.4
174.2
(56.07)
(0)
(0)
12.91***
220.2
14.03
(4.902)
(0)
(0)

(5)

11,221***
(42.15)
11,288***
(37.05)
−66.82
(56.12)
−116.2***
(10.06)
32.94
(56.32)
16.39
(11.01)

Panel C: Margins
0.0436*** 0.0436***
0.0436
0.0436
0.0436***
(6.40e−05) (6.40e−05)
(0)
(0)
(6.32e−05)
0.0469*** 0.0469***
0.0470
0.0470
0.0470***
(5.31e−05) (5.31e−05)
(0)
(0)
(5.26e−05)
−0.00335***−0.00335*** −0.00347
−0.00347 −0.00347***
(8.31e−05) (8.31e−05)
(0)
(0)
(8.22e−05)
−8.05e−06 −1.41e−05 −0.000660 −0.00127 −0.00110***
(1.12e−05) (1.16e−05)
(0)
(0)
(4.47e−05)
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Table 7A.2 (continued)
(1)
Coefﬁcients
Interactions
Controls
Tuition and fees
Year in school
School type
Has a coborrower
Maximum FICO
score
Spline of maximum
FICO score
School ﬁxed effects

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Panel C: Margins (continued)
−0.00336***−0.00336*** −0.00289
−0.00247 −0.00256***
(8.24e−05) (8.24e−05)
(0)
(0)
(7.32e−05)
2.49e−05***2.48e−05*** 8.36e−05
0.000276 0.000194***
(7.18e−06) (7.28e−06)
(0)
(0)
(1.96e−05)
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to four-year
undergraduates in the ﬁrst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-year intervals.
Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of residence.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and
PEPS.
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Table 7A.3 Loan-Level Propensity Score Matching, Q1 2005 and Q1 2006
(1)

Unmatched
Average treatment
on the treated

Unmatched
Average treatment
on the treated

(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel A: Maximum FICO score
−5.439
−5.439
−5.189
(0.777)*** (0.777)*** (0.784)***
−4.971
−3.458
−4.225
(1.585)*** (1.402)*** (1.376)***

(5)

Panel B: Margin
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.003
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***

Panel C: Original balance
1371.186 1371.1853
1352.15
1352.147
1352.147
(125.50)*** (125.50)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)*** (127.05)***
Average treatment 1272.251
1120.066
1425.717
1303.748
1157.226
on the treated (240.41)*** (213.86)*** (214.30)*** (168.91)*** (170.74)***
Unmatched

Number of observations
Untreated
4,828
Treated
14,931
Controls
Tuition and fees
x
Year in school
x
School type
x
Has a coborrower
Maximum FICO
score
Spline of maximum
FICO score
School ﬁxed
effects

4,828
14,931
x
x
x
x

4,838
13,634

4,838
13,634

4,838
13,634

x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Restricted to fouryear undergraduates in the ﬁrst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Spline of FICO scores in 20-point
intervals. Propensity scores calculated using probit regression. Nearest neighbor matching with
replacement. Tuition and fees calculated based on IPEDS data and student’s reported state of
residence.

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, and
PEPS.
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Table 7A.4 Private Student Loan Volumes at the School Level, Q1 2005
and Q1 2006
(1)

Post

Difference

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A: OLS
0.546*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 0.820*** 1.008*** 1.009***
(0.169)
(0.174)
(0.174)
(0.108) (0.0829) (0.0811)
1.726
1.603
1.603
2.270
2.740
2.743

0.541***
(0.178)
1.718
Difference due to –0.00419
endowments
(0.0484)
0.996
Difference due to 0.546***
coefﬁcients
(0.170)
1.726
Difference due to 0.000748
interactions
(0.00896)
0.999

(2)

Panel B: Oaxaca decomposition
0.436** 0.590*** 0.744***
(0.182)
(0.165)
(0.222)
1.547
1.804
2.104
0.00179
–0.135
−0.0761
(0.0489) (0.113)
(0.180)
1.002
0.835
0.927
0.492*** 0.873*** 0.974***
(0.184)
(0.103)
(0.154)
1.636
2.394
2.649
–0.0581 –0.148*
−0.153
(0.0857) (0.0825) (0.144)
0.944
0.862
0.858

0.590***
(0.183)
1.804
−0.292**
(0.138)
0.747
1.069***
(0.0777)
2.912
−0.187**
(0.0757)
0.829

0.590***
(0.180)
1.804
−0.289**
(0.136)
0.749
1.072***
(0.0748)
2.921
−0.193**
(0.0769)
0.824

Panel C: Propensity score matching
Average treatment 0.993*** 1.016*** 1.146*** 1.141*** 1.148*** 1.148***
on the treated (0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0412) (0.0413)
2.699
2.762
3.146
3.130
3.152
3.152
Controls
Tuition and fees
x
x
x
x
x
x
Graduation rate
x
x
x
x
x
Carnegie
x
x
x
x
classiﬁcation
ln(full-time equivalent
x
x
x
students)
HBCU, HSI
x
% black, % Hispanic
x
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in
italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the ﬁrst quarters of 2005 and 2006. Marginal
effects calculated by exponentiating estimated coefﬁcients. Outcome is natural log of PSL borrowers in the lender data.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title
IV Program Volume Reports.
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Table 7A.5 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effects of
BAPCPA on Loan Volumes and Original Balances, Q1
2005 and Q1 2006
Outcome

Loan volumes
ln(originations)

Control group
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Stafford
Stafford All Stafford PLUS Loans All federal
subsidized unsubsidized Loans
loans
loans
loans
0.491***
(0.0210)
1.634
0.471***
(0.0209)
1.602

0.450***
(0.0231)
1.568
0.434***
(0.0231)
1.543

0.487***
(0.0207)
1.627
0.467***
(0.0206)
1.595

641.6*** 647.5*** 624.5***
(163.5)
(159.9)
(161.2)
ln(original balance) 0.0544*** 0.0451*** 0.0450***
(0.0153)
(0.0151)
(0.0148)
1.056
1.570
1.046

−120.7*
(68.55)
-0.0143*
(0.00843)
0.986

542.9***
(143.1)
0.0330***
(0.0117)
1.034

ln(borrowers)

Average loan size
Original balance

0.512***
(0.0210)
1.669
0.491***
(0.0208)
1.634

0.459***
(0.0215)
1.582
0.438***
(0.0214)
1.550

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal
effects in italics. Restricted to four-year undergraduates in the ﬁrst quarters of 2005
and 2006. Marginal effects calculated by exponentiated estimated coefﬁcients. Note
that program effects on loan size may be biased downward.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CFPB private student loan data, IPEDS, PEPS, and Title
IV Program Volume Reports.
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Appendix 7B
Bias in Difference-in-Differences Estimates
Suppose that the outcome equation for federal loans is determined by the
following equation and that yi* is bounded above by y max
yi* = f(xi ) + εi
ݕ ൌ ൜
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തതതതതതቁ, can be written as
Then the observed mean ﬁrst difference, ቀݕ


*
a function of the uncensored loan amount, bi function, and the maximum loan
amount allowable.
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So when we take difference-in-differences when the outcome for private
loans is not censored (i.e., bi = bi*), the estimate δ̂ of program effect δ is biased
downwards.
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We do not observe ݕ כ ݕ, so we cannot estimate the magnitude of the
bias.
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Appendix 7C
Stiglitz-Weiss Analysis
This appendix contains the relevant theorems, notation, and equations
from Stiglitz and Weiss’s 1981 paper. For ease of discussion, we retain Stiglitz
and Weiss’s numbering.
Each project, indexed by θ, is assumed to have a probability distribution
of gross return R. The distribution of returns is denoted F(R,θ) and the density
of returns is denoted f(R,θ). Higher values of θ correspond to higher levels of
risk in the sense of mean-preserving spreads, i.e., for θ 1 > θ 2
ஶ

ஶ

න ܴ݂ሺܴǡ ߠଵ ሻܴ݀ ൌ න ܴ݂ሺܴǡ ߠଶ ሻܴ݀


then for y ≥ 0,
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An individual who borrows amount B at interest rate r̂ repays his loan if
R > B(1 + r̂ ). Note that this is a simpliﬁcation from the Stiglitz-Weiss model as
there is no term for collateral, since student loans are unsecured. The return to
the creditor or bank is denoted ρ(R, r̂ ) = min (R,B(1 + r̂ )). Upper bars denote
means.
Theorem 1: For a given interest rate r̂ , there is a critical value θ̂ such that a ﬁrm
borrows from the bank if and only if θ > θ̂ .
Theorem 3: The expected return on a loan to a bank is a decreasing function
of the riskiness of the loan to the bank.
Theorem 5: Whenever ρ(r̂ ) has an interior mode, there exists supply functions
of funds such that competitive equilibrium entails credit rationing.
Corollary 1: As the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as there is
any credit rationing.
Equation (7.5): (Zero-proﬁt condition)
ஶ
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Private student loan borrowers are analogous to the ﬁrms in the model:
projects, or school-major choices, with different mean returns can be distinguished from each other—to the lender returns to education for individuals
in the same major at the same school are drawn from the same distribution.1
Private student loan borrowers with the same expected mean return differ from
each other in their risk parameter, which Stiglitz-Weiss denote θ, where risk is
increasing in θ. In the analysis below, we consider credit score a proxy for −θ,
since risk is decreasing in credit score. The BAPCPA reforms that effectively
made most loans nondischargeable in bankruptcy decrease the risk associated
with any given loan, which effectively increases the expected return to the
creditor, as described in Stiglitz and Weiss’s Theorem 3.2
Given the Stiglitz-Weiss model and the theories described in the paper, our
hypotheses for the effect of the change to the bankruptcy laws making private
student loans presumptively nondischargeable can be stated as follows:
•

H1—Loan pricing (that is, lender margins) should remain the same
for originations after the law change. Since the proﬁtability of a given
loan increases for creditors, following Theorem 3 the supply of credit
should increase.3 Assuming an interior mode for the return to the creditor of lending at a given interest rate, Theorem 5 implies that credit
rationing will still exist. Given these conditions, Corollary 1 states
that “as the supply of funds increases, the excess demand for funds
decreases, but the interest rate charged remains unchanged, so long as
there is credit rationing.”4

•

H2—Lenders should be willing to lend to borrowers with lower credit
quality than they were willing to lend before the law change. This is
essentially a decrease in the critical value θ̂, which Theorem 1 states
that an individual will borrow from the creditor if and only if the borrower’s value of θ exceeds θ.̂ 5

•

H3—Overall loan volumes should increase. This follows from the
argument presented for H1.

Appendix Notes
1. One can think of a choice of major at a particular school as an investment with
uncertain returns. For example, a freshman liberal arts student might know the
distribution of returns of liberal arts majors from his school but does not know
what his particular return will be ex ante.
2. See Stiglitz and Weiss supra note 64.
3. Theorems refer to theorems in Stiglitz and Weiss’s paper.
4. Id. at 398.
5. Consider Stiglitz and Weiss’s Equation (5). Id.
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Default and Repayment among
Baccalaureate Degree Earners
Lance J. Lochner
University of Western Ontario
Alexander Monge-Naranjo
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
Washington University in St. Louis
A growing number of college students in the United States borrow
thousands of dollars from public and private lenders to ﬁnance their
higher education, and an increasing portion of them have been defaulting on their obligations. Over the past decade, the total number of Stafford Loan borrowers has nearly doubled to 10.4 million recipients in
2011–2012. In recent years, undergraduates have borrowed more than
$70 billion annually in federal student loans. More ominously, student
loan default rates have risen continuously since 2005 after falling for
more than a decade. Three-year cohort default rates stand at 13.4 percent for students entering repayment in 2009. Among students from private for-proﬁt institutions, three-year default rates exceed 20 percent.1
Against this backdrop, there is growing concern that many students are
borrowing too much, especially in the wake of the Great Recession.
These developments have led to renewed interest in the design of federal student loan programs, including a reevaluation of student borrowing limits, interest rates, and income-contingent repayment schemes.
Unfortunately, much of this discussion is occurring amid scant systematic evidence on the determinants of student loan repayment and
default, especially for recent cohorts.
Dynarski (1994), Flint (1997), and Volkwein et al. (1998) study
the determinants of student loan default using nationally representative data from the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study that
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surveyed borrowers leaving school in the late 1970s and 1980s. Other
empirical studies have generally examined default behavior at speciﬁc
institutions or in individual states in the United States.2 Gross et al.
(2009) provide a review of this literature and conclude that factors such
as race, socioeconomic background, educational attainment, type of
postsecondary institution, student debt levels, and postschool earnings
are important determinants of default. Minorities, students from lowincome families, and college dropouts all tend to have higher default
rates, as do students attending two-year and for-proﬁt private institutions. Default is also more likely for those with high debt levels and low
postschool earnings.
We go beyond previous analyses of default to consider other important measures of student loan repayment and nonpayment that are likely
to be of greater interest to potential lenders (public or private). Most
lenders are concerned about the expected return on their investments,
although government lenders may have other objectives. While default
is a key factor affecting the expected returns on student loans, other factors can also be important. For example, government student loans offer
opportunities for loan deferment or forbearance, which temporarily
suspend payments.3 The timing of default and deferment/forbearance
can also inﬂuence returns to lenders. From the lender’s point of view,
it matters if a borrower defaults (without reentering repayment) immediately after leaving school or after ﬁve years of standard payments.
The discounted value of payments from the former is much lower than
from the latter. Similarly, the discounted present value of payments is
much lower for borrowers who defer payments for extended periods of
time than for those who do not. These simple examples suggest that the
credit-worthiness of different types of borrowers (based on their background or their schooling choices) depends on the expected payment
streams and not simply whether they had ever entered default or are
currently in default at some arbitrary survey date.
Unfortunately, an analysis of expected returns across different
types of borrowers is impossible given current data sources, since it
requires data on potential determinants of repayment and access to
full repayment histories. As far as we know, these data are not available. In this chapter, we use data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond
Longitudinal Studies (B&B) to analyze a number of different repayment and nonpayment measures that provide useful information about
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expected returns on student loans. As discussed further in the following section, the B&B follows a random sample of 1992–1993 U.S.
college graduates for 10 years and contains rich information about
the individual and family background of respondents, choice of college major and institution, student borrowing levels, postschool earnings, and loan repayment status (including outstanding balances) 5 and
10 years after graduation. We use the student loan records to compute
ﬁve different measures related to repayment and nonpayment of student loans 10 years after graduation: 1) the fraction of initial student
debt still outstanding; 2) an indicator for default status; 3) an indicator
for nonpayment status (includes default, deferment, and forbearance);
4) the fraction of initial debt that is in default; and 5) the fraction of
initial debt that is in nonpayment. We then study the determinants of
all of these repayment/nonpayment measures, focusing on the roles of
individual and family background factors, college major, postsecondary
institution characteristics, student debt levels, and postschool earnings.
We ﬁnd that many of the factors identiﬁed in earlier studies are important for our more recent sample of borrowers; however, the importance
of some factors depends on the measure of repayment or nonpayment
under consideration. We highlight a number of general lessons and open
questions arising from our results in the concluding section.

DATA: THE BACCALAUREATE AND BEYOND
LONGITUDINAL STUDY
We use the B&B to analyze patterns in student loan repayment and
default for college graduates up to 10 years after graduating. The B&B
was initially drawn as a subsample from the 1993 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, a nationally representative random sample of
all postsecondary students in the United States.4 More speciﬁcally, the
B&B has followed the roughly 16,000 respondents who received baccalaureate degrees in the 1992–1993 academic year through 2003. The
B&B uses data from three basic sources: 1) survey data in 1993, 1994,
1997, and 2003; 2) institutional records on college costs and ﬁnancial
aid; and 3) snapshots from student loan administrative records in 1998
and 2003. With extensive information about family background and
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demographic characteristics, student achievement as measured by SAT/
ACT scores, college-related outcomes (e.g., undergraduate major, institution attended, graduate school attendance, and postgraduate degrees),
labor market outcomes every few years, and student loan balances and
repayment status 5 and 10 years after graduation, the B&B offers a
unique opportunity for studying student loan repayment and default
behavior in the United States.
The B&B sample is relatively homogeneous in its educational
attainment: all students have at least a BA/BS degree. The lack of college dropouts and students with less than four-year degrees is unfortunate, since previous research shows that repayment problems are most
common among these individuals.5 Still, we ﬁnd that many students
who graduated from college in 1992–1993 have experienced repayment
problems.
To focus on a typical American college student, we exclude noncitizens, the disabled, and individuals receiving their BA/BS at age
30 or older (less than 14 percent received their BA/BS at later ages).
Because new graduates who then attend graduate school are eligible
for automatic loan deferments when they are enrolled, they will have
spent less time in repayment. This directly reduces their opportunities
for both repayment and default within any given time frame, making it
difﬁcult to compare their repayment/default outcomes with those of students who have not participated in postgraduate studies. Our main analysis, therefore, excludes respondents who attended 12 or more months
of graduate school as of 1997, received any postgraduate degrees by
2003, or were enrolled in school in 2003.6 Altogether, this leaves 4,300
U.S. citizens who received baccalaureate degrees in 1992–1993 but
participated in little schooling thereafter. Roughly half of these graduates report that they borrowed money for their undergraduate schooling as of 2003. Our analysis of repayment and default focuses on these
2,180 borrowers.
The B&B contains standard demographic characteristics such as
gender and race/ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, white). We also use
measures of maternal education, categorizing students based on whether
their mothers never attended college, attended but did not receive a BA/
BS, or completed their BA/BS. Dependency status (for ﬁnancial aid
purposes) is also available for students, along with parental income in
1991 for those who are dependents. The B&B also contains data on
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student SAT and ACT scores. We categorize individuals into quartiles
based on their SAT scores if they are available. If an individual did
not report an SAT score, we use the corresponding ACT quartile.7 The
data also include information about the major course of undergraduate study and the type of institution from which individuals graduated
(public, private nonproﬁt, private for-proﬁt, historically black college/
university). We use the undergraduate institution from which individuals graduate to include a measure of the selectivity of the institution as
determined by Barron’s 1992 Admissions Competitiveness Index. We
consider the following three competitiveness categories: 1) most competitive and highly competitive, 2) very competitive and competitive,
and 3) all others. Sample averages for all of these variables are reported
for our sample of borrowers and nonborrowers, as well as borrowers
only, in Table 8A.1.
Our main focus is on student borrowing, repayment, and default
measured 10 years after graduation. As noted earlier, roughly half of
our sample borrowed funds for their undergraduate studies. Among
those who borrowed, the average amount of undergraduate loans was
$9,300. On average, another $600 was borrowed for graduate studies.
The latter amount is small, since our sample restrictions ensure that
students in our sample spent very little (or no) time in graduate school.
Ten years after graduation, borrowers still owed, on average, $2,600 on
their undergraduate loans. Two-thirds had repaid their undergraduate
loans in full.
Table 8.1 reports repayment status for borrowers as of 1998 and
2003. In both years, 92 percent were repaying their loans or had already
fully repaid their loans. The fraction of borrowers receiving a deferment or forbearance declined from 3.8 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent in
2003, while the share of borrowers in default rose from 4.2 percent to
5.8 percent over this period.8 These ﬁgures suggest that deferment and
forbearance are important forms of nonpayment with a diminishing role
over time: They make up nearly half of all nonpayments ﬁve years after
school, falling to slightly less than one-third ﬁve years later.
Table 8.2 shows transition rates for these repayment states from
1998 to 2003. The rows in the table list the probabilities of being in
repayment (including those who fully repaid), receiving a deferment
or forbearance, or being in default 10 years after school (in 2003) conditional on each of those repayment states ﬁve years earlier in 1998.
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Table 8.1 Repayment Status for Undergraduate Borrowers 5 and 10
Years after Graduation
Status
1998
2003
Fully repaid
0.269
0.639
(0.013)
(0.013)
Repaying or fully paid
0.920
0.917
(0.008)
(0.007)
Deferment or forbearance
0.038
0.025
(0.006)
(0.004)
Default
0.042
0.058
(0.006)
(0.005)
NOTE: Estimates are based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Ninety-four percent of borrowers in repayment (including those who
had fully repaid) in 1998 were also making their payments or had
fully repaid their loans by 2003. Four percent of borrowers who were
in repayment (or fully repaid) in 1998 were in default ﬁve years later.
Only 75 percent of borrowers in deferment/forbearance in 1998 were in
repayment (or fully repaid) ﬁve years later, while 16.5 percent were still
in deferment/forbearance and 8.5 percent were in default. Among those
in default in 1998, 54 percent had returned to repayment (or had fully
Table 8.2 Repayment Status Transition Probabilities
Repayment status in 2003
Repaying/
Deferment/
Repayment status in 1998
fully paid
forbearance
Default
Repaying or fully paid
0.939
0.020
0.040
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.005)
Deferment or forbearance
0.749
0.165
0.085
(0.063)
(0.057)
(0.032)
Default
0.544
0.038
0.418
(0.070)
(0.020)
(0.068)
NOTE: The table shows the probability of each status in 2003 conditional on the status
in 1998. Estimates based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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repaid) ﬁve years later, while 42 percent remained in default. Although
there is considerable persistence in these repayment states, many borrowers who were not making payments ﬁve years after school (i.e., in
deferment/forbearance or default) were making payments (or had fully
repaid their loans) ﬁve years later. Not surprisingly, deferment/forbearance is the least persistent state, since it is designed to temporarily
help borrowers in need. Indeed, borrowers cannot typically receive a
deferment or forbearance indeﬁnitely. In the end, most borrowers who
receive this form of assistance return to repayment; however, one in six
end up defaulting.
Finally, the B&B asked respondents about their earnings in the
1997 and 2003 surveys; we also use these data. The 1997 survey asked
respondents about their annual salaries for the jobs they were working
during April of that year, while the 2003 survey asked respondents about
their total income from work earned in 2002. Based on these questions,
respondents in our sample (borrowers and nonborrowers alike) reported
average earnings of roughly $30,000 in 1997 and $50,000 in 2002.

DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT BORROWING
AND REPAYMENT
In this section, we study the determinants of undergraduate borrowing and repayment behavior measured in 2003, roughly 10 years
after graduation. Since the standard repayment plan for Stafford Loans
is based on a 10-year repayment period, students who were always
in good standing and making the standard payment should have paid
down most, if not all, of their loans. As we show, many did not. In
addition to studying the fraction of debt students repaid within the ﬁrst
10 years after school, we also examine the traditional metric used to
study student loan repayment behavior: default.9 We then extend this
metric to include borrowers in deferment or forbearance and report on
the fraction of undergraduate debts remaining for borrowers who have
defaulted or are in nonpayment more generally.
We begin with an analysis of average postschool earnings, undergraduate borrowing, and repayment/nonpayment rates by student characteristics. We then explore differences in these outcomes based on the
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types of institutions from which students graduated. Finally, we use
standard multivariate regression methods to examine the importance
of individual/family and institutional factors, along with college major,
student borrowing, and postschool earnings levels in determining student loan repayment, default, and other measures of nonpayment. This
enables us to identify which factors are most important while simultaneously controlling for other potentially important factors.
Differences by Borrower Characteristics
Table 8.3 characterizes the postschool labor market outcomes,
undergraduate borrowing, and repayment outcomes across different
types of students deﬁned by gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quartiles, and maternal education. Because we are primarily interested in
repayment/nonpayment, this table focuses on our sample of borrowers
only. Before discussing repayment, we brieﬂy comment on differences
in earnings and undergraduate borrowing across groups as reported in
columns (2) and (3).
Column (2) reveals a large difference in earnings (including
incomes of zero for the nonemployed) between men and women, while
differences by race/ethnicity, student aptitude, and family background
are more modest. Male college graduates earn about 70 percent more
than female graduates 10 years after ﬁnishing school. Blacks earn about
15 percent less than whites, while Asians earn about 15 percent more.
Hispanics had earnings similar to whites in our sample of borrowers.
Earnings increase over SAT/ACT quartiles 1–3; however, earnings for
the top quartile are very similar to those in the second quartile (nearly
20 percent less than the third quartile). This seemingly perverse pattern
at the top is largely due to our sample selection criteria, which exclude
those who attended 12 or more months of graduate school (by 1997) or
received a graduate degree. This restriction disproportionately affects
the top aptitude quartile, and removing it yields very similar average
income levels for the top two quartiles (see Table 8A.2). Differences in
earnings based on maternal education are relatively modest, although
those with mothers who received a BA/BS degree earned almost $9,000
more than those whose mothers did not attend college.
Column (3) in Table 8.3 reveals very small differences in average undergraduate loan amounts compared across gender and SAT/
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ACT quartiles. Differences by race/ethnicity and maternal background
are more pronounced, though still modest. In considering race/ethnicity, Hispanics borrowed the least, at $8,100, while whites borrowed
the most, at about $1,300 more. Students whose mothers ﬁnished college borrowed nearly $1,200 more than students whose mothers never
attended college. These two patterns suggest that whites and borrowers from higher socioeconomic families are attending more expensive
institutions, on average.
The remaining columns in Table 8.3 focus on repayment and nonpayment of student loans. Column (4) shows the average fraction of
undergraduate loan amounts still outstanding in 2003. This provides a
useful measure of returns to lenders within the ﬁrst 10 years. As noted
earlier, borrowers who make standard payments every month should
owe very little (or nothing) on their undergraduate loans by this time. A
high value here indicates low payment levels or periods of nonpayment.
As the ﬁrst row in Table 8.3 shows, of the $9,300 initially borrowed,
students still owed 19 percent, on average, 10 years later. Column (5)
reports the fraction of borrowers in default, while column (6) reports a
broader measure of nonpayment that includes borrowers in deferment,
forbearance, or default. In our sample, 5.8 percent of all borrowers were
in default 10 years after ﬁnishing college, while 8.3 percent were not
making payments for various reasons (i.e., deferment, forbearance, or
default). Finally, columns (7) and (8) report the average share of undergraduate loan amounts currently in default or currently not being repaid
because of deferment, forbearance, or default.10 If borrowers in default
or nonpayment 10 years after leaving school are very unlikely to return
to good standing, these ﬁgures suggest that the expected loan loss rate
(for a typical borrower) faced by lenders is around 2.8 percent (based on
defaults), or as high as 5.2 percent (based on any nonpayment). These
amounts are notably lower than default/nonpayment rates themselves
(columns [5] and [6]) because many defaulters (nonpayers) repay some
of their student debts before entering default (nonpayment).
Now, consider differences in repayment and nonpayment patterns
by gender as reported in Table 8.3. Consistent with signiﬁcantly lower
postschool earnings, women owe more on their loans than men 10 years
after ﬁnishing college (22 percent vs. 15 percent) and have higher rates
of nonpayment (9.5 percent versus 6.7 percent). The fraction of debt in
nonpayment was also 2.5 times higher for women than for men. Yet,
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(1)
Characteristic
N
Full sample
2,120
Males
Females

900
1,210

Asians

50

Blacks

150

Hispanics

130

Whites

1,780

SAT/ACT Q1

510

SAT/ACT Q2

500

SAT/ACT Q3

480

(2)
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Earnings
($000s)
49.629
(1.300)
64.199
(2.426)
37.705
(1.097)
58.085
(3.975)
42.123
(2.513)
47.235
(3.115)
49.965
(1.483)
41.641
(1.641)
50.197
(2.164)
60.087
(3.914)

(3)
(4)
Total undergrad
Share of
loan amount undergrad debt
($000s)
still owed
9.336
0.188
(0.179)
(0.012)
9.646
0.146
(0.304)
(0.014)
9.091
0.221
(0.212)
(0.018)
8.706
0.236
(1.039)
(0.075)
9.165
0.506
(0.522)
(0.064)
8.127
0.216
(0.786)
(0.054)
9.441
0.158
(0.197)
(0.012)
9.466
0.236
(0.460)
(0.025)
9.153
0.141
(0.319)
(0.015)
9.673
0.175
(0.371)
(0.031)

(5)
Fraction in
default
0.058
(0.005)
0.057
(0.008)
0.059
(0.008)
0.112
(0.043)
0.132
(0.029)
0.113
(0.038)
0.047
(0.005)
0.061
(0.010)
0.048
(0.010)
0.047
(0.009)

(6)

(7)
(8)
Default × share Not paying ×
Fraction not
of debt
share of debt
paying
still owed
still owed
0.083
0.028
0.052
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.007)
0.067
0.019
0.028
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.006)
0.095
0.034
0.071
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.013)
0.130
0.020
0.026
(0.047)
(0.013)
(0.015)
0.180
0.156
0.208
(0.032)
(0.057)
(0.060)
0.134
0.031
0.048
(0.041)
(0.011)
(0.020)
0.070
0.017
0.040
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.007)
0.097
0.032
0.059
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.011)
0.054
0.022
0.025
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.007)
0.076
0.010
0.026
(0.014)
(0.004)
(0.007)
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Table 8.3 Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by
Individual Characteristics
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SAT/ACT Q4

370

Mother no
college

920

Mother some
college

610

Mother BA+

580

50.540
(2.508)
48.168
(1.726)
44.452
(1.960)
56.838
(3.177)

9.131
(0.378)
8.911
(0.240)
9.184
(0.297)
10.161
(0.416)

0.151
(0.022)
0.223
(0.021)
0.140
(0.014)
0.180
(0.021)

0.061
(0.012)
0.060
(0.008)
0.055
(0.010)
0.058
(0.010)

0.084
(0.014)
0.088
(0.011)
0.069
(0.011)
0.089
(0.014)

0.027
(0.009)
0.027
(0.005)
0.028
(0.008)
0.028
(0.013)

0.052
(0.014)
0.058
(0.012)
0.039
(0.009)
0.055
(0.016)

NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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these differences are not apparent when comparing default rates, which
are nearly identical for men and women. Even with similar default
rates, women have defaulted on 80 percent more debt than men. These
ﬁgures highlight the value of considering alternative measures of repayment and nonpayment beyond traditionally used default rates. Despite
very similar default rates between male and female student borrowers, lenders can expect faster payments and a higher recovery rate from
male students.
Differences in repayment behavior are much more pronounced
by race/ethnicity than by gender, with particularly stark differences
between blacks and whites. On average, black borrowers still owe 51
percent of their student loans 10 years after college, while white borrowers owe only 16 percent. Hispanics and Asians owe 22 percent and
24 percent, respectively. Black borrowers have defaulted on 16 percent
of their undergraduate debt and are in nonpayment on 21 percent. By
contrast, the next highest rates of nonpayment are for Hispanics, who
have defaulted on only 3.1 percent of their debt and are in nonpayment
on 4.8 percent. Given these dramatic differences, it is interesting to note
that default rates are quite similar for all three minority groups (13 percent for blacks, 11 percent for Hispanics and Asians), while they are
much lower for whites (less than 5 percent). There are larger differences
between blacks and the other minority groups for nonpayment rates
that include deferment and forbearance (18 percent for blacks versus 13
percent for Hispanics and Asians). Once again, important differences in
repayment and expected loan losses by lenders are obscured by focusing exclusively on default rates. It is also worth noting that the racial/
ethnic differences in repayment/nonpayment outcomes are unlikely to
be driven by differences in borrowing or postschool earnings, which are
quite modest. We explore this issue further below.
The share of undergraduate debt remaining 10 years after graduation is highest for students with the lowest SAT/ACT scores (24 percent for the lowest quartile, and 14–18 percent for all other quartiles).
All default and nonpayment outcomes show an interesting U-shaped
pattern in achievement that is roughly consistent with the inverted
U-shaped pattern for earnings. Default and nonpayment rates are as
high as 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, for the lowest SAT/ACT
group; they then fall to around 5 percent for the second and third quartiles before returning to higher levels for the top ability group. A simi-
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lar, though weaker, pattern is evident for the share of debt in default or
nonpayment. Unlike the relationship for earnings, the surprising nonmonotonic relationship between achievement and default/nonpayment
is not a consequence of our sample restriction that excludes those with
graduate degrees or 12 or more months of graduate school. A similar
pattern arises even when we do not impose this restriction. Indeed, the
fraction of debts in default or nonpayment is actually highest for the top
SAT/ACT quartile in the unrestricted sample (see Table 8A.2).
The last three rows in Table 8.3 show that socioeconomic status, as
measured by maternal education, is only weakly and statistically insigniﬁcantly related to default and nonpayment.11
By contrast, the fraction of debt repaid after 10 years is signiﬁcantly
higher for borrowers whose mothers attended college. Students with
stronger socioeconomic backgrounds appear to reduce their loan balances more quickly; however, they do not appear to be any less likely to
enter default, deferment, or forbearance.
Differences by Institutional Characteristics
We next explore differences in borrowing and repayment/nonpayment patterns, categorizing individuals based on the type of institution
from which they graduated. Table 8.4 shows differences by institutional
control (public, private not-for-proﬁt, and private for-proﬁt), and by college selectivity as determined by Barron’s. Given the high nonpayment
rates for black college graduates reported in Table 8.3, we also examine outcomes for blacks graduating from historically black colleges and
universities (HBCU) versus those from traditional non-HBCU institutions. Table 8.4, like Table 8.3, is based on our sample of borrowers.
There is considerable interest today in the high default rates at private for-proﬁt institutions. There is also concern about the high debt
levels associated with attendance at private institutions more generally.
The ﬁrst few rows of Table 8.4 offer more detailed evidence on these
issues from 1992–1993 graduates 10 years after school. Postschool
earnings are quite similar across graduates from public and private forproﬁt and nonproﬁt institutions; however, student debt levels are highest
for graduates of nonproﬁt institutions ($11,200), followed by for-proﬁt
institutions ($9,700) and public institutions ($8,400). Unfortunately, the
sample size for for-proﬁt institutions is quite small (33), making it dif-
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NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 8.4 Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by Type
of Institution Attended
(6)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(7)
(8)
(1)
(2)
Total under- Share of
grad. loan undergrad.
Default × Not paying ×
Fraction share of debt share of debt
Earnings
amount
debt still
Fraction in
Institution type
N
($000s)
($000s)
owed
default
not paying still owed
still owed
Public
1,350
49.458
8.407
0.174
0.056
0.076
0.025
0.047
(1.630)
(0.224)
(0.015)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.009)
Private nonproﬁt
720
49.827
11.207
0.213
0.054
0.086
0.032
0.061
(2.268)
(0.297)
(0.021)
(0.009)
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.014)
Private for-proﬁt
30
51.434
9.738
0.199
0.182
0.264
0.059
0.087
(7.896)
(1.263)
(0.073)
(0.091)
(0.108)
(0.042)
(0.047)
Most competitive 150
61.583
11.453
0.202
0.043
0.087
0.009
0.043
(4.663)
(0.650)
(0.034)
(0.016)
(0.022)
(0.005)
(0.014)
Competitive
1,300
49.990
9.471
0.168
0.054
0.075
0.026
0.041
(1.558)
(0.235)
(0.013)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.006)
Noncompetitive
620
46.041
8.668
0.230
0.065
0.096
0.034
0.076
(2.696)
(0.308)
(0.026)
(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.021)
Black, not HBCU 100
44.421
10.085
0.448
0.170
0.223
0.157
0.203
(3.088)
(0.667)
(0.054)
(0.042)
(0.045)
(0.045)
(0.048)
Black, HBCU
50
38.850
7.855
0.589
0.078
0.119
0.155
0.215
(4.075)
(0.837)
(0.132)
(0.033)
(0.041)
(0.124)
(0.129)
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ﬁcult to draw strong conclusions about borrowing and repayment/nonpayment rates for this group; note the large standard errors across the
table for this institution type. On average, the fraction of debt still owed
is slightly lower for public school graduates, but the differences across
institution types are statistically insigniﬁcant. Default and nonpayment
rates are very similar for public school graduates and nonproﬁt graduates, but they are three to four times higher (18 percent and 26 percent,
respectively) for for-proﬁt graduates. Unfortunately, because of small
sample sizes, we cannot statistically distinguish across the groups. The
extremely high default/nonpayment rates for for-proﬁt graduates do not
appear to translate into much higher shares of debt in default/nonpayment as observed in the last two columns.
Our next set of results compares students based on Barron’s rankings of institutional selectivity. Earnings and debt levels are both notably higher among students from the most competitive institutions. Differences in repayment, default, and nonpayment measures across school
selectivity are quite modest and generally not statistically signiﬁcant. As
might be expected, default and nonpayment rates are generally lowest
for graduates of the most competitive institutions; however, they do not
have the lowest share of debt still owed. In general, these differences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. There is little evidence to suggest that
institutional selectivity is a particularly important determinant of repayment and nonpayment; however, we examine below whether important
differences are confounded by other systematic differences in the characteristics and choices of individuals attending these institutions.
Finally, the bottom of Table 8.4 compares the outcomes for blacks
attending HBCU and non-HBCU institutions. Small sample sizes are
a problem here, as with for-proﬁt institutions, yet a few patterns are
worth noting. While earnings of HBCU graduates are similar to those of
black graduates from non-HBCUs, HBCU graduates leave school with
signiﬁcantly lower debt. The most notable differences between HBCU
and non-HBCU graduates, however, are for default and nonpayment.
Blacks from HBCUs have default (nonpayment) rates of 8 percent (12
percent) compared with roughly twice those rates for non-HBCU graduates. Despite these sizable differences, the fraction of debt in default
or nonpayment is remarkably similar (16 percent and 20–21 percent,
respectively).
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A Multivariate Analysis of Student Loan Repayment
As Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show, many important dimensions of heterogeneity across college graduates may affect repayment behavior.
Therefore, it is important to simultaneously account for all of these factors before drawing strong conclusions about which are most important
and why. We use standard multivariate regression methods to do this.
These methods can be helpful in sorting out questions such as the following: Are default rates so high among blacks because they attend different types of schools than whites? Or because their SAT/ACT scores
are lower? Or because their mothers are less educated? Do differences
in repayment or nonpayment across institution types simply reﬂect the
students they attract?
Before exploring repayment and nonpayment outcomes, we begin
by examining which factors determine how much a student borrows
(based on our full sample of borrowers and nonborrowers). Table 8.5
shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for total
undergraduate loan amounts (in thousands of dollars) as a function of
individual characteristics, college major, institutional characteristics,
and state ﬁxed effects based on the institutions from which students
graduated.12 Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics:
gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quartile, maternal education, dependency status (for ﬁnancial aid purposes), and parental income (in thousands of dollars) interacted with dependency status.13 This speciﬁcation is useful for measuring the full impact of these individual/family
characteristics on borrowing (and repayment/nonpayment outcomes
examined in subsequent tables) and incorporates any effects coming
through choice of major or institution of attendance. Column (2) controls for the same background characteristics, as well as college major
(all other majors not speciﬁcally listed reﬂect the omitted category),
while column (3) includes controls for background characteristics and
institution characteristics (e.g., type of control and Barron’s selectivity).
Column (4) includes all three types of variables: background, college
major, and institutional characteristics. Comparing estimated effects of
background characteristics across columns (1) versus (2) through (4) is
informative about the extent to which individual characteristics affect
borrowing through the choice of college major or institution. Column
(5) adds state ﬁxed effects to the speciﬁcation in column (4), accounting
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for any unobserved differences in policies, educational institutions, and
labor markets that vary across states. Similar speciﬁcations are used to
study repayment, default, and more general measures of nonpayment
below.
Several individual and family characteristics are important determinants of borrowing. Black students borrow signiﬁcantly more than all
other racial/ethnic groups. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that black graduates borrow nearly $2,000 more than whites. Accounting for choice
of major, this difference grows even larger, suggesting that blacks tend
to choose majors that are not typically associated with extensive borrowing. We also estimate higher levels of borrowing for students with
better SAT/ACT scores. Comparing columns (1) and (4) suggests that
much of this difference is explained by choice of major and institution: Higher-scoring students are inclined to attend schools and to
choose majors associated with greater borrowing. Table 8.3 shows that
students whose mothers have college education tend to borrow more.
Regression results in Table 8.5 show that the opposite is true once we
account for other personal differences, especially race, achievement,
and parental income. Accounting for these other factors, students whose
mothers received their BA/BS borrow roughly $1,500 less than those
whose mothers did not attend college. The estimates also suggest that a
$10,000 increase in parental earnings is associated with about $250 less
in borrowing. We ﬁnd no evidence to suggest that differences in borrowing by maternal education or parental income are due to differential
choices regarding major and institution.
Some majors appear to be associated with greater borrowing—engineering, health-related majors, history, and especially biology—though
not necessarily with high-paying professions. Institutional characteristics also appear to be important determinants of borrowing. Students
graduating from private (for-proﬁt or nonproﬁt) institutions tend to borrow about $3,000 more than those attending public institutions, all else
equal. Black students attending HBCUs tend to borrow $1,500–$2,000
less than blacks attending other institutions. Less-competitive institutions are associated with about $600–$700 less in borrowing, although
these differences are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
Altogether, many factors affect undergraduate borrowing; however,
differences across individuals, college majors, and institutions are generally modest. Tables 8.6–8.10 show the extent to which these same

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 251

1/28/2015 8:24:13 AM

252 Lochner and Monge-Naranjo

Table 8.5 Explaining Total Undergraduate Student Loan Amounts
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Male
0.086
0.046
0.192
0.139
0.096
(0.211)
(0.222) (0.208) (0.218) (0.215)
Black
1.875** 1.843** 2.559** 2.460** 2.803**
(0.486) (0.486) (0.559) (0.557) (0.549)
Hispanic
0.670
0.744
0.695
0.733
1.561**
(0.523) (0.521) (0.520) (0.518) (0.551)
Asian
−0.626
−0.767
−0.499
−0.673
−0.079
(0.609) (0.609) (0.600) (0.600) (0.616)
SAT/ACT Q2
0.254
0.110
0.215
0.089
0.139
(0.282) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) (0.273)
SAT/ACT Q3
0.723** 0.545
0.588** 0.413
0.348
(0.293) (0.296) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290)
SAT/ACT Q4
1.076** 0.749** 0.639** 0.312
0.195
(0.318) (0.325) (0.322) (0.328) (0.324)
Mother some college −0.641** −0.608** −0.625** −0.580** −0.310
(0.263) (0.262) (0.259) (0.257) (0.254)
Mother BA+
−1.447** −1.402** −1.607** −1.525** −1.445**
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244) (0.243) (0.240)
Dependent
−0.131
−0.041
−0.376
−0.291
−0.643**
(0.270) (0.269) (0.266) (0.265) (0.265)
Parental income
−0.025** −0.025** −0.026** −0.026** −0.023**
× dependent
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business
0.004
−0.075
−0.184
(0.374)
(0.368) (0.360)
Education
0.436
0.306
0.215
(0.375)
(0.368) (0.363)
Engineering
1.263**
1.445** 1.228**
(0.467)
(0.460) (0.453)
Health
1.904**
1.953** 1.755**
(0.459)
(0.451) (0.447)
Public affairs
−0.402
−0.588
−0.893
(0.603)
(0.592) (0.584)
Biology
3.189**
2.897** 2.951**
(0.532)
(0.527) (0.523)
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Table 8.5 (continued)
Variable
Math/science

(1)

(2)
0.318
(0.488)
0.453
(0.407)
1.618**
(0.797)
0.440
(0.408)
−0.072
(0.609)

No
3,750
0.062

No
3,750
0.077

Social science
History
Humanities
Psychology
Private for-proﬁt
Private nonproﬁt
HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive
State ﬁxed effects
N
2

R

(3)

(4)
0.321
(0.482)
0.340
(0.400)
1.008
(0.779)
0.013
(0.403)
0.122
(0.596)
2.798** 3.049**
(1.045) (1.039)
3.075** 3.089**
(0.226) (0.225)
−2.128** −1.945**
(0.909) (0.907)
−0.657
−0.565
(0.385) (0.384)
−0.651
−0.567
(0.427) (0.426)
No
No
3,700
3,690
0.113
0.128

(5)
0.447
(0.476)
0.112
(0.395)
1.195
(0.767)
−0.031
(0.396)
0.330
(0.588)
3.036**
(1.023)
2.656**
(0.235)
−1.552
(0.906)
−0.675
(0.397)
−0.720
(0.440)
Yes
3,690
0.183

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Estimates based on the sample of B&B
borrowers and nonborrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

factors affect repayment and nonpayment behavior for our sample of
borrowers only. All of these tables have the same structure, which is
very similar to that of Table 8.5. Indeed, the speciﬁcations in columns
(1)–(4) are the same as in Table 8.5. These speciﬁcations are informative about the importance of characteristics and choices known ex ante
(i.e., when lenders decide how much to lend to students). It is also useful to consider the extent to which ex post borrowing and earnings levels affect repayment/nonpayment outcomes conditional on these other
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factors, as well as the extent to which background, college major, and
institutional characteristics affect repayment/nonpayment through borrowing and earnings levels. To explore these issues, column (5) adds
measures of earnings in 1997, earnings in 2002, and the total amount
borrowed for undergraduate schooling (all in $000s) to the background,
college major, and institutional characteristics of column (4). Column
(6) also includes state ﬁxed effects.
In Table 8.6, we consider the share of undergraduate debt still owed
10 years after graduation. These OLS regressions produce a number of
interesting results. First, column (1) shows that, conditional on other
background characteristics, the share of debt owed by men was almost
5 percentage points less than the share owed by women. About onequarter of this difference is explained by choice of college major (see
column [2]) and another half by differences in postschool earnings (see
column [5] and recall that initial borrowing amounts were the same for
men and women as shown in Table 8.5). Most strikingly, the share of
debt still owed was 22–27 percentage points higher for blacks than for
whites. While this gap is smaller than the unconditional gap in Table
8.3, it is still statistically and economically quite signiﬁcant. Comparing columns (1)–(5) suggests that very little of this gap is explained by
choice of major, institution, loan amounts, or postschool earnings. Hispanics owe a slightly larger share of their debt than do whites; however,
half of the effect disappears when accounting for state ﬁxed effects.
Accounting for other individual characteristics eliminates the raw differences by SAT/ACT scores in the fraction of debt still owed. We also
observe no differences by dependency status or parental income. Students whose mothers graduated or obtained postgraduate degrees owe
4–7 percentage points less as a fraction of their initial loan when compared with students whose mothers never attended college.
Engineering majors reduce their loans more within the ﬁrst 10 years
after graduating, owing 10 percentage points less as a share of their
initial loan (compared with “other” majors). Column (5) in Table 8.6
suggests that this is not explained by differences in borrowing or postschool earnings.
Accounting for earnings and borrowing levels (and state ﬁxed
effects), social science and humanities majors appear to owe about 8
percentage points more (than “other” majors) as a share of their original
loan amounts. Institutional characteristics do not play an important role
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in determining repayment rates after accounting for loan amounts and
postschool earnings.
As might be expected, both earnings and loan levels are important
determinants of the share of debt repaid. Students with higher earnings
in 1997 had repaid a greater fraction of their debt (roughly 1.2 percentage points for every $10,000 in earnings), while those with higher
student debt levels had repaid a lower fraction (roughly 1.3 percentage points for every additional $1,000 in debt). It is also worth noting
that the R-squared values (reported at the bottom of the table) suggest
that debt levels and postschool earnings account for about 7 percent
of the variation in the share of debt owed, as much as individual background characteristics, college major, and institutional characteristics
combined (compare columns [4] and [5]).
We now turn to measures of nonpayment. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show
average marginal effects from probit speciﬁcations for default and our
broader measure of nonpayment that also includes deferment/forbearance. There is considerable agreement for both of these outcomes, so
we discuss them together. Both blacks and Asians have signiﬁcantly
higher default and nonpayment rates than whites (differences are about
6–9 percentage points), with slightly greater differences observed for
the broader measure of nonpayment.14 Default/nonpayment rates are
quite similar for whites and Hispanics. The estimated effects of race/
ethnicity are similar across all speciﬁcations, suggesting that racial
and ethnic differences in default and nonpayment rates are not driven
by differences in choice of major or institution, student debt levels, or
even postschool earnings realizations. Parental income for dependent
students reduces default and nonpayment, but the effects are small in
magnitude (e.g., an additional $10,000 in income lowers the probability of default by less than 0.01) and drop by half when accounting for
borrowing and postschool income levels. Before accounting for loan
amounts and postschool income (column [4]), we see that business
majors are signiﬁcantly less likely to experience default/nonpayment,
while history and math/science majors are more likely to experience
these problems. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated effects of college
major are not much different after accounting for student borrowing
and postschool earnings (compare columns [4] and [5]). None of the
institutional characteristics appear to inﬂuence default/nonpayment
once individual background characteristics are accounted for. Finally,

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 255

1/28/2015 8:24:14 AM

1/28/2015 8:24:15 AM

(6)
−0.0194
(0.0190)
0.2160**
(0.0396)
0.0347
(0.0411)
0.1070
(0.0615)
0.0056
(0.0236)
0.0235
(0.0252)
0.0289
(0.0276)
−0.0467**
(0.0205)
−0.0616**
(0.0213)
−0.0094
(0.0237)
0.0004
(0.0003)

256

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 256

Table 8.6 Explaining Fraction of Undergraduate Student Debt Still Owed 10 Years after Graduation
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Male
−0.0467**
−0.0341
−0.0471**
−0.0344
−0.0170
(0.0168)
(0.0177)
(0.0169)
(0.0178)
(0.0189)
Black
0.2710**
0.2720**
0.2560**
0.2510**
0.2440**
(0.0329)
(0.0332)
(0.0391)
(0.0393)
(0.0390)
Hispanic
0.0610
0.0602
0.0681
0.0669
0.0675
(0.0358)
(0.0360)
(0.0366)
(0.0367)
(0.0369)
Asian
0.0697
0.0621
0.0659
0.0598
0.0616
(0.0547)
(0.0546)
(0.0555)
(0.0554)
(0.0594)
SAT/ACT Q2
−0.0000
0.0013
0.0017
0.0032
0.0088
(0.0225)
(0.0225)
(0.0228)
(0.0228)
(0.0236)
SAT/ACT Q3
0.0046
0.0112
0.0056
0.0129
0.0179
(0.0233)
(0.0238)
(0.0238)
(0.0242)
(0.0249)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0143
0.0187
0.0093
0.0146
0.0228
(0.0252)
(0.0260)
(0.0259)
(0.0266)
(0.0272)
Mother some college
−0.0556**
−0.0573**
−0.0557**
−0.0573**
−0.0449**
(0.0197)
(0.0197)
(0.0199)
(0.0199)
(0.0204)
Mother BA+
−0.0596**
−0.0659**
−0.0655**
−0.0724**
−0.0550**
(0.0201)
(0.0202)
(0.0204)
(0.0205)
(0.0210)
Dependent
−0.0073
−0.0079
−0.0129
−0.0132
−0.0190
(0.0221)
(0.0223)
(0.0224)
(0.0226)
(0.0230)
Parental income
0.0002
0.0002
0.0002
0.0001
0.0004
× dependent
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
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−0.0411
(0.0781)

−0.0488
(0.0317)
−0.0356
(0.0306)
−0.1090**
(0.0365)
−0.0167
(0.0365)
−0.0404
(0.0507)
0.0036
(0.0407)
−0.0254
(0.0387)
0.0397
(0.0340)
0.0119
(0.0607)
0.0600
(0.0342)
0.0494
(0.0486)
−0.0491
(0.0780)

−0.0199
(0.0321)
−0.0437
(0.0317)
−0.0856**
(0.0375)
−0.0040
(0.0376)
−0.0165
(0.0507)
−0.0225
(0.0407)
−0.0189
(0.0403)
0.0577
(0.0345)
0.0186
(0.0604)
0.0742**
(0.0352)
0.0666
(0.0512)
−0.0832
(0.0888)

−0.0200
(0.0320)
−0.0411
(0.0320)
−0.0896**
(0.0378)
−0.0073
(0.0380)
0.0022
(0.0509)
−0.0502
(0.0420)
−0.0589
(0.0409)
0.0783**
(0.0351)
0.0236
(0.0610)
0.0826**
(0.0353)
0.0610
(0.0514)
−0.0656
(0.0890)
(continued)
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−0.0475
(0.0314)
−0.0333
(0.0304)
−0.1040**
(0.0359)
−0.0127
(0.0363)
−0.0368
(0.0504)
0.0052
(0.0402)
−0.0259
(0.0380)
0.0390
(0.0336)
0.0216
(0.0606)
0.0559
(0.0336)
0.0482
(0.0484)

(1)

(2)

(3)
0.0520**
(0.0178)
0.0416
(0.0649)
−0.0115
(0.0320)
−0.0046
(0.0350)

(4)
0.0474**
(0.0178)
0.0611
(0.0653)
−0.0090
(0.0322)
−0.0003
(0.0353)

No
1,850
0.0507

No
1,850
0.0653

No
1,820
0.0562

No
1,820
0.0717

HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive
1997 earnings
($000s)
2002 earnings
($000s)
UG loan amount
($000s)
State ﬁxed effects
N
R2

(5)
−0.0000
(0.0187)
0.0488
(0.0665)
0.0111
(0.0327)
0.0203
(0.0359)
−0.0012**
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0130**
(0.0012)
No
1,610
0.1410

(6)
0.0044
(0.0197)
0.0409
(0.0686)
−0.0126
(0.0344)
−0.0118
(0.0378)
−0.0011**
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0133**
(0.0012)
Yes
1,610
0.1910

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefﬁcient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student
loan debt still owed in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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we observe sizable and statistically signiﬁcant effects of student borrowing levels and postschool earnings. An extra $10,000 in earnings
in 2002 is associated with a roughly 0.8 (1.2) percentage-point drop in
the probability of default (nonpayment), while an additional $1,000 in
student loans increases the likelihood of default (nonpayment) by 0.3
(0.4) percentage points.
Finally, we consider the extent to which these factors affect the
share of undergraduate debt on which borrowers have defaulted or are
not currently paying (10 years after graduating). Tables 8.9 and 8.10
show results from OLS regressions for these two dependent variables.
Here, we ﬁnd that compared with whites, blacks default on 11–13 percent more of their debt and are in nonpayment on about 13–16 percent
more of their debt. Despite similarly high default and nonpayment rates
for Asians and blacks (Tables 8.7 and 8.8), Asians neither default on nor
are in nonpayment on a larger fraction of their debts relative to whites
and Hispanics. These ﬁndings suggest that blacks enter nonpayment
relatively early in the repayment process, while Asians enter relatively
late after much of their debt has been repaid. The effects of race/ethnicity on the share of debts in default/nonpayment are not driven by major,
institution choices, differences in debt levels, or postschool earnings.
The ﬁnal two rows of Table 8.10 suggest that after accounting for earnings and borrowing differences, students from the top SAT/ACT quartile are in nonpayment on a greater fraction of their undergraduate debt
(about 4 percentage points more) than all other achievement groups.
Other individual/family characteristics have little impact on the fraction
of debt in default/nonpayment. Choice of college major also appears
to have only minor (and generally statistically insigniﬁcant at the 0.05
level) effects on the share of debt in default/nonpayment; however, the
estimates in the ﬁnal two columns suggest that health majors default on
a signiﬁcantly smaller fraction, while humanities majors are in nonpayment on a signiﬁcantly higher fraction. Institutional control and college
selectivity are unrelated to the share of debts in default/nonpayment;
however, black borrowers attending HBCUs appear to stop paying and
default on a signiﬁcantly lower fraction of their debt than otherwise
similar black borrowers who attend non-HBCUs. As with the probability of default and nonpayment, higher earnings reduce the share of debt
on which individuals default or stop paying, while higher debt levels
increase the share. Contrary to the case with default and nonpayment,

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 259

1/28/2015 8:24:16 AM

1/28/2015 8:24:16 AM

(4)
−0.0089
(0.0125)
0.0732**
(0.0217)
0.0191
(0.0232)
0.0745**
(0.0292)
−0.0163
(0.0159)
−0.0133
(0.0169)
0.0073
(0.0176)
0.0143
(0.0138)
0.0139
(0.0141)
−0.0122
(0.0186)
−0.0008**
(0.0004)

(5)
−0.0001
(0.0137)
0.0665**
(0.0223)
0.0317
(0.0232)
0.0734**
(0.0323)
−0.0071
(0.0165)
−0.0175
(0.0180)
0.0056
(0.0184)
0.0177
(0.0142)
0.0064
(0.0151)
−0.0152
(0.0191)
−0.0005
(0.0004)

(6)
0.0005
(0.0137)
0.0554**
(0.0222)
0.0267
(0.0233)
0.0718**
(0.0326)
−0.0087
(0.0165)
−0.0150
(0.0179)
0.0061
(0.0184)
0.0225
(0.0142)
0.0029
(0.0151)
−0.0170
(0.0191)
−0.0004
(0.0004)
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Table 8.7 Explaining Default 10 Years after Graduation
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
Male
−0.0023
−0.0058
−0.0058
(0.0118)
(0.0124)
(0.0119)
Black
0.0733**
0.0687**
0.0804**
(0.0190)
(0.0189)
(0.0219)
Hispanic
0.0194
0.0184
0.0216
(0.0232)
(0.0232)
(0.0232)
Asian
0.0709**
0.0704**
0.0750**
(0.0293)
(0.0292)
(0.0295)
SAT/ACT Q2
−0.0040
−0.0125
−0.0071
(0.0157)
(0.0157)
(0.0159)
SAT/ACT Q3
−0.0079
−0.0146
−0.0074
(0.0167)
(0.0169)
(0.0169)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0185
0.0052
0.0206
(0.0171)
(0.0175)
(0.0173)
Mother some college
0.0104
0.0119
0.0126
(0.0139)
(0.0138)
(0.0139)
Mother BA+
0.0182
0.0149
0.0180
(0.0140)
(0.0138)
(0.0142)
Dependent
−0.0040
−0.0132
−0.0012
(0.0182)
(0.0185)
(0.0184)
Parental income
−0.0010**
−0.0008**
−0.0010**
× dependent
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 261

Business
Education
Engineering
Health
Public affairs
Biology
Math/science
Social science
History
Humanities
Psychology

1/28/2015 8:24:16 AM

−0.0110
(0.0590)

−0.0748**
(0.0279)
−0.0240
(0.0210)
−0.0369
(0.0275)
−0.0254
(0.0253)
−0.0137
(0.0336)
0.0140
(0.0249)
0.0478**
(0.0225)
−0.0288
(0.0240)
0.0678**
(0.0325)
−0.0008
(0.0224)
−0.0016
(0.0315)
−0.0156
(0.0607)

−0.0831**
(0.0310)
−0.0321
(0.0213)
−0.0226
(0.0291)
−0.0376
(0.0267)
−0.0168
(0.0328)
0.0062
(0.0246)
0.0380
(0.0240)
−0.0321
(0.0244)
0.0491
(0.0329)
−0.0031
(0.0228)
−0.0673
(0.0430)

−0.0810**
(0.0310)
−0.0256
(0.0212)
−0.0177
(0.0289)
−0.0475
(0.0268)
−0.0171
(0.0328)
0.0089
(0.0245)
0.0329
(0.0241)
−0.0221
(0.0241)
0.0501
(0.0329)
0.0008
(0.0226)
−0.0657
(0.0435)
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−0.0765**
(0.0281)
−0.0239
(0.0212)
−0.0224
(0.0257)
−0.0183
(0.0250)
−0.0127
(0.0339)
0.0125
(0.0249)
0.0451**
(0.0225)
−0.0310
(0.0242)
0.0681**
(0.0329)
−0.0010
(0.0225)
0.0001
(0.0318)

(continued)

(1)

(2)

HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive
1997 earnings
($000s)
2002 earnings
($000s)
UG loan amount
($000s)
Division ﬁxed effects
N
Log likelihood

No
1,870
−436.7

No
1,870
−421.4

(3)
0.0085
(0.0125)
−0.0331
(0.0373)
0.0158
(0.0240)
0.0167
(0.0259)

(4)
0.0069
(0.0124)
−0.0281
(0.0373)
0.0145
(0.0234)
0.0164
(0.0254)

No
1,840
−426.4

No
1,840
−410.0

(5)
−0.0088
(0.0131)
−0.0099
(0.0371)
0.0138
(0.0251)
0.0274
(0.0268)
−0.0003
(0.0004)
−0.0008**
(0.0003)
0.0027**
(0.0008)
No
1,610
−337.9

(6)
−0.0056
(0.0133)
−0.0049
(0.0376)
0.0117
(0.0249)
0.0181
(0.0269)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0008**
(0.0003)
0.0028**
(0.0008)
Yes
1,610
−328.0

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit speciﬁcations for default in 2003.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

262

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 262

Table 8.7 (continued)
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earnings in 1997 (a few years after graduation) rather than in 2003 are
most important here. This ﬁnding is not surprising because most individuals enter default/nonpayment in the ﬁrst few years after graduation. An extra $10,000 in 1997 earnings reduces the fraction of debt in
nonpayment by about 0.4 percentage points, while an additional $1,000
in undergraduate debt reduces this fraction by just over 0.3 percentage
points.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Given the large number of speciﬁcations we consider for each outcome, it is useful to brieﬂy summarize our ﬁndings. Table 8.11 shows
the estimates for all ﬁve repayment/nonpayment outcomes based on our
most general speciﬁcation (column [6] of Tables 8.6–8.10). To further
focus on the factors that matter, only variables that are statistically signiﬁcant for at least one outcome are included.
Among the individual and family background characteristics, only
race is consistently important for all measures of repayment/nonpayment. Ten years after graduation, black borrowers owe 22 percent more
on their loans, are 6 (9) percentage points more likely to be in default
(nonpayment), have defaulted on 11 percent more loans, and are in
nonpayment on roughly 16 percent more of their undergraduate debt
compared with white borrowers. These striking differences are largely
unaffected by controls for choice of college major, institution, or even
student debt levels and postschool earnings. By contrast, the repayment and nonpayment patterns of Hispanics are very similar to those of
whites. Asians show high default/nonpayment rates (similar to blacks),
but their shares of debt still owed or debt in default/nonpayment are not
signiﬁcantly different from those of whites. This suggests that many
Asians who enter default/nonpayment do so after repaying much of
their student loan debt. Maternal college attendance is associated with a
greater share of debt repaid after 10 years, while dependency status and
parental income are largely unimportant for repayment/nonpayment
after controlling for other factors.
The B&B data suggest some variation in repayment/nonpayment
across college major choices; however, which majors are most “success-
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(6)
−0.0027
(0.0155)
0.0853**
(0.0247)
0.0286
(0.0269)
0.0888**
(0.0377)
−0.0265
(0.0187)
−0.0182
(0.0197)
0.0062
(0.0202)
0.0076
(0.0159)
−0.0068
(0.0168)
0.0112
(0.0210)
−0.0007
(0.0004)

264

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 264

Table 8.8 Explaining Nonpayment (Default, Deferment, or Forbearance) 10 Years after Graduation
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Male
−0.0170
−0.0197
−0.0212
−0.0235
−0.0049
(0.0139)
(0.0145)
(0.0140)
(0.0146)
(0.0155)
Black
0.0900**
0.0855**
0.0999**
0.0906**
0.0905**
(0.0224)
(0.0224)
(0.0259)
(0.0257)
(0.0246)
Hispanic
0.0070
0.0045
0.0108
0.0070
0.0269
(0.0281)
(0.0281)
(0.0282)
(0.0282)
(0.0266)
Asian
0.0790**
0.0768**
0.0826**
0.0810**
0.0885**
(0.0364)
(0.0362)
(0.0368)
(0.0364)
(0.0372)
SAT/ACT Q2
−0.0178
−0.0249
−0.0210
−0.0287
−0.0257
(0.0184)
(0.0183)
(0.0187)
(0.0186)
(0.0187)
SAT/ACT Q3
−0.0150
−0.0189
−0.0157
−0.0188
−0.0191
(0.0194)
(0.0195)
(0.0196)
(0.0197)
(0.0197)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0268
0.0114
0.0257
0.0106
0.0081
(0.0196)
(0.0202)
(0.0200)
(0.0205)
(0.0203)
Mother some college
−0.0025
−0.0009
−0.0004
0.0017
0.0008
(0.0160)
(0.0160)
(0.0161)
(0.0160)
(0.0159)
Mother BA+
0.0014
−0.0036
−0.0006
−0.0069
−0.0055
(0.0164)
(0.0163)
(0.0167)
(0.0166)
(0.0167)
Dependent
0.0324
0.0256
0.0340
0.0251
0.0126
(0.0210)
(0.0212)
(0.0211)
(0.0213)
(0.0210)
Parental income
−0.0014**
−0.0013**
−0.0015**
−0.0013**
−0.0008
× dependent
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
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0.0116
(0.0620)

−0.0702**
(0.0293)
−0.0415
(0.0253)
−0.0480
(0.0329)
−0.0113
(0.0288)
−0.0167
(0.0397)
0.0060
(0.0305)
0.0587**
(0.0273)
−0.0282
(0.0279)
0.0847**
(0.0400)
0.0139
(0.0258)
0.0404
(0.0344)
0.0154
(0.0611)

−0.0522
(0.0294)
−0.0478
(0.0252)
−0.0262
(0.0349)
−0.0120
(0.0286)
−0.0019
(0.0367)
−0.0004
(0.0292)
0.0538
(0.0281)
−0.0252
(0.0275)
0.0653
(0.0382)
0.0184
(0.0254)
0.0097
(0.0363)

−0.0507
(0.0294)
−0.0421
(0.0252)
−0.0211
(0.0348)
−0.0195
(0.0287)
−0.0050
(0.0367)
−0.0014
(0.0293)
0.0480
(0.0283)
−0.0136
(0.0273)
0.0658
(0.0383)
0.0231
(0.0252)
0.0120
(0.0365)
265
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−0.0709**
(0.0292)
−0.0411
(0.0254)
−0.0315
(0.0310)
−0.0040
(0.0285)
−0.0159
(0.0398)
0.0073
(0.0304)
0.0555**
(0.0272)
−0.0302
(0.0280)
0.0868**
(0.0402)
0.0141
(0.0258)
0.0416
(0.0344)

(continued)

(1)

(2)

(3)
0.0201
(0.0143)
−0.0465
(0.0445)
−0.0100
(0.0255)
−0.0071
(0.0279)

(4)
0.0167
(0.0142)
−0.0322
(0.0442)
−0.0129
(0.0251)
−0.0094
(0.0277)

No
1,870
−555.1

No
1,870
−538.4

No
1,840
−543.4

No
1,840
−525.9

HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive
1997 earnings ($000s)
2002 earnings ($000s)
Undergrad. loan amount
($000s)
Division ﬁxed effects
N
Log likelihood

(5)
−0.0036
(0.0144)
−0.0438
(0.0434)
0.0033
(0.0265)
0.0171
(0.0286)
−0.0005
(0.0005)
−0.0012**
(0.0003)
0.0040**
(0.0009)
No
1,610
−404.7

(6)
−0.0000
(0.0146)
−0.0399
(0.0443)
−0.0020
(0.0265)
0.0043
(0.0289)
−0.0003
(0.0005)
−0.0012**
(0.0003)
0.0040**
(0.0008)
Yes
1,610
−396.1

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit speciﬁcations for nonpayment in
2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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ful” in terms of repayment of debt depends on the measure. Engineering majors owe a signiﬁcantly smaller share of their debts (than “other”
majors) after 10 years, while social science and humanities majors owe
a larger share. Humanities majors are also in nonpayment on the greatest share of debt. Default rates are lowest for business majors, whereas
health majors default on the lowest fraction of their debts (these are the
only signiﬁcantly different coefﬁcients). In most cases, differences in
these repayment measures across majors are modest compared with differences between blacks and whites.
Differences in repayment/nonpayment across the type of institutional control or selectivity are always small and generally statistically
insigniﬁcant for our sample of 1992–1993 graduates. Among black
borrowers, those attending HBCUs tend to be in nonpayment on signiﬁcantly less debt (roughly 12 percent less); however, other repayment/nonpayment measures show no statistically signiﬁcant effects of
an HBCU. Unfortunately, low sample sizes and correspondingly high
standard errors limit the conclusions we can draw from our analysis of
HBCUs.
Student debt and postschool income levels are both statistically signiﬁcant determinants of all measures of repayment and nonpayment,
although the estimated effects are modest (e.g., an extra $10,000 in
2002 earnings reduces the probability of nonpayment by 1.2 percentage points and $1,000 in additional student debt raises the probability
of nonpayment by 0.4 percentage points). For measures related to the
fraction of student debt outstanding, earnings a few years after school
are more important than earnings 10 years later when we measure
repayment/nonpayment. The opposite is true when considering simple
default/nonpayment rates.

SOME GENERAL LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To the extent that government and private lenders care about
expected returns on student loans they distribute, we show that analyses of default rates at some arbitrary date offer an incomplete picture
for several reasons. First, many borrowers who enter default eventually return to good standing. Second, borrowers enter default at differ-
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(6)
−0.0058
(0.0102)
0.1080**
(0.0212)
0.0164
(0.0219)
0.0031
(0.0330)
0.0086
(0.0126)
0.0062
(0.0135)
0.0216
(0.0147)
0.0009
(0.0110)
−0.0185
(0.0114)
−0.0118
(0.0127)
−0.0001
(0.0002)
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Table 8.9 Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Default 10 Years after Graduation
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Male
−0.0107
−0.0105
−0.0117
−0.0124
−0.0060
(0.0083)
(0.0088)
(0.0084)
(0.0090)
(0.0010)
Black
0.1060**
0.1050**
0.1300**
0.1290**
0.1160**
(0.0163)
(0.0165)
(0.0195)
(0.0196)
(0.0205)
Hispanic
0.0248
0.0249
0.0262
0.0257
0.0297
(0.0177)
(0.0178)
(0.0181)
(0.0182)
(0.0193)
Asian
0.0069
0.0028
0.0077
0.0039
0.0042
(0.0273)
(0.0273)
(0.0278)
(0.0277)
(0.0315)
SAT/ACT Q2
0.0069
0.0052
0.0038
0.0018
0.0060
(0.0111)
(0.0112)
(0.0113)
(0.0114)
(0.0125)
SAT/ACT Q3
0.0026
0.0008
0.0025
0.0004
0.0033
(0.0116)
(0.0118)
(0.0118)
(0.0120)
(0.0132)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0213
0.0163
0.0215
0.0157
0.0192
(0.0124)
(0.0129)
(0.0128)
(0.0132)
(0.0142)
Mother some college
−0.0016
−0.0026
−0.0014
−0.0024
0.0011
(0.0098)
(0.0098)
(0.0099)
(0.0100)
(0.0107)
Mother BA+
−0.0156
−0.0186
−0.0143
−0.0176
−0.0152
(0.0100)
(0.0100)
(0.0102)
(0.0102)
(0.0111)
Dependent
−0.0081
−0.0130
−0.0064
−0.0116
−0.0111
(0.0110)
(0.0111)
(0.0112)
(0.0113)
(0.0122)
Parental income
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0001
× dependent
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
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−0.0208
(0.0382)

−0.0315**
(0.0158)
−0.0213
(0.0152)
−0.0297
(0.0182)
−0.0337
(0.0181)
−0.00849
(0.0253)
−0.0147
(0.0202)
0.0283
(0.0193)
−0.0128
(0.0168)
0.0235
(0.0297)
0.0301
(0.0170)
−0.0232
(0.0242)
−0.0272
(0.0381)

−0.0266
(0.0169)
−0.0317
(0.0166)
−0.0210
(0.0198)
−0.0394**
(0.0198)
−0.00620
(0.0268)
−0.0214
(0.0214)
0.0404
(0.0213)
−0.0133
(0.0182)
0.0179
(0.0312)
0.0277
(0.0185)
−0.0367
(0.0271)
−0.0420
(0.0456)

−0.0235
(0.0171)
−0.0323
(0.0171)
−0.0159
(0.0202)
−0.0424**
(0.0203)
−0.00579
(0.0273)
−0.0199
(0.0224)
0.0375
(0.0219)
−0.0081
(0.0187)
0.0103
(0.0320)
0.0305
(0.0188)
−0.0397
(0.0276)
−0.0310
(0.0463)
(continued)
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−0.0333**
(0.0156)
−0.0229
(0.0150)
−0.0328
(0.0179)
−0.0291
(0.0180)
−0.0115
(0.0251)
−0.0155
(0.0198)
0.0226
(0.0189)
−0.0162
(0.0166)
0.0208
(0.0295)
0.0269
(0.0167)
−0.0212
(0.0241)

(1)

(2)

(3)
−0.0038
(0.0089)
−0.0805**
(0.0322)
0.0187
(0.0160)
0.0079
(0.0174)

(4)
−0.0057
(0.0089)
−0.0803**
(0.0324)
0.0197
(0.0161)
0.0098
(0.0176)

No
1,870
0.0302

No
1,870
0.0434

No
1,840
0.0341

No
1,840
0.0483

HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive
1997 earnings ($000s)
2002 earnings ($000s)
Undergrad. loan
amount ($000s)
State ﬁxed effects
N
R2

(5)
−0.0200**
(0.0098)
−0.0644
(0.0349)
0.0214
(0.0173)
0.0130
(0.0190)
−0.0006**
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0026**
(0.0006)
No
1,630
0.0634

(6)
−0.0117
(0.0105)
−0.0604
(0.0366)
0.0120
(0.0185)
−0.0050
(0.0203)
−0.0005
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0029**
(0.0007)
Yes
1,630
0.0911

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefﬁcient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 8.9 (continued)
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ent times. Total discounted payments are much lower from borrowers
who default (without reentering repayment) early relative to late in their
repayment period. Third, other forms of nonpayment are also important, especially during early years. For example, deferment and forbearance are more common than default 5 years after entering repayment.
Even if borrowers eventually repay their loans, pushing payments years
into the future can be costly to lenders, especially if interest is forgiven.
Differences between default rates and other measures of nonpayment can be sizable. For example, our results suggest that modest
black-white differences in default understate much larger differences in
expected losses when measured by the fraction of initial debt still owed
or in default after 10 years. The opposite is true comparing Asians and
whites. Default and nonpayment rates are high for Asians 10 years into
repayment, but the fraction of debt repaid within 10 years and the fraction in default are not statistically higher than corresponding rates for
whites. Although blacks and Asians default at similar rates, blacks stop
paying their loans early while Asians enter default relatively late.
Not surprisingly, borrowers are less likely to experience repayment problems when they have low debt levels or high postschool earnings. These effects are robust and important. As a ballpark ﬁgure for
all repayment/nonpayment measures, an additional $1,000 in debt can
be roughly offset by an additional $10,000 in income. For example, an
additional $1,000 in student debt increases the share of debt in nonpayment by 0.3 percentage points, while an extra $10,000 in earnings 9
years after graduation reduces this share by 0.4 percentage points.
Given the importance of postschool earnings for repayment, it
is natural to expect that differences in average earnings levels across
demographic groups or college majors would translate into corresponding differences in repayment/nonpayment rates—but this is not always
the case. Despite substantial differences in postschool earnings by race,
gender, and academic aptitude, differences in student loan repayment/
nonpayment across these demographic characteristics are, at best, modest for all except race. And, while blacks have signiﬁcantly higher nonpayment rates than whites, the gaps are not explained by differences in
postschool earnings, nor are they explained by choice of major, type
of institution, or student debt levels. Differences in postschool earnings (and debt) also explain less than half of the variation in repayment/nonpayment across college majors. We estimate little difference
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(6)
−0.0140
(0.0139)
0.1580**
(0.0290)
0.0214
(0.0300)
0.0083
(0.0453)
0.0017
(0.0173)
0.0023
(0.0185)
0.0411**
(0.0202)
−0.0140
(0.0151)
−0.0132
(0.0156)
−0.0015
(0.0174)
0.0000
(0.0002)
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Table 8.10 Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Nonpayment 10 Years after Graduation
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Male
−0.0191
−0.0163
−0.0196
−0.0180
−0.0148
(0.0132)
(0.0139)
(0.0134)
(0.0142)
(0.0137)
Black
0.1340**
0.1350**
0.1590**
0.1560**
0.1590**
(0.0259)
(0.0262)
(0.0311)
(0.0313)
(0.0282)
Hispanic
0.0091
0.0111
0.0109
0.0121
0.0244
(0.0282)
(0.0283)
(0.0289)
(0.0290)
(0.0265)
Asian
−0.0033
−0.0100
−0.0006
−0.0067
0.0033
(0.0434)
(0.0434)
(0.0443)
(0.0443)
(0.0432)
SAT/ACT Q2
−0.0184
−0.0190
−0.0197
−0.0207
−0.0052
(0.0177)
(0.0178)
(0.0181)
(0.0181)
(0.0171)
SAT/ACT Q3
−0.0177
−0.0178
−0.0161
−0.0169
0.0028
(0.0184)
(0.0188)
(0.0189)
(0.0192)
(0.0181)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0266
0.0206
0.0275
0.0204
0.0394**
(0.0198)
(0.0205)
(0.0204)
(0.0211)
(0.0196)
Mother some college
−0.0061
−0.0089
−0.0061
−0.0090
−0.0152
(0.0156)
(0.0156)
(0.0158)
(0.0158)
(0.0148)
Mother BA+
−0.0222
−0.0267
−0.0211
−0.0263
−0.0157
(0.0159)
(0.0159)
(0.0162)
(0.0162)
(0.0152)
Dependent
−0.0014
−0.0054
0.0001
−0.0041
0.0019
(0.0174)
(0.0177)
(0.0178)
(0.0180)
(0.0167)
Parental income
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0002
−0.0001
× dependent
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0002)
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−0.0337
(0.0609)

−0.0345
(0.0252)
−0.0363
(0.0242)
−0.0258
(0.0291)
0.0100
(0.0290)
0.0066
(0.0404)
−0.0260
(0.0323)
0.0152
(0.0308)
−0.0056
(0.0269)
0.0451
(0.0474)
0.0724**
(0.0271)
0.0038
(0.0387)
−0.0420
(0.0609)

−0.0112
(0.0232)
−0.0361
(0.0228)
−0.0171
(0.0272)
−0.0216
(0.0272)
0.0328
(0.0367)
−0.0275
(0.0294)
0.0413
(0.0292)
0.0062
(0.0249)
0.0486
(0.0429)
0.0853**
(0.0254)
0.0110
(0.0372)
−0.0733
(0.0625)

−0.0101
(0.0235)
−0.0424
(0.0234)
−0.0084
(0.0277)
−0.0266
(0.0279)
0.0233
(0.0374)
−0.0280
(0.0307)
0.0330
(0.0300)
0.0078
(0.0256)
0.0359
(0.0438)
0.0809**
(0.0258)
−0.0002
(0.0378)
−0.0590
(0.0635)
(continued)
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−0.0358
(0.0248)
−0.0371
(0.0239)
−0.0300
(0.0284)
0.0150
(0.0286)
0.0062
(0.0399)
−0.0255
(0.0315)
0.0099
(0.0301)
−0.0098
(0.0264)
0.0444
(0.0470)
0.0678**
(0.0266)
0.0058
(0.0384)

HBCU
Competitive
Noncompetitive

0.0091
(0.0141)
−0.0864
(0.0513)
0.0163
(0.0255)
0.0197
(0.0278)

0.0064
(0.0142)
−0.0758
(0.0517)
0.0167
(0.0257)
0.0200
(0.0281)

No
1,840
0.0241

No
1,840
0.0368

1997 earnings ($000s)
2002 earnings ($000s)
Undergrad. loan
amount ($000s)
State controls
N
R2

No
1,870
0.0228

No
1,870
0.0355

−0.0140
(0.0135)
−0.1270**
(0.0479)
0.0235
(0.0238)
0.0193
(0.0261)
−0.0005
(0.0004)
−0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0033**
(0.0009)
No
1,630
0.0655

−0.0006
(0.0145)
−0.1170**
(0.0501)
0.0106
(0.0253)
−0.00482
(0.0278)
−0.0004
(0.0004)
−0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0034**
(0.0009)
Yes
1,630
0.0960

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coefﬁcient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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in repayment/nonpayment across different types of institutions attended
by students.
Our ﬁndings raise a number of important questions. First, what
explains the poor repayment performance for black borrowers conditional on their postschool income, debt, and other demographic characteristics? Recent research by Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu
(2013) suggests that parental transfers are an important determinant
of student loan repayment for Canadian borrowers with low postschool earnings. Given relatively low wealth levels among U.S. blacks
(Barsky et al. 2002; Oliver and Shapiro 1997), it is likely that differences in parental support at least partially explain their high nonpayment rates. This issue certainly merits greater attention.
Second, what explains the large differences in national cohort
rates by institution type (e.g., two- vs. four-year or public vs. private
schools)? Ofﬁcial two-year cohort default rates for the 2010 cohort
are more than twice as high at four-year for-proﬁt schools as they are
at four-year public or private not-for-proﬁt schools (13.6 percent versus 6.0 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively). Yet, our results based
on individual-level data suggest little difference in repayment patterns
across institution types for college graduates. The discrepancy between
our ﬁndings and ofﬁcial default rates can almost certainly be traced to
much higher dropout rates at for-proﬁt schools than at public or private not-for-proﬁt schools (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012) and much
higher default rates for dropouts (Gross et al. 2009). In this case, the
default problem at private for-proﬁt schools may simply be a symptom of an underlying dropout problem. More generally, it is important
to remember that our repayment/nonpayment patterns are based on a
sample of baccalaureate degree recipients, and that some of these relationships might differ for borrowers without a four-year degree.
Third, with so many important changes in the labor market and
higher education sector over the past few decades, how different would
things look for today’s graduates? Recent evidence by Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu (2013) suggests that the role of postschool
income may have become more important for recent students, consistent with increased government attention to repayment enforcement.
The increasing importance of college major as a determinant of earnings
(Gemici and Wiswall 2011) suggests that greater differences in repayment across majors for more recent cohorts might also be expected, but

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 275

1/28/2015 8:24:20 AM

Not paying ×
share of debt
still owed
0.1580**
(0.0290)
0.0083
(0.0453)
0.0411**
(0.0202)
−0.0140
(0.0151)
−0.0132
(0.0156)
−0.0101
(0.0235)
−0.0084
(0.0277)
−0.0266
(0.0279)
0.0078
(0.0256)
0.0809**
(0.0258)
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Table 8.11 Summary of Results from Speciﬁcation (6) for All Repayment/Nonpayment Outcomes
Share of
Default ×
Fraction
Fraction
undergrad debt
share of debt
Variable
still owed
in default
not paying
still owed
Black
0.2160**
0.0554**
0.0853**
0.1080**
(0.0396)
(0.0222)
(0.0247)
(0.0212)
Asian
0.1070
0.0718**
0.0888**
0.0031
(0.0615)
(0.0326)
(0.0377)
(0.0330)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.0289
0.0061
0.0062
0.0216
(0.0276)
(0.0184)
(0.0202)
(0.0147)
Mother some college
−0.0467**
0.0225
0.0076
0.0009
(0.0205)
(0.0142)
(0.0159)
(0.0110)
Mother BA+
−0.0616**
0.0029
−0.0068
−0.0185
(0.0213)
(0.0151)
(0.0168)
(0.0114)
Business
−0.0200
−0.0810**
−0.0507
−0.0235
(0.0320)
(0.0310)
(0.0294)
(0.0171)
Engineering
−0.0896**
−0.0177
−0.0211
−0.0159
(0.0378)
(0.0289)
(0.0348)
(0.0202)
Health
−0.0073
−0.0475
−0.0195
−0.0424**
(0.0380)
(0.0268)
(0.0287)
(0.0203)
Social science
0.0783**
−0.0221
−0.0136
−0.0081
(0.0351)
(0.0241)
(0.0273)
(0.0187)
Humanities
0.0826**
0.0008
0.0231
0.0305
(0.0353)
(0.0226)
(0.0252)
(0.0188)
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HBCU
1997 earnings ($000s)
2003 earnings ($000s)
Undergrad. loan amount
($000s)

0.0409
(0.0686)
−0.0011**
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0133**
(0.0012)

−0.0049
(0.0376)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
−0.0008**
(0.0003)
0.0028**
(0.0008)

−0.0399
(0.0443)
−0.0003
(0.0005)
−0.0012**
(0.0003)
0.0039**
(0.0008)

−0.0604
(0.0366)
−0.0005
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0029**
(0.0007)

−0.1170**
(0.0501)
−0.0004
(0.0004)
−0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0034**
(0.0009)

NOTE: **p < 0.05. The table shows estimated coefﬁcients/average marginal effects from speciﬁcation (6) of Tables 8.6–8.10 if the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant for any repayment or nonpayment outcome. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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this is far from certain given the modest role of earnings differences
in explaining variation in repayment/nonpayment by college major in
our sample. It is even more difﬁcult to predict how other results might
change. Data on more recent cohorts are obviously needed to better
inform current policy debates.
We conclude by arguing that future research and policy discussions
of student loan repayment need to move beyond an exclusive focus on
default rates. Other forms of nonpayment are common, and the actual
timing of default matters as much as whether default occurs.

Notes
We thank Brian Greaney for his excellent research assistance and Brian Jacob and other
participants at the Conference on Student Loans for their comments. We would also like
to thank the Institute of Education and Sciences at the U.S Department of Education for
providing us access to the data. The research results and conclusions are ours and do not
necessarily reﬂect the views of the U.S. Department of Education. This paper has been
screened to ensure that no conﬁdential data are revealed. The views expressed are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily reﬂect ofﬁcial positions of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
1. See College Board (2012) for these and related statistics.
2. See Schwartz and Finnie (2002) and Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu
(2013) for empirical analyses of student loan repayment, delinquency, and default
in Canada.
3. Expected returns on income-contingent lending programs, such as the new Pay
As You Earn student loan repayment program in the United States, can lead to
full or partial loan forgiveness for borrowers experiencing low income levels for
extended periods. This clearly lowers the expected returns on the loans. Furthermore, the timing of payments can affect expected returns if lenders have discount
rates that are different from the nominal interest rates charged on the loans.
4. All averages in the tables in the chapter use the B&B panel weights to account for
the sampling scheme of the original National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
survey and attrition in subsequent surveys.
5. See Gross et al. (2009) for a survey of the literature on student loan default.
6. To understand the implications of these restrictions, we performed an analogous
analysis without imposing the restrictions on months of postgraduate study and
degrees. In regressions using this broader sample (analogous to those used in
Tables 8.5–8.10), we also included indicator variables for the following graduate
degrees: master’s level, professional degree, and doctoral degree. These results
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the text, with a few exceptions speciﬁcally noted below.
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7. These quartiles are based on the test score distributions for the full population
rather than our restricted sample.
8. Our repayment measures are based on individual loan records from the National
Student Loan Data System, accessed in both 1998 and 2003. Loan status (for both
dates) is determined from the most recent available status date at the time records
were accessed. Our measures of default include borrowers who had defaulted or
had expunged their student debt through bankruptcy. Since borrowers may have
more than one loan in the system, we cycle through all government student loans
in a borrower’s records and set the default indicator to one if any of the loans are
determined to be in default (or expunged through bankruptcy). Similarly, if any
loans are in deferment or forbearance, we set the indicator for deferment/forbearance equal to one.
9. Default is deﬁned as 270 days (9 months) of missed payments (excluding borrowers in formal programs designed to reduce payment, such as deferment or
forbearance).
10. Columns (7) and (8) report the sample averages for the shares of unpaid undergraduate loans multiplied by the default and nonpayment indicators, respectively.
11. Throughout the chapter, we refer to results as statistically signiﬁcant based on a
0.05 signiﬁcance level.
12. Tobit estimates generally yield similar conclusions about which variables are
important and their relative magnitudes/signs.
13. Unfortunately, parental income is unknown for students classiﬁed as independent.
14. When we do not exclude borrowers with longer periods of postgraduate studies or
graduate degrees from our sample, Asians have default/nonpayment rates similar
to those of whites and Hispanics.
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Appendix 8A
Supplemental Tables
Table 8A.1 Sample Means for Full Sample and Borrowers Only
Characteristic
Full sample
Borrowers only
Male
0.442
0.444
(0.013)
(0.010)
Asian
0.025
0.031
(0.004)
(0.004)
Black
0.067
0.049
(0.006)
(0.004)
Hispanic
0.060
0.043
(0.007)
(0.004)
White
0.844
0.873
(0.010)
(0.007)
Mother no college
0.442
0.369
(0.013)
(0.009)
Mother some college
0.280
0.263
(0.012)
(0.009)
Mother BA+
0.278
0.368
(0.012)
(0.009)
Dependent
0.576
0.671
(0.013)
(0.009)
Parental income
25.453
41.417
× dependent
(0.856)
(1.151)
SAT/ACT Q1
0.286
0.272
(0.013)
(0.009)
SAT/ACT Q2
0.282
0.290
(0.013)
(0.009)
SAT/ACT Q3
0.247
0.259
(0.012)
(0.009)
SAT/ACT Q4
0.185
0.179
(0.011)
(0.007)
Business
0.240
0.254
(0.014)
(0.010)
(continued)
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Table 8A.1 (continued)
Education
Engineering
Health
Public affairs
Biology
Math/science
Social science
History
Humanities
Psychology
Private for-proﬁt
Private nonproﬁt
HBCU
Most competitive
Competitive
Noncompetitive

0.132
(0.009)
0.073
(0.006)
0.067
(0.006)
0.038
(0.005)
0.047
(0.005)
0.054
(0.005)
0.082
(0.006)
0.018
(0.004)
0.079
(0.006)
0.033
(0.004)
0.022
(0.005)
0.322
(0.013)
0.029
(0.005)
0.063
(0.006)
0.633
(0.013)
0.304
(0.013)

0.117
(0.006)
0.062
(0.004)
0.060
(0.004)
0.038
(0.004)
0.037
(0.003)
0.052
(0.004)
0.090
(0.005)
0.015
(0.003)
0.087
(0.005)
0.032
(0.003)
0.016
(0.003)
0.283
(0.009)
0.020
(0.003)
0.074
(0.005)
0.649
(0.009)
0.278
(0.009)

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 282

1/28/2015 8:24:22 AM

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 283
1/28/2015 8:24:22 AM

(continued)

283

Table 8A.2 Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by
Individual Characteristics (Sample without Graduate School Attendance/Degree Restrictions)
Total
Share of
undergrad
Default × Not paying ×
undergrad
Fraction
Fraction
Earnings
loan amt.
debt still
share of debt share of debt
Characteristic
N
($000s)
($000s)
owed
in default
not paying
still owed
still owed
Full sample
3,790
51.063
9.287
0.233
0.050
0.092
0.029
0.066
(0.864)
(0.133)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.007)
Males
1,620
64.951
9.426
0.206
0.050
0.091
0.029
0.060
(1.595)
(0.216)
(0.012)
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.010)
Females
2,170
39.755
9.176
0.254
0.049
0.092
0.029
0.071
(0.757)
(0.165)
(0.013)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.009)
Asians
120
62.395
8.856
0.286
0.050
0.071
0.009
0.033
(3.150)
(0.604)
(0.063)
(0.020)
(0.023)
(0.006)
(0.017)
Blacks
260
44.910
9.464
0.523
0.098
0.207
0.110
0.243
(1.861)
(0.394)
(0.045)
(0.019)
(0.026)
(0.036)
(0.044)
Hispanics
230
48.860
7.823
0.198
0.070
0.122
0.017
0.055
(2.400)
(0.552)
(0.035)
(0.022)
(0.027)
(0.006)
(0.016)
Whites
3,150
51.032
9.356
0.210
0.045
0.082
0.025
0.055
(0.988)
(0.147)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.007)
SAT/ACT Q1
820
42.424
9.565
0.261
0.057
0.107
0.025
0.073
(1.211)
(0.354)
(0.023)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.010)
SAT/ACT Q2
900
49.344
9.129
0.229
0.041
0.067
0.015
0.041
(1.447)
(0.238)
(0.016)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.008)

Characteristic
SAT/ACT Q3

N
880

SAT/ACT Q4

830

Mother no
college
Mother some
college
Mother BA+

1,490
1,090
1,200

Earnings
($000s)
56.850
(2.274)
57.154
(1.739)
50.677
(1.254)
48.534
(1.339)
53.796
(1.891)

Total
undergrad
loan amt.
($000s)
9.132
(0.251)
9.486
(0.291)
8.732
(0.181)
9.226
(0.226)
10.051
(0.283)

Share of
undergrad
debt still
owed
0.189
(0.019)
0.230
(0.016)
0.243
(0.016)
0.202
(0.013)
0.249
(0.017)
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Table 8A.2 (continued)

Fraction
in default
0.038
(0.006)
0.057
(0.010)
0.055
(0.006)
0.049
(0.008)
0.043
(0.006)

Fraction
not paying
0.082
(0.011)
0.106
(0.012)
0.089
(0.008)
0.095
(0.010)
0.092
(0.010)

Default × Not paying ×
share of debt share of debt
still owed
still owed
0.020
0.044
(0.006)
(0.008)
0.051
0.094
(0.019)
(0.021)
0.023
0.058
(0.004)
(0.009)
0.046
0.085
(0.014)
(0.016)
0.021
0.060
(0.007)
(0.010)

NOTE: The table shows sample means based on sample of borrowers without restrictions on graduate school participation/degrees. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

1/28/2015 8:24:23 AM

Default and Repayment among Baccalaureate Degree Earners 285

References
Barsky, Robert, John Bound, Kerwin Koﬁ Charles, and Joseph P. Lupton.
2002. “Accounting for the Black-White Wealth Gap: A Nonparametric
Approach.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 97(459): 663–
673.
College Board. 2012. Trends in Student Aid, 2012. New York: College Board.
Deming, David J., Claudia Goldin, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2012. “The ForProﬁt Postsecondary School Sector: Nimble Critters or Agile Predators?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(1): 139–164.
Dynarski, Mark. 1994. “Who Defaults on Student Loans? Findings from
the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study.” Economics of Education
Review 13(1): 55–68.
Flint, Thomas A. 1997. “Predicting Student Loan Defaults.” Journal of Higher
Education 68(3): 322–354.
Gemici, Ahu, and Matthew Wiswall. 2011. “Evolution of Gender Differences
in Post-Secondary Human Capital Investments: College Majors.” IESP
Working Paper No. 03-11. New York: Institute for Education and Social
Policy, New York University.
Gross, Jacob P. K., Osman Cekic, Don Hossler, and Nick Hillman. 2009.
“What Matters in Student Loan Default: A Review of the Research Literature.” Journal of Student Financial Aid 39(1): 19–29.
Lochner, Lance, Todd Stinebrickner, and Utku Suleymanoglu. 2013. “The
Importance of Financial Resources for Student Loan Repayment.” CIBC
Working Paper No. 2013-7. Ontario, Canada: Western Social Science.
Oliver, Melvin L., and Thomas M. Shapiro. 1997. Black Wealth/White Wealth:
A New Perspective on Racial Inequality. New York: Routledge.
Schwartz, S., and Ross Finnie. 2002. “Student Loans in Canada: An Analysis of Borrowing and Repayment.” Economics of Education Review 21(5):
497–512.
Volkwein, J. Fredericks, Bruce P. Szelest, Alberto F. Cabrera, and Michelle
R. Napierski-Prancl. 1998. “Factors Associated with Student Loan Default
among Different Racial and Ethnic Groups.” Journal of Higher Education
69(2): 206–237.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 285

1/28/2015 8:24:23 AM

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 286

1/28/2015 8:24:23 AM

9
The Effects of Student Loans
on Long-Term Household
Financial Stability
Dora Gicheva
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Jeffrey Thompson
Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Student debt has been growing at a pace considerably faster than
inﬂation, but so have the costs of and returns to postsecondary education. For full-time undergraduate students in four-year colleges and
universities, the average cost, in 2012 dollars, of published tuition, fees,
room and board net of grant aid and tax beneﬁts has increased from
$7,620 to $11,630 for public institutions and from $17,470 to $22,830
for private nonproﬁt institutions between the 1992–1993 and 2011–2012
academic years (College Board 2012a). Since many students use loans
to supplement grant aid, it is not surprising that the average inﬂationadjusted amount of federal loans per full-time-equivalent (FTE) undergraduate student has increased by over $3,000 (in 2012 dollars) during
the same period (College Board 2012b). Combined with an increase
from 9 million to 14 million FTE undergraduate students and growth in
graduate enrollment and costs, these trends have amounted to remarkable growth in aggregate student borrowing, even without accounting
for the private loan industry and the private for-proﬁt education sector. At the same time, there is evidence that the return to college and
graduate degrees has been increasing as well during the same period,
although it is more difﬁcult to quantify the increase because college and
high school graduates may have different inherent abilities regardless
of educational attainment (Willis and Rosen 1979). Using March Current Population Survey (CPS) data, Avery and Turner (2012) estimate
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that the discounted value of the difference in mean earnings of college
graduates and high school graduates, accounting for tuition payments
and a four-year delay in labor market entry, has increased by more than
$100,000 in 2009 dollars over the period above. It is difﬁcult to disentangle all of these concurrent trends and to determine based on aggregate statistics alone whether the current debt levels are excessively high
or still below the efﬁcient level.
By examining how student borrowers fare ﬁnancially after graduation, we attempt to further the existing knowledge of the costs associated
with education debt and the manageability of the typical debt burden.
We compare the ﬁnancial stability of individuals who have borrowed
for education to similar individuals who have not. We show unintended
consequences of student debt of which borrowers and policymakers
should be mindful: impaired access to ﬁnancial markets after graduation and implied ﬁnancial hardship for many borrowers. Our results,
however, should be interpreted with caution because the optimal level
of student debt and its repercussions vary considerably with individual
ability, family background, and other characteristics. Furthermore, it
is difﬁcult to deﬁne a counterfactual outcome for a student borrower
because this type of debt may have a pronounced positive impact on
one’s lifetime earnings stream or occupational attainment.
We explore further the manageability of student debt for individuals who do not complete a bachelor’s degree, for whom the net beneﬁt
of education loans is expected to be considerably lower without the
boost in earnings associated with a college degree. Wei and Horn (2013)
compare two cohorts of respondents from the Beginning Postsecondary
Survey 1995–1996 and 2003–2004 six years postcollege entry. They
show a steady noncompletion rate but a pronounced increase in the student debt-to-income ratio of individuals in the sample without a degree,
from 24 to 35 percent, as well as a substantial fraction of noncompleters
with debt exceeding annual income. Our study provides more information about the ﬁnancial hardship faced by this segment of borrowers.
We show that, keeping education constant, more student debt is
associated with a higher probability of being credit constrained and
a greater likelihood of declaring bankruptcy. We ﬁnd evidence that
homeownership rates may also be affected by education loans. Controlling for earnings tends to strengthen these relationships, which is
consistent with omitted variable bias combined with positive return to
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student loans. The relationship between education debt and ﬁnancial
status appears to be related to current economic conditions: it weakens when we control for aggregate economic conditions and consumer
bankruptcy rates. Households that hold student debt and include a noncompleter tend to be more credit constrained.
Student loans have undisputed value. Many high school graduates
are otherwise unable to borrow against future income and would not
enroll in college or persist until graduation, owing to credit constraints.
Although there is no consensus in the literature about the fraction of
high school graduates who face credit constraints when making education decisions, researchers are generally in agreement that the importance of these constraints has been increasing since the 1980s.1 There
is further evidence that some students borrow less than the optimal
amount and substitute work hours for loans, which can affect academic
performance and the probability of dropping out (e.g., Berkner, He, and
Cataldi 2002; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003).
The other side of the coin is overborrowing, which can be deﬁned
as borrowing above the efﬁcient amount or beyond what constitutes a
manageable level of debt given the obtained education. Inefﬁciently
high borrowing can occur when students overestimate the expected
returns to education or underestimate the probability of dropping out .2
Lack of full information combined with the high risk inherent in education investments can lead to ﬁnancial hardship for many borrowers.
Hansen and Rhodes (1988) attempt to quantify the manageable education debt level and ﬁnd that in the early 1980s in California, only
about 4 or 5 percent of college seniors held potentially unmanageable
student debt, assuming earnings roughly equal to the average starting
salary for a college graduate at the time ($20,000). The debt levels in
their sample are subject to considerably less variation than what we
currently observe; only 2 percent of the students they analyze accumulated more than $16,000 in debt. Baum and Schwartz (2006) expand the
analysis and point out that the manageable loan repayment to income
ratio increases with household income and varies by family structure,
location, and other demographic characteristics. The median debt level
at the time of their study, $20,000, is manageable for a single individual whose income is at least $30,000. However, student loans may be
one area where focusing on outliers is no less important than analyzing
trends around the median. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of
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New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax data, while 55.5 percent of
borrowers owed $10,000 or less at the end of 2005, 17.7 percent had
a balance of $25,000 or more, with 3 percent owing above $75,000
(Lee 2013). It is of course likely that many borrowers from the right
tail of the debt distribution are also found in the right tail of the income
distribution, for example, individuals who borrowed large amounts to
complete professional degree programs with large expected returns.
Our chapter adds to the existing literature that examines implications of student debt beyond increased educational attainment. Previous
studies have analyzed the relationship between school loans and the
decision to attend graduate school (Fox 1992; Schapiro, O’Malley, and
Litten 1991; Weiler 1994), the choice of specialty by medical school
graduates (e.g., Bazzoli 1985; Colquitt et al. 1996; Hauer et al. 2008;
and Woodworth, Chang, and Helmer 2000, among others), law school
graduates’ choice to enter public sector law (Field 2009; Kornhauser
and Revesz 1995) and other postgraduation career decisions (Minnicozzi 2005; Rothstein and Rouse 2011). These studies are conducted in
fairly specialized settings or focus on the graduates of one speciﬁc institution. Analyses of more inclusive groups of graduates tend to be more
descriptive than causal and ignore the endogeneity of student loans and
a wide range of omitted variables (e.g., Chiteji 2007; Choy and Carroll
2000). Our goal is to study a more nationally representative sample of
households who accrued education debt at different points in time. To
at least partially account for the complex relationship between student
loans, education, career outcomes, and income, we instrument for the
amount borrowed and show results conditional on a rich set of covariates associated with higher labor market earnings. The study extends
Gicheva (2013), where a similar instrumental variable approach is used
and student debt is linked to lower probability of marriage, and Bricker
and Thompson (2013), who ﬁnd correlation between previously accumulated student debt and the likelihood of experiencing ﬁnancial distress during the recession of 2009.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Suppose that household i’s earnings (in their natural logarithm
form) are given by
Yi = f (Si) + εi ,
where S is a measure of the respondent and spouse or partner’s educational attainment that incorporates all productive components of
schooling, such as education quality and highest degree attained. The
additional component εi accounts for all other random and nonrandom
factors that affect earnings. The function f (s) is strictly increasing,
which assumes positive returns to education. Educational attainment is
a function of the amount of accumulated student debt L:
Si = g(Li).
The sign of g’(Li) depends on the counterfactual to a dollar of student
loans. Under a ﬁxed payment schedule, borrowers make a payment that
constitutes a constant fraction of their total debt each period, mL, with
m between zero and one. Household i’s earnings net of the loan payment are thus (Yi – mLi).
Financial distress is experienced when net income falls below a certain
threshold, c. The probability PD of experiencing ﬁnancial distress is
PD = Pr [εi < c – f(Si) + mLi].
This probability increases with the amount borrowed L as long as
ሺܿȂ ݂ሺܵሻ   ݉ܮሻ
ൌ െ݂ ᇱ ሺܵሻ݃ᇱ ሺܮሻ  ݉  ͲǤ
ܮ

Scenario 1: The counterfactual of a dollar of student loans is a dollar in
grant aid or a dollar decrease in the tuition price charged by institutions
of higher education. Then g’(L) = 0, and
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ሺܿȂ ݂ሺܵሻ   ݉ܮሻ
ൌ ݉ǡ;
ܮ

the probability of experiencing ﬁnancial distress increases with student
loans.
Scenario 2: Student debt is associated with increased educational
attainment, so that g’(L) ≥ 0. Then
ሺܿȂ ݂ሺܵሻ  ݉ܮሻ
ൌ െ݂ ᇱ ሺܵሻ݃ᇱ ሺܮሻ  ݉,
ܮ

which may be positive or negative. Holding constant Si , however,
ሺܿȂ ݂ሺܵሻ  ݉ܮሻ
ቤ
ൌ ݉  െ݂ ᇱ ሺܵሻ݃ᇱ ሺܮሻ  ݉Ǥ
ܮ
ௌୀௌҧ

The relationship between ﬁnancial distress and student loans is stronger
and positive when we condition on educational attainment.3
For individuals who obtain some postsecondary education but do
not complete a degree, let
Si = g(̃ Li),
with 0 ≤ g ′̃ (Li) ≤ g'(Li): educational attainment does not increase as
much with the amount borrowed as it does for individuals who attain a
degree. Then under Scenario 1, the relationship between ﬁnancial distress and student borrowing would be similar for completers and noncompleters, but under Scenario 2, the probability of ﬁnancial distress
increases faster with student loans for noncompleters. The difference
between the two groups should narrow once we condition on the available human capital measures. We explore these relationships empirically in the rest of the chapter.
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EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Speciﬁcation
We estimate linear probability models in which the dependent variable is a binary measure of household ﬁnancial stability. The observed
relationship between student debt and the outcomes of interest is likely
to be confounded by unobserved heterogeneity, even when all available
human capital and occupation controls are included. By their nature,
student loans are correlated with the type of education obtained and
with academic success (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003)—variables we do not observe—which may in turn affect factors such as
job stability, starting wages, and career wage growth, as well as other
correlates of ﬁnancial status. To help us avoid some of these issues,
we use an instrument for the amount of accumulated student debt that
exploits time variations in the size of the federal and private student
loan programs.
Our instrument is based on the observed upward trend in student
borrowing since the 1970s, when the federal student loan program was
in its early stages. The growth in the aggregate level of education debt
can be attributed in part to policy changes that should be exogenous to
households’ ﬁnancial stability. There have been multiple reauthorizations of the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 that have impacted the
amount and types of ﬁnancial aid available to postsecondary students.
The 1992 reauthorization has had the strongest impact on federal loans.
The amendment introduced unsubsidized Stafford Loans, increased the
annual and aggregate limits for subsidized Stafford Loans, substantially
increased the annual and eliminated aggregate PLUS Loan limits, and
extended federal loan eligibility to more students from middle- and highincome families. As a result, the total amount of federal student loans,
in 2011 dollars, increased from $23 billion to $35.5 billion between the
1992–1993 and 1994–1995 academic years. The share of all federal
student aid composed of federal loans increased from 61 to 73 percent
over the same period (College Board 2012b). The introduction of nonfederal loans in the mid-1990s also played a major role in the growth of
aggregate student borrowing. Private debt peaked in 2006–2007, when
the total amount of newly borrowed funds accounted for 26 percent of
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all student borrowing and experienced a sharp decline after 2008. It is
more difﬁcult to measure changes in the take-up rate for student loans,
but it has likely increased along with the mean and median debt level
among borrowers. The College Board (2012b) reports that the number of borrowers under the Stafford Loan program increased from 4.4
million in 1995–1996 to 10.3 million in 2010–2011. Increasing costs
of higher education are potentially part of the explanation, as well as
policy changes that increase the appeal of loans for certain groups of
the population, such as allowing parents to defer repayment on PLUS
Loans until six months after the student has left school, changing interest rates, or transitioning toward an online-based FAFSA application.
The instrument we use is constructed as the average amount borrowed per FTE student (including nonborrowers) in constant 2011
dollars, as reported by the College Board (2012b) in the year when a
respondent was 17 years old (this is referred to as the cohort year in the
rest of the chapter).4 High school graduates who made their borrowing
decisions in years that loans were more widely available and commonly
used among one’s peers are more likely to borrow or take on larger debt.
Our instrument accounts for changes in the take-up of student loans as
well as changes in eligibility, so we are able to exploit variations in
both. This instrument is used in Gicheva (2013) to examine the impact
of student debt on the rate of transitioning into ﬁrst marriage. Figure
9.1 shows the values used in the estimation, which combine federal and
private loans. Policy-induced changes, such as the increase in federal
borrowing after the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA or the upsurge
in private loans in the early and mid-2000s, are reﬂected by the trends
depicted in Figure 9.1, where in addition to a steady upward trend we
observe more pronounced jumps in the expected years.
Since the variation in the instrument is only across cohorts, and
the variable exhibits a persistent trend, it is possible that our estimation strategy may pick up similar trends in the outcome variables that
are attributable to other factors unrelated to student borrowing. Figure
9.2 plots homeowner rates for two age groups (25–29 and 45–49), the
annual unemployment rate for one age group (25–29) and the nonbusiness bankruptcy rate per household in years when respondents were
surveyed. The bankruptcy rate ﬂuctuates between less than 1 percent in
1995 and 2007 and 1.3 or 1.4 percent in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2010.
While 40 percent or fewer of younger households own their home, this
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Figure 9.1 Average Education Loans per Full-Time Equivalent Student
(2011 $)
8,000
Total (federal+private) loans per FTE student
7,000

Federal loans per FTE student

6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
$0

SOURCE: College Board (2012b).

fraction is over 70 percent for the older age group. Homeownership
rates increase for 25–29-year-olds between 1995 and 2007, with the
most pronounced increase in the late 1990s, and drop between 2007 and
2010. The decline starts earlier for older individuals, and the preceding
increase is not as pronounced. Other age groups (not plotted in Figure 9.2) are subject to comparable ﬂuctuations. The unemployment rate
ﬂuctuates between 4.7 and 6.1 percent in the ﬁrst ﬁve sampling years
and increases sharply in 2010 to 10.9 percent. Overall, the trends in these
data do not mirror the sustained upward movement exhibited by student
loans, but we nonetheless include the aggregate bankruptcy rate, along
with the homeownership rate by ﬁve-year age group as controls in the
estimation. There may also be spurious correlation in the data between
student debt and economic conditions, such as unemployment due to
recessions happening for unrelated reasons at the time when education
borrowing was on the rise. To account for this we also control for the
survey-year unemployment rate speciﬁc to the age group (in ﬁve-year
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Figure 9.2 Aggregate Trends in Homeownership, Bankruptcy,
and Unemployment
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NOTE: The bankruptcy rate is the annual number of nonbusiness bankruptcy ﬁlings from
the American Bankruptcy Institute divided by total number of U.S. households from the
U.S. census.
SOURCE: Data on household homeownership rates are from the U.S. census. The unemployment rate is reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data.

intervals) of the respondent and spouse or partner. All standard errors in
the regressions are clustered by year of birth, and all regressions use the
standard Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) weights.
Survey of Consumer Finances Data
We use data from the six waves of the SCF conducted between
1995 and 2010. Several features of the survey make it appropriate for
addressing the questions of interest and implementing our empirical
approach. The survey collects very detailed information about households’ ﬁnancial assets and liabilities, including full student borrowing
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histories. This allows us to observe the long-term impact of educationrelated debt, as many borrowers are interviewed 10 years or more after
incurring their debt. The fact that the SCF is a triennial cross-sectional
survey lets us observe the ﬁnancial status of households with student
loans during years characterized by differing economic conditions.
As a survey of household ﬁnances and wealth, the SCF includes
some assets that are broadly shared across the population (bank savings
accounts), as well as some that are held more narrowly and are concentrated in the tails of the distribution (direct ownership of bonds). To
support estimates of a variety of ﬁnancial characteristics as well as the
overall distribution of wealth, the survey employs a dual-frame sample
design.
A national area-probability (AP) sample provides good coverage of
widely spread characteristics. The AP sample selects household units
with equal probability from primary sampling units that are selected
through a multistage selection procedure, which includes stratiﬁcation
by a variety of characteristics, and selection proportional to their population. Because of the concentration of assets and nonrandom survey
response by wealth, the SCF also employs a list sample that is developed from statistical records derived from tax returns under an agreement with Statistics of Income.5 (See Kennickell [2000] for additional
details on the SCF list sample.) This list sample consists of households
with a high probability of having high net worth.6
The SCF joins the observations from the AP and list sample through
weighting.7 The weighting design adjusts each sample separately, using
all the useful information that can be brought to bear in creating poststrata. The ﬁnal weights are adjusted so that the combined sample is
nationally representative of the population and assets. These weights
are used in all regressions.
The SCF measure of student loans combines all debt accumulated
by household members, so we are implicitly making the assumption
that a dollar of student loans has the same impact on household ﬁnancial hardship regardless of whether the debt was incurred by the household head, the head’s spouse, or someone else.8 In our estimation we
account for the likely situation in which parents accumulate education
loans to ﬁnance their children’s education by using information on children’s ages and the time when the debt was incurred. An additional
limitation of the SCF information about student loans is that the year of
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loan origination is replaced by the year of consolidation for loans that
were consolidated.
We focus on three distinct measures of ﬁnancial hardship: 1) being
denied credit, 2) not paying bills on time, and 3) ﬁling bankruptcy in
the 10-year period prior to the interview date. We also construct an
indicator for homeownership as an additional measure of a household’s
ﬁnancial stability.
We restrict the sample to respondents who were born in 1954 or
later (or, in cases when a spouse or partner is present, the average year of
birth is 1954 or higher), because earlier cohorts completed high school
before the federal student loan program took off in the 1970s. We also
drop observations with age lower than 29. Most schooling should be
completed by this age, and in addition, the age restriction eliminates
individuals who were too young to incur consumer debt at the beginning of the 10-year interval covered by the bankruptcy indicator. Furthermore, the excluded age groups tend to have relatively low homeownership rates.9 Other covariates that we include in the regressions
include demographic characteristics of the survey respondent (gender,
race, and a quadratic in age) and indicators for the highest completed
education level, presence of college-age children in the primary economic unit (PEU), and disability status.
Summary statistics of these variables, for respondents in the cohorts
for 1971 and after in the 1995–2010 surveys, are included in Table 9.1.
The different dependent variables we consider in the next section of the
chapter are listed at the top. More than one-third—36.5 percent—of
households indicate that they were either denied credit, granted less
credit than they had applied for initially, or did not apply at all because
they feared rejection in the previous ﬁve years. Jappelli (1990) and Duca
and Rosenthal (1993) ﬁnd that the SCF questions about credit applications and outcomes provide a useful indicator of households that are
credit constrained. Jappelli (1990) ﬁnds that the families who believed
they would be turned down looked and behaved like the families that
had applied for and been denied credit.
Nearly 9 percent of households experienced a spell of late payment
(60 days or more) while paying bills at some point in the last ﬁve years.
Just over 8 percent of households have had a bankruptcy in the last 10
years, and slightly more than 6 in 10 households report owning their
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Table 9.1 Summary Statistics
Variable
Denied credit (or did not apply because
feared rejection)
Late payment (60 days or more) in last
ﬁve years
Bankrupt in last 10 years

Mean
Min
Max
1
0
0.365
(0.481)
1
0
0.085
(0.279)
1
0
0.083
(0.275)
1
0
0.610
Homeowner
(0.488)
1
0
0.542
Female
(0.498)
1
0
0.199
College degree
(0.399)
1
0
0.062
Master’s degree
(0.241)
1
0
0.013
Doctorate
(0.112)
1
0
0.684
White
(0.465)
1
0
0.140
Black
(0.347)
1
0
0.112
Hispanic
(0.315)
70
29
40.564
Age
(7.318)
1
0
0.112
Any college-aged kids in primary
(0.315)
economic unit (18–24)
1
0
0.065
Disabled (either respondent or spouse/
(0.247)
partner)
3.0
0.5
1.0
County per-capita income (“relative”
(0.3)
divided by national average)
16.4
1.1
6.031
County unemployment rate
(2.696)
19.536
0
10.967
Ln(normal income)
(0.953)
13.933
−0.693
10.493
Ln(predicted wage)
(1.597
NOTE: Weighted summary statistics for the 1995–2010 SCF samples. N = 12,413.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data. County per-capita income and the
county unemployment rate are derived from Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
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primary residence, but as Figure 9.2 suggests, the rate varies considerably with age.
Slightly more than half of the respondents are female (54 percent).
Twenty percent report a bachelor’s degree as the highest degree earned,
with 6 percent reporting a master’s, and only 1 percent claiming a PhD.
Nearly 70 percent of the sample is white, 14 percent African American,
and 11 percent Hispanic, with the remainder identifying as either Asian
or “other.” The average age of survey respondents is 40.6. Eleven percent of households live with a college-aged (18–24) person (other than
the spouse). In 1 of every 15 households either the respondent or the
spouse identiﬁes themselves as having a work-related disability.10
Annual average county-level unemployment rate and per-capita
personal income ﬁgures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are
merged into the SCF for each survey year. Unemployment averages
6 percent and ranges from 1.1 to 16.4 percent. In addition to controlling for unemployment at the county level, we include the survey year
age-speciﬁc unemployment rate reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data. Since economic conditions at the time of graduating college have been found to have lasting impact on the return to
schooling (Kahn 2010) and on the decision to continue one’s education
(Johnson 2013), we also control for the cohort year unemployment rate
for 24–29-year-olds in the United States. This variable ranges from 4.1
to 10.7 percent for observations in our sample. County per-capita personal income, relative to the national average, ranges from 0.5 (half the
national average) to 3.0. We also use “predicted wage income,” which
is calculated using the internal SCF data using occupation, human capital, and demographic controls and CPS data.11 Predicted earnings average nearly $52,000 and range from $0 to $1.1 million.12
Figure 9.2 suggests that the outcome variables we consider vary on
an aggregate level with each installment of the SCF and with respondents’ ages. To account for this we also include in the estimation the
survey-year household bankruptcy rate in the United States. We construct this rate as the number of nonbusiness bankruptcy ﬁlings reported
by the American Bankruptcy Institute (n.d.) divided by the U.S. Census
estimate of the total number of households in the United States. Since
the bankruptcy outcome we consider is retrospective, we calculate the
average bankruptcy rate in the survey year and preceding four years to
use in the estimation. The homeownership rates we use are based on
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CPS/Housing Vacancy Survey housing inventory estimates (U.S. Census Bureau n.d.). In the models that estimate the effect of student loans
on the probability of owning a home, we control for the age-speciﬁc
homeowner rate in the survey year.
Nearly one in ﬁve households has some student loan debt, with the
average loan (among debt holders) equal to $32,000. The questions in
the SCF on student loans reﬂect loans with an outstanding balance for
any member of the PEU. Over the period we are studying in this chapter, the share of households with educational loans and the size of the
average loan rose. Table 9.2 shows trends in the share of households in
the age group we study with any student loan debt and the average outstanding balance among those with loans. The share of households with
student loans rose from 16 percent in 1995 to 24 percent in 2010. The
average loan balance rose from nearly $19,000 to more than $37,000
(adjusted for inﬂation using U.S. CPI-U and expressed in 2010 dollars).
Table 9.2 Student Loans in the SCF
Share of PEU with any
student loan debt (%)
1995
16.1
1998
15.1
2001
14.8
2004
16.7
2007
19.1
2010
24.1

Average borrowing ($000s)
among those with debt
18.9
22.1
37.8
29.5
34.3
37.6

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data.

RESULTS
Student Debt and Financial Stability among All Households
We begin our analysis by focusing on one outcome: bankruptcy.
Our estimates for the relationship between student debt and the likelihood of ﬁling for bankruptcy over a 10-year period are presented in
Table 9.3, along with the coefﬁcients on other covariates.
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Column (1) of Table 9.3 shows the ﬁrst-stage estimation results
from a model that includes the full set of controls. The excluded instrument is highly signiﬁcant and has the expected positive sign and an
F statistic of 25.3. A dollar increase in the aggregate annual amount
borrowed per FTE student in the cohort year deﬁned in the previous
section corresponds on average to a $2.53 increase in the total amount
borrowed by the individual and other members of the PEU. More education is naturally associated with higher debt, and so is the presence
of college-age children in the household. Higher predicted earnings
are also correlated with more education debt, consistent with a positive expected return to student loans. The coefﬁcient on the age-speciﬁc
unemployment rate is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
In order to explore the mechanism through which student loans are
related to long-term ﬁnancial distress, we report three sets of secondstage results. The model in column (2) is most parsimonious, using only
student debt, indicators for female, African American, and Hispanic,
and a quadratic in age as explanatory variables, but we still instrument
for the amount borrowed. Debt has a strong positive impact on the probability of ﬁling for bankruptcy, with $1,000 in loans increasing the likelihood by 0.8 percentage points. Based on the argument made earlier in
the “Conceptual Framework” section, adding controls for educational
attainment and other measures of human capital should strengthen the
relationship when the counterfactual of student loans is lower educational attainment, which is indeed what we observe in column (3). This
speciﬁcation includes indicators for undergraduate and graduate degree
attainment, the natural logarithm of predicted earnings and normal
household income, disability status and presence of college-aged children in the PEU, as well as the county unemployment rate and county
per-capita income as controls for economic conditions. The coefﬁcient
on student loans increases to 0.01. This result highlights the importance
of including a rich set of human capital covariates in any model that
examines the implications of student debt.
In the full model in column (4) we add more controls for the economic conditions affecting households in the sample. In particular, we
include the age-speciﬁc unemployment rate at the time of the survey,
the unemployment rate among 24–29-year-olds in the cohort year, and
the ﬁve-year bankruptcy rate. The latter has a very strong, positive, and
highly signiﬁcant effect, with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the
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Table 9.3 Full-Sample Estimation Results for the Probability of
Bankruptcy
(1)
First stage
(full model )
Amount borrowed
Average loans per FTE
College degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate
College-aged kids in
household
Disabled
County relative percapita income
County unemployment
rate
Ln(normal income)
Ln(predicted earnings)
Age-speciﬁc
unemployment rate
Cohort unemployment
rate aged 24–29
Five-year bankruptcy
rate
Constant

0.00253***
(4.655)
3.273***
(3.749)
8.418***
(5.005)
15.51**
(2.676)
2.329***
(3.722)
0.372
(0.625)
0.307
(0.430)
0.0208
(0.148)
0.989
(1.482)
0.719***
(4.906)
0.831***
(4.203)
−1.055
(−0.669)
155.9
(0.944)
−5.308
(−0.517)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.00793***
(4.037)

0.00956***
(3.674)

0.00644**
(2.089)

−0.113***
(−10.06)
−0.162***
(−6.266)
−0.288***
(−5.489)
−0.0139
(−0.744)
0.0487***
(3.442)
−0.0607***
(−3.679)
-0.00325
(−1.669)
−0.0208**
(−2.702)
0.00437*
(1.815)

−0.103***
(−8.109)
−0.137***
(−4.369)
−0.239***
(−4.375)
−0.00756
(−0.433)
0.0488***
(3.471)
−0.0527***
(−3.519)
0.000557
(0.274)
−0.0189***
(−2.978)
0.00612**
(2.661)
0.00705
(1.218)
0.0104
(0.486)
17.86***
(4.689)
−0.624***
(−5.144)

−0.740***
(−6.158)

−0.494***
(−3.866)

NOTE: *signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; **signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; ***signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. The dependent variable is an indicator for bankruptcy during the previous 10 years. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include controls for
female, black, Hispanic, age, and age squared.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data (cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rates), and the American Bankruptcy
Institute (bankruptcy rate).
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aggregate bankruptcy rate increasing the 10-year probability of observing bankruptcy in our sample by 1.8 percentage points. The coefﬁcient
on the amount of student loans decreases but remains positive and signiﬁcant (0.006).
The results from the full model in Table 9.3 are summarized in column (1) of Table 9.4, which also shows the estimation results for the
other three outcomes of interest. All speciﬁcations in Table 9.4 include
the full set of controls, and in the homeownership model we also hold
constant the survey year homeowner rate by ﬁve-year age group. The
coefﬁcient on the amount borrowed for education has the “anticipated”
sign when we consider the probability of being denied credit (column
[2]) or owning a home (column [4]). While the coefﬁcient in column (1)
is positive and the same in magnitude as the one in the bankruptcy speciﬁcation, it is not statistically different from zero (t-statistic of 1.3). On
the other hand, $10,000 more in student loans decreases the probability
of owning a home by 9 percentage points; this estimate is signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level. The coefﬁcient in the late payment speciﬁcation
(column [3]) is negative, close to zero in absolute value, and not statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, the results from the speciﬁcations in Table 9.4 are suggestive of a potentially causal relationship between outstanding student
Table 9.4 Full-Sample Estimation Results, All Outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
Late
Dependent variable Bankrupt Denied credit payments
Amount borrowed 0.00644**
0.00643
−0.00274
(2.089)
(1.322)
(−1.105)
Five-year
17.86***
−0.283
4.696
bankruptcy rate
(4.689)
(−0.0699)
(1.653)
Age-speciﬁc
homeowner rate

(4)
Homeowner
−0.00899*
(−1.726)
3.733
(0.744)
−0.0232
(−0.595)

NOTE: *signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; **signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; ***signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All speciﬁcations include the controls from the full model in Table 9.3.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data (cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rates), the American Bankruptcy Institute (bankruptcy rate), and the U.S. Census (homeownership).
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loan balances and household ﬁnancial distress, but the ﬁndings are not
particularly strong and tend to be noisy. The coefﬁcients on the education variables in Table 9.3 also indicate that since higher attainment
levels are negatively related to various ﬁnancial distress measures, we
might be able to get a clearer picture of the long-term impacts of student
loans by contrasting completers and noncompleters. As discussed in the
“Conceptual Framework” section, we expect the relationship between
student loans and ﬁnancial distress to be more pronounced for individuals who attend college without attaining a degree. The next section
of results includes a series of speciﬁcations in which we contrast the
impact of outstanding student loan debt on ﬁnancial distress measures
for college completers and noncompleters.
Results by College Completion Status
We focus on college attendance because it is by far the most common level of postsecondary education in the data and among the U.S.
population, and because the consequences of holding student debt and
not completing an undergraduate degree are an important policy concern. As shown earlier in Table 9.1, college as the highest degree attained
is much more common than graduate degrees. The more detailed college attendance and completion statistics in Table 9.5 show that only
one quarter as many respondents (and spouses) report graduate school
as the highest level of school attended as college. The rate of completion is also much higher among those who attend graduate school; only
1 in 10 graduate school attending respondents or spouses fail to complete.13 Because there are relatively few graduate school attendees and
Table 9.5 Sample Distribution of College and Beyond College
Attendance and Degree Completion
Respondent
Spouse
Noncompleter Completer Noncompleter Completer
Highest level of
attendance
College
2,060
3,365
1,306
2,856
Graduate school
205
1,862
140
1,171
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using SCF data.
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even fewer noncompleters, the next step of our analysis focuses only on
cases with college as the highest level of attendance.
Table 9.6 contains the key coefﬁcient of interest, the one on student loans, for a similar instrumental variable speciﬁcation for each of
the dependent variables, as shown in Table 9.4, using several different
sample selections to contrast completers and noncompleters among college attenders. The speciﬁcations include indicators for female, black,
and Hispanic, a quadratic in age, county relative per-capita income,
the county unemployment rate, the cohort unemployment rate for age
24–29, the ﬁve-year bankruptcy rate, and the age-speciﬁc homeowner
rate in the case of the homeowner speciﬁcations. We estimate each
model both with and without the predicted wage variable. Earlier we
posit that holding constant the portion of earnings that varies with the
amount and quality of schooling would magnify the coefﬁcient on student loans more for completers than for noncompleters when education
loans are not directly replaceable by grant aid. The odd-numbered columns in Table 9.6 contain results for the speciﬁcations without predicted
earnings, while the results in the even-numbered columns account for
this measure of schooling and occupation.
Because the SCF student loan questions pertain to any outstanding
loans for any member of the PEU, it is possible that the debt will actually be for currently (or recently) attending children and not have meaningful relationship with the college completion status of the respondent or spouse/partner. To isolate households where the loans are for
the respondent and/or spouse/partner, we further restrict the sample of
“noncompleters” to exclude households with both college-aged kids
(18–24) in the home and with any of the student loans taken out within
the past three years.
We consider three subsamples of college attenders. Results for the
broadest subsample, including all PEUs where either the respondent
or the spouse has college as the highest level attended, are contained
in Panel A. Panel B includes results for a second subsample, which
includes cases where either the respondent or the spouse has college
as the highest level of school attended, while the other member of the
couple reports some lower level of attendance. The ﬁnal subsample is
restricted to households where both the respondent and the spouse/partner (if there is one present) have college as the highest level of school
attended (Panel C).
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The consistent result across each of the three subsamples of college
attenders is that the magnitude of the impact of outstanding student
loan balances is much greater among noncompleters than among those
who obtain a college degree. The coefﬁcient on student loans is almost
always greater in absolute value in the noncompleter speciﬁcations. In
addition, adding the predicted wage to the models tends to decrease the
difference between the two groups.
Among households where either the respondent or the spouse/partner (possibly both) failed to complete college, $1,000 in outstanding
education loans raises the probability of bankruptcy by 1.2 percentage
points (Panel A, columns [5] and [6]) and lowers the probability of
owning a home by 1.4 percentage points (column [4]). The student debt
coefﬁcients for the other outcomes have the anticipated sign but are
not signiﬁcant at standard levels. Among college completers, only the
coefﬁcient for late payments is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level, though the magnitude of the student loan debt measure is slightly
lower than it is for noncompleters.
In the households where the sole college attender did not receive
a degree, $1,000 in outstanding college debt raises the probability of
experiencing bankruptcy in the last 10 years by almost four percentage points. That level of outstanding loans decreases the probability of
owning a home by 5.6 percentage points. The effects of debt are much
smaller, and largely not signiﬁcant, among households where the sole
college attender completed his or her degree. The coefﬁcient for late
payments, while borderline insigniﬁcant, is positive and larger than that
for noncompleters, where the point estimate is negative.
Among households in which both the respondent and spouse/partner attended college and at least one person failed to complete, $1,000
in outstanding student loan debt raises the probability of having late
payments by two percentage points and decreases the probability of
owning a home by three percentage points. There is only one outcome
where the coefﬁcient on outstanding student loans is statistically significant among completers when we condition on the CPS earnings variable (late payments). In each case, however, the magnitudes on these
coefﬁcients are much smaller among completers, ranging from oneﬁfth to one-half as large as the effects among noncompleters.
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Table 9.6 Coefﬁcients on Amount Borrowed by Dependent Variable and Completion Status for College
Attenders (Any College Attended)
(2)
Denied credit
Panel A
At least one college
attender among
respondent (R)
and spouse/partner
(SP)
At least one attender
(1)
fails to complete
All attenders
complete
Panel B
Only one college
attender among
respondent and
spouse/partner
Attender fails to
complete
Attender completes

(3)
(4)
Late payments

(5)
(6)
Bankruptcy

0.0124** 0.0124**
(2.424)
(2.324)
0.000823 0.00168
(0.913)
(1.132)

0.00685
(0.966)
0.00229
(0.808)

0.00842
(1.111)
0.00874
(1.051)

0.00559 0.00689
(1.021) (1.175)
0.00184 0.00400*
(1.443) (1.854)

0.0167
(0.467)
0.00280
(0.355)

0.0220
(0.575)
0.00279
(0.338)

−0.00876 −0.00816 0.0396* 0.0387*
(−0.449) (−0.400)
(1.976)
(1.883)
0.00686 0.00756 −0.00106 −0.00118
(1.584) (1.665)
(−0.358) (−0.399)

(7)
(8)
Homeowner

N

−0.00637 −0.0138** 4,047
(−1.016) (−2.182)
−0.00144 −0.00671 2,921
(−0.558) (−1.640)

−0.0399* −0.0562*
(−1.694) (−1.917)
0.0126
0.00909
(1.406)
(1.118)

1,604
1,758
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Panel C
Respondent and
spouse/partner
both attend college
At least one attender
fails to complete
Both attenders
complete
Control for
Ln(predicted
earnings)

0.00571
(1.084)
0.00170
(0.721)
No

0.00830
(1.102)
0.00414
(1.210)
Yes

0.0125 0.0201*
(1.549) (1.804)
0.00235* 0.00386**
(1.764) (2.069)
No
Yes

0.00665
(0.648)
0.00192
(1.480)
No

0.00578
(0.445)
0.00244
(1.534)
Yes

−0.0113 −0.0296** 1,058
(−1.117) (−2.180)
−0.00226 −0.00574 1,276
(−0.775) (−1.591)
No
Yes

NOTE: *signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level; **signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; ***signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
All speciﬁcations include the controls for female, black, Hispanic, a quadratic in age, county relative per-capita income, the county
unemployment rate, the cohort unemployment rate for aged 24–29, the ﬁve-year bankruptcy rate, and the age-speciﬁc homeowner rate
(columns [7] and [8]).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from the SCF, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (county income and unemployment rate), the
Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data (cohort-speciﬁc unemployment rates), the American Bankruptcy Institute (bankruptcy rate),
and the U.S. Census (homeownership).
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DISCUSSION
Our results indicate that holding student debt is likely associated
with decreased ﬁnancial stability, particularly for individuals who accumulate debt but do not complete a bachelor’s degree. Several related
mechanisms can lead to the observed relationship between student
loans and ﬁnancial distress. Further work is needed to provide more
information about the speciﬁc issues caused by education debt. Debt
repayment has a direct impact on disposable income, which can place
ﬁnancial strain on households when combined with liquidity constraints
that prevent graduates from borrowing against future income. Brown
and Caldwell (2013) show a recent trend in the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Consumer Credit Panel of 25- and 30-year-old student borrowers having lower credit scores on average than the scores of similarly aged nonborrowers. This comparison, however, does not account
for correlates of income, ﬁnancial stability, and good credit rating that
are linked to student debt, such as educational attainment and occupation. Homeownership can be affected through a higher consumer
debt-to-income ratio, which mortgage lenders take into account, or the
ability to save enough for a down payment. Even if student debt does
not play a role in the rate at which graduates transition into homeownership, it can affect the value of the homes they purchase or the resources
that are devoted to other consumption categories.
Changing aggregate labor market conditions may indirectly lead us
to observe a relationship between education loans and ﬁnancial hardship if the ongoing steady increase in student borrowing has coincided
with continued decline in the returns to postsecondary education. Under
this scenario, it would not be the case that loans per se cause ﬁnancial hardship. Households that obtained schooling in more recent years
would fare worse ﬁnancially, owing to the lower returns to their education, but such households are also more likely to hold debt because
of exogenous increases in aggregate borrowing. However, trends from
the March CPS suggest increasing, not decreasing, high school–college
wage differential (see, for example, Avery and Turner [2012] and Day
and Newburger [2002]).
Given the high uncertainty in the ex post return to a college or
advanced degree, the observed levels of student borrowing may be
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ex ante efﬁcient, but the households that are the “lottery losers” are
observed experiencing ﬁnancial distress. Student debt generally cannot be discharged in personal bankruptcy, and therefore borrowers
who experience bad income shocks after graduation are unable to use
a major component of the safety net available to holders of other types
of debt. Borrowers who leave school without completing a degree have
been identiﬁed as a group that is particularly susceptible to being burdened by student debt, and we present evidence that conﬁrms this. The
currently existing insurance mechanism that is built into the federal
loan program includes such options as income-contingent and incomebased repayment plans and deferment options, but private student loans
come with little borrower protection. Our results may indicate the need
for more borrower protection, although we draw no conclusions about
the potential for moral hazard issues with which such policies may be
associated.

Notes
The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. The authors
would like to thank Jesse Rothstein and other participants at the Upjohn/EPI/Spencer
Conference on Student Loans for their helpful comments.
1. See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) for an overview of the literature.
2. For example, Avery and Kane (2004) observe this trend among Boston high school
students coming from both low-income and more afﬂuent families. Avery and
Turner (2012) show that in the Beginning Postsecondary Survey 2004:2009, 38
percent of dependent students entering college in 2003 who expect to attain a BA
degree have not earned any postsecondary degree by 2009; 51 percent of these
students end up with student loans, with the average borrower holding $14,500
in student debt. According to analysis of the same data presented by the College
Board (2012b), 5 percent of students who borrowed $75,000 or more and 10 percent of students who borrowed between $50,000 and $75,000 left school without
a degree by 2009.
3. As researchers, we observe an imperfect measure of schooling Si and occupation.
In our empirical analysis it is used to construct a predicted wage income variable
that is based on Current Population Survey (CPS) respondents’ earnings.
4. Since in our data student loans are measured at the household level in our data, for
respondents with a spouse or partner we use the mean of the two ages.
5. See Wilson and Smith (1983) and Internal Revenue Service (1992) for a description of the Statistics of Income ﬁle. The ﬁle used for each survey largely contains
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6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

data from tax returns ﬁled for the tax year two years before the survey takes place.
See Kennickell (1998) for a detailed description of the selection of the 1998 list
sample.
For reasons related to cost control on the survey, the geographic distribution of the
list sample is constrained to that of the area-probability sample.
The evolution of the SCF weighting design is summarized in Kennickell (2000),
with additional background by Kennickell and Woodburn (1992).
In this chapter we use the term household for simplicity. The SCF actually uses a
concept of primary economic unit (PEU), which includes family members living
together in the housing unit who are ﬁnancially dependent on the respondent. Family here includes unmarried partners and their children. Residents of the household
who do not usually live in the residence or who are economically independent of
the survey respondent are not considered to be part of the PEU, and any student
loans they may hold are not included in the SCF.
See, for example, U.S. Census Bureau (2013).
The disability status is not necessarily caused by work but is identiﬁed by the
respondent in a battery of questions about employment status.
As described in the 2010 SCF documentation:
For each occupation group, regressions were run separately for males and females
of the log of annualized wages on a constant, a spline on age [AGE, MAX(0, AGE35), MAX(0, AGE-55))], a dummy variable for part-time employment (1 = working
fewer than 20 hours per week), a dummy variable for self-employment (1 = selfemployed), a dummy for race (1 = Hispanic or nonwhite), and dummy variables
for years of education (1 = 12 years of education, some college or an associate’s
degree, bachelor’s degree, higher degree than bachelor’s degree). If there were too
few people in a CPS three-digit occupation group, either the SCF case was matched
to a neighboring occupation group, or the match was made at the level of the twodigit occupation code. Some of the model coefﬁcients may be identically zero where
there are too few cases in the appropriate cells in the CPS data to identify these coefﬁcients; for example, a coefﬁcient for the (36,55) element of the age spline may be
identically zero if there are no CPS cases in that age group for the given occupation.

12. Before taking the natural log of predicted earnings, which is the variable included
in the regressions below, we add $0.50 to all observations reporting zero predicted
earnings. Predicted earnings are not adjusted for inﬂation.
13. Attendance and completion in the SCF are constructed from two variables. The
attendance variable asks (separate for respondent and spouse) the highest level
of school attended, including four possible responses for college (one, two, three,
or four years of college) and only one for any level of graduate school attended.
Among those with any college attendance, both respondent and spouse are asked
the degree completed with 10 options, including associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s,
and a variety other advanced degrees.
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In 2012 total student loan debt in the United States reached an alltime high of $966 billion, with one-third of that debt held by 15 million
people under age 30 (Lee 2013). Student loans are now the primary
means through which American families ﬁnance postsecondary education. With the costs of attendance higher than ever, and grant aid often
available only for the ﬁnancially needy or exceptionally talented, nearly
two-thirds of all undergraduates receive at least some governmentbacked credit to cover those costs. That credit is comparatively accessible, requiring a lengthy application but no credit history, and students
and families can borrow a sizable amount of money. Yet not all students
and families borrow, even when declining to borrow means that they
are hard-pressed to afford college, and there is little evidence to help
account for that apparent aversion. Thus, while there is widespread concern about the amount of borrowing and “overborrowing,” high rates
of delinquency and default in some sectors of the market, and debate
about whether the resulting debt-income ratio is appropriate, deepening
our understanding of the initial borrowing decision itself remains an
important task.
Since college attainment is tightly linked to families’ ability to pay
for college (e.g., Bailey and Dynarski 2011), substantial inequalities
arise from students’ need to borrow and their decisions about how to
respond to that need. Two groups of students on opposite ends of the
income spectrum often ﬁnd themselves able to avoid borrowing. The
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ﬁrst group is exceptionally wealthy, possessing the ﬁnancial strength
to cover college costs without credit, while the second group is exceptionally poor (and often quite talented), thus receiving sufﬁcient grant
aid to cover costs without need for credit. Most students and families
fall into the great grey middle in between. These people have demonstrable ﬁnancial need (as calculated by formulaic federal needs analysis), meaning that there is a gap between their available resources and
the costs of college attendance. They are nearly always offered loans,
but a sizable fraction decline to take them.1 This is especially common
among students from lower-income families; national data suggest that
as many as 45 percent of the neediest undergraduates do not take up
loans, even though this leaves them short of the resources required to
cover their costs of attendance (Cunningham and Santiago 2008).2
Declining loans that could help meet the costs of college attendance is typically referred to as loan aversion and according to some
economists constitutes bizarre behavior (Cadena and Keys 2013). But
aversion is a frequently used but poorly understood term, since it is
unclear whether these students are actually averse to loans (implying
a belief about borrowing), have a lack of information about them, or
are not offered them at all (The Institute for College Access and Success [TICAS] 2007). In addition, since data on loan aversion typically
come from student surveys, it is difﬁcult to know whether stated attitudes translate into action. Finally, there is little systematic information
about demographic differences in loan aversion and to what they may
be attributed.
This generally weak knowledge base means that it is unclear
whether and what kind of intervention is required and/or appropriate to
encourage borrowing among (some) students to increase their chances
of degree completion. In addition, more research is needed to determine
the processes underlying the decision to forgo student loans, and in particular whether that decision constitutes loan aversion.
With these challenges in mind, this chapter contributes to the study
of loan aversion by drawing on a comprehensive set of information
about a focal group of students: Pell Grant recipients. The relatively low
graduation rate of Pell recipients is a national concern and the focus of
numerous initiatives such as the “Reimagining Aid Design and Delivery” project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Since
the purchasing power of the Pell Grant is at its lowest point in history
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(covering just 30 percent of the costs of a public four-year university on
average), even low-income students have to cover as much as $12,000
of college costs on their own (Goldrick-Rab 2013). Why do some lowincome students accept loans to cover this need while others do not?
We begin by triangulating evidence from both surveys and administrative records to get a handle on how differences in the measurement
of loan-taking decisions might affect conclusions. We next examine
differences in those decisions among more than 600 ﬁrst- time undergraduates receiving the Pell Grant across 10 of Wisconsin’s public universities. In particular, we attend to demographic variation suggested by
prior literature, including disparities based on race/ethnicity, parental
education, and immigrant status. We also consider the role played by
the institutional contexts where students attend college by examining
the associations between loan decisions and university characteristics.
After replicating some key borrowing disparities noted in earlier studies, we test several explanations for these differences. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the moderating effects on loan decisions according to families’
ﬁnancial resources; perceived returns to education; ﬁnancial knowledge; attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social
capital. Finally, we examine the evidence regarding the association
between loan taking and educational outcomes.
Overall, our ﬁndings strongly suggest that the manner in which loan
decisions are measured have serious implications about the prevalence
and antecedents of so-called loan aversion. Some analyses indicate that
the decision to decline loans may be a strategy undertaken by students
with strong family commitments and those living in contexts where the
use of credit for consumption is normalized. We conclude with a discussion of future areas for research and intervention, noting that there are
still many unknowns regarding the consequences of loan taking, both
on average and for different groups of students. This chapter suggests
that loan aversion may not be something to overcome, but that it may in
fact beneﬁt some students, perhaps while hampering the college attainment of others.
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TRENDS IN COLLEGE FINANCING AND LOAN TAKING
The United States has never had a free system of public higher
education; instead, political goals of equitable opportunity are pursued through a complex price-discounting strategy known as ﬁnancial
aid. To induce students from low-income families to choose college,
government, philanthropy, and educational institutions collaboratively
frame college enrollment as an affordable decision for all qualiﬁed students. Families and students are encouraged to embrace the ﬁnancial
aid system’s workings, norms, and values, which include the contention
that higher education yields private and public returns, and individuals
should therefore feel comfortable taking on debt to invest in their human
capital development (Baum and Schwartz 2012; Leslie and Brinkman
1987; Manski and Wise 1983; McPherson and Schapiro 1991). Institutions of higher education are then left to determine the value of their
services and set their own prices. The return to individual investments
is expressed in terms of increased earnings observed at some time in the
future, but it requires signiﬁcant near-term sacriﬁce (Carnevale, Rose,
and Cheah 2011). Concomitantly, because of the social beneﬁts accrued
to an educated populace, the government asserts its authority to help
ensure that low-income citizens can pursue higher education through
vouchers (such as Pell Grants) and government-managed loan systems
(Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 2012).
The availability and use of federal loans has changed radically over
time. Prior to the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act, federal loans consisted almost entirely of subsidized loans targeting needy
families. Total federal loan volume was around $22 billion (in 2011
dollars) in 1991–1992. Over the course of the next year, that number
grew by almost 50 percent with the introduction of unsubsidized loans,
which at the time constituted 9 percent of all student loan dollars across
all sources. The growth of unsubsidized loans was dramatic, swelling
from about $10 billion (in 2011 dollars) in 1995–1996 to more than $20
billion in 2005–2006, and to almost $50 billion in 2011–2012. Those
increases correspond to real declines in family income associated with
the recession and increasing college costs, including at public colleges
and universities. Growth in subsidized loans was slower, since they are
means-tested and less available (Baum and Payea 2012).
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Currently, dependent undergraduate students can borrow up to
$5,500 in Stafford Loans (including a maximum of $3,500 in subsidized loans) in their ﬁrst year of study, and up to $6,500 (including up to
$4,500 in subsidized loans) in their second year. The limit for the third
year and beyond is $7,500 (including up to $5,500 in subsidized loans).
Average total borrowing per full-time equivalent undergraduate student
rose by 45 percent, from $3,677 (in 2011 dollars) to $5,335 between
2001–2002 and 2006–2007, and by another 4 percent to $5,540, in
2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012).
With declining family resources and higher costs of attendance,
students today by and large cannot forgo loans and instead turn to
work to ﬁll the ﬁnancial holes. The average unmet ﬁnancial need of
Pell recipients is about $12,000 at four-year colleges and universities; a
student must work, at federal minimum wage, almost 35 hours a week,
52 weeks a year, to cover those costs, which research suggests is nearly
impossible if the student hopes to complete college on time (GoldrickRab 2013). Moreover, while many students have an “expected family
contribution,” (EFC) which suggests that the family should be able to
pay for college, some families are unable or unwilling to do so, and
thus students borrow unsubsidized loans to cover that EFC. It is therefore unsurprising that over the last decade, the total number of federal
Stafford Loan borrowers increased by 95 percent, from 5.4 million in
2001–2002 to 10.4 million in 2011–2012 (Baum and Payea 2012). This
means that the percentage of undergraduates holding loans grew from
23 to 35 percent over that 10-year period. Moreover, the percentage
of undergraduates borrowing both subsidized and unsubsidized federal
loans grew from 9 percent in 2001–2002 to 25 percent in 2011–2012
(College Board 2012).
Borrowing is more common among students at public universities and less so among students attending public two-year colleges.
The percentage of students borrowing to attend public universities
has remained steady at around 55 percent since 1999, but the average
amount borrowed among bachelor’s degree recipients has grown from
just over $20,000 to nearly $25,000. In addition, borrowing grew more
rapidly from 2005–2006 to 2010–2011 than it had during the preceding
ﬁve years. Debt per borrower grew at an average annual rate of 2.1 percent beyond inﬂation, and average debt per graduate grew at an average
annual rate of 2.7 percent (Baum and Payea 2012).
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Students from low-income families are far more likely to borrow
for college. An analysis of bachelor’s degree recipients graduating from
public universities in 2007–2008 found that 68 percent of students from
families earning less than $30,000 per year had an average cumulative debt load of $16,500, while just 40 percent of students from families earning $120,000 or more annually held any debt, with an average
amount of $14,500 (Baum and Payea 2012). The resulting disparity
in debt-to-income ratio is substantial—low-income families hold debt
amounting to about 70 percent of their income, while wealthier families
have debt amounting to around 10 percent of income (a rate deemed
manageable by the ﬁnancial industry).3
Evidence from several waves of the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) suggests that between 40 and 50 percent
of students borrowing subsidized Stafford Loans took the maximum
allowable amount over the past two decades, even after two increases in
the maximum. More than one in four students borrowing the maximum
amount of federal loans in the 2007–2008 academic year also took out
a private loan or a federal PLUS loan (Wei and Skomsvold 2011). This
suggests that more students are borrowing close to the limits and that
loan caps may contribute to the mistaken appearance of loan aversion.
There is some evidence that loan limits may hinder the ability of a small
number of students to complete college; for example, recent work by
Johnson (2013) found that a simulated $5,000 increase in student loan
limits would increase bachelor’s degree attainment rates by 0.7 percentage points. Thus, even in the face of growing concern about the overall
amount of borrowing, there is some reason to think that in the current
context, students from low-income families might face greater odds of
college success if they were willing or able to borrow more.

A DESCRIPTIVE PORTRAIT OF LOAN AVERSION
The body of research on loan aversion is mainly descriptive, with
a few multivariate studies and laboratory experiments included. These
provide a broad sense of the characteristics of students who decline
loans, and some targeted tests of whether that apparent aversion can be
overcome through intervention.
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The NPSAS of 2003–2004 can be used to form a portrait of loanaverse students.4 An examination of this data by Cunningham and
Santiago (2008) conﬁrms that students who decline to borrow have
less unmet need—simply put, they do not need to borrow. In addition, among students with a signiﬁcant amount of unmet need ($2,000
or more), loan aversion is more common among students from lowincome families, those who attend part time, and students attending
public four-year (rather than private four-year) institutions. Loan aversion is less common among black students compared to white students,
and it is more common among Asian and Hispanic students compared
to white students.
After comparing these results to data from the 1992–1993 NPSAS,
Cunningham and Santiago (2008) note that racial/ethnic differences in
borrowing seem to be a new phenomenon, emerging with the growth
of students borrowing associated with the use of unsubsidized loans.
This raises additional questions about whether the use of subsidized
and unsubsidized loans differs by race/ethnicity as well.5 It is worth
noting that research evidence has clearly established racial/ethnic variation in rates of loan default, with black students at the greatest risk of
defaulting on their loans (Gross et al. 2009), even as the loans may be
more effective in increasing completion rates (Jackson and Reynolds
2013).
Smaller qualitative studies identify similar patterns. For example,
Burdman (2005) conducts interviews with students, counselors, outreach professionals, and ﬁnancial aid administrators that suggest that
aversion to loans may reduce opportunities for a subset of low-income
and minority students, particularly low-income, ﬁrst-generation, and
Mexican-American students. She ﬁnds that students whose parents had
less education appeared more likely to work full time and avoid borrowing than students whose parents have college or graduate degrees.
Among full-time students, those whose parents did not ﬁnish high
school were more than twice as likely as those whose parents had graduate degrees to work full time instead of borrowing. Among full-time
dependent students, low-income students were less likely to borrow
than other students, and when they did borrow, they took smaller loans.
But debt aversion, she suggested, may also affect the initial choice of
whether and where to attend college—before students have the opportunity to actually receive a loan offer and reject it.
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However, other evidence suggests that students may be mislabeled
as loan averse when they are actually amenable to borrowing. For example, Eckel et al. (2007) study educational ﬁnance preferences using an
experiment in which real money was distributed (e.g., the choices were
not hypothetical). The sample was drawn from across Canada and
included 900 students aged 18–55 who were recruited for participation
in the exercise. Based on the results, the authors conclude that debt
aversion plays little or no role in the demand for postsecondary education ﬁnance in the form of a loan. Students with experience carrying
and managing debt are more willing than others to take on additional
debt to ﬁnance postsecondary education. But presenting students with
only loan options for postsecondary education is unlikely to negatively
impact investment in postsecondary education, as long as care is taken
that the price of the loans is not too high. Johnson and Montmarquette
(2011) elicit similar ﬁndings in another Canadian study with a sample
of low-income and rural students. They ﬁnd a greater willingness to pay
for college with loans among rural respondents, and no systematic loan
aversion. Finally, in a third Canadian study, Palameta and Voyer (2010)
ﬁnd that roughly 5–20 percent of their overall sample of low-income
high school students was loan averse, depending on the price of the
offered grant. In their experimental study, as the price of attending college increased, a higher percentage of students were inclined to choose
a stand alone grant but not a grant/loan combination. The results show
that overall some underrepresented groups are slightly but signiﬁcantly
more likely to make loan-averse decisions. Of course, it is unclear if the
Canadian context and student body is sufﬁciently similar to the United
States to extrapolate these ﬁndings.

EXPLANATIONS FOR LOAN AVERSION: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE
Loan aversion is often described as common, unfortunate, and not
easily overcome, but these depictions are typically based on conjecture
rather than evidence. Reports on loan aversion, such as those issued
by The Project on Student Debt and the Institute on Higher Education
Policy (e.g., Burdman 2005; TICAS 2007; Cunningham and Santiago
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2008) tend to point to two explanations for declining loans while possessing unmet ﬁnancial need: a preference for using alternative sources
of ﬁnancing (e.g., savings or work earnings), or cultural/ethnic perspectives that discourage borrowing. Practitioners suggest that aversion
may be growing in response to the Great Recession and news about
rising default rates in some sectors. But there are many more theoretical explanations for why students and families may choose to decline
to accept the loans offered to them. In this section we adapt a model of
understanding the use and effects of ﬁnancial aid initially described in
Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel (2009).
First, families may vary in their ﬁnancial strength, and this could—
in a manner consistent with rational choice theory—lead them to
decline loans. Families that can afford the net price of attendance, either
because they have sufﬁcient wealth or receive sufﬁcient grant aid, may
reject loans offered to them.6 Again, this is a heterogeneous group—
both the wealthiest and poorest families, those with the highest and
lowest incomes, the highest and lowest EFCs, and who are facing the
highest and lowest net prices are the most likely to borrow. But among
students from low-income families, rational choice theory would lead
to the expectation that loan aversion is more common among families
with greater incomes, a higher EFC, or a lower net price. On the other
hand, families with more debt may also be loan averse.
Another explanation for loan aversion points to the problem of
informational asymmetries. Many policymakers, practitioners, and
researchers highlight a large body of economic theory and evidence
suggesting that college is an excellent investment for most low-income
students, even as loan balances increase (Avery and Turner 2012; Baum
and Schwartz 2012). On average, each additional year of education generates a payoff in the labor market, and the lifetime returns to degrees
are substantial, even for groups marginalized by race, class, or ethnicity.
Even during the recent deep recession, college graduates fared better
than high school graduates (Carnevale, Rose, and Cheah 2011). Informational barriers are typically given as the reason why many students
and families insist that the costs of attendance are too high and unaffordable (Hoxby and Avery 2012; Hoxby and Turner 2013). At least
one U.S. experiment indicates that providing more information can
moderately reduce that perception (Hoxby and Turner 2013). However,
an experiment in the Netherlands suggests the opposite, ﬁnding that
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students who receive additional information on the terms of loans do
not adjust their loan-taking behaviors over time (Booij, Leuven, and
Oosterbeek 2012).
Research by McKinney, Roberts, and Shefman (2013) indicates
that many community college ﬁnancial aid counselors believe that their
low-income students do not understand the long-term implications of
taking out student loans. Similarly, some researchers contend that college attainment would increase if students had a “payback calculator” in
hand when assessing the value of taking on another year of college and
its accompanying debt (Haveman n.d.). In particular, if students could
compare the value of a government-subsidized loan to the opportunity
costs of working, they would choose to borrow (Baum and Schwartz
2012). However, these payback calculators are usually designed to
inform the initial attendance decision instead of whether to persist in
college and have not been subjected to rigorous experimental testing.
Moreover, at least two studies question whether borrowing for college is inherently rational, noting that students who decline loans may
be seeking to avoid temptation or trouble. Dowd (2008) posits that students with stronger senses of self (e.g., internal locus of control and selfcontrol) and correspondingly higher educational expectations ought to
behave more like econometricians when making decisions—presumably increasing their likelihood of borrowing for college. However,
Dowd is unable to empirically test this hypothesis. Instead, Cadena and
Keys (2013) indirectly test the hypothesis that loan aversion is driven
by self-control. They use two waves of federal NPSAS data by comparing the rates of loan rejection among students who are living on and off
campus and are eligible for the maximum amount of subsidized loans.
They report that their ﬁndings “support a self-control explanation . . .
students are rejecting the loans, in part, to avoid the temptation to overspend out of borrowed money” (p. 1118).
It may also be the case that the decision to decline loans is related to
students’ sense of why they are enrolled and what they aim to achieve,
and particularly to variation in their expected returns. Evidence suggests that students repeatedly revise and rethink their rationales for
pursuing college degrees, practically on a daily basis, as they proceed
through college (Armstrong and Hamilton 2013; Clydesdale 2007;
Deil-Amen and Goldrick-Rab 2009; Manski and Wise 1983). Students
who are academically prepared for college may perceive borrowing as
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less risky, perhaps because pursuing college incurs fewer psychic costs.
To be clear, while this idea expands on theories of college as a “great
experiment” (Manski and Wise 1983), it is too simplistic to suggest that
when college feels worthwhile, students will decide to take on loans, as
other contexts can also offset or mediate these decisions. For example,
some research indicates that the longer a student is enrolled in college,
the less likely she or he is to be risk averse (Davies and Lea 1995). The
increase in a student’s debt load seems to precede a change in their feelings toward debt—in other words the more debt accrued, the greater the
tolerance for debt.
One key attribute of many theories of loan aversion, particularly
those drawn from economics, is that they are methodologically individualistic in their approach, assuming that students make borrowing
decisions independently. But there is a growing body of research suggesting differential responsiveness to ﬁnancing options according to
the setting and context in which decisions are made (Armstrong and
Hamilton 2013; Dowd 2008; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009;
Hossler, Schmit, and Vesper 1999; McDonough 1997; Paulsen and St.
John 1997; Perna 2006, 2008; St. John, Paulsen, and Carter 2005; Tinto
1993). Individuals can make decisions in the context of their familial
needs or their community needs, and the role played by those other
actors is more important than what is assumed by “preferences” in economic models, since the inﬂuence of those contexts can be reciprocal.
For example, loan decisions may be both shaped by and contribute to
the social and cultural capital students obtain from their relationships
(Goldrick-Rab, Harris, and Trostel 2009; McDonough and Calderone
2006; Paulsen and St. John 1997).
More broadly, a student’s willingness to borrow may be moderated
by university institutional culture—speciﬁcally, how university administrators, faculty, staff, and students explicitly and implicitly add (or
reduce) college costs by demanding more (or less) from students in
order for them to fully engage in college life. Indeed, borrowing behaviors vary substantially by institution and how much time students spend
in college. At schools like most of those in this study—public universities—56 percent of students who spent a year or less enrolled without
completing a degree borrowed, compared to 63 percent of those who
stayed up to two years (Baum and Payea 2012). While such institutional
differences in loan taking are well documented, explanations for those
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differences are not always articulated (Cunningham and Santiago 2008;
Gross et al. 2009).
In Paying for the Party, Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) document
the impacts of what Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013) term the “countryclubiﬁcation” of state universities. Responding to the demands of many
wealthy and out-of-state students for the college experiences that preserve and enhance their existing social advantages, these public institutions are increasingly spending limited resources to create opportunities and settings for elitist socialization. High-income students respond
positively to higher sticker prices, seeking out colleges and universities that cost more, while low-income students prefer institutions that
cost less (Hoxby and Avery 2012). The expenses associated with higher
sticker prices crowd out other spending, and the resulting climate has
the potential to alienate working-class students for whom college is
meant to be a route out of poverty, not a visit to elite cultures. They cannot participate without taking on loans, and even with the loans, they
often still cannot afford full participation.
On the other hand, loan aversion may be related to the familial
environments in which students were raised. This would be consistent
with evidence on risk aversion. For example, Hryshko, Luengo-Prado,
and Sørensen (2011) provide evidence from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), measuring risk aversion based on a set of survey
questions probing respondents’ willingness to accept jobs with various
combinations of income probabilities. Risk aversion is inferred from
the answers to these questions, and the composite risk-aversion measure is regressed on a variety of background variables. The authors ﬁnd
that the best demographic predictors of risk aversion are age, gender,
and parental education, as well as whether they lived with both parents
when they were younger. They ﬁnd that males and children of more
educated parents are less risk averse. While they do not ﬁnd that income
is a predictor of risk aversion, this is partly because parents’ education
and income are correlated; they do ﬁnd a simple (negative) correlation
with risk aversion as expected.
Absent sufﬁcient social capital to help them understand student
loans in particular, students may seek attitude-behavior consistency by
either refusing loans because they also refuse credit cards, or reframing
student debt as different from other forms of debt so as to justify accepting it. For example, Davies and Lea (1995) describe students who are
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averse to taking on debt but maintain consistency between that attitude
and their behavior (loan taking in college) by not recognizing student
loans as like credit card debt. The way debt is framed may therefore be
important to whether or not students accept it. In a laboratory experiment conducted with ﬁnancial aid recipients in Chile, Colombia, and
Mexico, Caetano, Palacios, and Patrinos (2011) conclude that debt
aversion—widely detected in their sample—is due to labeling effects.
Speciﬁcally, labeling a contract as a “loan” decreased its probability of
being selected over a ﬁnancially equivalent “contract” by more than 8
percent. The authors also ﬁnd that students are willing to pay a premium
of about 4 percent of the ﬁnanced value to avoid a contract labeled as
debt. They conclude that debt aversion exists and may potentially distort investments.
Another possibility is that students’ orientations toward loans are
related to their familial beliefs, particularly their time horizon or future
time perspective, a measure of the extent to which individuals focus on
the future rather than the present or past. This time horizon is typically
measured using a discount rate, which reﬂects the weight that individuals place on events in the future compared to those of today. Individuals
with a future orientation, which is considered a hallmark of “modern”
American life, tend to have lower discount rates as they place relatively
more weight on the future and a longer time horizon. Meanwhile, a
present orientation, with a higher discount rate and a shorter time horizon, is labeled traditional, and in a sense, “backward.”
Economists theorize that students who have a long time horizon—
those who give considerable weight in their thinking to their longterm well-being—are more likely to make investments with long-term
payoffs, including investing in retirement savings and borrowing for
school. There are clear socioeconomic differences in time horizons.
For example, Lawrence (1991) shows that higher socioeconomic adults
(those who tend to be white and who have higher incomes) have longer
time horizons. Speciﬁcally, these adults evidently “discount” or reduce
the value of future costs and beneﬁts at a rate of 12 percent per year,
whereas economically disadvantaged adults discount the future at a rate
of 19 percent per year, compared to the 8–9 percent yield of long-term
Treasury notes during that time frame. Put differently, the time horizon
of economically disadvantaged people is less than two-thirds as long
as economically advantaged people. Similarly, a study conducted in

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 329

1/28/2015 8:24:38 AM

330 Goldrick-Rab and Kelchen

Canada examines loan aversion among students from a range of family
income backgrounds, using a set of lab experiments. The authors ﬁnd
that loan aversion was more common for low-income students because
they had a greater tendency to discount future rewards (Palameta and
Voyer 2010).
However, it is also possible that a shorter time horizon is linked
to variation in expected returns to college, particularly due to the estimated chances of completing degrees and ﬁnding employment after
graduation. For example, Latino students interviewed in focus groups
in one study expressed an aversion to loans because they must be
repaid even if degrees are not completed. They also said they would
prefer to make their college choices based on their current economic
situations and what they can afford while managing their family and
personal responsibilities. “They would rather ‘pay as they go,’ and
they believe they can get a quality education wherever they enroll,
as long as they are motivated” (Cunningham and Santiago 2008,
p. 18). This may be related to the disproportionate number of Latino
(and Asian) students from immigrant families, which tend to operate in
unbanked cash economies (Teranishi 2010). Very different results were
obtained from a sample studied at one California university (Brint and
Rotondi 2008), where the authors report that students no longer think
of loans as a burden to be avoided or discharged quickly, but rather as
a means of freedom, which opens up (rather than limits) behavioral
options. The increased availability of loan repayment options—such as
income-based repayment, income-contingent repayment, and pay-asyou-earn—has the potential to reduce the risk of borrowing for college,
but these programs are only utilized by a small percentage of eligible
students. Only one-tenth of the 15 million students with Federal Direct
Loans are enrolled in these income-based options (Chopra 2013).
A low future time perspective, or a past orientation, appears unresponsive to changes in information possessed by the individual. For
example, in a study of retirement savings, Jacobs-Lawshen and Hershey (2005) ﬁnd that increasing the knowledge of ﬁnancial planning
among those with a past orientation induced no increase in their rates
of retirement savings. They conclude, “When it comes to savings, it is
difﬁcult to overcome a short time horizon. Failing to look to the future
ensures a minimal impact of risk tolerance on saving, almost irrespective of how much one knows about ﬁnancial planning” ( p. 339). A criti-

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 330

1/28/2015 8:24:38 AM

Making Sense of Loan Aversion: Evidence from Wisconsin 331

cal question is whether saving for retirement should be thought of as
comparable to borrowing for college, given the long-term payoffs, and
whether or not borrowing for college is a “failure” in the same way that
not saving for retirement is said to be. Additionally, a study by Norvilitis and Mendes-Da-Silva (2013) provides some indication that students
with a stronger sense of delayed gratiﬁcation (a future orientation) have
lower levels debt.
Another aspect of students’ preferences, which may be grounded
in the beliefs of their families, relates to their work orientation. More
than 75 percent of undergraduates work, but according to some studies,
working during college (especially over long hours), has been linked to
lower rates of degree completion (King 2002; Pascarella and Terenzini
2005). Other studies, however, ﬁnd the opposite (Bozick 2007; Staff
and Mortimer 2007; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2003). A posited
advantage of loans, therefore, has been the ability to alleviate the need
to work (or work so much). But a work orientation may go beyond a
preference, especially when one considers the value that some individuals place on working, or what some sociologists refer to as the “centrality” of work. Put simply, people have many reasons for working, some
of which are not plainly economic. For example, ethnographic evidence
indicates that some students elect to work in order to honor their family
or culture, or because they have always worked (Mortimer 2003; Weis
1985). If work is central to the lives of students, serving to connect
them to others and bring meaning to their lives, then it may well not be
replaced with loans (Feldman and Doerpinghaus 1992; Lobel 1991).
It may also be the case that students vary in the social capital they
can draw on to understand and make sense of loans. One of the primary
difﬁculties with current ﬁnancial aid policy is that it is poorly understood by nearly all of its constituents (Goldrick-Rab and Roksa 2008).
Most people do not know what opportunities for aid exist, how to access
the various programs, and what one can expect to receive. Low-income
parents and students are less likely to receive high-quality information
about ﬁnancial aid opportunities, and as a result are less likely to ﬁle a
federal application for student aid (FAFSA) or apply to more expensive
colleges (which may, in fact, offer them a better ﬁnancial aid package) (Long 2008). Upper-income students receive information about
college from a variety of sources, while low-income students rely on
their high school counselors, largely because their parents and siblings
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did not attend college (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000). As a result, students
from poor families who would likely qualify for all or nearly all of the
aid required to ﬁnance college fail to even apply, since they have limited access to information about how to apply for aid, little assistance
in ﬁlling out the extraordinarily complex application, and substantial
(and warranted) fears that college is unaffordable. Students from lowincome families who are insufﬁciently educated as to the variation in
quality among college ﬁnancing strategies, and frustrated by the timeconsuming nature of the application process, unwittingly take on highinterest private loans, credit cards, or off-campus employment without
complete knowledge of the consequences (Cabrera and La Nasa 2000).
Thus, the amount of social capital held, as embodied in, for example,
assistance with the FAFSA, may explain disparities in loan aversion.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Drawing on this wide array of prior economic and sociological
theory and evidence, we conceive of the choices involved in accepting
or rejecting student loans as involving both individual-level and family
or community decisions. We ask the following ﬁve research questions:
1) How does the way loan aversion is measured affect the assessment of which students are loan averse?
2) What are the key demographic disparities in loan aversion
among students from low-income families?
3) Which of the following factors appears to moderate those
observed disparities in loan aversion: family ﬁnancial strength;
perceived returns to degree; ﬁnancial knowledge; attitudes,
beliefs, and dispositions; work behaviors; and social capital?
4) How is the assessment of these moderators affected by measurement of loan aversion?
5) How is loan aversion related to postsecondary outcomes?
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METHODOLOGY
Using survey and administrative records for a sample of Pell Grant
recipients participating in the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study
(WSLS), we examine the incidence and correlates of loan-taking behaviors among low-income students—all of whom have unmet ﬁnancial
need—and consider a range of potential explanations for observed variation in these.7 To examine the reasons for loan aversion, we focus on a
relatively young sample of ﬁrst-time, full-time undergraduates attending two-year and four-year colleges in one state’s public higher education system. In addition, after exploring institutional differences in loan
taking, we use college ﬁxed effects to control for any institutional differences and focus on student-level differences.
Setting
This study takes place in Wisconsin, where more than 80 percent
of undergraduates are enrolled in the public University of Wisconsin
(UW) System and Wisconsin Technical College System. As in many
states, over the past decade state appropriations per full-time equivalent student have declined (State Higher Education Executive Ofﬁcers
2013). As a result, the costs of attendance continue to rise, and demonstrated need unmet through ﬁnancial grant aid is swelling. For example,
in 2010–2011, the average family contribution to college costs in the
UW System was $4,686, the average amount of need-based aid was
$7,303, and the average amount of unmet ﬁnancial need was $5,236—
up from $1,951 in 2002–2003 (Wisconsin Higher Educational Aids
Board 2012).
Wisconsin is also typical when it comes to key indicators of college
access and success. The on-time college-going rate among high school
graduates is 61 percent (the national average is 62 percent), the average
ACT composite test score is 22 (the national average is 21), 52 percent
of undergraduates ﬁle applications for ﬁnancial aid (compared to 50
percent nationally), the ﬁrst-to-second-year retention rate at universities
is 77 percent (76 percent nationally), and the six-year graduation rate
for bachelor’s students is 58 percent (56 percent nationally) (GoldrickRab and Harris 2010).
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Data
Data for this study come from multiple sources, and all details of
each measure are provided in Table 10.1. We utilize two measures of
loan aversion. The ﬁrst is based on a question administered in a survey
conducted during the students’ ﬁrst semester of college, in fall 2008.
As part of a much longer survey about college plans and ﬁnances, students were asked: “Suppose you could take out a loan up to $10,000
with a 7 percent interest rate. How much money would you take?” Students could choose from the following ﬁve choices: $0, $1,000, $2,500,
$5,000, and $10,000. In fall 2008, the interest rate on subsidized student
loans was 6.0 percent, and for unsubsidized student loans the rate was
6.8 percent.8 We did not tell the students this information in the survey, and the overall responses and level of ﬁnancial aid knowledge suggested in the study provide little reason to think that they were aware
the degree to which the rate we inquired about was slightly higher than
the current unsubsidized rate and a point higher than the subsidized
rate. At the time data were collected, income-based repayment was not
available.9 We code students who said they would take none of the loan
they were offered as loan averse.
In addition, we used information from students’ ﬁnancial aid packages, also obtained in fall 2008, which indicated whether students were
offered loans, how much they were offered and of what type (subsidized or unsubsidized), and the amount accepted. This is an uncommon
approach, as few data sets include loan offered, usually only recording
the loans accepted.10 We code a student as loan averse if she refused
all loans offered in that term.11 We also include a substantial number
of demographic characteristics and measures of moderating concepts
drawn from both survey and administrative data. All details on these
are found in Table 10.1.
Sample
The overall WSLS sample includes 3,000 students. For this chapter,
we focus on a subsample that includes the 684 students attending 10 of
the state’s 13 public universities and the 13 public two-year colleges
for whom we observe both the key survey and administrative measures
of loan aversion described above. The sample is 58 percent female and
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74 percent non-Hispanic white, and almost 80 percent of the students
lack a parent with a bachelor’s degree. About 4 percent of the students
are ﬁrst-generation immigrants, 10 percent are second-generation, and
9 percent speak a language other than English in their homes. On average, in their ﬁrst year of college these Pell recipients faced a net price
of more than $8,000 after taking all grant aid into account. Most of
them had a substantial amount of unmet ﬁnancial need, as deﬁned by
the cost of attendance less all grant aid. On average, unmet need was
$7,700. More speciﬁcally, over 85 percent had unmet need exceeding
$3,500 (the maximum subsidized Stafford Loan for ﬁrst-year students),
and 72 percent had unmet need of greater than the $5,500 that ﬁrst-year
students may borrow in subsidized and unsubsidized loans.
Almost 17 percent of these students grew up in poverty, and almost
one-third qualify for a zero expected family contribution, meaning that
their families are not expected to pay anything toward their postsecondary education. About 12 percent of students reported providing ﬁnancial support to their families when attending school, with more than
one-third feeling a sense of ﬁnancial obligation to their families, and
25 percent drawing no monetary support from their families. They held
very little credit card debt—just about $150 on average. Fifty-eight percent of students in the sample did not even have a credit card.
In terms of academic preparation, students had an ACT score of
just over 21, the statewide average, and nearly three quarters had strong
high school preparation for college, but only about half said it was
extremely likely that they would complete a bachelor’s degree, and one
in ﬁve said they were having trouble with college. On average, they
expected to enter a career paying just over $60,000 per year. Slightly
more than 60 percent of students answered at least 12 of 15 questions
regarding ﬁnancial knowledge correctly, and just under half said they
were competent at managing their money.
This sample of Pell Grant recipients exhibits a long time horizon
and overwhelming willingness to sacriﬁce today’s needs for their future
potential. Very few indicate a general averse to all forms of debt. About
95 percent evidenced an internal locus of control, and 75 percent said
that debt was not a normative part of today’s lifestyle or that taking out
loans was a good thing to help you enjoy life. The vast majority worked
while in high school, and about half worked while in college as well, an
average of eight hours per week.

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 335

1/28/2015 8:24:40 AM

Concept/measure
Source
Loan aversion
Aversion A
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Aversion B

Demographics
Gender

Question wording (survey)

Response categories

Suppose you could take out
$0, $1,000, $2,500, $5,000,
a loan up to $10,000 with a 7
and $10,000
percent interest rate. How much
money would you take?

Coding
Loan averse = $0

Loan averse = accepted $0 of
loan offered, conditional on
offer

Financial aid
package, Fall
2008
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

What is your gender?

Female, male

Female = 1

What is your race/ethnicity?

Parental
education

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

What is the highest level of
education completed by either
parent?

If multiple categories were
checked, the underrepresented
group = 1
First-generation student = no
parent with more than high
school degree

Immigrant
status

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Primary
language

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Were you/your mother/your
father born in the United
States?
What language is spoken most
often inside your family's
home?

Non-Hispanic White, AfricanAmerican, Latino, Southeast
Asian, Native American
Grade 1–8, some high school,
GED, high school graduate,
some college/technical degree/
associate’s, bachelor’s degree,
master’s degree or above
Yes/no

Race/ethnicity

English, Spanish, Hmong,
Chinese, other

1st gen = student born outside
U.S.; 2nd gen = either parent
born outside U.S.
Other than English = 1

336

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 336

Table 10.1 Description of Measures, Sources, and Coding

1/28/2015 8:24:40 AM

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 337

Institutional cost
Net price

Difference between
institutional cost of attendance
and all grant aid awarded to
student

Financial aid
package, Fall
2008

Family ﬁnancial
strength
Childhood
poverty

Survey, Fall 2009 “When I was growing up there Indicate if true
wasn’t enough to eat at home.”
“When I was growing up I had
to wear secondhand clothes.”
Expected family Financial aid
contribution package, Fall
2008
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Financial
obligation to
family
No ﬁnancial
help from
family
Credit card debt

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008
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Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Computed using 2008 FAFSA
and federal formula; both
continuous measure and ﬂag
for $0 EFC (lowest) included
Coded 1 = yes

“Since starting college, have
Yes/no
you regularly given any family
or friends (not including
spouses) more than $50 per
month? Do not include loans.”
“I feel obligated to support my 5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly
family ﬁnancially.”
agreement/disagreement
agree
“In the past year…my family
provided money for my
education.”
“How much do you owe
on all of your credit cards
combined?”

5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Not at all
agreement/disagreement

337

Financial
reciprocity

If either answer is yes,
poverty = 1

<$100; $100–499; $500–999;
$1,000–4,999; $5,000 or more
(continued)

Concept/measure
Perceived returns
to degree
Likely to
complete
degree
ACT score
Strong high
school
coursework

Source

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Question wording (survey)

“How likely are each of the
following scenarios; you will
get a bachelor's degree”

ACT record data
Presence or absence of
Financial aid
package, Fall
“Academic Competitiveness
2008
Grant”

Course difﬁculty Baseline survey,
Fall 2008
Expected
Baseline survey,
monetary
Fall 2008
returns to
degree
Financial
knowledge
Overall
Baseline survey,
knowledge Fall 2008

“Classes are more difﬁcult
than I expected.”
“For the career you most plan
to have, how much money do
you expect to make in a year?”

1/28/2015 8:24:40 AM

“What is the difference between
a grant and a loan?” “Which
statement best describes the
difference between a subsidized
and unsubsidized loan?” And
two series of questions about
ﬁnancial aid criteria and credit
scores

Response categories

Coding

5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Extremely likely
agreement/disagreement

ACG was a federal grant
indicating the student had
completed rigorous high
school coursework, based on
an analysis of transcripts
5-point Likert scale indicating
agreement/disagreement
Fill in blank

1 = ACG present

15 Items testing general
ﬁnancial literacy and speciﬁc
ﬁnancial aid knowledge (see
notes for more)

Coded 0–15, also high = 12+

1 = Somewhat or strongly
agree
Logged earnings
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Perceived
Baseline survey,
competence Fall 2008
with money
Attitudes, beliefs,
dispositions
Time horizon
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Willingness to
sacriﬁce

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Generalized
Baseline survey,
debt aversion Fall 2008
Self-control
Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Internal locus of
control
Work behaviors
Worked in high
school

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

5-point Likert scale

1 = Very or extremely well

“If you were guaranteed you
would receive the money,
which of the following options
would you select right now?”
“I am willing to sacriﬁce today
so that my life will be better
tomorrow.”
“Is it ever okay to borrow
money?”
“Being in debt is part of today's
lifestyle.” “Taking out a loan is
a good thing because it allows
you to enjoy life.”
“I am responsible for what
happens to me.”

$75 right now; $100 in 3
months; $250 in one year;
$500 in 3 years

Coded as four binary variables
($75 right now omitted)

5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly
agreement/disagreement
agree
Yes/no

1 = Yes

5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly
agreement/disagreement
disagree with either statement

5-point Likert scale indicating 1 = Somewhat or strongly
agreement/disagreement
agree

“When you were a high school Open-ended
senior how many hours, on
average, did you work each
week?”
“Have you been working since Yes/no
you started college?”

Coded 1= if any hours
recorded

Coded 1 = yes
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Currently
working

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

“How well do you think you
handle managing money?”
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(continued)

Concept/measure
Source
Number of
Baseline survey,
hours
Fall 2008
working
Social capital
FAFSA
assistanceperson
FAFSA
assistancelevel of
education
Conﬁdent help
is available

Academic
outcomes
Enrollment

Question wording (survey)
“In the last seven days how
many hours did you spend
working on-campus? Working
off-campus?”

Response categories
Open-ended

Coding
Total number of hours recorded

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

“Who helped you ﬁll out your
ﬁnancial aid application?
Check all that apply.”

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

“Did the person who helped
you earn a college degree?”

Parent, sibling, spouse,
guidance counselor, friend,
someone else, no one (ﬁlled it
out myself)
Yes/no

No help; family (parent,
sibling spouse); other (friend,
guidance counselor, someone
else)
Coded 1 = yes

Baseline survey,
Fall 2008

“How conﬁdent are you that, if 5-point Likert scale
faced with ﬁnancial problems,
you could get help from other
people rather than dropping out
of school?”

National student
clearinghouse
records and
college transcripts
by term

1 = Very or extremely
conﬁdent
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Credits earned

College transcripts
by term
On 4-year
College transcripts
degree track by term
Semesters
enrolled
Cumulative
College transcript
GPA

Completed 90 credits within
3 years
Total number of terms enrolled

NOTE: The data set includes a measure of religious preference and a measure of work centrality but both lack sufﬁcient variation for inclusion.
Measures of ﬁnancial knowledge include A) In your opinion what is the difference between a grant and a loan? (i) Grant comes from Federal government, loans come from Wisconsin; (ii) A grant doesn’t have to be paid back; a loan has to be paid back; (iii) A grant has to be paid back but no
interest is charged, a loan must be paid back and interest is charged. B) Which of the following describes the biggest difference between subsidized
and unsubsidized Stafford Loans? (i) A subsidized loan does not charge interest, an unsubsidized loan charges interest, (ii) a subsidized loan is paid
for by parents, an unsubsidized loan is paid off by students, (iii) a subsidized loan costs students more than an unsubsidized loan, (iv) a subsidized
loan does not charge interest until the student leaves college, an unsubsidized loan begins to charge interest as soon as the student receives the loan.
C) Agree/disagree: A government loan is a kind of ﬁnancial aid. D) Agree/disagree: The money students earn while working in college is used to
calculate how much aid they get. E) Agree/disagree: If a student earns more than a certain amount from working, their ﬁnancial aid might be reduced.
F) Agree/disagree: Students receive the same amount of ﬁnancial aid for every year they are in school. G) Agree/disagree: Students will receive the
same amount of ﬁnancial aid if they switch schools. H) Agree/disagree: Students who take time off from school will get the same amount of ﬁnancial
aid if/when they return. I) Which of the following factors are used to calculate credit scores? Check all that apply: number of jobs held, amount of
existing debt, gender, whether payments were made on time, types of credit used, race/ethnicity, recent applications for credits cards or other loans.
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It is worth noting that Avery and Turner (2012) hypothesize that
the FAFSA is one of the greatest deterrents to loan taking, but in this
sample we observe a substantial group of needy students who complete the FAFSA and still decline all loans. Most students in the sample
(87 percent) got assistance from a family member when completing
the FAFSA for college, with about 42 percent getting assistance from a
college-educated person. But only about one-third reported being conﬁdent that they could obtain ﬁnancial help if in trouble so as to avoid
leaving college. Overall, about 70 percent of these students remained
enrolled at their initial institution a year after they ﬁrst began.
Table 10.2 also compares the characteristics of this sample to the
characteristics of all students in the WSLS attending those same universities and colleges. There are some notable differences between the
analytic sample and the overall WSLS sample, with the analytic sample
being less racially diverse and by some measures more economically
advantaged. These are important considerations when thinking about
the generalizability of the results.
Analysis
We use blocked probit regressions with marginal effects to examine
potential explanations for why students decline loans—we do this ﬁrst
using the administrative measure (Table 10.6) and then the survey measure (Table 10.7). We also use probit regression to examine the association between loan aversion and college performance and retention.

BORROWING BEHAVIORS AMONG PELL
GRANT RECIPIENTS
Next, we describe the ﬁndings regarding the measurement of loan
aversion, the characteristics of loan-averse students, and the characteristics of institutions where loan-averse students are more or less
prevalent.
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Table 10.2 Descriptive Statistics by Sample Inclusion
Characteristic
Female (%)
Race/ethnicity (%)
Non-Hispanic white
Latino
Hmong (Southeast Asian)

Not in sample
54.6

69.4
7.3
10.0

Native American

4.3

Black

6.8

Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%)
Immigrant status
First-generation (%)
Second-generation (%)

78.6

6.9
12.0

Analytic sample
difference
4.2
(2.7)
5.1*
(2.8)
−1.8
(1.5)
−2.4
(1.8)
−1.3
(1.2)
0.8
(1.5)
0.9
(2.5)
−2.4*
(1.4)
−2.5
(2.0)
−3.4*
(1.9)

English not ﬁrst language (%)

12.4

Institutional cost
Net price ($)

6,199

1,596***
(322)

9.3

6.8***
(1.8)
280***
(107)
−7.6***
(2.5)
−1.4
(2.0)
−1.3
(3.0)

Family ﬁnancial strength
Childhood poverty (%)
Expected family contribution ($)

1,447

Zero EFC (%)

35.0

Financial reciprocity (%)

12.6

Financial obligation to family (%)

34.5

(continued)
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Table 10.2 (continued)
Characteristic
No ﬁnancial help from family (%)
Credit card debt ($)
Perceived returns to degree
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%)

Not in sample
20.0
107

51.6

ACT score

21.5

Strong high school coursework (%)

71.9

College difﬁculty (%)

20.5

Expected monetary returns to degree ($)
Financial knowledge
Overall knowledge
High ﬁnancial knowledge (%)
Perceived ﬁnancial competence (%)
Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions
Time horizon (%)
$75 right now

60,362

11.8
59.5
42.8

22.5

$100 in three months

16.2

$250 in one year

16.1

$500 in three years

45.2

Willing to sacriﬁce (%)

76.1
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Analytic sample
difference
5.7**
(2.6)
54*
(29)
1.5
(3.2)
0.2
(0.4)
5.6
(4.0)
12.8
(2.4)
438
(3,725)
0.2
(0.1)
3.8
(3.1)
1.7
(3.1)

−2.4
(2.6)
−0.4
(2.4)
0.4
(2.3)
2.4
(3.2)
7.8***
(2.6)
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Table 10.2 (continued)
Characteristic
Generalized debt aversion (%)

Not in sample
5.9

Self-control (%)

79.7

Internal locus of control (%)

94.5

Work behaviors
Worked in high school (%)
Currently working (%)
Current number of hours working
Social capital
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%)
No help—ﬁlled out alone

83.8
53.2
8.6

9.0

Family

87.0

Other person

14.3

FAFSA assistance from college-educated
person (%)

42.3

Conﬁdent help is available (%)

34.5

Retention at initial college in year 2 (%)

69.5

Maximum sample size

880

Analytic sample
difference
−0.1
(1.4)
−3.5
(2.6)
2.8**
(1.3)
3.0
(2.2)
−0.2
(3.2)
−1.0
(0.8)

3.4*
(1.9)
−3.0
(2.2)
−4.0*
(2.1)
0.2
(3.1)
3.3
(3.0)
2.8
(2.5)
684

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Loan
aversion categories were deﬁned in the following ways: 1) Administrative: If a student
accepted none of his/her loan offer (if offered any). 2) Survey: If responded he/she
would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes students at
included UW System campuses only.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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Measurement
As noted earlier, most research on loan aversion has been conducted
using either in-depth interviews or surveys. Measuring loan aversion
in this way inherently relies on student self-reports of attitudes and/or
behaviors and does not capture their actual behaviors. For this reason,
we begin with a simple analysis triangulating how these two sources of
data align when it comes to classifying students as loan averse. In total,
48 percent of the sample is loan averse according to either the survey or
the administrative measures. The survey measure classiﬁes 401 of students as loan averse, while the administrative measure applies that label
to just 128 students. As Table 10.3 indicates, we ﬁnd that the correlation
between the survey and administrative measures is weak (r = 0.21) and
aligned for only 64 percent of the sample, with 52 percent agreement
that a student is not loan averse, and 12 percent agreement that the student is loan averse. Fully 29 percent of the sample would be classiﬁed
as loan averse using the survey measure, even though in practice they
accepted loans. In addition, 7 percent of students who said they would
not borrow loans according to the survey did accept loans according to
the administrative data. While these differences could be explained by
other factors (for example, students might report not wanting to take
loans but do it anyway), and therefore this evidence is not sufﬁcient to
record these as “misclassiﬁcations,” the apparent disconnect is worthy
of further investigation.
It is possible that some students who expressed loan aversion on
the survey may have done so because they had already accepted loans
and did not (or could not) want to borrow more. Nearly 72 percent of
students whom according to the survey might be loan averse do appear
Table 10.3 Relationship between Survey and Administrative Data
Measures of Loan Aversion
Administrative data (%)
Survey data
Borrower
Loan averse
Borrower
52
7
Loan averse
29
12
NOTE: Total sample size = 684; percentaged according to that total R = 0.213.
SOURCE: Survey data are from the fall WSLS, and administrative data are from the
University of Wisconsin system.
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to be in this category, suggesting that loan aversion using survey data
may be overstated. On the other hand, the survey classiﬁed about 7
percent of students as willing to accept loans, even though the administrative data indicate that they refused the loans they were offered. This
may be because students regretted the decision to refuse loans and were
expressing on the survey a wish to take them, or because on the survey
the students meant they would take them, but not right now or not under
the conditions in which they were offered.
Given the indication of apparently substantial measurement error
present when loan aversion is measured using survey data, we take
additional steps in the next analyses to consider which students may be
mislabeled as loan averse when only survey data are used.
Student-Level Differences in Borrowing
Table 10.4 displays the differences in characteristics between loanaverse students and borrowers using both the administrative data measure of loan aversion and the survey measure of loan aversion. The
overall trends in student characteristics are consistent with most prior
research. We ﬁnd that Southeast Asian students (predominately Hmong
in this sample) are greatly overrepresented among loan-averse students,
while African Americans are substantially overrepresented among loan
takers. Both ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants and students for
whom English is not spoken at home are far more likely to be loan
averse. In this sample of students from low-income families, where
almost 80 percent of students do not have at least one parent with a
bachelor’s degree, more parental education seems to lead to less loan
aversion. Students facing higher net prices were also less likely to be
loan averse.
Notably, students from families with less ﬁnancial strength are
more often loan averse. This is also more common among students who
grew up in poverty or have lower expected family contributions, and
among those who report that their families do not provide monetary
support for their college education and yet feel obligated to ﬁnancially
support their family while in college.
We hypothesized that students who perceive stronger returns to
their degrees would be more likely to borrow for college, but we ﬁnd
limited support for this assertion. Overall, it seems that students with
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Characteristic
Demographics
Female (%)
Race/ethnicity (%)
Non-Hispanic White

Borrowers

Loan averse
difference

Survey sample

Borrowers

Loan averse
difference

Test for
measurement
difference
(p-value)

57.8

5.6
(5.2)

59.8

−2.4
(4.1)

0.167

76.4

−10.9**
(4.8)
2.5
(2.6)
13.5***
(3.7)
0.6
(2.0)
−4.8***
(1.8)
−2.4
(4.4)

74.9

−0.9
(3.5)
−0.7
(1.8)
5.9***
(2.2)
0.6
(1.4)
−3.5*
(2.0)
−3.4
(3.3)

0.051

Latino

5.1

Hmong (Southeast Asian)

5.3

Native American

2.9

Black

8.4

Parental education < bachelor’s degree (%)

79.9

Immigrant status
First-generation (%)

3.2

7.3***
(2.8)

5.8
5.2
2.8
9.0
80.8

2.2

5.4***
(1.7)

0.262
0.032
0.992
0.622
0.858

0.468
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Second-generation (%)
English not ﬁrst language (%)

8.1
6.2

8.0**
(3.7)
16.2***
(4.0)

8.6
6.5

2.2
(2.4)
5.9**
(2.4)

0.115
0.008

Institutional cost
Net price ($)

8,027

−1,322***
(385)

8,391

−1,428***
(290)

0.808

Family ﬁnancial strength
Childhood poverty (%)

15.3

4.5
(4.1)
−396***
(137)
6.3
(4.9)
2.4
(3.4)
11.1**
(5.2)
11.2**
(5.0)
24
(69)

15.0

2.6
(3.0)
−109
(113)
3.5
(3.8)
−0.2
(2.6)
8.4**
(4.0)
0.3
(3.7)
−139***
(41)

0.654

Expected family contribution ($)

1499

Zero EFC (%)

27.6

Financial reciprocity (%)

10.8

Financial obligation to family (%)

31.3

No ﬁnancial help from family (%)

23.7

Credit card debt ($)

157

1475
27.3
11.3
29.8
25.6
220

0.062
0.614
0.486
0.638
0.043
0.066
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Admin. sample
Characteristic
Perceived returns to degree
Likely to complete bachelor’s degree (%)

Borrowers
53.5

ACT score

21.8

Strong high school coursework (%)

78.9

College difﬁculty (%)

34.1

Expected monetary returns to degree ($)
Financial knowledge
Overall knowledge
Above average ﬁnancial knowledge (%)
Perceived ﬁnancial competence (%)

61,510

12.0
63.2
44.1

Loan averse
difference
−1.9
(5.3)
−0.7
(0.4)
−8.1*
(4.6)
−4.1
(4.8)
−4,228
(4,306)
−0.2
(0.2)
0.8
(5.2)
1.7
(5.3)

Survey sample
Borrowers
53.2
21.5
75.9
37.7
60,844

12.0
62.1
41.8

Loan averse
difference
−0.2
(4.1)
0.5
(0.3)
3.8
(3.4)
−10.4***
(3.8)
−108
(4,442)
0.0
(0.2)
3.0
(4.0)
6.3
(4.1)

Test for
measurement
difference
(p-value)
0.774
0.014
0.020
0.253
0.487

0.280
0.702
0.436
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Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions
Time horizon (%)
$75 right now

20.8

$100 in three months

16.5

$250 in one year

16.8

$500 in three years

46.0

Willing to sacriﬁce (%)

84.1

Generalized debt aversion (%)

5.4

Self-control (%)

74.8

Internal locus of control (%)

97.5

Work behaviors
Worked in high school (%)

87.0
50.8

Current number of hours working

6.9

22.1

−1.0
(3.4)
13.1**
(5.3)
3.9***
(1.2)

88.1

16.4
18.5
43.0
84.3
5.7
70.7
97.0

50.1
7.2

−4.7
(3.2)
−1.4
(3.0)
−4.8
(3.0)
11.0***
(4.1)
−0.9
(3.1)
0.3
(1.9)
13.2***
(3.4)
0.9
(1.3)

0.830

−3.0
(2.8)
6.9*
(4.2)
0.9
(0.8)

0.621

0.581
0.405
0.747
0.945
0.440
0.262
0.414

0.303
0.014
(continued)
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Currently working (%)

−3.7
(3.9)
−3.7
(3.3)
−1.7
(3.9)
9.1*
(5.2)
−1.2
(3.9)
2.7
(2.7)
8.1**
(4.0)
−0.9
(1.8)

Admin. sample
Characteristic
Social capital
FAFSA assistance—type of person (%)
No help—ﬁlled out alone

Borrowers

12.7

Family

84.6

Other person

8.7

FAFSA assistance from college-educated
person (%)
Conﬁdent help is available (%)

42.0
38.1

Retention at initial college in year 2 (%)

76.2

Sample size

556

Loan averse
difference

−1.6
(3.4)
−3.5
(4.0)
9.4**
(3.9)
2.8
(5.2)
−1.8
(5.1)
0.6
(4.4)
128

Survey sample
Borrowers

11.9
84.9
10.4
40.0
32.8
72.1
401

Loan averse
difference

1.3
(2.8)
−2.1
(3.0)
−0.2
(2.4)
6.0
(4.1)
12.0***
(4.0)
10.2***
(3.4)
283

Test for
measurement
difference
(p-value)

0.493
0.767
0.018
0.587
0.016
0.055

1/28/2015 8:24:44 AM

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. Difference = difference in means between borrowers and
loan-averse students. Loan aversion categories were deﬁned in the following ways: Administrative: If a student accepted none of his/her
loan offer (if offered any). Survey: If responded he/she would not take any money at a 7 percent interest rate. The sample includes UW
System administrative consenters with both survey and administrative data on loan aversion.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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stronger academic preparation and greater expected earnings are more
likely to borrow. However, unexpectedly, students who ﬁnd college
more difﬁcult are also more likely to borrow.
Perhaps most remarkable given current policy efforts, we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant evidence that ﬁnancial knowledge is related to
borrowing behaviors among these low-income students. There is some
indication that students who perceived themselves as ﬁnancially competent were more loan averse, but the ﬁnding is sensitive to how loan
aversion is measured and cannot be said to differ from zero. Thus, it
does not appear that increasing the ﬁnancial education of these students
would alter their borrowing behavior.
Also contrary to prior studies, we ﬁnd that in this sample of Pell
Grant recipients, loan aversion is associated with a longer time horizon.
The vast majority of students (about 84 percent) reported a willingness
to sacriﬁce today for tomorrow, and while this did not differ for loanaverse students, those who were averse to loans were far more likely to
choose to receive $500 in three years rather than a smaller amount of
money sooner. It seems these students may forgo the short-term need
for resources for what they perceive as a better deal in the future (having less debt). This is consistent with the ﬁnding that students with selfcontrol are also overrepresented among loan-averse students.
Loan aversion appears to be offset by the decision to work during college. While not statistically signiﬁcant, results indicate that students who worked in high school are more likely to borrow, while those
working in college are less likely to borrow.
Finally, there is some evidence that the form of social capital held
by students relates to their loan aversion. Students who believe they can
get ﬁnancial help if they need it are less likely to borrow, as are students
who got help from someone other than a family member when applying for college. In other words, they may have additional supports that
either help them perceive that loans are unnecessary or are inadvisable.
The measure used to deﬁne loan aversion generally does not seem to
affect the description of who is loan averse and who is a borrower, with
a few exceptions. First, and most importantly, if students are classiﬁed
as loan averse using the survey data, then non-Hispanic white students
are equally represented among loan takers and nontakers. However, if
loan aversion is measured with administrative data, non-Hispanic white
students are substantially overrepresented among loan takers. Also, the
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degree of loan aversion is much larger among Southeast Asian students
when measured using administrative records compared to surveys. It is
also possible that the survey and administrative measures may capture
somewhat different aspects of loan aversion—for example, students
may be more likely to decline loans in their ﬁrst semester of college
because they can gain support from their families while still expressing
a desire to avoid taking on additional loans.
While the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant, the trends
regarding gender point in opposite directions using different data
sources. Relying on the survey measure, women are more loan averse
than men, but relying on the administrative measure, men are more
averse than women.
The measurement of loan aversion has implications for some of
these differences. For example, when aversion is assessed using the
survey measure, it appears that borrowing is unrelated to whether a
student is non-Hispanic white, has a lower expected family contribution, the family does not contribute to their education, or the number
of hours they are working. However, if the administrative data is used
to measure loan aversion, we ﬁnd that non-Hispanic white students are
more likely to borrow, as are students with higher EFCs, while students whose families do not support them and who work longer hours
are more loan averse. The strength of the relationships between student
characteristics and loan aversion also vary widely according to how
aversion is measured.
Institutional Level
Financial aid administrators at the colleges and universities initiate
the process of borrowing for students, and students’ decisions are made
in the context of their campus affordability climates (Goldrick-Rab
and Kendall 2013). For this reason, we next explore how loan-taking
behaviors varied according to the speciﬁc college or university students
attended. Table 10.5 reveals that the percentage of loan-averse students
varies substantially across these Wisconsin institutions, ranging from
just 7.8 percent at the most selective institution (University B) to 38.8
percent at the two-year branch campuses.12 These differences correlate
with the academic abilities of students (the correlation between ACT
score and loan aversion is around r = −0.72). But they do not align
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Table 10.5 Distribution of Borrowing Behavior (Measured Using Administrative Data) by Campus and Selectivity
Campus
UW colleges
Four-year
Most selective
University A
University B
Total
Somewhat selective
University C
University D
University E
University F
University G
University H
Total
Least selective
University I
University J
Total

Loan averse
(%)
38.8
15.7

ACT
25
18

ACT
75
23

Net price
($)
4,566

%
Pell
24

Graduation
rate
20

Default
rate
8.5

Retention
rate
82.0

%
minority
9.1

8.3
7.8
8.0

23
26

26
30

6,266
6,246

17
12

69
81

2.2
1.4

83.9
93.8

6.8
12.8

11.9
9.1
16.7
9.8
10.0
10.9
11.1

20
20
20
21
20
20

24
25
24
25
24
24

6,779
6,225
6,418
6,474
4,657
5,506

21
25
22
25
38
20

51
56
55
61
41
56

3.5
4.5
4.2
3.8
9.2
4.5

75.8
74.0
74.9
78.4
71.6
78.0

7.4
5.0
5.9
5.8
7.0
9.5

18.7
35.9
24.5

19
18

24
23

8,578
7,940

23
32

43
27

5.7
10.4

73.3
64.3

17.0
22.8
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NOTE: All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Selectivity categories are based on retention rates and ACT scores. All institutional characteristics are from the 2008–2009 academic year, except student loan default rates, which are for the FY 2009 cohort. The
net price listed is for the lowest-income students ($0–$30,000 per year family income). Student loan default rates listed here are over a
three-year period. Institutions are not named consistent with the WSLS data agreement.
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System campus aid ofﬁcers (loan offers and acceptances); IPEDS (percent Pell, ACT, grad rate, and
net price); U.S. Department of Education (default rate); UW System Fact Book (retention rate and percent minority).
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with the institution’s sticker price and available ﬁnancial aid—many
other institutions have similar net prices but different rates of loan aversion. It is also worth noting the range of students rejecting part of their
loans—this is again most uncommon at selective institutions, but it is
most common among three of the somewhat selective universities, and
this is not easily explained by examining the characteristics of those
institutions.
Focusing on the 10 universities, the highest rates of loan aversion
are evident at the least selective schools, where students have the lowest
ACT scores and graduation rates, face the highest net prices and highest default rates, and where the proportion of students on campus from
racial/ethnic minority backgrounds and/or receiving the Pell Grant are
among the highest. The lowest rates of loan aversion are found at the
most selective institutions enrolling the smallest fraction of Pell recipients on their campuses, and where default rates are exceptionally low
and graduation rates are exceptionally high. This suggests the possibility that either the institutional context in which students make their
decisions about loans may contribute to their decisions, and/or these
variations reﬂect strong sorting processes of borrowers across schools.
Again, this merits future investigation.

EXPLAINING LOAN AVERSION
We now examine whether the observed differences in loan aversion discussed above persist when taking multiple differences among
students into account. We also consider whether the observed demographic differences in loan aversion can be explained by the hypothesized moderating factors described earlier. Finally, we consider the
variation in explanatory power of these factors, depending on how loan
aversion is measured.
Multivariate Analyses
Net of a wide range of individual characteristics and controlling for
the institution attended, the analysis of loan aversion measured using
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survey data reveals that black students are far more likely than nonHispanic white students to borrow, and second-generation immigrants
are much more likely than native students to borrow as well (see Table
10.6). Loan-averse students do not view debt as part of today’s lifestyle
and are unwilling to borrow to pay for a nicer lifestyle now. At the
same time, they are also more likely to have been assisted by a collegeeducated person when completing the FAFSA, and to feel that they can
ﬁnd ﬁnancial help if they need it in order to avoid having to drop out
of college. Unexpectedly, students who ﬁnd college more difﬁcult are
more likely to borrow—and this is after taking into account differences
in their academic preparation and work behaviors. It may be that students who ﬁnd college more difﬁcult are more realistic and/or aware of
their academic challenges, and thus are borrowing loans to free themselves to focus on school.
This same analysis also suggests that black and non-Hispanic
white students vary in how they view debt (termed “self control” in the
tables), and once that variation is accounted for, black students are more
likely than non-Hispanic white students to borrow.13 This relationship
is strengthened after additional differences in work behavior and social
capital are leveled. Similarly, second-generation immigrant students
appear more likely than native students to view college as difﬁcult, and
once that difference is ameliorated, differences in immigrant status in
loan taking appear more prominent. It is notable that ﬁrst-generation
immigrants appear somewhat more loan averse than native students,
while second-generation immigrants are far less loan averse.
In sharp contrast, the same analyses using administrative data to
measure loan aversion fail to identify any statistically signiﬁcant relationships between these theoretically important factors and loan aversion (see Table 10.7). Using the exact same sample of students but
measuring aversion as declining a loan offered, none of the observed
disparities in borrowing behavior (such as those indicated in the administrative data panel of Table 10.3) persist net of other factors. This may
be attributable to the much smaller number of students classiﬁed as
loan averse using the administrative measure, which requires students
to decline loans in a speciﬁc term (the same term in which the survey was ﬁelded). If the estimates were more precise and the observed
coefﬁcients held, we might observe some similar patterns to the survey
results but with much smaller disparities.
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Table 10.6 Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Survey Data
Dependent variable: Declined to accept any money in hypothetical loans
Measure
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Female
0.002
0.010
0.008
0.006
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.050)
Latino
−0.009
−0.020
−0.038
−0.065
(0.106)
(0.103)
(0.101)
(0.098)
Hmong (Southeast Asian)
0.097
0.127
0.186
0.098
(0.167)
(0.175)
(0.179)
(0.177)
Native American
−0.006
0.029
0.016
0.057
(0.148)
(0.157)
(0.155)
(0.154)
Black
−0.137*
−0.139*
−0.176** −0.176**
(0.077)
(0.082)
(0.079)
(0.075)
Parental education < bachelor’s degree
−0.085
−0.091
−0.079
−0.077
(0.060)
(0.062)
(0.062)
(0.063)
First-generation immigrant
0.241
0.244
0.233
0.119
(0.167)
(0.179)
(0.186)
(0.178)
Second-generation immigrant
−0.120
−0.147
−0.153
−0.173**
(0.101)
(0.098)
(0.093)
(0.084)
English not ﬁrst language
−0.006
0.045
0.021
0.177
(0.156)
(0.164)
(0.160)
(0.174)
Net price ($000s)
−0.034
−0.037
−0.038
−0.037
(0.025)
(0.028)
(0.038)
(0.042)

Model 5
−0.004
(0.050)
−0.077
(0.095)
0.094
(0.180)
0.064
(0.159)
−0.186**
(0.076)
−0.075
(0.063)
0.133
(0.180)
−0.169**
(0.086)
0.167
(0.175)
−0.038
(0.041)

Model 6
0.001
(0.050)
−0.072
(0.096)
0.130
(0.182)
0.100
(0.164)
−0.183**
(0.072)
−0.031
(0.065)
0.145
(0.179)
−0.161*
(0.085)
0.164
(0.176)
−0.037
(0.044)
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Childhood poverty
EFC ($000s)
Zero EFC
Financial reciprocity
Financial obligation to family
No ﬁnancial help from family
Credit card debt ($000s)
Extremely likely to complete BA
ACT score
Strong high school coursework (%)
College difﬁculty
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−0.020
(0.067)
0.018
(0.030)
0.063
(0.076)
−0.020
(0.083)
0.047
(0.056)
−0.035
(0.058)
−0.173
(0.153)
0.005
(0.050)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

−0.027
(0.066)
0.017
(0.030)
0.079
(0.075)
−0.021
(0.08)
0.070
(0.056)
−0.039
(0.056)
−0.148
(0.165)
0.001
(0.050)
0.007
(0.014)
−0.109
(0.076)
−0.150***
(0.051)
−0.050
(0.065)

−0.034
(0.064)
0.017
(0.030)
0.048
(0.076)
−0.046
(0.076)
0.078
(0.056)
−0.044
(0.054)
−0.153
(0.190)
−0.011
(0.050)
0.007
(0.015)
−0.099
(0.077)
−0.157***
(0.050)
−0.049
(0.068)

−0.052
(0.064)
0.021
(0.033)
0.052
(0.078)
−0.074
(0.075)
0.076
(0.056)
−0.039
(0.055)
−0.156
(0.189)
−0.010
(0.050)
0.006
(0.014)
−0.099
(0.078)
−0.155***
(0.051)
−0.042
(0.063)

−0.043
(0.063)
0.015
(0.029)
0.060
(0.076)
−0.040
(0.078)
0.081
(0.057)
0.001
(0.061)
−0.160
(0.209)
−0.036
(0.050)
0.006
(0.014)
−0.106
(0.076)
−0.158***
(0.051)
−0.038
(0.063)
(continued)
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Expected earnings from college (log $)

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Above avg ﬁnancial knowledge
Perceived ﬁnancial competence
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years
Willing to sacriﬁce today for tomorrow
Generalized debt aversion
Self-control
Internal locus of control
Worked in high school
1/28/2015 8:24:46 AM

Model 1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 3
−0.001
(0.024)
−0.046
(0.090)
0.062
(0.051)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 4
0.003
(0.024)
−0.071
(0.090)
0.040
(0.050)
0.045
(0.085)
−0.077
(0.072)
0.069
(0.069)
−0.001
(0.077)
0.139
(0.125)
0.146***
(0.052)
−0.030
(0.183)
—
—

Model 5
0.003
(0.024)
−0.077
(0.092)
0.040
(0.051)
0.040
(0.086)
−0.077
(0.074)
0.070
(0.070)
−0.012
(0.080)
0.138
(0.126)
0.135**
(0.053)
−0.002
(0.177)
−0.028
(0.067)

Model 6
0.006
(0.025)
−0.088
(0.092)
0.039
(0.050)
0.021
(0.085)
−0.093
(0.070)
0.044
(0.070)
0.005
(0.077)
0.182
(0.127)
0.132**
(0.054)
−0.038
(0.184)
−0.027
(0.069)
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Table 10.6 (continued)
Measure
Financial knowledge (0–15)

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 361

Currently working
Number of hours currently working
Family helped on FAFSA
Other person helped on FAFSA
FAFSA help from college-educated person
Could get ﬁnancial help if needed
F-value
Sample size

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.58
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.27
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.40
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.20
472

0.097
(0.073)
0.000
(0.004)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.06
472

0.084
(0.073)
0.001
(0.004)
0.002
(0.071)
−0.114*
(0.069)
0.095*
(0.052)
0.106*
(0.056)
2.01
472

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data ﬂag for childhood poverty is included in the model but not reported (not signiﬁcant). The regression also controls for college ﬁxed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The coefﬁcients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.7 Predicting Loan Aversion Using Student Characteristics: Administrative Data

Dependent variable: Declined to accept any loans, if offered.
Measure
Female
Latino
Hmong (Southeast Asian)
Native American
Black
Parental education < bachelor’s degree
First-generation immigrant
Second-generation immigrant
English not ﬁrst language
Net price ($000s)

1/28/2015 8:24:47 AM

Childhood poverty

Model 1
0.011
(0.012)
0.007
(0.018)
0.035
(0.052)
0.006
(0.020)
−0.010
(0.010)
−0.010
(0.013)
0.016
(0.030)
−0.000
(0.012)
0.002
(0.014)
−0.003
(0.014)
—

Model 2
0.012
(0.013)
0.013
(0.025)
0.077
(0.090)
0.015
(0.034)
−0.014
(0.013)
−0.011
(0.016)
0.011
(0.027)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.001
(0.016)
−0.001
(0.008)
−0.007

Model 3
0.012
(0.012)
0.009
(0.022)
0.081
(0.094)
0.020
(0.037)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.011
(0.015)
0.014
(0.028)
−0.004
(0.011)
0.003
(0.017)
−0.001
(0.009)
−0.006

Model 4
0.007
(0.008)
0.008
(0.017)
0.084
(0.096)
0.015
(0.030)
−0.010
(0.009)
−0.007
(0.011)
0.011
(0.023)
−0.007
(0.008)
0.008
(0.018)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.003

Model 5
0.009
(0.010)
0.005
(0.015)
0.083
(0.100)
0.028
(0.045)
−0.010
(0.010)
−0.007
(0.012)
0.013
(0.027)
−0.005
(0.008)
0.004
(0.014)
−0.001
(0.009)
−0.006

Model 6
0.006
(0.007)
0.004
(0.010)
0.064
(0.078)
0.014
(0.026)
−0.007
(0.007)
−0.007
(0.010)
0.011
(0.021)
−0.004
(0.006)
0.003
(0.011)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.004

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 363

EFC ($000s)
Zero EFC
Financial reciprocity
Financial obligation to family
No ﬁnancial help from family
Credit card debt ($000s)
Extremely likely to complete BA
ACT score
Strong high school coursework (%)
College difﬁculty
Expected earnings from college (log $)

(0.008)
−0.007
(0.042)
−0.004
(0.010)
0.006
(0.012)
0.004
(0.008)
0.007
(0.011)
−0.001
(0.007)
0.015
(0.015)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

(0.008)
−0.007
(0.054)
−0.003
(0.009)
0.009
(0.013)
0.004
(0.007)
0.005
(0.009)
0.001
(0.008)
0.015
(0.014)
0.001
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.009)
−0.006
(0.007)
−0.015
(0.105)
−0.004

(0.006)
−0.006
(0.051)
−0.004
(0.007)
0.007
(0.010)
0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
0.001
(0.010)
0.012
(0.011)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.008)
−0.004
(0.006)
−0.012
(0.091)
−0.003

(0.007)
−0.006
(0.050)
−0.004
(0.007)
0.003
(0.008)
0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.007)
0.001
(0.005)
0.012
(0.011)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.005
(0.010)
−0.005
(0.006)
−0.010
(0.085)
−0.004

(0.005)
−0.008
(0.041)
−0.002
(0.005)
0.004
(0.008)
0.003
(0.005)
0.007
(0.009)
0.001
(0.009)
0.008
(0.008)
0.000
(0.002)
−0.005
(0.008)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.065)
−0.002
(continued)
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Financial knowledge (0–15)

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Measure
Above average ﬁnancial knowledge
Perceived ﬁnancial competence
Time horizon: $100 in 3 months
Time horizon: $250 in 1 year
Time horizon: $500 in 3 years
Willing to sacriﬁce today for tomorrow
Generalized debt aversion
Self-control
Internal locus of control
Worked in high school

Model 1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 3
(0.030)
0.011
(0.013)
0.002
(0.007)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Model 4
(0.023)
0.007
(0.009)
0.000
(0.005)
0.004
(0.011)
0.021
(0.024)
0.018
(0.018)
0.007
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.008)
0.003
(0.005)
0.007
(0.009)
—
—

Model 5
(0.030)
0.010
(0.011)
0.001
(0.005)
0.007
(0.013)
0.025
(0.027)
0.018
(0.018)
0.006
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.008)
0.003
(0.005)
0.005
(0.010)
0.001
(0.005)

Model 6
(0.019)
0.007
(0.008)
−0.000
(0.004)
0.005
(0.010)
0.019
(0.022)
0.013
(0.014)
0.004
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.007)
0.002
(0.004)
0.004
(0.007)
0.002
(0.004)
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Currently working
Number of hours currently working
Family helped on FAFSA
Other person helped on FAFSA
FAFSA help from college-educated person
Could get ﬁnancial help if needed
F-value
Sample size

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
3.33
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.65
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.80
472

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.46
472

−0.009
(0.010)
0.001
(0.007)
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
2.22
472

−0.008
(0.009)
0.001
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.004)
0.007
(0.008)
2.00
472

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. A missing data ﬂag for childhood poverty is included in the model, but not reported (not
signiﬁcant). The regression also controls for college ﬁxed effects. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The coefﬁcients are the result of a probit model with marginal effects.
SOURCE: Sources for each measure are listed in Table 10.1.
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LOAN AVERSION AND EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES
There are many mechanisms through which aversion to borrowing
could affect educational outcomes, which could include both positive
and negative pathways. For example, loan aversion may mean that students work harder and invest more energy in school to ﬁnish faster. Or it
may mean that students must attend school part-time in order to afford
college (Cunningham and Santiago 2008). The most important issue,
however, is that selection into loan aversion is likely to bias the estimates of impacts. In other words, if loan-averse students are more often
from families with less overall ﬁnancial stability, this may overstate the
negative impact of aversion for educational outcomes. In the present
analysis we are not able to adequately remove potential biases resulting from unobserved characteristics of both students and their schools,
which correlate both with loan aversion and the chances of college persistence. Thus, our results are best thought of as correlational.
The way in which loan aversion is measured has implications for
whether or not it is associated with retention to the second year of college. As Table 10.8 indicates, if aversion is measured using survey data,
we ﬁnd that loan-averse students are 10 percentage points more likely to
persist in college to their second year, whereas using the administrative
data we observe no relationship whatsoever. But, net of other observable characteristics, borrowers outperform loan-averse students, enrolling for more semesters, earning more credits, and higher grade point
averages. The results based on the administrative data indicate that borrowers had somewhat weaker outcomes than loan-averse students with
regard to enrollment each term and earned a slightly lower cumulative
grade point average (see Table 10.8).

DISCUSSION
Many of our descriptive ﬁndings echo those produced by Cunningham and Santiago’s (2008) analysis of the 2003–2004 NPSAS data,
conﬁrming racial/ethnic variation in loan aversion, for example.14 This
sample exhibits less loan aversion overall, probably because the stu-
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Table 10.8 Academic Outcomes by Borrowing
Administrative data measure
Regressions
Measure
Loan averse
Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted
Enrollment by term
95.7
−0.5
−0.2
Spring 2009
(2.1)
(3.1)
82.4
0.2
−4.8
Fall 2009
(3.9)
(3.9)
76.2
1.4
−1.8
Spring 2010
(4.5)
(4.8)
70.9
0.2
−3.2
Fall 2010
(4.8)
(5.8)
70.6
−2.5
−8.3
Spring 2011
(4.8)
(6.2)
64.8
2.0
−1.8
Credits earned
(2.9)
(3.1)
18.3
5.3
2.5
On 4-year track
(4.2)
(5.2)
(90 credits)
4.96
−0.07
−0.18
Semesters enrolled
(0.17)
(0.19)
2.58
−0.05
−0.22***
Cumulative GPA
(0.08)
(0.08)
128
684
678
Sample size

Loan averse
94.4
78.1
73.5
66.9
65.4
63.7
22.8
4.78
2.42
401

Survey measure
Regressions
Unadjusted Covariate-adjusted
3.4**
(1.5)
10.5***
(2.9)
9.0***
(3.4)
10.2***
(3.7)
7.8**
(3.8)
6.3***
(2.2)
−0.2
(3.5)
0.41***
(0.13)
0.26***
(0.07)
684

4.2**
(2.0)
8.9***
(3.1)
6.9**
(3.5)
9.3**
(4.1)
5.1
(4.4)
4.6**
(2.1)
−2.2
(3.8)
0.31**
(0.12)
0.23***
(0.06)
678
367

1/28/2015 8:24:48 AM

NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. All students in this analysis were offered a loan. Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS is
used for continuous outcomes, while a probit model with marginal effects is used for binary outcomes. Covariate-adjusted estimates
include race, gender, parental education, age, EFC, total grants accepted, and campus ﬁxed effects.
SOURCE: University of Wisconsin System.
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dents all received grant aid and attended college full time initially, factors that the authors found were associated with lower rates of loan
aversion. However, our data and methods allowed us to dig deeper into
both the accuracy of the assessment of loan aversion and the meaning
of it. In particular, the additional examination of variation in borrowing behaviors according to immigration status and language spoken at
home highlights some additional reasons to attend to variation in borrowing behaviors. The fastest growing segments of the undergraduate
populations, especially at public two-year colleges, appear more disinclined to borrow.
Our analysis is consistent with recent research suggesting that
declining student loans may not be irrational, but rather reﬂect students’
and their families’ tastes for commitment and preference for making do
without debt (Cadena and Keys 2013). Students who borrow may not
share these preferences or may ﬁnd them outweighed by other needs,
and they are more likely to ﬁnd themselves having difﬁculty in college.
We ﬁnd complementary evidence from in-depth interviews conducted
for the same study with a focal sample of 50 WSLS participants interviewed repeatedly over a ﬁve-year period. One student refused to borrow, putting great emphasis on his selection of a roommate who would
support his choices to maximize his time spent working, minimize the
time spent on leisure, live frugally, and focus on school. Another student was far less focused, trying to attend to every relationship in her
life at the same time, prioritizing school, family, boyfriend, and work to
the detriment of her physical and mental health, which ultimately drove
her to take on loans shortly before dropping out of school.
Perhaps the greatest lesson from this study, however, is that the
measurement of loan aversion affects conclusions about which students
refuse to borrow and why. Most studies of loan aversion rely on student
surveys, which this chapter suggests may overstate the prevalence of
antiborrowing attitudes. This could mean that loan aversion is less common than previously estimated. On the other hand, it is also possible
that the apparent disconnect between students’ preferences and their
actions does not reveal an inconsistency but rather points to constrained
choices. It may be that students are borrowing when they prefer not
to, which could contribute to negative outcomes of borrowing down
the road. An increasing debt burden held by individuals who strongly
preferred not to have debt could also have public policy implications.
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It is possible that these debt holders will push for a policy solution that
helps reduce the burden immediately after leaving college. Research by
Ozymy (2012) suggests that lower-income college students are more
likely to contact their elected ofﬁcials regarding student loans than
higher-income students, and self-interest is the likely reason. This could
result in accelerating the shift in policy toward income-based repayment options from ﬁxed repayment options.
Limitations
While this study has several strengths, including the use of multiple
forms of data to measure loan aversion, detailed information on students’ attitudes and behaviors, and the ability to connect loan aversion
to educational outcomes, it also suffers some signiﬁcant limitations.
First and most importantly, the sample is constrained to a fraction of
all Wisconsin Pell recipients, who likely differ in key ways from the
national population of such students. Second, it is difﬁcult to ascertain
whether observed measurement differences in loan aversion are attributable to the difference between stated preferences and actual behavior,
timing, or something else. Third, the analyses are relatively small in
size, limiting statistical power.
Implications and Future Research
There is a critical question looming large and unanswered in this
analysis, essential for how readers think about next steps: Is loan aversion a concern? Some will readily answer yes, thinking that deciding
not to borrow means that students will be worse off in the long run if
borrowing would have increased their chances of degree completion
compared to the alternatives. Loan-averse students, in other words, may
have a reduced risk of being burdened with unmanageable debt, while
also increasing their chances of college dropout and reducing their
expected lifetime earnings.
On the other hand, there are additional opportunity costs that accrue
to some students, including those who are most often loan averse. The
typical calculation for assessing whether debt is manageable and optimal compared to the returns to college relies on a comparison to a student’s future earnings. Debt to future earnings ratios are most often the
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focus of calculations regarding the appropriateness of loans. However,
not only do students from low-income families face more constrained
labor markets and employment discrimination than other students,
thus lowering their projected future earnings, but they also come from
families with more existing debt and greater ﬁnancial need—meaning
that a portion of their future earnings are often already committed to
their families, as a form of familial debt (Burton 2007). Thus it may be
more appropriate to focus on debt to household ratio when assessing the
rationality of loan aversion, and include a student’s natal family (and
even extended kin network) in that household calculation.
Today, nearly one in ﬁve households has student debt—double the
share of two decades earlier—with an average balance of more than
$26,000. While higher education advocates are right to point out that
college is a good investment, and the price of a new sedan is comparable,
they miss a critical point: poor families owe 24 percent of their household income to student debt, compared to 7 percent or less for families
making more than $60,000 a year (Fry 2012). While the amount of
debt may be relatively similar across levels of family income, its meaning is quite different. With such a differential impact on poor families,
loan aversion may be a smart decision. The relevant lack of aversion, in
other words, could also be viewed as problematic.
In the future, researchers should think about ways to increase the
precision of how we measure loan-taking decisions (using both surveys and administrative data) so that it becomes possible to intervene
to facilitate student decisions consistent with their own preferences and
intentions. It would also be useful to conduct detailed mixed-method
ethnographic studies of students and low-income families to examine
how decisions about loan taking affect the degree to which higher education helps to increase their social mobility or perpetuates their economic struggles.
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Notes
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Great Lakes Higher Education Guaranty
Corporation, Institute for Research on Poverty, Spencer Foundation, William T. Grant
Foundation, Wisconsin Center for the Advancement of Postsecondary Education, and
an anonymous donor provided funding for this study, conducted in partnership with
the Fund for Wisconsin Scholars, the Higher Educational Aids Board, the University
of Wisconsin System, and the Wisconsin Technical College System. The authors thank
Allie Gardner and Kaja Rebane for their help and support. All mistakes reside with
the authors. Contact the lead author at srab@education.wisc.edu with questions and
comments.
1. A small fraction of students attend colleges that do not participate in the Title IV
ﬁnancial aid program (these are mainly for-proﬁt institutions), or colleges that
decline to offer loans (most often community colleges and/or minority serving
institutions).
2. Estimates vary; one recent study suggests that overall about one in six students at
public and private four-year colleges and universities declines the entirety of the
subsidized loans offered to them (Cadena and Keys 2013).
3. While some argue that the relevant ratio is debt-to-postgraduation income, it is
important to recognize that among low-income families, money is often shared—
that is, children continue to contribute to their families postgraduation and receive
little ﬁnancial assistance in return—and students more often reside in areas with
fewer employment opportunities and lower wages.
4. The latest NPSAS was just released but is unavailable at the time of this writing
because of the government shutdown.
5. Samples in this chapter are too small to examine differential patterns according to
loan subsidization.
6. Net price is the difference between the institution’s cost of attendance (the sticker
price, including tuition, fees, room and board, and all other estimated costs) and
all grant aid students receive. The net price thus includes the family’s expected
contribution (ofﬁcially calculated by a federal formula) and all funds they are left
to earn or borrow to pay for college.
7. The lead author directs the Wisconsin Scholars Longitudinal Study (WSLS), and
more details about the study can be found at www.ﬁnaidstudy.org and in GoldrickRab et al. (2012). All data included in this analysis were collected over a ﬁve-year
period by the WSLS research team.
8. Interest rates on unsubsidized Stafford Loans have been ﬁxed at 6.8 percent from
2006–07 to 2012–13. The interest rate on subsidized Stafford Loans declined from
6.8 to 6.0 percent for loans issued in 2008–09, 5.6 percent in 2009–10, 4.5 percent
in 2010–11, and 3.4 percent in 2011–12 and 2012–13. It remains 3.4 percent for
the 2012–13 academic year. Beginning July 1, 2013, all interest rates are tied to
the 10-year Treasury note.
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9. Subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans carry different repayment protections. Today, under Income-Based Repayment, the government will pay the interest for up to three years for borrowers whose incomes are too low to cover interest
payments on their subsidized loans, but this is not the case for unsubsidized Stafford Loans.
10. We thank Dr. Stephen DesJardins for noting in his published papers that requesting
loan offers when obtaining ﬁnancial aid data is essential to exploring ﬁnancial aid
packages and their impacts.
11. We also considered deﬁning a student as loan averse if s/he declined at least half
of all of the loans offered. The correlation between the two measures was weaker
(0.16), which is unsurprising, since the survey measure required rejection of all
loans offered. We also considered categorizing a student as loan averse if s/he
declined all unsubsidized loans, since the interest rate in the survey question was
more consistent with these. The correlation between the survey and administrative
measures this way was 0.28, suggesting that at least some students thought of the
survey question as regarding that type of loan. However, we have a much smaller
sample of those students compared to all students offered any loans, and declining
subsidized loans is a behavior worth examining, so we focus on that larger sample
here.
12. Consistent with the WSLS data agreement, universities are not named here.
13. In analyses not shown, we also ﬁnd that students from three of the poorest areas in
the state—Milwaukee, Kenosha, and Racine—are more loan averse.
14. Cunningham and Santiago (2008) found more aversion among Chinese and Vietnamese students, while we identiﬁed substantial aversion among Hmong students.
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The need for higher education and training has never been as important to individuals and our economy as it is today, yet its affordability
is seriously in question. College costs have skyrocketed, as family
incomes and state funding for public higher education have declined,
leading millions to take on student debt, drop out, or struggle to keep
up with classes while working many hours per week to pay the bills.
Even after recent signiﬁcant increases, the maximum Pell Grant today
covers the smallest share of the cost of attending a public college since
the start of the program 40 years ago. It should be no surprise that the
gaps in college enrollment, persistence, and graduation between students from high- and low-income families have widened over the last
30 years, threatening both the American Dream and our nation’s economic competitiveness.
Although these gaps cannot be closed with ﬁnancial aid policy
alone, research shows that it can increase enrollment and completion.
This chapter focuses speciﬁcally on student loan policy at the federal
level and offers a number of recommendations to reduce complexity,
improve targeting, contain debt burdens, and encourage completion and
wise borrowing. These recommendations are part of a comprehensive
package of reforms to federal student aid, detailed in our 2013 white
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paper, Aligning the Means and the Ends: How to Improve Federal Student Aid and Increase College Access and Success (The Institute for
College Access and Success [TICAS] 2013). Unless otherwise noted,
the information in this chapter is drawn from that paper.

BACKGROUND
As context for our recommendations, we provide some brief background information about federal and private student loans.
Federal Student Loans
The current federal student loan program is too complex, its beneﬁts are poorly targeted, and its terms are too arbitrary. Much of the
complexity is a holdover from when banks received subsidies to make
Stafford Loans with terms set and guaranteed by the government. The
resulting rules shielded banks—but not borrowers or taxpayers—from
risk. Now that these federal loans are made directly and more costeffectively by the U.S. Department of Education, the entire student loan
system can and should be streamlined and improved.
From the myriad types and terms of different loans to the repayment
process, it can be hard to ﬁgure out how federal student loans work.
Consider, for example, the main source of undergraduate loans since
July 2010: the Direct Stafford Loan program. There are “subsidized”
and “unsubsidized” Stafford Loans, each with different eligibility criteria and treatment of interest during school and periods of deferment and
with separate caps on how much a student can borrow each year and
cumulatively. The vast majority (82 percent) of undergraduates with
subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, so some of their loans
accrue interest while they are in school and some do not.1
Subsidized loans currently provide students with valuable beneﬁts,
including a low ﬁxed interest rate and no interest accrual while they
are in school.2 However, these beneﬁts are not well targeted, as highincome students may qualify just because they attend a high-cost college, and most students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized
loans.
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All Stafford Loans offer ﬂexible repayment plans, as well as loan
deferments and forbearances, yet more than one in eight student loan
borrowers is defaulting within three years of entering repayment.3 The
consequences of defaulting on a federal loan can follow borrowers for
the rest of their lives, ruining their credit, making it difﬁcult to buy a
car or rent an apartment, and limiting their job prospects. They may
also face garnished wages, seized income tax refunds, and diminished
Social Security checks.
Private Loans
Private educational loans are a much riskier way to pay for college
than federal student loans. Most private loans have variable, uncapped
interest rates and require a cosigner (U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). No more a form
of ﬁnancial aid than a credit card, private loans typically have interest
rates that, regardless of whether they are ﬁxed or variable, are highest for those who can least afford them. Private loans lack the basic
consumer protections and ﬂexible repayment options of federal student
loans, such as unemployment deferment, income-driven repayment,
and loan forgiveness programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Reform is clearly and urgently needed. Our loan recommendations
aim to better support access and success while containing costs and
risks for both students and taxpayers. To achieve those goals, we propose simplifying the loan program, improving the targeting of beneﬁts,
containing debt burdens, and encouraging wise borrowing. Our recommendations include the following:
•

Provide a single undergraduate student loan with no fees, a
low in-school interest rate, and a ﬁxed rate in repayment that is
never much higher than the rate on loans being offered to current students.

•

Streamline and improve federal loan repayment options.
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•

Improve the timing, content, and effectiveness of student loan
counseling.

•

Reduce the number of student loan defaults.

•

Reform the student loan collections process.

•

Strengthen consumer protections for private loan borrowers.

One Simple, Affordable Undergraduate Loan Program
We propose replacing the current Stafford Loans with one simple, affordable undergraduate loan. Our recommended changes are
designed to simplify the loan program, ensure that loans both appear
and are affordable for borrowers, and better align the cost of the loan
for the student with the costs for the government. There is no way to
perfectly balance all three of these goals. However, what we propose
is an important step forward on each front, focused on making federal
student loans a more effective tool for ensuring access and supporting
success while containing risk for both the student and the taxpayer.
Speciﬁcally, we recommend that there be only one federal loan for
undergraduate students, in place of the subsidized and unsubsidized
Stafford Loans available today. A single loan will be much easier for
borrowers to understand and monitor, and for schools and the Department of Education to administer. This loan—which we refer to in this
chapter as the One Loan—has an interest rate that is lower while the
student is in school and higher by a set margin, but capped, when the
borrower enters repayment. The interest rates are tied to the government’s cost of borrowing and designed to help offset the cost of the loan
program, rather than being arbitrarily set by Congress.4 The features of
One Loans are described in the sections below.
Fixed interest rates and no fees
Fixed rates are important to provide certainty, predictability, and
reassurance to students, many of whom have never borrowed before and
may not fully understand the consequences of variable rates. The recent
mortgage crisis demonstrated all too clearly that millions of Americans with mortgages did not understand the risks of variable rates, with
terrible consequences for both them and our nation’s economy. Fixed
interest rates also further distinguish One Loans, which are a form of
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ﬁnancial aid, from other ﬁnancial products such as credit cards and
private loans. As mentioned earlier, interest rates on private loans are
usually variable, like a credit card. The private loans that offer ﬁxed
rates will almost certainly have higher interest rates than One Loans for
all borrowers except those who have, or whose cosigners have, pristine
credit. At the height of the lending boom in 2007–2008, a majority of
private student loan borrowers had not taken out as much as they could
have in federal loans ﬁrst, underscoring the need to clearly distinguish
federal student loans from private loans (TICAS 2011a).
The One Loan’s ﬁxed rate is tied to the government’s cost of lending in the year the loan is disbursed. For instance, the interest rate on all
loans disbursed in a given school year might be set based on the interest
rate on the one-year Treasury bill or 10-year Treasury note at the ﬁnal
auction preceding June 1 of that year. Students who take out One Loans
each year that they are in school may end up having loans with different
interest rates, depending on the market conditions each year. However,
all the other terms of their One Loans would be the same.
There is no reason for the new loan to have fees, which are remnants of the bank-based guaranteed loan program and add unneeded
complexity to the loan. The ﬁxed interest rate will be set to cover the
cost of One Loans without needing to add supplemental fees.
Low in-school interest rate
The in-school interest rate on One Loans is based on the government’s actual cost of borrowing when the loans are made. The rate for
new loans would take effect each year on July 1 and apply to all loans
issued through June 30 of the following year. The in-school rate applies
while the borrower is enrolled at least half-time and during a six-month
grace period after she leaves school, similar to the usual timing of the
interest subsidy on subsidized Stafford Loans. Having a lower interest
rate when students are in school is intended to encourage them to stay
enrolled and complete their education, knowing that their interest rate
will rise if they stop out or drop out.5 Lower in-school interest rates also
help encourage the use of federal loans over private loans or other types
of ﬁnancing available to consumers with limited or no credit histories.
Charging a low in-school rate, rather than charging no interest, while
the student is enrolled is designed to both lower the cost of providing
the loan and discourage students from dragging out their time in school.
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Higher, but capped, out-of-school rate
The One Loan’s out-of-school interest rate is set at the in-school
rate when the loans were taken out, plus a ﬁxed margin designed to
cover the cost of the loan program, including the interest-rate insurance
described below, loan forgiveness and discharge, and administrative
costs. For example, imagine a One Loan with an in-school interest rate
of 3 percent based on the government’s cost of borrowing that year.
If, for illustration purposes only, the repayment rate were set at the inschool rate plus two percentage points, it would have an out-of-school
interest rate of 5 percent. The out-of-school rate, while higher than the
in-school rate, must be low enough to ensure that federal loans are—
and look like—ﬁnancial aid in contrast to other types of ﬁnancing such
as private loans.
The out-of-school interest rate on the One Loan will be subject to a
universal cap, like Stafford Loan interest rates; currently the undergraduate Stafford Loan interest rate is capped at 8.25 percent.6 A universal
cap protects consumers from extremely high rates in the economy and
reinforces the differences between federal loans and commercial ﬁnancial products. For example, if the universal cap were 7 percent, the
in-school interest rate were 6 percent, and the repayment rate set at the
in-school rate plus two percentage points, the loan would have an outof-school interest rate of 7 percent because the cap would keep the rate
from rising above 7 percent.
Interest-rate insurance
The One Loan has an important new feature: a form of insurance
that prevents interest rates from ever being too much higher than the
rate on loans being offered to current students. This feature addresses
the major disadvantage of ﬁxed rates for borrowers, without requiring
reﬁnancing or consolidation. To prevent borrowers from getting stuck
with high ﬁxed rates when market rates decline signiﬁcantly, the interest rate on One Loans will reset to a lower ﬁxed rate when interest rates
in the economy drop substantially from when the loan was issued.
For example, the interest-rate insurance might prevent outstanding
One Loans from having a rate that is more than two percentage points
above the rate on loans being offered to current students. If a borrower
had a One Loan with an out-of-school interest rate of 6.5 percent, and
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interest rates dropped so that the One Loans to current students had
an out-of-school rate of 3.8 percent, the borrower’s interest rate would
automatically drop from 6.5 percent to 5.8 percent, so that the rate was
no more than two percentage points above the current rate.
The interest rate on affected One Loans would not increase, even if
rates in the economy do. This helps borrowers who go to school when
interest rates are unusually high, while avoiding the uncertainty and risk
of a variable rate for all borrowers. We believe this interest rate insurance, which has some similarities to existing ﬁnancial instruments (e.g.,
swaptions) can be provided at a reasonable cost to both borrowers and
taxpayers, and incorporated into the ﬁxed margin in the out-of-school
interest rate.7 The cost of this feature will depend on the selected interest rate margin, universal cap, and the speciﬁcs of the insurance.
Interest-free deferments for Pell Grant recipients
In addition to the One Loan’s low in-school rate, universal interest
rate cap, and interest rate insurance, which apply to all borrowers, the
One Loan provides additional protection to borrowers from low-income
families. Pell Grant recipients who take out loans would be eligible for
interest-free deferments during periods of unemployment and economic
hardship, just as with subsidized Stafford Loans currently.8
Subsidized Stafford Loans do not accrue interest while the borrower
is in school, during the six-month grace period, or when payments are
deferred for certain reasons after the borrower leaves school, including periods of unemployment and the ﬁrst three years in IBR or PAYE
if income-driven payments are less than monthly interest.9 However,
as mentioned above, these valuable beneﬁts are not well targeted for
several reasons: high-income students may qualify for subsidized loans
just because they attend a high-cost college; and the vast majority of
students with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, which
accrue interest during these periods.
The One Loan better targets these valuable beneﬁts to the borrowers who most need them, when they need them most. Borrowers who
received Pell Grants, by deﬁnition, come from low- and moderateincome families and are therefore much less likely to have family members who can support them during periods of unemployment or low
earnings. The loans will provide interest relief on all loans held by Pell
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Grant recipients, rather than just some of their loans, when they are
unemployed or their incomes are too low to cover their interest in an
income-driven repayment plan.
Retain current loan limits
The loans will have the same aggregate loan limits as Stafford
Loans: currently $31,000 for dependent undergraduates and $57,500
for independent undergraduates. Student loans have become a fact of
life for more and more Americans, and there is widespread and understandable concern about high and pervasive debt levels. Federal loan
limits provide a necessary signal to students and colleges about how
much borrowing might be too much. The higher loan limits for independent students rightly recognize that these students have greater
ﬁnancial responsibilities and may need to borrow more to stay and succeed in school.10
Some have suggested raising the current loan limits, while others
have suggested lowering them, but the data do not support either suggestion (TICAS 2012a,b). As mentioned earlier, average debt for 2011
graduates of public and nonproﬁt four-year colleges was well below the
aggregate limits—the average including private loans was $26,600 for
the two-thirds who borrowed, and one-third of graduates had no student
debt (TICAS 2012c). The majority of undergraduates who borrow private education loans could have borrowed more in federal student loans
before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS 2011a). Finally,
colleges already have the authority to limit or deny loans for individual
students on a case-by-case basis (TICAS 2012d).
The Department of Education should, however, analyze the potential effects of prorating federal student loans by attendance status.
Unlike Pell Grants, federal loans are not prorated based on a student’s
attendance status. In other words, students enrolled half time receive
a prorated portion of the Pell Grant that students enrolled full time
receive, but may receive the same loan amount as a full-time student.
Students who take out full loans but make only part-time progress may
be at an increased risk of dropping out and defaulting. Students who
attend college part time are less likely to complete a degree or certiﬁcate (U.S. Department of Education 2011), and failure to complete a
degree or certiﬁcate is one of the strongest predictors of future default
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(Nguyen 2011; Gross et al. 2009). They may also be at greater risk of
exhausting their loan eligibility before completing their degree. Prorating loans would involve reducing student eligibility for federal loans
at a time when college is getting harder to afford, but it is possible that
it could help encourage students to enroll in more courses per term,
thereby completing a degree and reducing their risk of default. Given
both the risks and the potential beneﬁts, such a change warrants careful
analysis and consideration.
Streamline and Improve Federal Loan Repayment Options
We have identiﬁed several ways to simplify and improve federal
loan repayment options to help borrowers manage their debt, and
reduce the ﬁnancial distress and defaults that undermine the goals of
increased enrollment and completion. There is even more complexity
on the repayment side of the federal loan process than on the borrowing
side. The number of repayment options and the variation in eligibility
requirements, costs, and beneﬁts can be overwhelming, even for those
working in the ﬁeld. With so many choices and variables, comparisons
can become unwieldy and confusing, and borrowers may be more likely
to end up in plans that do not ﬁt their needs or goals. However, having
some well-designed choices, combined with timely and effective counseling, can help borrowers ﬁnd a good ﬁt for their own situation, stay in
repayment, and avoid default.
Let borrowers make one loan payment for all their
federal loans
To reduce complexity and make it easier to stay current on their
loans, we recommend that borrowers be able to make a single payment that covers all of their federal loans. Currently, this can only be
accomplished through a separate consolidation process, which is a signiﬁcant bureaucratic hurdle for borrowers and has trade-offs that are not
in every borrower’s best interest.11 Borrowers should not have to consolidate their loans just to avoid making multiple payments to multiple
servicers on their federal student loans each month.
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Base repayment plan eligibility on total federal loan debt
The “standard” repayment plan for unconsolidated federal loans is
currently a 10-year plan. Borrowers are automatically enrolled in this
plan if they do not actively choose a different one before their ﬁrst payment (U.S. Department of Education 2013a). If borrowers owe more
than $30,000, they may be able to choose an “extended” 25-year plan
instead, but only if they owe that much within one loan program.12 For
example, if they owe $31,000 in the Federal Family Education Loan
Program (FFELP) or $31,000 in Direct Loans, they may qualify for the
extended plan. But if they owe $15,000 in Direct Loans and $16,000 in
FFELP Loans, they do not qualify. In contrast, total federal student loan
debt, along with the borrower’s income, is used to determine eligibility
for income-driven repayment plans, in which borrowers pay for up to
20 or 25 years.13 Meanwhile, borrowers who combine their loans into a
Direct Consolidation Loan have access to “standard” repayment plans
that gradually increase from 10 to 30 years depending on the borrowers’
total federal loan debt.14 Any signal to borrowers about optimal repayment periods, if one were ever intended, gets lost in all this complexity,
and what is optimal to one borrower may not be for another.
Instead, we recommend that all borrowers have access to repayment
plans based on their total federal student loan debt, with incrementally longer repayment periods available to those with larger total
debt. Making these repayment options consistent for all loans would
greatly simplify the process for borrowers, especially when paired with
improved loan counseling that helps them identify their priorities and
see which plan is the best ﬁt. Borrowers who want to reduce the overall
cost of their debt by paying it down faster will be able to select shorter
repayment plans and make prepayments without penalty, as they can
now. Borrowers who want assurance that their monthly payments will
remain affordable, given their income, will have access to a streamlined
income-driven plan, as discussed in detail below. Additionally, borrowers who want all their payments to count toward Public Service Loan
Forgiveness will always be able to choose a 10-year payment plan.15
Currently, as mentioned above, borrowers who do not select a
repayment plan are automatically placed in a 10-year plan, making it
the “default” plan. A 10-year plan has signiﬁcant beneﬁts for borrowers if they can afford the monthly payments, which are higher than the
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monthly payments in longer plans. Given the growth in student debt
levels over the past generation, a 10-year plan may be increasingly
unrealistic for many borrowers.16 Automatically enrolling borrowers in
this plan, regardless of their total debt levels, could be setting some borrowers up to fail.
Nevertheless, there are trade-offs between shorter and longer
repayment plans. Longer repayment periods provide lower monthly
payments but also cost borrowers more over the life of the loan. The
best plan for one borrower may not be the best for another borrower.
The decision of which repayment plan is most appropriate for any given
borrower—whether made by the individual or by the Department of
Education through the selection of a “default” or mandatory plan—is
important and needs to be considered carefully. As we discuss later
in the chapter, loan counseling should be improved to help borrowers
decide which plan is best for them. The Department of Education should
also carefully analyze data on borrowers’ repayment plan choices and
outcomes—including their ability to make payments and total amount
paid—to determine whether a 10-year plan remains the best option for
borrowers who do not actively select another plan. It should also consider the broader implications of changing the default repayment plans
for borrowers, colleges, and taxpayers.
Give all borrowers access to a single, improved income-driven
repayment plan
When Congress created the Income-Based Repayment plan (IBR)
for federal loans in 2007, it was a major step forward for student loan
borrowers.17 TICAS, through its Project on Student Debt, developed
the policy proposal that laid the groundwork for IBR (TICAS et al.
2006). We ﬁrst consulted with stakeholders on all sides and conducted
an in-depth analysis of debt burdens and repayment plans. This analysis
found that protections and options for borrowers with high debt relative
to their income were inadequate, inconsistent, and inaccessible (TICAS
2006). With America’s higher education system increasingly reliant
on student loans, and the consequences of default so severe and longlasting, students were bearing too much of the risk to ensure access or
support success. We developed a “Plan for Fair Loan Payments” that
called for affordable payments based on income and family size, cover-
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age of both Direct and FFELP Loans, and a light at the end of the tunnel
with forgiveness after 20 years of income-driven payments. These
goals were supported by thousands of students, higher education leaders, loan industry representatives, civil rights groups, Republicans and
Democrats in Congress, and organizations representing parents, college
counselors, and others.18
Thanks to the broad coalition that helped make the case for a solution, IBR became available to all federal loan borrowers in July 2009
(TICAS 2009). Despite the absence of much publicity or borrower
outreach in the ﬁrst few years of the program, more than 1.3 million
borrowers were enrolled in IBR by the winter of 2012 (U.S. Department
of Education 2013b). IBR caps monthly payments at a manageable
share of income and forgives any principal or interest that remains
after 25 years of payments. To qualify, borrowers must have a “partial ﬁnancial hardship,” deﬁned as a debt-to-income ratio that makes a
10-year payment unaffordable. Required payments can be as low as $0
for borrowers with very low incomes, and payments rise incrementally
with income. Payments are capped at the lower of the monthly payment under the standard 10-year plan, or 15 percent of “discretionary
income,” which is deﬁned as adjusted gross income (AGI) minus 150
percent of poverty for the borrower’s family size.19
In recent years, the number of repayment options similar to IBR
has grown. In early 2010, Congress passed the president’s proposal to
expand IBR for future borrowers (White House 2010). Starting in July
2014, new borrowers will be able to qualify for a lower monthly payment
and shorter forgiveness period than the current IBR program provides:
10 percent of discretionary income and 20 years, instead of 15 percent
and 25 years. In the fall of 2010, President Obama announced a new
Pay As You Earn plan to give an estimated 1.6 million current students
and recent graduates access to the same lower payment cap and shorter
forgiveness period, with the goal of offsetting the recession’s effect on
their job prospects and earnings (White House 2011 and TICAS 2012f).
To qualify for Pay As You Earn, students must have borrowed their
ﬁrst loan after September 30, 2007, and received at least one federal
loan disbursement after September 30, 2011. Pay As You Earn became
available to eligible borrowers in December 2012 through regulatory
additions to a preexisting program called Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR), which is only available for borrowers with Direct Loans.20
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ICR, which is still available, provides less relief than IBR in most cases.
Direct Loan borrowers in any of these repayment plans who also work
for public or nonproﬁt employers may have their loans discharged after
just 10 years of payments, through the Public Service Loan Forgiveness
plan Congress created at the same time as IBR.21
We recommend consolidating the well-intentioned, but highly
complex, mix of currently available income-driven plans—current
IBR, IBR for new borrowers in 2014, Pay As You Earn, and ICR—into
one new and improved income-driven plan. Borrowers would no longer
have to ﬁgure out which plans they qualify for or which of their loans
will be covered by which payment cap or forgiveness period. Those
already enrolled in IBR, Pay As You Earn, and ICR would have the
option of staying put or switching to the new plan. For the purposes of
this chapter, we refer to the new plan as Pay As You Earn 2 (PAYE2).
To simplify, strengthen, and improve access to income-driven payments, PAYE2 will be available to all borrowers, regardless of their
debt or income level, whether their loans are Direct or FFELP, or when
they borrowed. This will make it much easier for borrowers who want
the assurance of manageable payments to enroll whenever it makes
sense for them, whether it is before they make their ﬁrst payment, after
they have hit a rough patch, or when they are concerned about what
the future will bring. Rather than requiring borrowers to have a certain
debt-to-income ratio to enroll, borrowers with higher incomes relative
to their debt will simply make larger payments as determined by the
plan’s sliding scale. This is already the case for those whose incomes
rise substantially after they entered an income-driven plan. If borrowers
have access to even lower monthly payments in another plan, and that is
more important to them than the assurance of income-driven payments,
they need not enroll in PAYE2.
Enabling all borrowers to enroll in PAYE2 will likely require
adjustments in some aspects of income-driven plan design, such as the
treatment of accrued interest, when to capitalize interest and how much,
and whether and how borrowers can exit and reenter PAYE2. Further
study is needed to determine optimal approaches. These changes will
affect the beneﬁts and risks of widespread enrollment in PAYE2.
PAYE2 will ensure that payments never exceed 10 percent of
income while better targeting beneﬁts. In its current design, Pay As You
Earn has undeniable beneﬁts for low- and moderate-income borrowers,
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but it may also result in some high-income borrowers getting substantial
forgiveness when they could well afford to pay more. PAYE2 includes
two adjustments that better target beneﬁts while assuring that monthly
payments never exceed 10 percent of the borrower’s income and avoiding arbitrary cliffs, in which borrowers in very similar situations get
very different beneﬁts.
1) Gradually phase out the “income exclusion” for higherincome borrowers. PAYE2, like IBR and Pay As You Earn,
calculates monthly payments based on the borrower’s “discretionary income”—AGI minus an “income exclusion”—to
protect income needed to cover basic living expenses. Currently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, the income exclusion is
150 percent of the poverty level for the borrower’s household
size. Based on this deﬁnition, a borrower with a family of four
and an AGI of $40,000 has $34,575 protected for basic living
expenses. The family therefore has a discretionary income of
$5,425, or $452 per month, so payments set at 10 percent of
discretionary income would be $45 per month.22
However, as borrowers’ incomes rise, it becomes increasingly
unnecessary to shield a share of their earnings. Borrowers with
very high incomes are able to devote a larger share of their total
incomes to loan payments and still have sufﬁcient funds left
over to cover basic necessities, such as food and housing. As
a result, PAYE2 gradually phases out the income exclusion for
borrowers with AGIs between $100,000 and $250,000, so that
borrowers with AGIs of $250,000 or more would have their
monthly payments calculated as 10 percent of their total AGI.
Borrowers with AGIs below $100,000 would not be affected,
and monthly payments for all borrowers would never be greater
than 10 percent of their total income. The AGI levels at which
the phase-out begins and ends would be indexed to inﬂation to
ensure fairness over time.
2) Cap all monthly payments at 10 percent of income.
Currently, in IBR and Pay As You Earn, some borrowers can
end up paying less than 10 percent of their income, owing to
a certain cap on their monthly payments. This occurs if, after
entering IBR or Pay As You Earn, the borrower’s income rises
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high enough that he no longer has a “partial ﬁnancial hardship” (i.e., his debt-to-income ratio has declined so much that a
10-year payment is now affordable). When this occurs, his payments are capped at the monthly amount he would have had to
pay had he entered a 10-year standard repayment plan when he
entered IBR. For some high-income borrowers, this cap will be
lower than 10 percent of their incomes. Removing the current
10-year-payment cap and instead capping payments at 10 percent of income better targets income-driven repayment beneﬁts
to those who need them and prevents high-income borrowers
from receiving substantial loan forgiveness when they could
have afforded to pay more.23
Additionally, PAYE2 will provide forgiveness after 20 years of payments. As we have long recommended, any debt remaining after 20
years of income-driven payments should be discharged. This will make
it easier for borrowers to see the light at the end of the tunnel, and
let them focus on saving for retirement and their children’s education
before the next generation is in college. The changes to payment determinations described above better target the forgiveness available after
20 years because higher-income borrowers will be more likely to pay
off their debts within that period.
Furthermore, we recommend making it easier for all borrowers
in income-driven plans to keep their income information up to date.
Regardless of how many income-driven plans there are, there is a
need to further improve the process through which borrowers provide
updated income information to their loan servicers. Currently, borrowers in income-driven plans must provide tax or other income information
each year to avoid reverting to non-income-driven payments that may
be much higher than they can afford. Recent improvements require that
borrowers be notiﬁed before they have to submit information and make
it easier for some borrowers to submit it to their servicer (U.S Department of Education 2012a). Additionally, in late 2012, the Department
of Education launched a user-friendly tool that lets borrowers electronically transfer their own tax information from the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) into an online form, both to apply for income-driven plans
and to update their income information (U.S. Department of Education
2012b). Unfortunately, this process is only available to borrowers who
have ﬁled an IRS 1040 form. Borrowers with incomes too low to owe
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federal income tax may not have a 1040 form to draw from, requiring
them to go through extra steps to verify their incomes. As a result, borrowers with the greatest need for income-driven payments may have
the hardest time continuing to qualify for them.
To simplify the process for all borrowers, the income veriﬁcation
process for PAYE2 should enable borrowers to draw on earnings data in
their W-2 and 1099 forms. In addition, borrowers should be able to give
the Department of Education advance permission to access their AGI
and W-2 information for some period of time (e.g., ﬁve years), as they
could until recently for IBR and ICR, to reduce the risk of inadvertently
missing a deadline.
Finally, any forgiven loan balances should not be treated as taxable
income. Borrowers currently enrolled in IBR, ICR, and Pay As You
Earn, as well as those who would be enrolled in our proposed PAYE2
plan, can have their loan balances forgiven after 20 or 25 years (depending on the program) of qualifying payments. Treating discharged loans
as taxable income creates a tax liability that most recipients will be
unable to afford, discourages enrollment in income-driven repayment
plans, and is inconsistent with the treatment of other discharged loans.24
Improve the Timing, Content, and Effectiveness of Student
Loan Counseling
Federal law and regulations require entrance and exit counseling
for any student who receives a federal loan.25 Entrance counseling has
the potential to help students optimize their borrowing and better understand the risks and beneﬁts, and exit counseling has the potential to help
students select an appropriate repayment plan and avoid default. However, the timing and content of required counseling must be improved
to better help students borrow wisely, complete college without burdensome debt, and repay their loans. With common-sense modiﬁcations
and more research on what works, loan counseling can more effectively
inform crucial decisions about borrowing and repayment.
Loan counseling should be conducted when it is most likely to have
an impact: before students commit to borrowing. Currently, entrance
counseling can occur after the promissory note is signed, as long as
the counseling comes before the ﬁrst loan disbursement. This timing
problem can and must be ﬁxed. Also, whereas entrance counseling is
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only required when students ﬁrst borrow, interim counseling should
take place at key points when borrowers are likely to beneﬁt, such as
when they have borrowed over a certain amount or sought certiﬁcation
of a private loan.
To be more effective, loan counseling must be individualized based
on the borrower’s speciﬁc situation and needs; it should not just disclose general information and options. Entrance counseling could give
students an estimate of their total debt burden if they borrow the amount
they are seeking in each year they plan to be in school and also provide
the resulting monthly and total payments under different plans. Exit
counseling could ask students about their plans and preferences and
point them toward speciﬁc repayment plans based on this information.
For instance, if a student has borrowed a small amount and has secured
a job with sufﬁcient pay, the counseling might encourage her to select
a 10-year ﬁxed payment plan to minimize the total amount she will pay
over the life of the loan. On the other hand, if the student has borrowed
a large amount and is unsure how much she is likely to earn, the counseling might highlight income-driven repayment as a way to keep her
payments affordable. Currently, counseling does not have to be tailored
to the individual student’s situation and can, for example, use average
loan amounts rather than the amount the student has actually borrowed.
Entrance and interim loan counseling should include warnings
about the risks of private loans and discourage students from considering them if they have not exhausted their federal loan options. Students
need to understand the protections and beneﬁts that come from federal
loans, including set and predictable interest rates, ﬂexible repayment
plans, deferment options, and forgiveness programs, before they take
out a private loan. To the extent possible, exit counseling should include
any private loan debt so students can select a repayment plan for their
federal loans based on an understanding of their total debt, including
any private loans.
Finally, all loan counseling should be consumer tested and improved
based on feedback, and ongoing analysis should be conducted of counseling’s impact on student decisions. For instance, existing data systems
could be used to assess the impact of variations in entrance, interim, and
exit counseling on student enrollment, persistence, borrowing, repayment, and default rates. Such analysis could be used to continually
improve the counseling to better support student success, prevent loan
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defaults and unwise or unnecessary borrowing, and reduce the burden
of student debt by helping students choose appropriate repayment plans.
Strengthen Consumer Protections
We recommend strengthening consumer protections to support
smart borrowing, to prevent default, and to reduce the ﬁnancial distress
of borrowers with federal and private loans.
Federal loan borrowers
As a form of ﬁnancial aid, federal student loans provide many
important consumer protections that are not required of private education loans or other types of ﬁnancing. Examples include discharges
under circumstances such as school fraud, school closure, severe and
permanent disability, or death; income-driven repayment plans that
help ensure affordable payments and a light at the end of the tunnel;
deferments and forbearances that let borrowers temporarily suspend
payments without becoming delinquent or paying additional fees; and
an opportunity to reenter repayment after default. Such policies are
supposed to prevent or reduce defaults, unfair treatment, and extreme
ﬁnancial distress for borrowers who used federal loans to help pay for
their own or their child’s education. Unfortunately, the federal loan
system does not work as well as it should to protect borrowers in challenging circumstances. The recommendations presented in this section
are aimed at reducing red tape for distressed, disabled, or defrauded
federal loan borrowers and reducing and preventing defaults. While far
from comprehensive, these recommendations touch on several important areas for improvement in ways that address the interests of both
borrowers and taxpayers.
Respond to signs of ﬁnancial distress in ways that can
prevent default.
•
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ability of IBR and related plans as soon as those borrowers have
been delinquent, in forbearance, or in economic hardship or
unemployment deferment for more than 60 days (U.S. House
of Representatives 2012).26 Despite efforts to make repayment
more manageable, default rates have risen even among those
who entered repayment after IBR became available (TICAS
2012e). Borrowers struggling to keep up with monthly payments clearly need this information and related counseling.
Once distressed borrowers are aware of income-driven repayment and how it could help them, they might also beneﬁt from
information about extended repayment plans, deferments, forbearances, and conditions for cancellation.
•

Automatically enroll severely delinquent borrowers in an
income-driven repayment plan. It takes at least nine months
of nonpayment to default on a federal student loan. The federal loan promissory note should require borrowers to give the
Department of Education permission to access their IRS information if they miss at least six consecutive payments. Using
their income and family size, the Department of Education
could then determine what their income-driven payment would
be.27 If it were less than their current payment, the Department of Education would notify the borrower and, unless they
chose another plan, automatically enroll the borrower in the
income-driven plan. For borrowers with very low incomes,
income-driven payments may be as little as $0, and incomedriven payments will be lower than 10-year payments for most
borrowers under ﬁnancial strain. By enrolling them and engaging in follow-up contact and counseling, the Department of
Education may be able to prevent otherwise very likely defaults
and the associated costs for both borrowers and taxpayers.
Notiﬁcation and ease of use will be essential to this policy’s
effectiveness, as borrowers need to know that their payment
has been lowered and how and why to update their income and
family size at least annually.

Determine why most delinquent borrowers are not successfully
contacted before they default. Data show that a signiﬁcant number
of borrowers who default were never successfully contacted by their
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lenders because their lenders did not have current contact information
(U.S. Department of Education 2010). It will be very difﬁcult to reduce
default rates and help more borrowers enroll in affordable repayment
plans if servicers and/or the Department of Education lack accurate,
up-to-date contact information for federal loan borrowers or functional
systems for reaching them. The Department of Education should conduct a study to determine the main causes of this serious problem, use
the ﬁndings to identify needed changes, make any such changes that
are within its authority, and recommend that Congress make additional
changes if necessary.
Reconsider the use of private debt collectors for federal student loans. Currently, the federal student loans collections process is
almost entirely in the hands of private debt collection agencies (U.S.
Department of the Treasury 2009). These debt collectors are given the
authority to act on behalf of the lender or guarantor in everything from
rehabilitation of a defaulted loan to information about loan discharges
to negotiating loan compromises. Because their contracts with the
Department of Education provide bigger rewards for collecting larger
dollar amounts, these debt collectors have a disincentive to inform
borrowers of their rights or to set reasonable and affordable payment
amounts based on the borrowers’ ﬁnancial circumstances, as required
by law (Hechinger 2012). Given the commission structure and conﬂicts
of interest, it is not surprising that the National Consumer Law Center
has found a remarkable amount of deceptive, unfair, and illegal conduct
by private collectors involving federal student loans (Loonin 2012).
Recent news investigations have also documented such conduct and the
underlying “boiler-room” business model (Hechinger 2012 and Martin
2012).
Collections should prioritize the interests of borrowers and taxpayers, not collection agencies. With the Department of Education spending
more than $1.4 billion a year on commission-based contracts with private debt collectors, an examination of whether outsourcing is the most
effective or appropriate approach is long overdue (Martin 2012). In
2009, the IRS conducted an extensive review of its private collections
contracts and moved to bring the function in-house (IRS 2009). The
Treasury Department is responsible for the collection of debt owed to
the federal government but has delegated to the Education Department
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the authority to collect on defaulted student loans.28 We recommend
that the Treasury Department withdraw the delegation of its authority
for a randomly selected number of defaulted loans for the purpose of
studying whether taxpayers’ and borrowers’ interests would be better
served by collecting all defaulted federal student loans by trained Treasury employees rather than by private debt collectors.
Rethink default penalties to ensure that distressed borrowers
have a way out. While there should clearly be some penalties associated with defaulting on a federal student loan, they should not be
designed to keep borrowers without ﬁnancial means in default indeﬁnitely, with already unmanageable debt just continuing to mount. For
example, collection fees of up to 25 percent are currently added to what
borrowers owe when they default, even if the actual costs of the collections activities are much less.29 These fees go to the private collection
agencies discussed above. If a borrower went into default because she
could not afford her loan payments, high fees make it even less likely
that she will ever be able to get out of default. Another policy that can
trap borrowers in default is limiting them to only one chance at rehabilitation. It is worth considering whether borrowers who redefault should
be allowed to rehabilitate their loans more than once after some period
of successful payments.
Ensure that borrowers who are abused or defrauded by a college can get relief. The Department of Education should use its full
authority to enforce the law that relieves borrowers of debt resulting
from illegal or abusive school practices. The “false certiﬁcation” provisions in law are designed to offer relief for harmed students as well as
to discourage illegal, abusive school practices. The law provides for
the discharge of loans falsely certiﬁed by institutions and for the Secretary to recover the loan amounts from the schools and their afﬁliates.
While the statutory authority is broad, the Department of Education
has interpreted these false certiﬁcation provisions very narrowly, denying needed relief to borrowers who suffered harm at the hands of their
school. Borrowers should be eligible for relief if, for example, a school
improperly or falsely certiﬁes students’ satisfactory academic progress,
enrolls students in career education programs that lack the programmatic accreditation necessary for employment in the occupation, enrolls
students who do not speak English in programs taught only in English,
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or enrolls students with criminal records in programs that prepare them
for employment in professions from which they are barred because of
their criminal record.30 The regulations must be revised so that borrowers can count on relief from debts resulting from a school’s harmful
actions when there is reasonable evidence that the harm took place.31
Private loan borrowers
As discussed earlier, private education loans are a much riskier way
to pay for college than federal student loans. Whether private loan rates
are variable or ﬁxed, lower-income students often receive the worst
rates and terms, and private loans do not have the important borrower
protections and repayment options that come with federal loans. The following policy changes would help prevent students from unnecessarily
taking out risky private loans, ensure that consumers have information
they need to make wise borrowing decisions, and stop deceptive and
predatory private lending practices.
Prevent unnecessary private loan borrowing by requiring
school certiﬁcation of private loans. The majority of undergraduates
who borrow private education loans could have borrowed more in federal student loans before turning to the riskier private market (TICAS
2011a). Unfortunately, many students who borrow private loans—and
the parents who cosign these loans—do not understand the difference
between federal and private loans until it is too late (TICAS 2011c).
Requiring private lenders to conﬁrm a borrower’s eligibility with his
or her school before disbursing the loan ensures the student is eligible
for that loan and the loan amount. It also gives the school a chance
to help the student make an informed borrowing decision. Before the
credit crunch, about a third of all private loans to undergraduates were
made without such school certiﬁcation (U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.S. Department of Education 2012). Currently,
most lenders voluntarily ask schools to certify their private loans, but
lenders are not required to do so, and changing credit conditions could
once again create incentives to cut schools out of the loop. In addition,
many schools do not take the opportunity to counsel students before
certifying. Students, schools, and lenders, as well as the U.S. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Education, have all endorsed requiring “school certiﬁcation” of private loans,
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including notifying the student of any remaining federal aid eligibility
before the loan is certiﬁed.32 The CFPB could require such certiﬁcation
for all private loans, and legislation introduced in 2013 (S. 113 and H.R.
3612) would do so as well (Durbin 2013; Polis 2013).
Treat private loans like other consumer debt in bankruptcy.
Since 2005, it has been much more difﬁcult to discharge private education loans than credit cards and other consumer debt in bankruptcy,
often leaving even the most destitute borrowers with no way out. A joint
report to Congress from the CFPB and Department of Education found
that this change coincided with rapid growth in questionable lending
practices, compounding the risk to student borrowers (CFPB and U.S.
Department of Education 2012). It also found a lack of evidence to support industry claims that restricting bankruptcy rights improved loan
prices or access to credit. House and Senate legislation (the Fairness
for Struggling Students Act of 2013 and the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2013) would restore fair bankruptcy treatment to
private loan borrowers and is supported by TICAS and a broad coalition
representing students, consumers, and colleges.33
Enable private loan borrowers to reﬁnance or modify their
loans. Borrowers who face unmanageably high payments on their private loans do not have access to lower payments through IBR or other
federal repayment plans, and private lenders are not required to provide
the types of repayment options and borrower protections that are built
into federal loans, such as unemployment deferments and forbearances
without fees. Private loans typically have variable interest rates that are
highest for the students and cosigners who can least afford them. Those
who borrowed their loans at a high rate are often unable to reﬁnance
despite historically low interest rates in the economy, even if their current credit score would qualify them for a lower ﬁxed or variable rate
if they took out a loan today (CFPB 2012). Keeping borrowers locked
into high rates and high payments poses risks not only to their ability
to meet basic needs but also to retirement savings and homeownership,
and to the broader economy as a result (Chopra 2012; CFPB 2012). We
recommend that the CFPB and Congress develop standards for loan
reﬁnancing and/or modiﬁcation to make private loan borrowers’ debt
more manageable.34
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CONCLUSION
The American Dream envisions a nation where everyone can fully
participate in our democracy, and our fates are determined by ability
and accomplishment rather than circumstances of birth. Ensuring college access and increasing student success are crucial to achieving and
preserving that dream and the economic opportunity and mobility on
which it depends. College education is increasingly the primary path to
stable employment, higher wages, retirement beneﬁts, and health insurance, as well as a key predictor of civic participation, better health,
and the next generation’s odds of getting ahead—or at least not falling
behind. An educated workforce is also essential to America’s economic
competitiveness; our nation needs more people to get quality training
and education after high school than ever before. However, as college
education has become more essential for all these reasons, income gaps
in enrollment and completion have widened rather than narrowed.
To meet the broadly shared goal of greatly increasing the share of
Americans with a college education, federal student aid policies, including those related to student loans, must be improved to better support
access and success for lower-income students. When student ﬁnancial
aid works as it should, students who are willing to study hard can afford
to go to college, which is what we mean by college access, and they can
complete a meaningful degree or certiﬁcate without burdensome debt,
which is what we mean by student success.

Notes
1. Calculations by TICAS on 2011–2012 data from the College Board (2012).
2. For more information about both subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford Loans, see
http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (accessed June 11,
2014).
3. For the most recent federal loan cohort default rates, see https://studentaid
.ed.gov/about/data-center/student/default from the U.S. Department of Education
(accessed June 11, 2014).
4. The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act signed into law in the summer of 2013
ties interest rates for new Stafford and PLUS Loans to the 10-year Treasury note
yield when the loan was issued, but the rates are still not based on the government’s actual cost of lending and running the loan program.
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5. This refers to the fact that interest rates for One Loans are lower when borrowers
are in school, and higher when they enter repayment. If students discontinue their
studies, whether temporarily (stop out) or permanently (drop out), they will no
longer qualify for the lower in-school interest rate (though the in-school interest
rate will still cover the six-month grace period after students leave school.)
6. Enacted in the summer of 2013, the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act capped
interest rates for undergraduate Stafford Loans at 8.25 percent, graduate Stafford
Loans at 9.5 percent, and PLUS Loans at 10.5 percent.
7. For information on swaptions, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swaption (accessed
June 11, 2014).
8. For more information about existing deferments for federal student loans, see http://
studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance (accessed June 11, 2014).
9. The grace period interest subsidy was temporarily eliminated for loans issued in
2012–2013 and 2013–2014.
10. For more information on independent students, see TICAS, Education Trust, and
CLASP (2012).
11. For more information about federal loan consolidation, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/consolidation (accessed June 11, 2014).
12. For more information about the extended repayment plan, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/extended (accessed June 11, 2014).
13. All of the borrower’s Direct and FFELP Loans count in determining eligibility for
IBR and Pay As You Earn, with the exception of Parent PLUS and consolidation
loans that repaid Parent PLUS Loans. For more information, see http://studentaid
.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based and http://studentaid.ed.gov/
repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (accessed June 11, 2014).
14. Depending on total educational indebtedness, a borrower with a Direct Consolidation Loan has access to a “standard” repayment period of 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, or
30 years in a non-income-based plan. For more information, see http://loanconsol
idation.ed.gov/examples/repyperiod.html from the U.S. Department of Education
(accessed June 11, 2014). The Direct Consolidation Loan program deﬁnes total
debt for this purpose as total Direct Loan debt plus FFELP debt up to the same
amount as the Direct Loan total. For more information about the deﬁnition, see
http://1.usa.gov/WBrewl (accessed June 11, 2014).
15. For more information about the payments that qualify for Public Service Loan Forgiveness, which include 10-year payments and payments made in income-driven
plans, see http://1.usa.gov/OjQu3p (accessed June 11, 2014).
16. For example, in 2008, 1 in 10 graduates from four-year colleges had at least
$40,000 in student loans, up from just 3 percent in 1996 (using constant 2008 dollars) (TICAS 2010).
17. The IBR plan was created as part of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act
of 2007.
18. For more information about the Plan for Fair Loan Payments and support for its
goals, see “The Plan for Fair Loan Payments,” The Project on Student Debt, http://
bit.ly/VLVIbj (accessed June 11, 2014).
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19. For more information about IBR, see http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/under
stand/plans/income-based and http://IBRinfo.org (accessed June 11, 2014).
20. For more information about ICR, see http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/
understand/plans/income-contingent (accessed June 11, 2014).
21. For more information about Public Service Loan Forgiveness, see http://student
aid.ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service and http://
www.ibrinfo.org/what.vp.html#pslf (accessed June 11, 2014).
22. Calculations by TICAS based on data from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (2012).
23. The Obama administration and others have also proposed eliminating the standard payment cap so that borrowers in income-driven repayment plans are always
making payments based on their incomes. See, for example, U.S. Department of
Education (2014) and HCM Strategists et al. (2014).
24. The Obama Administration and a bipartisan group of representatives have proposed preventing debt discharged under IDR plans from being considered taxable
income. For more information, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (2014) and
H.R. 2492 (2009).
25. For information on current loan counseling requirements, see the U.S. Department
of Education (2012c). For information on the federal regulations regarding loan
counseling, see 34 CFR 685.304, http://bit.ly/XtgttB (accessed June 11, 2014).
26. In the fall of 2013, the U.S. Department of Education reached out by e-mail to
over 3 million federal student loan borrowers, including those carrying higher than
average debt or showing signs of ﬁnancial distress, to inform them about incomedriven repayment options. See U.S. Department of Education (2013c).
27. Income would be adjusted gross income (AGI) or, if no tax form were available
for the past two tax years, wages from W-2 forms. While the family size deﬁnition
may not be identical to the U.S. Department of Education’s deﬁnition, it is a proxy
under these circumstances and could be amended by the borrower.
28. As speciﬁed in 31 U.S.C.§3711: “For purposes of this section, the Secretary of the
Treasury may designate, and withdraw such designation of debt collection centers
operated by other Federal agencies. The Secretary of the Treasury shall designate such centers on the basis of their performance in collecting delinquent claims
owed to the Government.”
29. For more information, see https://www.myeddebt.com/borrower/collectionCosts
Navigate (accessed June 11, 2014).
30. For examples of teachers being pressured to manipulate grades in order to retain
students, see Field (2011).
31. For more information, see comments on false certiﬁcation in TICAS (2011b).
32. For more information, see the December 10, 2009, letter signed by 25 organizations in support of mandatory certiﬁcation. See http://bit.ly/Y1qwUN (accessed
June 11, 2014). Also see the May 7, 2010, letter signed by lenders and others urging inclusion of mandatory school certiﬁcation in the Senate ﬁnancial reform bill,
referenced in Lederman (2010).
33. For more information, see the coalition letter to Senator Durbin in support of
the Fairness for Struggling Students Act of 2013, available at http://projecton
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studentdebt.org/pub_view.php?idx=872 (accessed June 11, 2014), and the coalition
letter to Representative Cohen in support of the Private Student Loan Bankruptcy
Fairness Act of 2013, available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/pub_view
.php?idx=871 (accessed June 11, 2014).
34. The Reﬁnancing Education Funding to Invest for the Future Act was introduced in
the summer of 2013 and endorsed by TICAS. For more information about the bill,
see S. 1266 of the act and Brown (2013).
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Loans for Educational Opportunity
Making Borrowing Work for Today’s Students
Susan Dynarski
University of Michigan
Daniel Kreisman
Georgia State University

Susan Dynarski and Daniel Kreisman presented a paper that proposes a new system of
federal student lending based on an income-based model of repayment in which payments will automatically rise and fall with a borrower’s earnings, just as contributions
to Social Security do. The paper was commissioned by The Hamilton Project, and while
this volume provides only a synopsis of it, the full version can be accessed at The Hamilton Project’s Web site, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/ﬁles/downloads_and_links/
THP_DynarskiDiscPaper_Final.pdf.

Borrowing for college has risen steadily for decades, and studentloan debt has mounted to $1 trillion, now surpassing credit cards as the
third-largest form of consumer debt. With 7 million student loans in
default and rising tuition prices, some are beginning to wonder if the
costs associated with student borrowing are out of line with the value
of attending college.
The evidence, however, suggests we have a repayment crisis, not a
student debt crisis. Four facts support this interpretation. First, typical
borrowers have only a moderate amount of debt: 69 percent of students in recent cohorts borrow $10,000 or less, and 98 percent borrow
$50,000 or less. Second, the payoff to a college education is high over
the student’s lifetime. The typical holder of a bachelor’s degree earns
several hundred thousand dollars more than a high school graduate over
a lifetime. Even those who start college but do not graduate experience
lifetime gains of about $100,000. Third, although default rates have
been rising, they are not driven by the small fraction of borrowers with
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large loans. Rather, it is borrowers with typical levels of student debt
who struggle with their payments, especially in the ﬁrst few years after
college. Fourth, default is highly correlated with the age of the borrower,
with younger borrowers at far greater risk of default and delinquency.
Many individuals have difﬁculty repaying loans because, under
the existing system of federal lending, workers typically repay their
loans early in their careers, when their incomes are relatively low and
variable. A college education, however, is an investment that pays off
over many decades. The mismatch between the timing of the costs and
beneﬁts of education is especially salient among young borrowers,
who are most likely to default. A few missed payments, as penalties
and fees accrue, can lead to rapidly rising loan balances. The damaged
credit records that result from a few missed student loan payments can
block young people from borrowing for other purposes, such as for cars
and homes. Thus, the current system can turn reasonable levels of debt
into repayment burdens that make ﬁnancial independence and stability
more difﬁcult to achieve. Moreover, the current system harms taxpayers because, when delinquency and default rates on loans are high, the
lender also suffers.
As an alternative, we propose a single, straightforward, incomebased repayment system called Loans for Educational Opportunity
(LEO). The main idea of this proposal is that the repayment of loans
would be automatic and simple, and that repayments would increase
(and decline) with earnings. Employers would deduct contributions
in the same way that they deduct payroll taxes. For example, the W-4
would be modiﬁed to include a checkbox that asks whether a worker
has a LEO. Borrowers could also indicate a higher repayment amount
than the one that would otherwise be automatically deducted by ﬁling a W-4 that speciﬁes additional withholding. Self-employment and
multiple jobs would be handled the same way as Social Security and
income taxes, with quarterly payments and an annual reconciliation in
April to correct any over- or underpayment. Contributions would stop
when the loan is repaid or after 25 years.
We highlight four key principles:
1) Contribution rates should rise with earnings. Our simulations
show that setting rates at 3 percent of earnings up to $10,000,
7 percent between $10,001 and $25,000, and 10 percent above
$25,001 would result in the typical loan being paid off in 10–15
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years. A ﬂat contribution rate of 6–9 percent of earnings would
achieve similar results but would lead to higher payments (as a
share of earnings) for many borrowers.
2) Interest rates should hold the taxpayers harmless. The federal
government should seek neither to make nor to lose money from
student loans. Student loans correct a capital market failure: the
private sector will not provide loans that are secured only by a
borrower’s future earnings. Interest rates should cover the costs
of borrowing, credit risk from unpaid loans, and administrative
overhead, and should adjust annually over the life of the loan
and not be nominally capped.
3) Eliminate in-school interest subsidies. The subsidized Stafford Loan, which is limited to students with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
need, does not begin to charge interest until the students are out
of school. This is expensive for the government and has little
bearing on either college attendance or persistence because
it does not put any money into the hands of students. Deferring interest accrual while students attend school serves only
to shorten the repayment period for those who receive it and
beneﬁts borrowers with higher incomes more than those with
lower incomes.
4) Allow existing borrowers to join the new system. Certain
borrowers under the old federal loan system will have the
opportunity to convert their loans to the new system. Only federal, undergraduate loans can be repaid in this way; loans made
to parents of students (PLUS Loans) will not be eligible. Existing borrowers can be brought into the new system by having
the Department of Education purchase existing loans from the
private loan companies. There is a precedent for this: during the
credit crunch, the Department of Education was authorized to
buy loans from private servicers in order to free up capital so
that more student loans could be made.
This is a system of loan repayment designed for the vast majority
of former students—the 98 percent who borrow a manageable amount
($50,000 or less). For the few students who borrow unmanageable
amounts, most of whom borrow through the private market, we advocate the following regulatory reforms. First, private loans should be
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dischargeable in bankruptcy. The protection from bankruptcy, established in 2005, gives lenders incentives to make loans even to students
who are unlikely to be able to handle the payments, since the lender
knows the borrower cannot ever escape the debt. Second, private lenders should not be allowed to use the label “student loan” for a loan
that requires a cosigner or credit history. Removing the student loan
label ensures that borrowers cannot confuse these loans with federal
student loans and signals to students that they should borrow with caution. Third, students must exhaust federal lending options before taking
out private loans. Some students take out private loans without exhausting their federal loan options, which reﬂects a lack of information on
the part of the borrowers, as Stafford Loans are less costly than private
loans.
This proposal can be implemented without adding to the federal
deﬁcit; in fact, it will likely save money for the federal government. The
only major costs that the government would bear are those associated
with administering repayment of the loans, which is currently handled
by the private sector. These costs, however, can be more than offset by
three provisions of this proposal. First, the federal deduction of loan
interest would be eliminated for federal borrowers paying through the
new system (which, in time, should be all student borrowers), saving
$1 billion in tax expenditures. Second, the proposal eliminates existing
contracts with private loan servicers, which currently cost about $360
million annually. Finally, as discussed above, the proposal eliminates
the in-school subsidy, which will reduce by billions the cost of the federal loan program.
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Measuring the Beneﬁts of
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The federal government has maintained a student loan program
since the 1960s, and since the early 1990s the program has been available to all undergraduate, subbaccalaureate, and graduate students
without regard to family income. Since 2006, graduate students have
been able to use the program to ﬁnance the entire cost of their educations as determined by the institution they attend (in any program,
for any credential, and including living expenses) without limit (Deﬁcit
Reduction Act of 2005).
From a federal policy perspective, a government loan program is
a logical tool to help ensure that people can obtain a postsecondary
education. In essence, loans allow students to move some of the future
earnings that they would gain from that education to the present to
ﬁnance the education itself. The government’s role in sponsoring such a
program is sound on a theoretical basis as well: A robust private market
for student lending is unlikely to develop because of information asymmetries and poor economies of scale (i.e., relatively small loans with
multiple disbursements and long repayment terms); a private market
would likely make credit most readily available to those who need it
least (i.e., students from more afﬂuent families or those attending elite
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institutions of higher education); and a private lending market would
restrict credit availability in times of economic stress, the point at which
demand for higher education tends to surge.
Despite its appeal, there is a downside to a loan arrangement for
the student. If his future earnings are lower than expected or erratic,
he may not be able to repay the loan on time or in full and would incur
penalties, fees, accrued interest charges, a damaged credit history, etc.
That problem falls away, however, if the student can repay the loan as
a share of his income.
That reasoning led policymakers to add an income-based repayment plan to the federal loan program in the mid-1990s, coupling it
with loan forgiveness, which was ultimately set in regulations at 25
years of payments (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993). That
early version of income-based repayment, which remains available
today, suffered from a number of limitations and has never been widely
used.1 Those limitations prompted student aid advocates to argue in
2006 that the program should be redesigned to make it more widely
available and offer lower payments to borrowers.2 Ultimately, lawmakers agreed and enacted the Income-Based Repayment program in 2007
and implemented it in 2009.
Under this version of the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) program
(which this chapter refers to as Old IBR to distinguish it from an even
more recent version of the program), borrowers make payments equal
to 15 percent of their adjusted gross income after an exemption equal
to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines adjusted for household
size (see Table 13.1). Remaining debt is forgiven after 25 years of payments. All borrowers are eligible for the program if it would reduce
their monthly payments below what they would pay under a 10-year
ﬁxed amortization, which is also known as the standard repayment
plan.3 Policymakers also added a new loan forgiveness provision when
they enacted IBR: public service loan forgiveness (PSLF). Under PSLF,
borrowers using IBR who work for most nonproﬁt organizations or any
government position can have unpaid debt forgiven after 10 cumulative
years of payments.4
In 2010, only months after borrowers could ﬁrst enroll in Old IBR,
President Obama proposed that Congress modify the program for all
borrowers by reducing monthly payments to 10 percent of discretionary
income and shortening the loan forgiveness term to 20 years of pay-
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Table 13.1 Comparing Terms for New and Old Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plans
Repayment term
Old IBR
New IBR
All borrowers with federal student loans Borrowers who took out ﬁrst federal loan
Eligible borrowers
on or after October 1, 2007, and also took
not in default
out a loan on or after October 1, 2011; and
all new borrowers as of October 1, 2011
All federal student loans (except Parent Same
Eligible loans
PLUS loans)
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) on prior Same
Income deﬁnition
year federal tax return; can exclude
spouse’s income if ﬁling separately
150% of federal poverty guidelines adj. Same
Exemption
for household ($17,235 single, plus
$6,030 ea. additional person, including
spouse)
10%
Payment as share of income above 15%
exemption (annual)
Payment on original loan balance using Same
Maximum payment regardless of
a 10-year ﬁxed monthly payment
income
120 cumulative monthly payments (10 Same
Public Service Loan Forgiveness
years) in qualiﬁed job
eligibility
20 years
General loan forgiveness eligibility 25 years
(all enrollees)
417
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ments. All other terms under IBR would be left unchanged. Congress
passed this proposal in early 2010 as part of a larger health care reform
bill (Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). While this
law made the New IBR terms available to new borrowers as of 2014,
the Obama administration used its authority under a different statute
to accelerate the start date to December 2012 for new borrowers as of
October 1, 2007.5 This “bridge” program is called Pay As You Earn.
This chapter refers to both Pay As You Earn and the IBR that begins
for new borrowers in 2014 as New IBR. The terms of the two programs
are virtually identical, with only one minor exception: Pay As You Earn
includes a limit on how much interest can be capitalized at a certain
point in repayment, but it does not limit how much interest can accrue.
This is unlikely to have any effect on most borrowers, and a negligible
effect on the limited universe of borrowers with high debt balances—
over $50,000—who experience prolonged low incomes with sudden,
large increases in incomes that are sustained.
In summary, the federal government has offered student loan borrowers repayment plans based on income since the early 1990s but later
added the IBR plan and then modiﬁed it shortly thereafter to further
reduce borrower payments. This chapter focuses on the most recent
changes to the program.

UNDERSTANDING NEW IBR
To better understand how New IBR would affect borrowers over
their entire repayment terms, in 2012 we developed a calculator that
incorporates all of the repayment parameters and rules (i.e., income
exemption, interest accrual, loan forgiveness, etc.) for both New and
Old IBR to compare how the changes would affect different types of
borrowers based on various debt and income scenarios. That is, our
analysis examines how the program would work over a borrower’s
entire 20- or 25-year repayment term. Such an approach is the best way
to understand how the multiple repayment terms in the program interact
over many years with other factors such as inﬂation, interest accrual,
income changes, and changes in household size.
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Using the calculator, we analyze hundreds of hypothetical borrower
scenarios (Delisle and Holt 2012). One of our main conclusions is that
the changes to IBR made the program much more generous than was
commonly understood, particularly for graduate students. Borrowers
with debt from graduate school, despite earning high incomes, stand to
have substantial debts forgiven. Under Old IBR, such a scenario would
be highly unusual. (See Table 13.2 for a comparison.) Moreover, New
IBR can work like tuition assistance for graduate students because a
borrower can still qualify for substantial amounts of loan forgiveness,
even when he earns an income that is average relative to national or
peer incomes. Meanwhile, New IBR provides relatively small increases
in beneﬁts for undergraduate students and lower-income borrowers
compared to Old IBR.6
Those ﬁndings are more thoroughly explained in Delisle and Holt
(2012), but they can be described brieﬂy with the following points.
Graduate students stand to beneﬁt the most from the changes because
they can borrow federal student loans to ﬁnance their entire educations
and then repay all federal student loans—from both undergraduate and
graduate studies—as one balance under IBR, whereas undergraduate
borrowers are subject to annual and aggregate borrowing limits. Under
Old IBR, monthly payments and the 25-year term before loan forgiveness were sufﬁcient to repay even large amounts of graduate student
debt, but changes under New IBR reduce borrowers’ monthly payments
by 33 percent compared to Old IBR, and then shorten the repayment
time before loan forgiveness by 5 years. Those changes result in a large
increase in beneﬁts for graduate students because of the rules on what
they may borrow in federal loans.
For dependent undergraduates the payment reductions under New
IBR increase beneﬁts as well, but dependent undergraduate debt levels
are not high enough such that New IBR results in signiﬁcantly larger
amounts of loan forgiveness compared to Old IBR.
Lastly, lower-income borrowers see little effect from the changes
under New IBR, because the income exemption is the same under both
plans, and these borrowers have too little income over that exemption
such that the changes in the repayment rate and loan forgiveness term
under New IBR do not translate into a large reduction in payments.
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Table 13.2 Comparing a Borrower under Old and New IBR Plans
Starting loan balance: $65,000 at 6.0% interest
Repayment year
Total
1
5
10
15
20
25
payments Forgiven
Income ($)
45,000
116,034
58,986
82,731
162,744
228,257
Old IBR ($)
Monthly payment
291
259
472
713
722
—
132,459
—
Loan balance
67,112
65,410
63,815
46,187
12,993
—
New IBR ($)
Monthly payment
194
173
315
475
694
—
88,045
55,817
Loan balance
66,574
72,908
77,210
73,241
55,817
—
NOTE: Loan balance reﬂects principal and accrued unpaid interest at the end of the repayment year indicated. Borrower’s
income increases at 7 percent annually. Income reﬂects total income, but payments are calculated on the baiss of adjusted
gross income, which is reduced by an assumed amount explained in Note 10 at the end of the chapter. The exemption is
calculated for a household size of one for the ﬁrst three years and a size of two each year thereafter to reﬂect a spouse.
SOURCE: Delisle and Holt (2012).
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GRADUATE STUDENTS AND THE “NO MARGINAL
COST THRESHOLD”
In this chapter, we delve more deeply into the beneﬁts that New
IBR will provide to graduate and professional students, using our prior
work as a foundation. Our ﬁndings from that initial work suggest that
the policy and market implications of the New IBR are signiﬁcant in
the graduate and professional education arena; namely, New IBR could
act as a form of tuition assistance, as students borrow knowing that all
or some of the incremental debt they incur will ultimately be forgiven.
However, that work relied on somewhat generic (though plausible) debt
and income scenarios, making it difﬁcult to gauge the size and scope of
the tuition-assistance effect and what types of degree programs could
be most affected (Delisle and Holt 2012). Furthermore, our initial work
did not factor in PSLF. That beneﬁt applies to 25 percent of jobs in the
economy, owing to the government’s very broad deﬁnition of “public
service” and makes the beneﬁts we highlighted in our initial work several times larger because loan forgiveness occurs after only 10 years of
payments (U.S. Department of Education Ofﬁce of Federal Student Aid
n.d.).
To build on our prior analysis, we develop income projections for
individuals working in certain professions who have graduate and professional credentials. We also include the effects of PSLF in all of our
analyses.
For the income estimates, we opt to estimate incomes by profession
rather than lump together broader categories of graduate and professional degrees, such as all masters’ of arts or all masters’ of science.
This allows for more distinctions in probable earnings between different professions. Moreover, many students who seek a graduate or
professional degree do so to obtain employment or advancement in a
deﬁned ﬁeld. For example, a student seeking a Juris Doctor typically
intends to practice law or work in a ﬁeld that requires that credential,
and a student pursuing a master’s of education likely intends to work in
primary or secondary education. Thus, we can link specialized graduate
and professional degrees to speciﬁc career and income paths. One limitation of this approach, however, is that it does not capture the incomes
of borrowers who earn a degree in one area but are employed in another.
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Obtaining complete and reliable information on the amounts
that graduate students borrow for speciﬁc degrees and what speciﬁc
programs cost is more problematic. Programs for the same graduate
credential can have a range of costs, students can incur debt to ﬁnance
a wide range of living costs, and they can attend part time or full time.7
In a few cases we located debt ﬁgures by profession or specialized
degree type, but most often those sources report only mean debt levels
and understate the loan balances that borrowers would actually repay
in New IBR because they do not include accrued interest or debt from
undergraduate studies. Thus it is difﬁcult to pinpoint the cost and debt
incurred for a particular graduate or professional credential. However,
to provide context for our analysis, we incorporate federal student loan
debt levels for graduate and professional students by broad degree-type
category as reported by the federal government in the 2012 National
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey. (See Table 13.3.)
Instead of using cost or debt levels as the central focus of our analysis, we use a “no marginal cost threshold” (NMCT) measure. This
places the analysis on what students would repay based on their projected incomes, not necessarily the amount that they borrow.
Table 13.3 Graduate Degree Categories and Debt Levels ($)
Degree by Dept. of Educa- Degree-profession Debt level by percentile
tion survey category
proﬁle
25th
50th
75th
Education (any master’s)
K-12 Teacher
23,000 42,000 69,000
Other master’s degree
Accountant
29,000 49,000 85,000
Reporter
Social Worker
Speech Pathologist
Other master of science (MS) Engineer
23,000 47,000 75,000
Nurse
Other health science degree Pharmacist
98,000 132,000 199,000
Veterinarian
Law (LLB or JD)
Lawyer
86,000 140,000 191,000
NOTE: Debt ﬁgures reﬂect cumulative federal loan amount owed, principal and interest, from undergraduate and graduate studies for those who completed a degree in
2011–12, rounded to nearest $1,000.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey
2012; Authors’ calculations.
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Because we already know the terms of New IBR and have built
them into a calculator, we can determine how much an individual would
repay on her student loans once we have estimated her future income
over 20 years. That is, what she repays in total is a function of her
income. We can also ﬁnd the level of debt at which she ceases to incur
any increases in her future loan payments if she borrows an additional
dollar. Taking on more debt at that point increases only how much debt
she has forgiven after 10 or 20 years, not her monthly or total payments.
The NMCT concept may best be understood in relation to a traditional loan. Under a traditional loan arrangement, the more a student
borrows, the more she must repay. Under New IBR, for a set income
level and path, there must be an amount of debt where that relationship
ends, and the more a student borrows, the more she has forgiven.
This NMCT is a convenient indicator for identifying the implications of New IBR. If the NMCT is below what a graduate degree costs,
then most borrowers holding those degrees will receive loan forgiveness. Schools could also raise prices with impunity, as those increases
are borne by the federal government through loan forgiveness, and students would be encouraged to borrow for the full cost of attendance.
Alternatively, an NMCT that is far below the typical cost of a graduate
degree in a particular ﬁeld might indicate that the New IBR is doing
what its supporters wanted—it is subsidizing socially valuable credentials that a student’s future income gains would not justify alone. There
are a number of other ways to interpret the NMCT, and we highlight
those in the discussion section of this chapter.

METHODOLOGY
Estimating Incomes by Profession and Credential
We selected 10 professions for our analysis: 1) lawyer, 2) pharmacist, 3) teacher, 4) accountant, 5) registered nurse, 6) social worker,
7) reporter (journalist), 8) engineer, 9) speech pathologist, and 10) veterinarian. The selection process aimed partly to present a wide range of
professions that have varying earnings levels among the employment
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categories available in the data we used, and partly to capture graduate
and professional programs that vary in cost.
To generate a 20-year income trajectory for each profession, we use
age-based income data reported in the American Community Survey
(ACS) for 2003–2011 for individuals who indicated that they worked
in the speciﬁed profession and held a master’s degree or higher level of
education. The data do not allow us to conﬁrm that the respondent held
a degree that matches that profession; however, we selected professions
where that would generally be the case (e.g., a lawyer with a Juris Doctor, a social worker with a Master of Social Work). Nevertheless, it is
the income of individuals in a given profession that matters most for
our analysis.
The income model roughly shows what a lawyer earns when she is
30 years old, when she is 31 years old, and so on. We assume all borrowers graduate and begin repaying their loans at age 27. Therefore, a
30-year-old lawyer is in her third year of loan repayment.8 We generate
two categories for each income proﬁle, one at the 50th percentile and
one at the 75th. Thus, the model roughly shows what a 30-year-old lawyer earns at the 50th and 75th percentiles for his profession.
Whereas a longitudinal data set would offer advantages over the
ACS for developing our income projections, the available longitudinal
data sets, such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, are limited
to broad profession categories or include too few respondents within a
speciﬁc profession. The ACS data set, on the other hand, includes many
individual professions with a large number of respondents in each and
includes an indicator for level of education. That allows us to focus
on individual professions and individuals with masters’ or professional
degrees rather than having to use more generic categories.
We chose to generate income estimates at the 50th and 75th percentiles because they give a sense of where the NMCT occurs for what
might be considered a typical graduate in a given profession, and what it
would be for a graduate who earns more than most of his peers, respectively. It is important to keep in mind that for borrowers who earn less
than these amounts, the NMCT is lower. For graduates whom one could
reasonably expect to earn below the 50th percentile (e.g., a teacher who
plans to teach in a rural area, or graduates from the lowest-ranked law
schools), the NMCT is also lower than the ﬁgures we stated.
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Because we use data over the 2003–2011 period, we ﬁrst adjust all
ﬁgures for inﬂation and convert them to 2011 dollars. Then we inﬂate
them again to match the future year in the borrower’s repayment plan.
Thus, the income projections begin in 2011, and a borrower’s income in
his 20th year of repayment is inﬂated to adjust for those 20 future years.
We also aggregate the earnings information because of the somewhat limited number of respondents in a given profession at a speciﬁc
age. Therefore, we use ﬁve-year age ranges to approximate earnings
by age and then interpolate and extrapolate income with increases for
age. For example, we use the income information for veterinarians aged
30–34 to approximate the earnings of a 32-year-old veterinarian and
income information for veterinarians aged 35–39 to approximate the
earnings of a 37-year-old veterinarian. Then we interpolate incomes in
the intervening years in even, incremental steps, where earlier years are
lower and later years are incrementally higher.
That approach tends to produce smoother increases in incomes each
year in a borrower’s repayment term than individuals are likely to experience. When combined with the 2.5 percent annual inﬂation increases,
our income projections show borrowers increasing their incomes every
year in the repayment term based on both age and inﬂation. That effect
also likely overstates borrowers’ incomes because of issues such as negative income shocks that occur over an individual’s life, although some
of those effects should be captured in the data we used to build the models. However, biasing a borrower’s income higher than it is likely to be
in reality means our analysis overestimates what a borrower would pay
on his student loans under New IBR, underestimates the amount of debt
that would be forgiven, and it indicates that the NMCT for borrowing
an additional dollar is likely below what we present. Table 13.25 (pp.
436–437) shows all of the income projections.
New IBR Calculator and Important Repayment Assumptions
The calculator we use to determine loan payments and the NMCT
reﬂects all of the repayment rules for New IBR and several important
assumptions and adjustments.9 Annual payments are equal to 10 percent of a borrower’s adjusted gross income (AGI). However, AGI tends
to be lower than a borrower’s stated income due to pretax fringe beneﬁts and above-the-line deductions and credits. The calculator adjusts
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for those beneﬁts by reducing total income to reﬂect an AGI ﬁgure.10
We assume that all borrowers make IBR payments based only on their
income, exclusive of any income from a spouse, as is allowed under
New IBR.11
New IBR also reduces a borrower’s AGI by an exemption amount
equal to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, based on
household size. For this chapter, we assume that all borrowers have a
household size of one for the ﬁrst ﬁve repayment years and a household
size of two each year thereafter to reﬂect a spouse (a larger household
size increases the exemption).12 The calculator increases the exemption
by 2.5 percent each incremental repayment year to reﬂect adjustments
for inﬂation.
New IBR includes a maximum payment cap based on how much
debt a borrower has when entering repayment. This monthly payment
cap is equal to the payment the borrower would make if he were paying
his initial loan balance off on a 10-year amortization schedule. Therefore, a borrower’s payment cannot exceed this level while enrolled in
IBR, no matter how high his income. This payment cap is also the initial
eligibility test for enrolling in IBR. If a borrower’s payments are below
this cap, he may enroll in New IBR, though if they later exceed it, he is
not disqualiﬁed from IBR’s other important beneﬁt: loan forgiveness.
Consistent with the rules under New IBR, interest on the loan
accrues and payments are ﬁrst credited to unpaid accrued interest before
principal. Unpaid accrued interest during repayment is not added to the
borrower’s principal balance (i.e., capitalized or compounded) unless
and until his payments reach the capped payment discussed above.
We set the ﬁxed interest rate on the borrower’s debt at the weighted
average of the rates on federal student loans (unsubsidized Stafford
Loans and Grad PLUS), which were 6.8 percent and 7.9 percent,
respectively, in the 2012–2013 school year. Those are still reasonable
proxies, despite a recent change in law that will reduce those rates in the
near term, because the rates are projected to rise in the near future above
the 6.8 and 7.9 percent rates.13 We assume the ﬁrst $45,000 of debt
a borrower incurs is unsubsidized Stafford Loans, and any above that
is Grad PLUS, except for lawyers, pharmacists, registered nurses, and
veterinarians, for which we assume the ﬁrst $65,000 is unsubsidized
Stafford Loans, reﬂecting the fact that borrowers with those degrees
likely borrowed unsubsidized Stafford Loans for three, rather than two,
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years in their graduate studies. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans have lower
interest rates, but those loans are subject to annual and aggregate limits.
Students take out Grad PLUS Loans once they have reached the annual
or aggregate unsubsidized Stafford Loan limits.
Outstanding principal and interest on the loans is forgiven after 10
years of payments for PSLF and 20 years for all other cases. Loan forgiveness at the 20-year mark is taxable, although estimated tax liability
is excluded for the purposes of this chapter. We assume that lawmakers
will make loan forgiveness tax free in the near future.

ANALYSIS PRESENTATION
Loan Repayment Tables by Profession and Income Category
We have arranged the results of our analysis in Tables 13.4–13.24.
Table 13.4 is a summary table for all of the degree-profession categories.
There are sets of two tables for each degree-profession category
(where each profession is linked to the most likely degree they were
awarded), one for a borrower earning at the 50th percentile and one
for a borrower earning at the 75th percentile in that degree-profession
category. The “Debt level for completer” column states the cumulative
undergraduate and graduate federal debt levels (including capitalized
and noncapitalized interest) for program completers, of those who borrowed, reported in the 2011–2012 National Postsecondary Student
Aid Study (NPSAS) database at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of
indebtedness. The NPSAS data include general categories for graduate
and professional programs, and we attempted to match the best NPSAS
category with the degree-profession categories in this analysis.
The “Debt level for IBR no marginal cost” columns show the level
of debt at which a student in the stated degree-profession category,
earning at the percentile indicated in the table title, would bear no incremental cost in repayment if she borrowed an additional dollar. Under
that heading, PSLF indicates where that point is for a borrower who
qualiﬁes for loan forgiveness after 10 years of payments under PSLF.
We assume the borrower makes her qualifying payment consecutively
and all in the ﬁrst 10 years of repayment, although eligibility is based
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Table 13.4 Debt Level for IBR No Marginal Cost Threshold ($)
Loan Forgiveness Program
PSLF
20-year
Earnings percentile
Earnings percentile
Degree/profession
50th
75th
50th
75th
Accountant
37,000
70,000
52,000
100,000
Engineer
50,000
74,000
88,000
113,000
Lawyer
54,000
116,000
86,000
179,000
Nurse
32,000
49,000
47,000
68,000
Pharmacist
70,000
82,000
91,000
114,000
Reporter
20,000
40,000
32,000
58,000
Social worker
17,000
27,000
26,000
41,000
Speech pathologist
22,000
31,000
32,000
46,000
K-12 teacher
16,000
25,000
26,000
41,000
Veterinarian
31,000
76,000
44,000
114,000
NOTE: When an accountant earning a master’s degree accumulates $37,000 in federal
student loans, borrowing an additional dollar does not increase his total payments on
that debt, if he earns an income at the 50th percentile based on his age and qualiﬁes
for Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF). If he earns at the 75th percentile, once
he accumulates $70,000 in federal student loans, borrowing an additional dollar does
not increase his total payments.
Borrower’s debt is forgiven after 10 years of payments in IBR. For all other borrowers
in IBR, debt is forgiven after 20 years of payments, denoted as “20-year” in this table.
“No marginal cost” is the debt level at which a borrower repaying through IBR incurs
no cost in borrowing an additional dollar above that debt level, excluding potential
taxes that apply to amounts forgiven under IBR 20-year. No taxes apply to debt forgiven under PSLF.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

on cumulative payments at any point in the repayment term. The values
under “20-year” indicate the NMCT for borrowers who do not qualify
for PSLF and have their debt forgiven after 20 years of payments.
Lastly, on the left side of the table, “Total payments PSLF” and
“Total payments 20-year” show the total principal and interest payments
the borrower in the stated degree-profession category would make for
the corresponding debt level indicated at the top of the column. The
payments are discounted to the present at a rate of 2.5 percent.
As a rule, a borrower’s total payments for a debt level above the
NMCT will not exceed the payments she would make for a debt level at
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the NMCT. For example, if the NMCT is $61,000, the borrower’s total
payments will be the same if she leaves school with a loan balance of
exactly that amount or any amount greater.
The following notes apply to Tables 13.5–13.24.
NOTE: Borrower’s debt is forgiven after 10 years of payments in IBR. For all other
borrowers in IBR, debt is forgiven after 20 years of payments, denoted as “20-yr” in
this table.
a
“Low” is 25th percentile, where 25 percent of degree completers ﬁnish with the stated
debt level or less; “Mid” is 50th percentile; “High” is 75th percentile.
b
Borrower incurs no cost in borrowing an additional dollar above the stated debt level,
excluding potential taxes that apply to amounts forgiven under IBR 20-year. No taxes
apply to debt forgiven under PSLF.
c
Total payments under each plan are the present discounted value of all principal and
interest payments made under that plan during the duration of the loan using 2.5 percent discount rate.

Table 13.5 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Accountant with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
70,000 100,000
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 53,470 59,462
59,462
—
c
Total payments 20-yr
Ineligible 64,524 137,032
—
143,267

Table 13.6 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Accountant with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
37,000 52,000
Total payments PSLFc
34,608 37,908 37,908
37,908
—
Total payments 20-yrc
36,305 73,333 79,444
—
79,444
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Table 13.7 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Engineer with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 47,000 75,000
74,000 113,000
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 54,779 66,612
66,612
—
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 59,644 109,300
—
157,066
Table 13.8 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Engineer with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 47,000 75,000
50,000 88,000
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 47,715 48,090
48,090
—
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 62,738 112,189
—
115,127

Table 13.9 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Lawyer with JD Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
86,000 140,000 191,000
116,000 179,000
Total payments PSLFc
92,057 100,435 100,435
100,435
—
Total payments 20-yrc
115,451 226,611 248,668
—
248,668
Table 13.10 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Lawyer with JD Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
86,000 140,000 191,000
54,000 86,000
Total payments PSLFc
47,661 47,661 47,661
47,661
—
Total payments 20-yrc 121,219 122,696 121,696
—
121,219
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Table 13.11 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Nurse with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 47,000 75,000
49,000 68,000
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 49,409 49,535
49,535
—
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 61,761 103,546
—
103,546
Table 13.12 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Nurse with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 47,000 75,000
32,000 47,000
Total payments PSLFc Ineligible 35,112 35,112
35,112
—
Total payments 20-yrc Ineligible 70,929 70,929
—
70,929

Table 13.13 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Pharmacist with PharmD Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
98,000 132,000 199,000
82,000 114,000
Total payments PSLFc
88,049 88,049 88,049
88,049
—
Total payments 20-yrc 140,742 179,107 179,107
—
179,107
Table 13.14 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Pharmacist with PharmD Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
98,000 132,000 199,000
70,000 91,000
Total payments PSLFc
57,956 57,956 57,956
57,956
—
c
Total payments 20-yr
133,865 133,865 133,865
—
133,865
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Table 13.15 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Reporter with MA Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
40,000 58,000
Total payments PSLFc
33,595 38,052 38,052
38.052
—
Total payments 20-yrc
36,904 73,342 82,852
—
82,852
Table 13.16 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Reporter with MA Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
20,000 32,000
Total payments PSLFc
20,234 20,234 20,234
20,234
—
Total payments 20-yrc
41,485 41,706 41,706
—
41,706

Table 13.17 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Social Worker with MSW Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
27,000 41,000
Total payments PSLFc
24,604 24,604 24,604
24,604
—
Total payments 20-yrc
41,213 56,815 56,815
—
56,815
Table 13.18 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Social Worker with MSW Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
17,000 26,000
Total payments PSLFc
14,027 14,027 14,027
14,027
—
Total payments 20-yrc
33,911
33,911 33,911
—
33,911
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Table 13.19 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Speech Pathologist with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile
by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
31,000 46,000
Total payments PSLFc
34,012 34,315 34,315
34,315
—
Total payments 20-yrc
36,343 68,730 68,730
—
68,730
Table 13.20 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Speech Pathologist with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile
by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
29,000 49,000 85,000
22,000 32,000
Total payments PSLFc
22,726 22,726 22,726
22,726
—
Total payments 20-yrc
42,737 45,041 45,041
—
45,041

Table 13.21 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
K-12 Teacher with Master’s Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 42,000 69,000
25,000 41,000
Total payments PSLFc
23,964 24,149 24,149
24,149
—
c
Total payments 20-yr
30,249 55,443 55,443
—
55,443
Table 13.22 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
K-12 Teacher with Master’s Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
23,000 42,000 69,000
16,000 26,000
Total payments PSLFc
23,964 24,149 24,149
24,149
—
Total payments 20-yrc
30,249 55,443 55,443
—
55,443
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Table 13.23 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Veterinarian with DVM Earning 75th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
98,000 132,000 199,000
76,000 114,000
Total payments PSLFc
71,166 71,166 71,166
71,166
—
Total payments 20-yrc 155,593 160,551 160,551
—
160,551

Table 13.24 Student Loan Payments ($) Using Income-Based Repayment
Veterinarian with DVM Earning 50th Percentile by Age
Debt level for IBR
Debt level for completersa
no marginal costb
Low
Mid
High
PSLF
20-yr
98,000 132,000 199,000
31,000 44,000
Total payments PSLFc
34,475 34,475 34,475
34,475
—
c
Total payments 20-yr
64,431 64,431 64,431
—
64,431

KEY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Public Service Loan Forgiveness
The NMCT for borrowers who qualify for PSLF is one of the most
signiﬁcant ﬁndings from the analysis. It is important to understand that
“public service” under PSLF is quite broad, and borrowers who might
not be considered employed in traditional public service jobs will qualify for loan forgiveness after 10 years. Employment at any 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt nonproﬁt qualiﬁes, as does any government position (state,
federal, local, and tribal). This is why the federal government estimates
that 25 percent of all jobs in the economy would qualify (Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau 2013).
For borrowers who qualify for PSLF, the point at which they bear
no incremental cost in borrowing more is low relative to what many
graduate and professional degrees cost, without even factoring in what
students may borrow to pay for living costs, what they may have borrowed in undergraduate debt, or the interest they would accrue on their
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federal loans while in school. This suggests that through New IBR,
the federal government has provided a very large source of tuition
assistance for graduate and professional students who work in the governmental or not-for-proﬁt sectors.
In fact, this tuition assistance is large enough that it could become
common for the government to pay for a student’s entire graduate education via loan forgiveness under PSLF, especially in some professions.
Moreover, certain categories of students will pursue graduate degrees
knowing that they will only work in PSLF-qualiﬁed employment, such
as teachers and social workers. An example using the social worker
proﬁle helps illustrate this point.
Imagine a student who, having already accumulated a loan balance of $29,000 during her undergraduate studies, pursues a Master
of Social Work and borrows the entire cost of the education, including
living expenses. Assume she earns at the 75th percentile for a social
worker with a master’s degree by age for her ﬁrst 10 years after graduate school. Because she began the program with debt well in excess of
the NMCT ($23,000), every dollar she borrows will be forgiven by the
federal government and will not increase her payments beyond those
she would make on the debt she accumulated in undergraduate studies.
This borrower need not earn an income that is unexpectedly low for
this to be true. In fact, she can earn a relatively high income for a social
worker with a master’s degree, as this example reﬂects an income at the
75th percentile.
Note that for undergraduate students, the effects of New IBR and
PSLF are much different. It would be impossible for an undergraduate
student to fully ﬁnance an undergraduate degree through PSLF. Borrowers must incur costs for the initial amounts they borrow below the
NMCT, and they will take out their initial loans pursuing an undergraduate degree. Furthermore, annual and aggregate loan limits in the
federal loan program that apply to dependent undergraduates are generally set below or near the NMCT for all but the lowest-paid professions
we proﬁled.
Stafford Loans Alone Allow for Signiﬁcant Loan Forgiveness
Delisle and Holt (2012) show how high-income borrowers could
qualify for loan forgiveness by amassing high-debt balances through
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Table 13.25 Income Projections by Percentile for Degree-Profession
Categories by Loan Repayment Year ($)
Repayment year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Accountant with
master’s
50th percentile
59,017 62,644 66,415 70,336 74,411 78,647 82,169 85,819 89,599
75th percentile
73,544 79,842 86,410 93,255 100,390 107,822 114,104 120,632 127,416
Engineer with
master’s
50th percentile
69,747 74,356 79,153 84,142 89,332 94,729 99,776 105,017 110,457
75th percentile
82,445 88,282 94,360 100,686 107,269 114,119 119,987 126,078 132,398
Lawyer with JD
50th percentile
59,065 66,031 73,308 80,908 88,842 97,123 102,786 108,672 114,788
75th percentile
95,425 106,326 117,712 129,601 142,011 154,961 164,898 175,235 185,986
Nurse with master’s
50th percentile
54,842 58,462 62,228 66,146 70,221 74,459 77,197 80,025 82,947
75th percentile
72,876 77,591 82,496 87,598 92,903 98,419 101,843 105,377 109,023
Pharmacist with
PharmD
50th percentile
58,692 68,269 78,289 88,767 99,719 111,164 116,013 121,034 126,234
75th percentile 108,019 113,095 118,358 123,814 129,468 135,327 138,952 142,674 146,495
Reporter with
master’s
50th percentile
39,660 42,419 45,293 48,283 51,394 54,631 55,849 57,094 58,365
75th percentile
53,070 58,167 63,485 69,032 74,817 80,849 85,211 89,741 94,444
Social worker with
MSW
50th percentile
24,131 28,821 33,730 38,867 44,240 49,857 51,586 53,371 55,212
75th percentile
37,955 42,269 46,774 51,478 56,389 61,512 64,330 67,250 70,276
Speech pathologist
with master’s
50th percentile
49,359 50,373 51,407 52,461 53,536 54,631 55,766 56,923 58,103
75th percentile
60,729 62,439 64,196 66,003 67,859 69,767 71,772 73,832 75,951
K-12 teacher with
master’s
50th percentile
34,671 36,775 38,964 41,238 43,603 46,059 48,391 50,810 53,321
75th percentile
43,541 46,126 48,812 51,604 54,505 57,519 60,558 63,713 66,988
Veterinarian with
DVM
50th percentile
62,133 63,551 64,968 66,386 68,128 69,869 71,611 73,352 75,094
75th percentile
85,585 92,579 99,868 107,465 112,933 118,608 124,496 130,604 136,940
NOTE: The table shows the 20-year income projections developed and used in this chapter. Loan
payments under the Income Based Repayment plan are calculated using these income projections. All ﬁgures are in nominal dollars.
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Table 13.25 (continued)
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

93,515 97,571 100,603 103,726 106,942 110,254 113,665 116,155 118,698 121,297 123,951
134,463 141,784 146,794 151,966 157,306 162,817 168,506 173,219 178,062 183,040 188,155

116,104 121,964 126,761 131,721 136,850 142,153 147,636 152,920 158,375 164,008 169,824
138,955 145,758 151,903 158,265 164,849 171,664 178,717 185,627 192,770 200,154 207,787
121,142 127,742 133,164 138,778 144,589 150,605 156,830 160,425 164,101 167,862 171,707
197,164 208,786 219,750 231,131 242,944 255,203 267,924 275,288 282,852 290,623 298,606
85,965 89,082 91,309 93,592 95,932 98,330 100,788 104,911 109,177 113,591 118,157
112,787 116,670 119,923 123,266 126,702 130,232 133,859 138,053 142,372 146,821 151,404

131,619 137,193 140,069 143,002 145,995 149,048 152,162 157,142 162,277 167,570 173,026
150,418 154,446 158,937 163,555 168,306 173,192 178,216 183,417 188,767 194,269 199,929

59,665 60,993 62,848 64,758 66,724 68,748 70,831 75,391 80,135 85,069 90,199
99,326 104,393 106,189 108,010 109,856 111,726 113,621 119,612 125,831 132,286 138,986

57,113 59,073 61,387 63,779 66,253 68,810 71,454 73,566 75,738 77,974 80,273
73,411 76,659 79,460 82,354 85,343 88,430 91,618 94,490 97,448 100,495 103,634

59,307 60,534 63,151 65,860 68,666 71,570 74,577 78,128 81,810 85,627 89,584
78,130 80,370 83,174 86,067 89,052 92,134 95,313 99,794 104,439 109,254 114,244

55,925 58,626 60,769 62,982 65,268 67,629 70,067 72,681 75,381 78,171 81,054
70,387 73,914 76,901 79,991 83,187 86,494 89,913 93,370 96,943 100,637 104,454

77,079 79,064 81,049 83,034 85,019 86,047 87,075 88,103 89,130 90,158 91,122
140,829 144,827 148,936 153,161 157,504 166,542 175,933 185,690 195,825 206,351 207,939
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the federal Grad PLUS Program, which allows graduate students to borrow whatever a school charges (plus living costs as determined by the
school) once they have exhausted the annual ($20,500) or aggregate
($138,500) Stafford Loan limit.
Some observers may therefore believe that New IBR only has
implications for graduate education and borrowing when combined
with Grad PLUS Loans. This analysis shows, however, that in many of
the cases we proﬁle, borrowers will reach the NMCT well before they
would have to access Grad PLUS Loans. This is even more so the case
if a borrower enters graduate school with a debt from undergraduate
studies and repays the combined balance through New IBR.
For example, a student who borrows the maximum in undergraduate loans for a dependent over ﬁve years would enter graduate school
with a balance of about $34,000 (including accrued interest and assuming he did not make any payments), and if he attends graduate school
for two years and borrows the maximum in Stafford Loans, his combined loan balance (including accrued interest from both sets of loans)
would total approximately $80,000 in Stafford Loans alone. That ﬁgure
exceeds the NMCT for all but the highest-earning degree-profession
categories that we proﬁled.
Declining Marginal Costs for More Debt
Even though our analysis focuses on the NMCT, as a borrower’s
debt level approaches that point, it is signiﬁcant that the incremental
cost of borrowing an additional dollar begins to decline. This effect
occurs because some, but not all, of the added cost of borrowing more is
forgiven. Thus, borrowers face declining costs in borrowing additional
sums before their debt reaches the NMCT. It is as if the borrower faces
a declining interest rate (and even a negative interest rate) the more he
borrows as he approaches the NMCT.
For example, a lawyer earning at the 75th percentile by age, who
repays his loans for 20 years under New IBR, pays a total of $226,611
(present value) and fully repays his loan when he enters repayment
with a $140,000 balance at 7.65 percent interest; when he enters repayment with a balance of $179,000, or $39,000 more, his total payments
increase by only $22,000 (present value) over the same 20-year repayment term. That is far less than what would be needed to fully repay the
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incremental $39,000 in debt plus interest over 20 years. Consequently,
he has $67,000 forgiven (present value) after 20 years of payments when
he borrows the additional amount. In short, borrowing more only marginally increases his costs, because much of the added cost is forgiven.
Payments for Median and High Debt Levels
In most of the cases we proﬁled, borrowers make payments under
New IBR (PSLF or 20-year forgiveness) that are identical (or nearly
identical) for median and high debt levels. That is because the NMCT
for most of the cases we proﬁle is close to median federal debt levels for
borrowers who complete the speciﬁed graduate and professional programs according to federal data.
For example, a nurse with a master’s degree earning at the 50th
percentile by age would make the same payments on his loans if he left
school with the median ($47,000) or the 75th percentile level ($75,000)
of federal student loans for graduates with masters’ of science.
This dynamic could have a signiﬁcant impact on students’ decisions about what schools to attend and how much to borrow. It could
make attending an averaged-priced program the same cost as attending the highest-cost program, with the difference subsidized completely
through loan forgiveness. Alternatively, a student who might consider
using his own funds to ﬁnance some of his education, or work part
time to ﬁnance his education, could decide that on the margin, whatever
those choices would save him in future loan payments would simply be
forgiven under New IBR and he should therefore borrow rather than use
his own resources.
Schools also face altered incentives when borrower payments are
the same for median and high debts. If a school is aware that the median
amount of debt that students graduate with is above the NMCT for
students who earn at the 75th percentile (or even higher), then any
incremental price increases will be borne by the federal government
through loan forgiveness, provided the students use federal loans to
ﬁnance those costs. In such a scenario the school might take steps to
inform students about this effect, making students insensitive to prices
that exceed the NMCT, or the effects might simply work their way
into the graduate school marketplace as schools raise prices without
any drop-off in demand. If the cost of attendance is already above the
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NMCT at a given program or school, then New IBR could artiﬁcially
increase supply and demand irrespective of the labor market value of
that graduate degree.
Implications for Scholarships and School-Provided Financial Aid
Some graduate and professional programs provide ﬁnancial aid to
certain students. Other organizations also offer scholarships for graduate and professional studies. New IBR may change whether, how, and
to whom schools and other organizations provide this aid. Schools and
scholarship providers may see the aid they are providing as supplanting
loans that would have been forgiven by the federal government anyway.
They may then put that money to other uses.
For example, a student who borrows $10,000 more than the NMCT
for her degree-profession proﬁle effectively receives a $10,000 grant
from the federal government to ﬁnance her education. Her ﬁnancial
situation would be unchanged had she received the same amount from
her school or a third party in the form of a scholarship.
Examples of Behavioral Changes in the Market
When scanning the market for examples of school and student
responses to New IBR, it is important to keep in mind that the program has been available only since December 2012, the date at which
eligible borrowers could ﬁrst enroll. Moreover, the eligible cohorts of
borrowers who would be out of school and in repayment—those who
started borrowing more recently—is limited. Thus, student and school
familiarity with the program is likely still in its very early stages. Even
so, some early examples have emerged that illustrate how schools and
students are responding to the beneﬁts of New IBR.
Financial planners and consultants are helping clients understand
the program, how to use it, and how to optimize the beneﬁts it provides.
This is not completely surprising given that the program is new and its
beneﬁts are not widely known. Also, many of the terms and rules for
IBR are complicated and thus lend themselves to ﬁnancial planning
services, such as those for federal income tax preparation or retirement savings, where individuals can take actions that will reduce their
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monthly and total payments, signiﬁcantly boosting the debt that they
have forgiven, and thereby justifying fee-for-service ﬁnancial planning.
Graduate and professional schools are also starting to inform current and prospective students about the beneﬁts of New IBR. Most
of these are focused on the beneﬁts of PSLF. Many law schools offer
special repayment programs for borrowers who use New IBR combined with PSLF, whereby the school pays a portion or all of a former
student’s loan payments as long as he earns below a certain income
threshold. Georgetown’s law school aggressively markets the beneﬁts
of its program to current and prospective students with seminars and
other materials. A video recording of one such seminar includes testimonials from former students enrolled in the program who say the
program allows them to take jobs with lower salaries and “ignore” debt
balances, which often exceed $100,000.14

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The ﬁndings in this chapter show that the repayment terms policymakers designed for New IBR are unlikely to cause many graduate and
professional students to fully repay their loans—even if they earn a
competitive salary in their chosen careers—which will likely provide
an incentive for graduate and professional students to borrow more
rather than less, particularly for some professions. It should also make
graduate students less sensitive to the price of a graduate or professional
degree, allowing institutions to charge higher tuitions, especially for
certain programs where borrowers could qualify for PSLF.
Policymakers need not completely roll back the changes made to
IBR to mitigate these effects. In our 2012 paper (Delisle and Holt 2012)
we demonstrated a limited approach to curtailing some of the beneﬁts of
New IBR. Our proposal would allow only the lowest-income borrowers
(those earning less than 300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines)
to make payments at 10 percent of income, require all others to pay 15
percent of their incomes above IBR’s exemption, and require borrowers with higher debt levels to pay for longer before they receive loan
forgiveness.
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Alternatively, policymakers could allow all borrowers to pay 10
percent of their incomes but reduce New IBR’s exemption to $10,000
for all borrowers from the current level of 150 percent of the federal
poverty guidelines based on household size ($17,235 for a single person in 2013). All borrowers would qualify for loan forgiveness after
20 years of payments, except those with more than $50,000 in federal
loans, who would qualify after 30 years of payments.
To address the extremely high subsidies and moral hazard issues
inherent in PSLF, policymakers could simply cap the amount that can
be forgiven under that beneﬁt. Under current law, there is no limit.
Without changes like these, New IBR, along with PSLF, could have
a very large impact on the graduate education marketplace and borrowing behavior in the coming years.

Notes
1. The program, called Income-Contingent Repayment, requires borrowers to make
payments equal to 20 percent of adjusted gross income after an exemption equal to
the federal poverty guidelines. Borrowers can often obtain much lower payments
under other repayment options that are fully amortizing and not based on income
by extending the duration of the loan and by making payments that slowly increase
over time. Moreover, borrowers must have loans under the Direct Loan Program
to use Income-Contingent Repayment, which up until about 2010 represented at
most about 25 percent of loan issuance. The balance of the loans was made by
private lenders and backed by the federal government but was not eligible for
Income-Contingent Repayment.
2. The advocates’ most compelling argument for modifying the program was that
a borrower who defaulted on his loans and had his wages garnished by the U.S.
Department of Education would pay roughly the same share of his income as
under the Income-Contingent Repayment plan. (See Baum and Schwartz [2006],
which was cited by advocates to make the case for payments based on smaller
share of income than under the Income-Contingent Repayment option, and Shireman et al. [2006]).
3. For example, if a borrower’s monthly payment based on a 10-year amortization
schedule is $300, but her payments based on the IBR formula would be $290, she
qualiﬁes to enroll in IBR. If her income later increases such that her payments
would exceed the amount she would pay on a 10-year amortization, then her payments are capped at $300 but she may remain enrolled in IBR and still qualiﬁes for
loan forgiveness after the required number of payments.
4. When Congress debated legislation to enact Old IBR in 2007, lawmakers focused
exclusively on the loan forgiveness beneﬁts of the program for borrowers in public

Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb 442

1/28/2015 8:25:07 AM

Measuring the Beneﬁts of Income-Based Repayment 443

5.

6.

7.

8.

service jobs, PSLF. They viewed that provision as the main legislative change;
few mentioned that the program would allow borrowers to make lower monthly
payments than the Income-Contingent Repayment program in place at the time.
The Obama administration used the authority under a provision added to the
Higher Education Act in 1993 that allows the Secretary of Education to offer an
income-contingent repayment plan within certain parameters (20 U.S.C. § 1087e).
A “new borrower” for purposes of the plan is someone who takes out a federal student loan for the ﬁrst time on or after the speciﬁed date. For the Pay As You Earn
plan, the borrower must also have taken out a loan on October 1, 2011, or after, or
have become a new borrower on or after October 1, 2011. Someone who borrowed
initially prior to that date but repaid the earlier loans in full before borrowing again
on or after that date is also considered a “new borrower.”
Undergraduates face relatively low limits in the federal loan program, thereby limiting the beneﬁts of loan forgiveness. A dependent undergraduate borrower can
borrow a maximum of $5,500 in her ﬁrst year, $6,500 in her second, and $7,500
each year thereafter. The aggregate limit is $31,000. An independent undergraduate can borrow $4,000 more in the ﬁrst two years and $5,000 more in later years,
with an aggregate limit of $57,500. Note that borrowers can enter repayment with
balances higher than the aggregate limit due to interest accrual. Additionally, a
small share of undergraduate borrowers have federal Perkins Loans in addition to
Stafford Loans, which may be repaid through New IBR as a consolidation loan.
Perkins Loans do not count toward the aggregate loan limit for Stafford Loans. If
eligible, certain students may therefore borrow $5,500 annually through the program, in addition to the Stafford limit, with a separate aggregate limit of $27,500.
Borrowers with persistently low incomes make similar payments under both the
Old and New IBR plans, owing to the exemption that is the same under both programs. Both Old and New IBR plans calculate a borrower’s payments on income
after an exemption equal to 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, adjusted
for household size. If a borrower’s income is below that threshold, then his payment is $0 regardless of which IBR he is using. Furthermore, borrowers with
incomes slightly above the threshold make similar payments because 10 percent
and 15 percent of the nonexempt income translates into only slightly different
payments.
Students can ﬁnance their housing, food, transportation, and other costs using
federal loans. Those costs are determined by the school itself with little to no
parameters set by the federal government. A review of a number of graduate school
programs’ calculations suggests that the typical ﬁgure for such costs is $13,000 per
year, though some schools set the ﬁgure as high as $25,000 per year.
IBR calculates a borrower’s payments based on his prior year federal income tax
return, and the program often updates his payments many months after his most
recent tax return is ﬁled. Therefore, a borrower will make payments under IBR that
reﬂect his income in the prior year or even later, not his current income; that is,
a 27-year-old borrower would make payments based on his income when he was
age 25 or 26. Our analysis does not account for this lag and likely overstates the
income and loan payments borrowers make.
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9. The version of the New America IBR calculator used for this chapter is available in Microsoft Excel format at the URL below. Note that the calculator does
not display loan payments in discounted present value. The analysis in this
chapter reports loan payments displayed in the calculator in discounted present
value using a constant discount rate of 2.5 percent. http://edmoney.newamerica
.net/sites/newamerica.net/ﬁles/articles/NAF%20IBR%20Calculator%20with%20
PSLF%20for%20New%20IBR.xlsx (accessed April 22, 2014).
10. Income levels entered into the calculator that are less than $68,000 equate to
an AGI of 90 percent of total income. Income between $68,001 and $100,000
equates to an AGI of 85 percent of total income. Income between $100,001 and
$150,000 equates to an AGI of 95 percent of income. Income between $150,001
and $200,000 equates to an AGI of 98 percent of income. Income of $200,000
and above is not reduced. The calculator automatically increases those income
brackets by 2.5 percent each successive year in the calculator. For example, the
$68,000 income threshold at which point a borrower’s AGI reﬂects 90 percent
of total income increases by 2.5 percent per year so that in the second year it
is $69,700, and so on. The rationale for those brackets is the following. Fringe
beneﬁts and the student loan interest deduction, even though small on an absolute
basis, can easily reduce a borrower’s income by a large percentage. The 90 percent
threshold is conservative. As borrowers earn more, the threshold increases because
these earners are more able to take advantage of fringe beneﬁts, particularly pretax
retirement contributions. At high incomes, the reduction is reduced because we
assume that these borrowers have unearned income that partially or fully offsets
any pretax fringe beneﬁts or other above-the-line deductions and credits.
11. Borrowers would have to ﬁle a separate federal income tax return from their
spouses to do this. While this may cause them to pay slightly more in income
taxes, the reduced loan payments and increase in loan forgiveness far outweigh
those costs.
12. Under the IBR rules, borrowers may include a spouse in their household size calculation, even if the couple ﬁles separate federal income tax returns. Children may
be included in a borrower’s household size if the borrower provides for more than
half of a child’s care, regardless of which spouse claims the child as a dependent
on his or her tax return.
13. In 2012, Congress and the president amended the federal loan program such that
interest rates on newly issued loans are based on the interest rates on 10-year Treasury notes plus a mark-up (Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013). Based
on Congressional Budget Ofﬁce estimates in 2013, interest rates on graduate Stafford Loans and Grad PLUS Loans will remain lower than rates in effect prior to
enactment of the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act only through 2015, after
which they will remain above those rates.
14. Georgetown removed this video from its Web site after we published a post on the
Higher Ed Watch blog regarding the Georgetown Law loan repayment program.
The referenced footage can still be viewed on the Ed Money Watch blog. See
Delisle and Holt (2013).
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